Venting and Gossiping in Conflicts: Verbal Expression in Ultimatum Games

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift


Conflicts often lead to expression of emotion to unrelated parties. We study non-instrumental verbal expression in binary ultimatum games, where receivers can comment either privately or to a third-party audience prior to accepting or rejecting the offer. The potential for gossip is sufficient to induce image concerns in senders, resulting in fairer offers in the audience treatment. Consequently, despite insignificant effect on receivers’ behaviour, the possibility of verbal expression to an audience is found to increase co-operation and hence welfare. There is demand for verbal expression even when it is unobserved or not triggered by negative stimulus.


  • Margaret Samahita
Enheter & grupper

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK

  • Nationalekonomi


Sidor (från-till)111-121
Antal sidor12
TidskriftJournal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Tidigt onlinedatum2016 dec 13
StatusPublished - 2017 apr
Peer review utfördJa

Relaterad forskningsoutput

Samahita, M., 2017 feb 27, Lund: Department of Economics, Lund Universtiy. 169 s.

Forskningsoutput: AvhandlingDoktorsavhandling (sammanläggning)

Samahita, M., 2015, Department of Economics, Lund Universtiy, 27 s. (Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University; nr. 33).

Forskningsoutput: Working paper

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