Cryptanalysis of the Gemmell and Naor Multiround Authentication Protocol

Christian Gehrmann

doi:10.1007/3-540-48658-5_14

Cryptanalysis of the Gemmell and Naor Multiround Authentication Protocol

Christian Gehrmann

Nätverk och säkerhet

Forskningsoutput: Kapitel i bok/rapport/Conference proceeding › Konferenspaper i proceeding › Peer review

Sammanfattning

Gemmell and Naor proposed a new protocol for the authentication of long messages which was based on block codes and which used a transmission channel k times. This multiround authentication makes it possible to limit the key size independently of the message length. We propose a new attack and show that the probability analysis made by Gemmell and Naor, which was only based on the minimum distance property of the codes, does not hold for our attack. Considering also the impersonation attack we conclude that the number of rounds have to be odd.

Originalspråk	engelska
Titel på värdpublikation	CRYPTO '94
Redaktörer	Yvo Desmedt
Utgivningsort	Berlin, Heidelberg
Förlag	Springer
Sidor	121-128
Antal sidor	7
Volym	839
Utgåva	IACR
ISBN (elektroniskt)	978-3-540-48658-9
ISBN (tryckt)	978-3-540-58333-2
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48658-5_14
Status	Published - 1994 aug. 21
Evenemang	14th annual cryptographic conference CRYPTO '94 - California, Santa Barbara, USA Varaktighet: 1994 aug. 21 → 1994 aug. 25 Konferensnummer: 14

Publikationsserier

Namn	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Förlag	Springer
Volym	839

Konferens

Konferens	14th annual cryptographic conference CRYPTO '94
Förkortad titel	CRYPTO '94
Land/Territorium	USA
Ort	Santa Barbara
Period	1994/08/21 → 1994/08/25

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ)

Annan elektroteknik och elektronik

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10.1007/3-540-48658-5_14

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title = "Cryptanalysis of the Gemmell and Naor Multiround Authentication Protocol",

abstract = "Gemmell and Naor proposed a new protocol for the authentication of long messages which was based on block codes and which used a transmission channel k times. This multiround authentication makes it possible to limit the key size independently of the message length. We propose a new attack and show that the probability analysis made by Gemmell and Naor, which was only based on the minimum distance property of the codes, does not hold for our attack. Considering also the impersonation attack we conclude that the number of rounds have to be odd.",

keywords = "Hash functions, Block code, Impersonation attack, Message length",

author = "Christian Gehrmann",

year = "1994",

month = aug,

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doi = "10.1007/3-540-48658-5_14",

language = "English",

isbn = "978-3-540-58333-2",

volume = "839",

series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science",

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editor = "Yvo Desmedt",

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AU - Gehrmann, Christian

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N2 - Gemmell and Naor proposed a new protocol for the authentication of long messages which was based on block codes and which used a transmission channel k times. This multiround authentication makes it possible to limit the key size independently of the message length. We propose a new attack and show that the probability analysis made by Gemmell and Naor, which was only based on the minimum distance property of the codes, does not hold for our attack. Considering also the impersonation attack we conclude that the number of rounds have to be odd.

AB - Gemmell and Naor proposed a new protocol for the authentication of long messages which was based on block codes and which used a transmission channel k times. This multiround authentication makes it possible to limit the key size independently of the message length. We propose a new attack and show that the probability analysis made by Gemmell and Naor, which was only based on the minimum distance property of the codes, does not hold for our attack. Considering also the impersonation attack we conclude that the number of rounds have to be odd.

KW - Hash functions

KW - Block code

KW - Impersonation attack

KW - Message length

U2 - 10.1007/3-540-48658-5_14

DO - 10.1007/3-540-48658-5_14

M3 - Paper in conference proceeding

SN - 978-3-540-58333-2

VL - 839

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

SP - 121

EP - 128

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A2 - Desmedt, Yvo

PB - Springer

CY - Berlin, Heidelberg

T2 - 14th annual cryptographic conference CRYPTO '94

Y2 - 21 August 1994 through 25 August 1994

ER -

Cryptanalysis of the Gemmell and Naor Multiround Authentication Protocol

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