Military spending as a coup-proofing strategy: opening the ‘black box’ for Spain (1850-1915)

Forskningsoutput: Working paper

Abstract

Armies have recurrently intervened in politics by leading (or giving support to) coups d’état. Several authors suggest that civilian governments have used military spending to overcome armies’ grievances and avoid their insubordination. However, recent quantitative analyses do not reach conclusive results when exploring the impact of total military expenditure on the frequency and the success of coups d’état. We argue that total military spending might not be a good indicator of governments’ effort to gain the loyalty of the army, as it may conceal relevant changes in the composition of the military budget. This paper aims to open the military spending ‘black box’. While total military spending does not seem to have any relationship with the frequency of coups, payments to officers (along with other coup-proofing strategies) appears to be associated to a lower frequency of coups in 1850-1915 Spain.

Detaljer

Författare
Enheter & grupper
Externa organisationer
  • University of Barcelona
Forskningsområden

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK

  • Statsvetenskap

Nyckelord

  • Military spending, coup d’état, Spain
Originalspråkengelska
Sidor1-43
Antal sidor43
StatusPublished - 2017 dec
PublikationskategoriForskning

Publikationsserier

NamnSTANCE Working Papers Series
Nr.6
Volym2017

Related projects

Jan Teorell, Jens Bartelson, Annika Björkdahl, Hanna Bäck, Augustín Goenaga, Martin Hall, Sara Kalm, Johannes Lindvall, Ellen Ravndal, Ted Svensson, Alexander von Hagen-Jamar, Linda Eitrem Holmgren, Lina Hjärtström & Moa Olin

Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (RJ)

2015/01/012020/12/31

Projekt: Forskning

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