A Key-Recovery Side-Channel Attack on Classic McEliece Implementations

Qian Guo, Andreas Johansson, Thomas Johansson

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikel i vetenskaplig tidskriftPeer review

Sammanfattning

In this paper, we propose the first key-recovery side-channel attack on Classic McEliece, a KEM finalist in the NIST Post-quantum Cryptography Standardization Project. Our novel idea is to design an attack algorithm where we submit special ciphertexts to the decryption oracle that correspond to cases of single errors. Decoding of such ciphertexts involves only a single entry in a large secret permutation, which is part of the secret key. Through an identified leakage in the additive FFT step used to evaluate the error locator polynomial, a single entry of the secret permutation can be determined. Iterating this for other entries leads to full secret key recovery. The attack is described using power analysis both on the FPGA reference implementation and a software implementation running on an ARM Cortex-M4. We use a machine-learning-based classification algorithm to determine the error locator polynomial from a single trace. The attack is fully implemented and evaluated in the Chipwhisperer framework and is successful in practice. For the smallest parameter set, it is using about 300 traces for partial key recovery and less than 800 traces for full key recovery, in the FPGA case. A similar number of traces are required for a successful attack on the ARM software implementation.
Originalspråkengelska
Sidor (från-till)800-827
Tidskrift IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (TCHES)
Volym2022
Nummer4
StatusPublished - 2022

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ)

  • Datavetenskap (datalogi)

Fingeravtryck

Utforska forskningsämnen för ”A Key-Recovery Side-Channel Attack on Classic McEliece Implementations”. Tillsammans bildar de ett unikt fingeravtryck.

Citera det här