Essays on Auctions

The thesis is concerned with topics relating to auctions and competitive bidding. In the first chapter, the case of a procurement
situation where multiple producers compete in price and quality, but are unable to commit to quality, is treated in a scoring
auction context. An optimal scoring rule, for a buyer able to comittto a rule, is characterised. The second chapter is concerned
with auctions where bidders are ex-ante asymmetric in the sense that one bidder may receive a fraction of the seller's profit. The
issue of existence of equilibria under such circumstances is considered. It turns out there are in general no equilibria in
continuous, strictly increasing strategies. The final chapter considers competition between privately held and state-owned
businesses in the German auction for third-generation (3G) mobile telecommunications. A theoretical model is developed. The
only equilibria of this model consistent with observed behaviour are equilibria where ownership does nor affect the outcome of
the auction.