Evolutionary Selection against Iteratively Weakly Dominated Strategies

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Bibtex

@article{45786328e22a4e0abf3376983055a52e,
title = "Evolutionary Selection against Iteratively Weakly Dominated Strategies",
abstract = "This paper provides sufficient conditions under which regular payoff monotonic evolutionary dynamics (a class of imitative dynamics that includes the replicator dynamic) select against strategies that do not survive a sequence of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. We apply these conditions to Bertrand duopolies and first-price auctions. Our conditions also imply evolutionary selection against iteratively strictly dominated strategies.",
keywords = "Iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, Iterated admissibility, Payoff monotonicity, Convex monotonicity, Evolutionary dynamics, Replicator dynamic, C72, C73",
author = "Axel Bernerg{\aa}rd and Erik Mohlin",
year = "2019",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.009",
language = "svenska",
volume = "117",
pages = "82--97",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "0899-8256",

}