Peirce Knew Why Abduction Isn’t IBE—A Scheme and Critical Questions for Abductive Argument

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Abstract

Whether abduction is treated as an argument or as an inference, the mainstream view presupposes a tight connection between abduction and inference to the best explanation (IBE). This paper critically evaluates this link and supports a narrower view on abduction. Our main thesis is that merely the hypothesis-generative aspect, but not the evaluative aspect, is properly abductive in the sense introduced by C. S. Peirce. We show why equating abduction with IBE (or understanding them as inseparable parts) unnecessarily complicates argument evaluation by levelling the status of abduction as a third reasoning mode (besides deduction and induction). We also propose a scheme for abductive argument along with critical questions, and suggest retaining abduction alongside IBE as related but distinct categories.

Detaljer

Författare
Enheter & grupper
Externa organisationer
  • Sun Yat-sen University
  • University of Konstanz
  • Institute of Philosophy, SAS
Forskningsområden

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK

  • Filosofi

Nyckelord

Originalspråkengelska
Sidor (från-till)569-587
TidskriftArgumentation
Volym32
Utgåva nummer4
Tidigt onlinedatum2017 nov 29
StatusPublished - 2018 dec
PublikationskategoriForskning
Peer review utfördJa