How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?

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Abstract

This paper experimentally studies unilateral communication of intentions in eight different two-player one-shot normal form games with complete information. We find that communication is used both to coordinate and to deceive, and that messages have a significant impact on beliefs and behavior even in dominance solvable games. Nash equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy jointly account for many regularities, but not all of the evidence. Sophisticated sender behavior is especially difficult to reconcile with existing models.

Detaljer

Författare
Enheter & grupper
Externa organisationer
  • Stockholm School of Economics
  • Stockholms universitet
Forskningsområden

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK

  • Nationalekonomi

Nyckelord

Originalspråkengelska
Sidor (från-till)153-181
Antal sidor29
TidskriftGames and Economic Behavior
Volym107
StatusPublished - 2018 jan 1
PublikationskategoriForskning
Peer review utfördJa