Fitting-attitude Analysis and the Logical Consequence Argument

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Abstract

A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, it’s proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good, the other to good-for; or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that whereas the first option faces a counter-intuitive scope issue, an attitudinal approach couched in terms of ‘for someone’s sake’ attitudes has the unwelcome consequence that whatever is good for someone is also necessarily good. It is argued that this consequence can be avoided if we modify the standard way of formulating the fitting-attitude analysis of final impersonal value.

Detaljer

Författare
Enheter & grupper
Forskningsområden

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK

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Nyckelord

Originalspråkengelska
Sidor (från-till)560–579
Antal sidor19
TidskriftPhilosophical Quarterly
Volym68
Utgåva nummer272
Tidigt onlinedatum2017 dec 12
StatusPublished - 2018 jul
PublikationskategoriForskning
Peer review utfördJa