Information, stochastic dominance and bidding: The case of Treasury auctions

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Abstract

We explore the link between informativeness of signals, stochastic dominance and equilibrium bids in a multi-unit auction with risk averse bidders. We show that for a particular class of signal distributions, informativeness is related to conditional first-order stochastic dominance, so that a higher degree of informativeness in the signal-fundamental distribution induces higher bids and therefore higher revenues. Our framework is relevant for discussing total revenues and informativeness in US Treasury auctions.

Detaljer

Författare
Enheter & grupper
Externa organisationer
  • KEDGE Business School
Forskningsområden

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK

  • Nationalekonomi

Nyckelord

Originalspråkengelska
Sidor (från-till)80-82
Antal sidor3
TidskriftEconomics Letters
Volym153
StatusPublished - 2017 apr 1
PublikationskategoriForskning
Peer review utfördJa