The ontological parsimony of mereology

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift

Abstract

David Lewis (Parts of classes, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, 84) famously argued that mereology is ontologically innocent. Many who have considered this claim believe he was mistaken. Mereology is not innocent, because its acceptance entails the acceptance of sums, new objects that were not previously part of one’s ontology. This argument, the argument from ontological parsimony, has two versions: a qualitative and a quantitative one. I argue that the defender of mereology can neutralize both arguments by holding that, given mereology, a commitment to the parts of an object is not an extra ontological commitment, made in addition to the commitment to the object; and that if the parts of an object are ‘ontologically innocent’, then sums cannot fail to be innocent either.

Detaljer

Författare
Enheter & grupper
Forskningsområden

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK

  • Filosofi

Nyckelord

Originalspråkengelska
Sidor (från-till)3253-3271
TidskriftPhilosophical Studies
Volym172
Utgåva nummer12
StatusPublished - 2015
PublikationskategoriForskning
Peer review utfördJa

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Relaterad forskningsoutput

Jeroen Smid, 2017, 226 s.

Forskningsoutput: AvhandlingDoktorsavhandling (sammanläggning)

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Related projects

Björn Petersson, Olle Blomberg, Gunnar Björnsson, Johan Brännmark, Åsa Burman, Tobias Hansson Wahlberg, Patrizio Lo Presti, Anna-Sofia Maurin, Jeroen Smid & Andras Szigeti

Swedish Research Council

2012/03/01 → …

Projekt: NätverkNationellt samarbete

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