From virtue to decency

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift

Abstract

In her work on virtue ethics Rosalind Hursthouse has formulated an Aristotelian criterion of rightness that understands rightness in terms of what the virtuous person would do. It is argued here that this kind of criterion does not allow enough room for the category of the supererogatory and that right and wrong should rather be understood in terms of the characteristic behavior of decent persons. Furthermore, it is suggested that this kind of approach has the added advantage of allowing one to make sense of the centrality of negative precepts in commonsense morality.

Detaljer

Författare
Enheter & grupper
Forskningsområden

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK

  • Filosofi

Nyckelord

Originalspråkengelska
Sidor (från-till)589-604
TidskriftMetaphilosophy
Volym37
Utgåva nummer5
StatusPublished - 2006
PublikationskategoriForskning
Peer review utfördJa