Sammanfattning
This thesis makes a contribution to mechanism design: a field of economic theory concerned with constructing and analyzing economic mechanisms. Examples include design of auctions, voting systems, school choice, kidney exchange and many more. The thesis consists of four separate papers. Paper one and two proposes and analyzes two new iterative auction mechanisms for selling multiple heterogeneous items. Paper three analyzes resource allocation within an organization and characterizes a class of strategyproof mechanisms. In a strategyproof mechanism no agent can gain anything by misrepresenting her true preferences. This is a demanding incentive property, but if possible to achieve a desirable property of any reallife mechanism. In the fourth and last paper we revisit the problem of assigning items and money. A strategyproof mechanism with desirable efficiency and fairness properties is constructed and analyzed. Below follows a short summary of each paper.
The first paper proposes an iterative sealedbid auction for selling multiple heterogeneous items to bidders interested in buying at most one item. It generalizes the single item bisection auction to the environment with multiple heterogeneous items. We focus on the case with two items for sale. We show that the auction elicits a minimal amount of information on preferences required to find the VickreyClarkGroves outcome, when there are two items for sale and an arbitrary number of bidders.
The second paper also considers a model in which bidders wish to acquire at most one item. We define a polynomial time multiitem auction that locates the VCG prices in a finite number of iterations for any given starting prices. This auction is called the VickreyEnglishDutch auction and it contains the VickreyEnglish auction and the VickreyDutch auction as special cases. By means of numerical experiments, it is showed that when the auctioneer knows the bidders' value distributions, the VickreyEnglishDutch auction is weakly faster than the VickreyEnglish auction and the VickreyDutch auction in 89 percent and 99 percent, respectively, of the investigated problems. A greedy version of the VickreyEnglishDutch auction is demonstrated to perform even better in the simulation studies.
The third paper examines strategyproof allocation of multiple divisible and indivisible resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. We find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave function over a polyhedral extension of the set of Paretoefficient allocations is strategyproof. Moreover, these are the only strategyproof and unanimous mechanisms satisfying a coherence property and responding well to changes in the availability of resources.
The fourth paper revisits the problem of allocating copies of an item together with monetary transfers. We propose a strategyproof, constrainedlyefficient and fair mechanism. In contrast to Groves mechanisms, for which all the surplus is given to the agents who are assigned an object, the new mechanism gives also a share of the surplus to the agents who are not assigned an object.
The first paper proposes an iterative sealedbid auction for selling multiple heterogeneous items to bidders interested in buying at most one item. It generalizes the single item bisection auction to the environment with multiple heterogeneous items. We focus on the case with two items for sale. We show that the auction elicits a minimal amount of information on preferences required to find the VickreyClarkGroves outcome, when there are two items for sale and an arbitrary number of bidders.
The second paper also considers a model in which bidders wish to acquire at most one item. We define a polynomial time multiitem auction that locates the VCG prices in a finite number of iterations for any given starting prices. This auction is called the VickreyEnglishDutch auction and it contains the VickreyEnglish auction and the VickreyDutch auction as special cases. By means of numerical experiments, it is showed that when the auctioneer knows the bidders' value distributions, the VickreyEnglishDutch auction is weakly faster than the VickreyEnglish auction and the VickreyDutch auction in 89 percent and 99 percent, respectively, of the investigated problems. A greedy version of the VickreyEnglishDutch auction is demonstrated to perform even better in the simulation studies.
The third paper examines strategyproof allocation of multiple divisible and indivisible resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. We find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave function over a polyhedral extension of the set of Paretoefficient allocations is strategyproof. Moreover, these are the only strategyproof and unanimous mechanisms satisfying a coherence property and responding well to changes in the availability of resources.
The fourth paper revisits the problem of allocating copies of an item together with monetary transfers. We propose a strategyproof, constrainedlyefficient and fair mechanism. In contrast to Groves mechanisms, for which all the surplus is given to the agents who are assigned an object, the new mechanism gives also a share of the surplus to the agents who are not assigned an object.
Originalspråk  engelska 

Kvalifikation  Doktor 
Tilldelande institution 

Handledare 

Tilldelningsdatum  2014 sep. 3 
Status  Published  2014 
Bibliografisk information
Defence detailsDate: 20140903
Time: 13:15
Place: EC3:210
External reviewer(s)
Name: Herings, JeanJacques
Title: Professor
Affiliation: Maastricht University

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ)
 Nationalekonomi