Sequential Rules for House Allocation with Price Restrictions
Forskningsoutput: Tidskriftsbidrag › Artikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift
This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such market, price equilibrium may be excluded for certain preference profiles. However, the existence of a unique minimal rationing price equilibrium has previously been established on a general preference domain that contains “almost all” preference profiles. This type of equilibrium has been demonstrated to be an important ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism for housing markets with price restrictions. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a finite ascending price sequence that terminates to a minimal rationing price equilibrium. This sequence is demonstrated to play a key-role in an Iterative English Auction Rule for housing markets with price restrictions.
|Enheter & grupper|
Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK
|Tidskrift||Games and Economic Behavior|
|Status||Published - 2018|
|Peer review utförd||Ja|
Tommy Andersson & Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 2015, Department of Economics, Lund University, 23 s. (Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University; nr. 18).
Forskningsoutput: Working paper