An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy-free and budget-balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities

Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikel i vetenskaplig tidskriftPeer review

Sammanfattning

We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via so-called agent- (Formula presented.) -linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent- (Formula presented.) -linked allocations.

Originalspråkengelska
Sidor (från-till)50-60
TidskriftInternational Journal of Economic Theory
Volym18
Utgåva1
Tidigt onlinedatum2021
DOI
StatusPublished - 2022

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ)

  • Nationalekonomi

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