Fitting-Attitude Analyses: The Dual-Reason Analysis Revisited
Forskningsoutput: Tidskriftsbidrag › Artikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift
Classical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of its being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. Recently such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason-notions rather than to only one. The idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring(s) vis-à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; the agent should favour the object on account of those properties that provide reason for favouring the object in the first place. While this expansion of the original proposal might seem intuitive, given that favourings are discerning attitudes, it is nonetheless argued that proponents of the fitting-attitude analysis are in fact not served by such an expansion of the classical analysis.
|Enheter & grupper|
Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK
|Status||Published - 2012|
|Peer review utförd||Ja|