A lower bound on the probability of deception in multiple authentication

Ben Smeets

doi:10.1109/ISIT.1991.695236

A lower bound on the probability of deception in multiple authentication

Ben Smeets

Institutionen för elektro- och informationsteknik

Forskningsoutput: Kapitel i bok/rapport/Conference proceeding › Konferenspaper i proceeding › Peer review

Sammanfattning

New bounds are derived for the probabilities of successful attack on multiple authentication schemes by removing the frequently assumed 'freshness' constraint on the source states. We prove that the overall probability of successful deception, P_D(L), for a sequences of L uses of the authentication channel, is bounded from below by max(k/v, 1/√b). We also show that if P_D{L) = 1/√b, then the key entropy is lower bounded by 1/2(L + l)log₂ b bits and that this bound is tight.

Originalspråk	engelska
Titel på värdpublikation	Proceedings 1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory
Förlag	IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Sidor	180
Antal sidor	1
ISBN (elektroniskt)	0780300564
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.1991.695236
Status	Published - 1991
Evenemang	1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 1991 - Budapest, Ungern Varaktighet: 1991 juni 24 → 1991 juni 28

Publikationsserier

Namn	IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings
ISSN (tryckt)	2157-8095

Konferens

Konferens	1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 1991
Land/Territorium	Ungern
Ort	Budapest
Period	1991/06/24 → 1991/06/28

Bibliografisk information

Publisher Copyright:
© 1991 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. All rights reserved.

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10.1109/ISIT.1991.695236

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title = "A lower bound on the probability of deception in multiple authentication",

abstract = "New bounds are derived for the probabilities of successful attack on multiple authentication schemes by removing the frequently assumed 'freshness' constraint on the source states. We prove that the overall probability of successful deception, PD(L), for a sequences of L uses of the authentication channel, is bounded from below by max(k/v, 1/√b). We also show that if PD{L) = 1/√b, then the key entropy is lower bounded by 1/2(L + l)log2 b bits and that this bound is tight.",

author = "Ben Smeets",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 1991 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. All rights reserved.; 1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 1991 ; Conference date: 24-06-1991 Through 28-06-1991",

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Smeets, B 1991, A lower bound on the probability of deception in multiple authentication. i Proceedings 1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory., 695236, IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings, IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., s. 180, 1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 1991, Budapest, Ungern, 1991/06/24. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.1991.695236

A lower bound on the probability of deception in multiple authentication. / Smeets, Ben.
Proceedings 1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory. IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 1991. s. 180 695236 (IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings).

Forskningsoutput: Kapitel i bok/rapport/Conference proceeding › Konferenspaper i proceeding › Peer review

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A lower bound on the probability of deception in multiple authentication

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Konferens

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