Ownership and First-Person Authority from a Normative Pragmatist Perspective

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Ownership and First-Person Authority from a Normative Pragmatist Perspective. / Lo Presti, Patrizio.

I: Contemporary Pragmatism, Vol. 17, Nr. 4, 2020, s. 268-285.

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Ownership and First-Person Authority from a Normative Pragmatist Perspective

AU - Lo Presti, Patrizio

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - Mental episodes are typically associated with subjective ownership and first-person authority. My belief that an apple is red is had by me; it is mine and I’m in a privileged position to know it. Your experience of red is had by you; it is yours and you are in a privileged position to know it. The two assumptions are that mental events are had by individuals to whom they occur, and that owners are in a privileged epistemic position to fallibly report their own. This paper asks how to understand ownership and first-person authority (section 1). It argues that the two assumptions should not be accepted by default (section 2). A normative pragmatism is specified, on which mental episodes are not owned, but owed to practices of reason articulation (section 3). Finally, a positive account of ownership and first-person authority is considered (section 4).

AB - Mental episodes are typically associated with subjective ownership and first-person authority. My belief that an apple is red is had by me; it is mine and I’m in a privileged position to know it. Your experience of red is had by you; it is yours and you are in a privileged position to know it. The two assumptions are that mental events are had by individuals to whom they occur, and that owners are in a privileged epistemic position to fallibly report their own. This paper asks how to understand ownership and first-person authority (section 1). It argues that the two assumptions should not be accepted by default (section 2). A normative pragmatism is specified, on which mental episodes are not owned, but owed to practices of reason articulation (section 3). Finally, a positive account of ownership and first-person authority is considered (section 4).

KW - first-person authority

KW - normativity

KW - pragmatism

KW - mental content

KW - ownership

U2 - 10.1163/18758185-17040004

DO - 10.1163/18758185-17040004

M3 - Article

VL - 17

SP - 268

EP - 285

JO - Contemporary Pragmatism

JF - Contemporary Pragmatism

SN - 1875-8185

IS - 4

ER -