Keyed logic BIST for Trojan detection in SoC

Elena Dubrova; Mats Naslund; Gunnar Carlsson; Ben Smeets

doi:10.1109/ISSOC.2014.6972433

Keyed logic BIST for Trojan detection in SoC

Elena Dubrova, Mats Naslund, Gunnar Carlsson, Ben Smeets

Forskningsoutput: Kapitel i bok/rapport/Conference proceeding › Konferenspaper i proceeding › Peer review

Sammanfattning

As demonstrated by the recent attack on Intel's Ivy Bridge processor, the traditional Logic Built-In Self-Test (LBIST) methods do not provide adequate protection of SoC against malicious modifications known as hardware Trojans. In this paper, we introduce a simple but efficient countermeasure against hardware Trojans which exploits non-zero aliasing probability of LBIST. We propose to generate LBIST test patterns based on a configurable key which is decided and programed into the circuit after the manufacturing stage. Since the key and hence expected LBIST signature are unknown at the manufacturing stage, an attack based on selecting suitable values for the Trojan which result in the same signature as a fault-free circuit signature becomes infeasible.

Originalspråk	engelska
Titel på värdpublikation	2014 International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014
Redaktörer	Ondrej Daniel, Peeter Ellervee, Dragomir Milojevic, Jari Nurmi, Tommi Paakki
Förlag	IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (elektroniskt)	9781479968909
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1109/ISSOC.2014.6972433
Status	Published - 2014 dec. 2
Externt publicerad	Ja
Evenemang	2014 16th International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014 - Tampere, Finland Varaktighet: 2014 okt. 28 → 2014 okt. 29

Publikationsserier

Namn	2014 International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014

Konferens

Konferens	2014 16th International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014
Land/Territorium	Finland
Ort	Tampere
Period	2014/10/28 → 2014/10/29

Bibliografisk information

Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 IEEE.

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ)

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10.1109/ISSOC.2014.6972433

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Dubrova, E., Naslund, M., Carlsson, G., & Smeets, B. (2014). Keyed logic BIST for Trojan detection in SoC. I O. Daniel, P. Ellervee, D. Milojevic, J. Nurmi, & T. Paakki (Red.), 2014 International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014 [6972433] (2014 International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014). IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISSOC.2014.6972433

Dubrova, Elena ; Naslund, Mats ; Carlsson, Gunnar et al. / Keyed logic BIST for Trojan detection in SoC. 2014 International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014. redaktör / Ondrej Daniel ; Peeter Ellervee ; Dragomir Milojevic ; Jari Nurmi ; Tommi Paakki. IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2014. (2014 International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014).

@inproceedings{672c4240462749bba611bd1e3a6b7cbd,

title = "Keyed logic BIST for Trojan detection in SoC",

abstract = "As demonstrated by the recent attack on Intel's Ivy Bridge processor, the traditional Logic Built-In Self-Test (LBIST) methods do not provide adequate protection of SoC against malicious modifications known as hardware Trojans. In this paper, we introduce a simple but efficient countermeasure against hardware Trojans which exploits non-zero aliasing probability of LBIST. We propose to generate LBIST test patterns based on a configurable key which is decided and programed into the circuit after the manufacturing stage. Since the key and hence expected LBIST signature are unknown at the manufacturing stage, an attack based on selecting suitable values for the Trojan which result in the same signature as a fault-free circuit signature becomes infeasible.",

author = "Elena Dubrova and Mats Naslund and Gunnar Carlsson and Ben Smeets",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2014 IEEE.; 2014 16th International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014 ; Conference date: 28-10-2014 Through 29-10-2014",

year = "2014",

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doi = "10.1109/ISSOC.2014.6972433",

language = "English",

series = "2014 International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014",

publisher = "IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",

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Dubrova, E, Naslund, M, Carlsson, G & Smeets, B 2014, Keyed logic BIST for Trojan detection in SoC. i O Daniel, P Ellervee, D Milojevic, J Nurmi & T Paakki (red), 2014 International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014., 6972433, 2014 International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014, IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2014 16th International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014, Tampere, Finland, 2014/10/28. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISSOC.2014.6972433

Keyed logic BIST for Trojan detection in SoC. / Dubrova, Elena; Naslund, Mats; Carlsson, Gunnar et al.

2014 International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014. red. / Ondrej Daniel; Peeter Ellervee; Dragomir Milojevic; Jari Nurmi; Tommi Paakki. IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2014. 6972433 (2014 International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014).

Forskningsoutput: Kapitel i bok/rapport/Conference proceeding › Konferenspaper i proceeding › Peer review

TY - GEN

T1 - Keyed logic BIST for Trojan detection in SoC

AU - Dubrova, Elena

AU - Naslund, Mats

AU - Carlsson, Gunnar

AU - Smeets, Ben

PY - 2014/12/2

Y1 - 2014/12/2

N2 - As demonstrated by the recent attack on Intel's Ivy Bridge processor, the traditional Logic Built-In Self-Test (LBIST) methods do not provide adequate protection of SoC against malicious modifications known as hardware Trojans. In this paper, we introduce a simple but efficient countermeasure against hardware Trojans which exploits non-zero aliasing probability of LBIST. We propose to generate LBIST test patterns based on a configurable key which is decided and programed into the circuit after the manufacturing stage. Since the key and hence expected LBIST signature are unknown at the manufacturing stage, an attack based on selecting suitable values for the Trojan which result in the same signature as a fault-free circuit signature becomes infeasible.

AB - As demonstrated by the recent attack on Intel's Ivy Bridge processor, the traditional Logic Built-In Self-Test (LBIST) methods do not provide adequate protection of SoC against malicious modifications known as hardware Trojans. In this paper, we introduce a simple but efficient countermeasure against hardware Trojans which exploits non-zero aliasing probability of LBIST. We propose to generate LBIST test patterns based on a configurable key which is decided and programed into the circuit after the manufacturing stage. Since the key and hence expected LBIST signature are unknown at the manufacturing stage, an attack based on selecting suitable values for the Trojan which result in the same signature as a fault-free circuit signature becomes infeasible.

U2 - 10.1109/ISSOC.2014.6972433

DO - 10.1109/ISSOC.2014.6972433

M3 - Paper in conference proceeding

AN - SCOPUS:84919360616

T3 - 2014 International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014

BT - 2014 International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014

A2 - Daniel, Ondrej

A2 - Ellervee, Peeter

A2 - Milojevic, Dragomir

A2 - Nurmi, Jari

A2 - Paakki, Tommi

PB - IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

T2 - 2014 16th International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014

Y2 - 28 October 2014 through 29 October 2014

ER -

Dubrova E, Naslund M, Carlsson G, Smeets B. Keyed logic BIST for Trojan detection in SoC. I Daniel O, Ellervee P, Milojevic D, Nurmi J, Paakki T, redaktörer, 2014 International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014. IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2014. 6972433. (2014 International Symposium on System-on-Chip, SoC 2014). doi: 10.1109/ISSOC.2014.6972433

Keyed logic BIST for Trojan detection in SoC

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