Collective Incentives and Cooperation in Teams with Imperfect Monitoring

Forskningsoutput: Working paper

Abstract

We experimentally explore the role of collective incentives in sustaining cooperation in finitely repeated public goods games with imperfect monitoring. In our experiment players only observe noisy signals about individual contributions, while total output is perfectly observed. We consider sanctioning mechanisms that allow agents to commit to collective punishment in case total output fall short of a target. We find that cooperation is higher in the case of collective punishment compared to both the case of no punishment and the case of standard peer-to-peer punishment which conditions on the noisy signals. Further experiments indicate that both the commitment possibility and the collective nature of punishment matter for the positive effect of collective incentives on cooperation.

Detaljer

Författare
Enheter & grupper
Externa organisationer
  • University of Essex
Forskningsområden

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK

  • Nationalekonomi

Nyckelord

Originalspråkengelska
Antal sidor33
StatusPublished - 2018
PublikationskategoriForskning

Publikationsserier

NamnWorking Papers
FörlagLund University, Department of Economics
Nr.2018:11