Sammanfattning
A potential mechanism to explain changes in cooperativeness in the presence of risk may be opportunities for informal risk sharing. Using a novel experimental design, we show that the presence of both independent and correlated risk prevents the typical decay of cooperation in a laboratory social dilemma game. Notably, this result seems to rule out risk sharing as a possible mechanism behind the cooperation increase. Exploratory analyses tentatively suggest that behavior consistent with a risk sharing account may emerge late in the game, congruent with previous theorizing of slow learning in stochastic environments.
Originalspråk | engelska |
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Artikelnummer | 102309 |
Tidskrift | Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics |
Volym | 114 |
DOI | |
Status | Published - 2025 feb. |
Bibliografisk information
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Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ)
- Nationalekonomi