Evolutionary Selection against Iteratively Weakly Dominated Strategies

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Abstract

This paper provides sufficient conditions under which regular payoff monotonic evolutionary dynamics (a class of imitative dynamics that includes the replicator dynamic) select against strategies that do not survive a sequence of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. We apply these conditions to Bertrand duopolies and first-price auctions. Our conditions also imply evolutionary selection against iteratively strictly dominated strategies.

Detaljer

Författare
Enheter & grupper
Externa organisationer
  • Södertörn University
Forskningsområden

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK

  • Beräkningsmatematik
  • Nationalekonomi

Nyckelord

  • Iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, Iterated admissibility, Payoff monotonicity, Convex monotonicity, Evolutionary dynamics, Replicator dynamic, C72, C73
Originalspråksvenska
Sidor (från-till)82-97
TidskriftGames and Economic Behavior
Volym117
Tidigt onlinedatum2019
StatusPublished - 2019
PublikationskategoriForskning
Peer review utfördJa