Venting and Gossiping in Conflicts: Emotion Expression in Ultimatum Games
Forskningsoutput: Working paper
Conflicts often lead to expression of emotion to unrelated parties. We study non-instrumental emotion expression in binary ultimatum games, where receivers can express emotion either privately or to a third-party audience prior to accepting or rejecting the offer. The possibility of emotion expression to an audience increases welfare, but this is driven by senders behaving more fairly rather than any change in receivers' behaviour. We thus show that the role of emotion expression in increasing co-operation is mainly driven by the punishment motive. There is demand for emotion expression even when it is unobserved, this is motivated by low self-esteem.
|Enheter & grupper|
Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK
|Förlag||Department of Economics, Lund Universtiy|
|Status||Published - 2015|
|Namn||Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University|
2017 apr, I : Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. 67, s. 111-121 12 s.
Forskningsoutput: Tidskriftsbidrag › Artikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift