Sequential Rules for House Allocation with Price Restrictions

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift


This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such market, price equilibrium may be excluded for certain preference profiles. However, the existence of a unique minimal rationing price equilibrium has previously been established on a general preference domain that contains “almost all” preference profiles. This type of equilibrium has been demonstrated to be an important ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism for housing markets with price restrictions. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a finite ascending price sequence that terminates to a minimal rationing price equilibrium. This sequence is demonstrated to play a key-role in an Iterative English Auction Rule for housing markets with price restrictions.


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Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK

  • Nationalekonomi


Sidor (från-till)41-59
Antal sidor19
TidskriftGames and Economic Behavior
StatusPublished - 2018
Peer review utfördJa

Relaterad forskningsoutput

Tommy Andersson & Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 2015, Department of Economics, Lund University, 23 s. (Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University; nr. 18).

Forskningsoutput: Working paper

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