Minimizing Side-Channel Attack Vulnerability Via Schedule Randomization

Forskningsoutput: Kapitel i bok/rapport/Conference proceedingKonferenspaper i proceeding

Abstract

Control systems can be vulnerable to security threats where an attacker gathers information about the execution of the system. In particular, side-channel attacks exploit the predictability of real-time control systems and of their schedules. To counteract their action, a scheduler can randomize the temporal execution of tasks and limit the amount of information the attacker can gather. Schedule randomization is aimed at achieving the highest possible schedule diversity (measured using the upper-approximated entropy metric) during the real-time execution of the controller. This paper investigates fundamental limitations of schedule randomization for a generic taskset. The constructed schedule set has minimal size and achieves the highest possible upper-approximated entropy.

Detaljer

Författare
Enheter & grupper
Externa organisationer
  • Technical University Of Kaiserslautern
Forskningsområden

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK

  • Datavetenskap (datalogi)
Originalspråkengelska
Titel på värdpublikation2019 IEEE 58th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)
FörlagIEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Sidor2928-2933
Antal sidor6
ISBN (elektroniskt)978-1-7281-1398-2
ISBN (tryckt)978-1-7281-1399-9
StatusPublished - 2019 dec
PublikationskategoriForskning
Peer review utfördJa

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