Value Grounded on Attitudes. Subjectivism in Value Theory

Forskningsoutput: AvhandlingDoktorsavhandling (monografi)

Abstract

Popular Abstract in English
Does subjectivism in value theory — the view that value is grounded on attitudes — imply that when we think and talk about what is good and bad we must necessarily be thinking and talking about our desires and other attitudes? Does value subjectivism entail that evaluative utterances are reports or expressions of the speaker’s attitude? Are subjectivists committed to an axiology according to which only preference satisfaction is valuable for its own sake? Are subjectivists disqualified from talking about intrinsic value? Is it a consequence of subjectivism that if we had different attitudes than those that we in fact have different things would be valuable? Is subjectivism a view on which things can be good or bad only by being good or bad for particular people? Are subjectivists committed to objectionable forms of relativism or egoism? Is every form of idealization of attitudes in tension with the spirit of subjectivism? Is subjectivism a bleak view on which nothing matters?

In Value Grounded on Attitudes – Subjectivism in Value Theory, Fritz-Anton Fritzson defends subjectivist views against some common objections and offers a sympathetic formulation of value subjectivism.

Detaljer

Författare
  • Fritz-Anton Fritzson
Enheter & grupper
Forskningsområden

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK

  • Filosofi

Nyckelord

Originalspråkengelska
KvalifikationDoktor
Tilldelande institution
Handledare/Biträdande handledare
Tilldelningsdatum2014 sep 13
Förlag
  • Lund University (Media-Tryck)
Tryckta ISBN978-91-7473-994-7
StatusPublished - 2014
PublikationskategoriForskning

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