An Algorithm for Identifying Least Manipulable Envy-Free and Budget-Balanced Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities

Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers

Forskningsoutput: Working paper/PreprintWorking paper

Sammanfattning

We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via so-called agent-k-linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.
Originalspråkengelska
StatusPublished - 2021

Publikationsserier

NamnWorking Papers
FörlagLund University, Department of Economics
Nr.2021:2

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ)

  • Nationalekonomi

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