Risking Other People's Money: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Incentives and Personality Traits

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Abstract

Decision makers often face incentives to increase risk‐taking on behalf of others through bonus contracts and relative performance contracts. We conduct an experimental study of risk‐taking on behalf of others using a large heterogeneous sample and find that people respond to such incentives without much apparent concern for stakeholders. Responses are heterogeneous and mitigated by personality traits. The findings suggest that lack of concern for others’ risk exposure hardly requires “financial psychopaths” in order to flourish, but is diminished by social concerns.

Detaljer

Författare
Enheter & grupper
Externa organisationer
  • Uppsala universitet
  • University of Vienna
Forskningsområden

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK

  • Nationalekonomi

Nyckelord

Originalspråkengelska
Sidor (från-till)648-674
Antal sidor27
TidskriftScandinavian Journal of Economics
Volym122
Utgåva nummer2
Tidigt onlinedatum2019 mar 18
StatusPublished - 2020 apr
PublikationskategoriForskning
Peer review utfördJa