Practical Attacks on Relational Databases Protected via Searchable Encryption

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelraheem, Tobias Andersson, Christian Gehrmann, Cornelius Glackin

Forskningsoutput: Kapitel i bok/rapport/Conference proceedingKonferenspaper i proceedingPeer review


Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) schemes are commonly proposed to enable search in a protected unstructured documents such as email archives or any set of sensitive text files. However, some SSE schemes have been recently proposed in order to protect relational databases. Most of the previous attacks on SSE schemes have only targeted its common use case, protecting unstructured data. In this work, we propose a new inference attack on relational databases protected via SSE schemes. Our inference attack enables a passive adversary with only basic knowledge about the meta-data information of the target relational database to recover the attribute names of some observed queries. This violates query privacy since the attribute name of a query is secret.

Titel på värdpublikationInformation Security - 21st International Conference, ISC 2018, Proceedings
RedaktörerLiqun Chen, Mark Manulis, Steve Schneider
Antal sidor21
ISBN (tryckt)9783319991351
StatusPublished - 2018
Evenemang21st Information Security Conference, ISC 2018 - Guildford, Storbritannien
Varaktighet: 2018 sep. 92018 sep. 12


NamnLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volym11060 LNCS
ISSN (tryckt)0302-9743
ISSN (elektroniskt)1611-3349


Konferens21st Information Security Conference, ISC 2018

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ)

  • Systemvetenskap, informationssystem och informatik


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