Introduction

The possibility of incommensurability indicates that some predicates are different: when two things are incommensurable, neither is determinately better than the other nor are they equally as good as each other. Hence, they are related in some other manner. The possibility of incommensurability can be argued for by referring to the existence of moral dilemmas. Whenever one can make a small improvement argument, one can make a case for incommensurability, and this seems possible any time one makes multidimensional comparisons. Multidimensional comparisons are ubiquitous. In ethical theory, they are almost always present since plausible conceptions of well-being are multidimensional. “Incommensurability” used as a catch-all term is thus compatible with, among other possibilities, incomparability and parity, and all non-conventional value relations fall under its umbrella. The chapter also presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in this book.