Extensionality for Fusions and Pluralities

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift

Abstract

One of the more persistent debates in mereology is whether distinct wholes can have the same parts. Extensional mereologists hold that if there is no part that makes the difference, then there is nothing to distinguish the wholes, so sameness of parts implies identity. Non-extensionalists, however, do think there are cases where distinct wholes share all their parts. This paper argues that the kind of argument non-extensionalists employ can also be levelled against a widely accepted extensionality principle of plural logic. Non-extensionalists thus face a dilemma: either give up the argument for non-extensional mereology, or deny both the extensionality principle of mereology and the analogous principle for plural logic.

Detaljer

Författare
Enheter & grupper
Externa organisationer
  • University of Manchester
Forskningsområden

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK

  • Filosofi
Originalspråkengelska
Antal sidor20
TidskriftSynthese
StatusE-pub ahead of print - 2018 nov 7
PublikationskategoriForskning
Peer review utfördJa