@techreport{0f9cbe997b3e4eba9a0de37c5fadbcba,
title = "Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited",
abstract = "This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.",
keywords = "Indivisible objects, fairness, coalitionally strat",
author = "Tommy Andersson and Lars-Gunnar Svensson",
year = "2006",
language = "English",
series = "Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University",
publisher = "Department of Economics, Lund University",
number = "11",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Economics, Lund University",
}