Discontinuous and Continuous Stochastic Choice and Coordination in the Lab

Forskningsoutput: Working paper

Abstract

Coordination games have multiple equilibria under complete information. However, recent theoretical advances show that if players are uncertain but can acquire information about a payoff-relevant state of the world, the number of equilibria depends on whether they can implement strategies (stochastic choice rules) discontinuous in the state. We experimentally test these results in a two-player investment game. Through a minimal visual variation in the design (our treatment) we prompt participants to play strategies whereby their probability to invest is either continuous or discontinuous in the payoff-relevant state. When participants use continuous strategies, average behavior is consistent with play in the risk-dominant equilibrium, the unique theoretical prediction. When they use discontinuous strategies—in¬¬ which case there are multiple equilibria—average behavior is closer to the payoff-dominant equilibrium strategy. Additionally, we extend the theory to heterogeneous populations: the set of equilibria monotonically decreases in the proportion of players who use continuous strategies.

Detaljer

Författare
Enheter & grupper
Externa organisationer
  • Nazarbayev University
Forskningsområden

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK

  • Nationalekonomi

Nyckelord

Originalspråkengelska
Antal sidor59
StatusPublished - 2020 aug 31
PublikationskategoriForskning

Publikationsserier

NamnWorking Papers
FörlagLund University, Department of Economics
Nr.2020:17