The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency, and Distribution in EU Negotiations
Forskningsoutput: Tidskriftsbidrag › Artikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift
Decision-making in the European Union is subject to the risk of negotiation failure, because of governments' incentives to conceal their true preferences. This article argues that the EU Presidency possesses a set of informational and procedural resources that can help unlock incompatible negotiating positions and secure efficient agreements, while simultaneously allowing the government in office to shape distributional outcomes. Drawing on general bargaining theory and rational choice institutionalism, it presents a theory of the demand for, and supply of, brokerage by the chair. The explanatory power of this theory is demonstrated through two case studies: Germany's chairing of the negotiations, and France's chairing of the IGC 2000 negotiations.
|Enheter & grupper|
Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK
|Tidskrift||Journal of Common Market Studies|
|Status||Published - 2003|
|Peer review utförd||Ja|