Aktivitet: Föredrag eller presentation › Presentation
Beskrivning
Abstract: In Complicity, Kutz presents the Individual Difference Principle: ‘I am accountable for a harm only if what I have done made a difference to that harm’s occurrence.’ (C. Kutz (2000) Complicity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 125). As Kutz acknowledges, the Individual Difference Principle has a great deal of intuitive plausibility. However, Kutz rejects it, because he believes that it conflicts with our judgements about moral responsibility in cases of overdetermination. In this talk, I argue that Kutz’s rejection of the Individual Difference Principle is based on an inadequate understanding of difference-making. To show this, I present a more nuanced notion of difference-making, and argue that, given this more nuanced understanding of difference-making, the Individual Difference Principle is consistent with our judgements about moral responsibility in cases of overdetermination.