Increased cooperation in stochastic social dilemmas: Can it be explained by risk sharing?

Stepan Vesely, Erik Wengström

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Sammanfattning

A potential mechanism to explain changes in cooperativeness in the presence of risk may be opportunities for informal risk sharing. Using a novel experimental design, we show that the presence of both independent and correlated risk prevents the typical decay of cooperation in a laboratory social dilemma game. Notably, this result seems to rule out risk sharing as a possible mechanism behind the cooperation increase. Exploratory analyses tentatively suggest that behavior consistent with a risk sharing account may emerge late in the game, congruent with previous theorizing of slow learning in stochastic environments.

Originalspråkengelska
Artikelnummer102309
TidskriftJournal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Volym114
DOI
StatusPublished - 2025 feb.

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  • Nationalekonomi

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