A Naturalistic Perspective on Knowledge How: Grasping Truths in a Practical Way

Bidragets översatta titel : A Naturalistic Perspective on Knowledge How : Grasping Truths in a Practical Way

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Sammanfattning

For quite some time, cognitive science has offered philosophy an opportunity to address central problems with an arsenal of relevant theories and empirical data. However, even among those naturalistically inclined, it has been hard to find a universally accepted way to do so. In this article, we offer a case study of how cognitive-science input can elucidate an epistemological issue that has caused extensive debate. We explore Jason Stanley’s idea of the practical grasp of a propositional truth and present naturalistic arguments against his reductive approach to knowledge. We argue that a plausible interpretation of cognitive-science input concerning knowledge—even if one accepts that knowledge how is partly propositional—must involve an element of knowing how to act correctly upon the proposition; and this element of knowing how to act correctly cannot itself be propositional.
Bidragets översatta titel A Naturalistic Perspective on Knowledge How : Grasping Truths in a Practical Way
Originalspråkengelska
Artikelnummer5
Antal sidor11
TidskriftPhilosophies
Volym5
Nummer1
DOI
StatusPublished - 2020 mars 12

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ)

  • Filosofi

Konstnärlig forskning

  • Webbpublikation/sida

Nyckelord

  • knowledge

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