Collective Guilt Feelings

Forskningsoutput: Kapitel i bok/rapport/Conference proceedingKapitel samlingsverk

Abstract

Defenses of the possibility of collective guilt feelings falls roughly into two categories: collectivistic positions that assign guilt feelings to groups as such but play down the experiential component in guilt feelings, and individualistic positions which understand collective guilt feelings in terms of individual experiences. The analogy between collective and individual guilt feelings is examined from two collectivistic viewpoints. It is argued that the functional states of collectives and individuals with respect to guilt are less analogous than collectivists assume. Instead, an individualistic perspectival understanding of collective guilt feelings is proposed. Groups as such cannot feel guilty in the morally relevant sense, but guilt as felt by individuals can have a distinctively collective character, such that the feeling still may be an appropriate response to assignments of collective responsibility.

Detaljer

Författare
Enheter & grupper
Forskningsområden

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK

  • Filosofi
Originalspråkengelska
Titel på värdpublikationRoutledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility
RedaktörerDeborah Tollefsen, Saba Bazargan-Forward
UtgivningsortNew York
FörlagRoutledge
Kapitel16
Sidor228-242
Antal sidor15
ISBN (elektroniskt)978-1-315-10760-8
ISBN (tryckt)978-1-138-09224-2
StatusPublished - 2020
PublikationskategoriForskning
Peer review utfördJa

Publikationsserier

NamnRoutledge Handbooks in Philosophy
FörlagRoutledge

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