The moral black hole

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift

Abstract

It is commonly believed that people become selfish and turn to looting, price gouging, and other immoral behaviour in emergencies. This has been the basis for an argument justifying extraordinary measures in emergencies. It states that if emergencies are not curtailed, breakdown of moral norms threaten ('the moral black hole'). Using the example of natural disasters, we argue that the validity of this argument in non-antagonistic situations, i.e. situations other than war and armed conflict, is highly questionable. Available evidence suggests that people in such emergencies typically do not display panic reactions or exaggerated selfishness, and that phenomena such as looting and price gouging are rare. Furthermore, a version of the moral-black-hole argument based on the mere possibility of a moral black hole occurring runs into problems similar to those of Pascal's Wager. We conclude that we should be wary against applying the moral-black-hole argument to non-antagonistic cases.

Detaljer

Författare
  • Per Sandin
  • Misse Wester
Externa organisationer
  • KTH Royal Institute of Technology
Forskningsområden

Nyckelord

Originalspråkengelska
Sidor (från-till)291-301
Antal sidor11
TidskriftEthical Theory and Moral Practice
Volym12
Utgåva nummer3
StatusPublished - 2009 jun
PublikationskategoriForskning
Peer review utfördJa
Externt publiceradJa