Subjunctive Facts and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Reason Distinction

Forskningsoutput: KonferensbidragKonferenspaper, ej i proceeding/ej förlagsutgivet

Abstract

Elsewhere I have argued that the notion of a normative agent-neutral reason is undermined by certain views on reasons; the existence of agent-neutral reasons can be questioned. Here I shall not repeat my doubts but rather address a way of expressing the distinction that I had not considered and which would, if correct, put an end to my worries about the soundness of this dichotomy. The idea, which was suggested to me by Douglas Portmore (personal communication) is that normative reasons are facts of a peculiar kind: they are subjunctive facts of a certain kind.

Detaljer

Författare
Enheter & grupper
Forskningsområden

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK

  • Filosofi

Nyckelord

Originalspråkengelska
StatusUnpublished - 2010
PublikationskategoriForskning
Peer review utfördNej
EvenemangWorkshop: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - Münster, Tyskland
Varaktighet: 2010 apr 292010 apr 30

Konferens

KonferensWorkshop: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
LandTyskland
OrtMünster
Period2010/04/292010/04/30

Related projects

Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen

2010/01/012012/12/31

Projekt: Forskning

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