Sammanfattning
A standard reaction to the problem of evil is to look for a greater good that can explain why God (with the traditional attributes) might have created this world instead of a seemingly better one which has no (or less) evil. This paper proposes an approach we call the Moral Progress Approach: Given the value of progress, a non-perfect world containing evil may be preferable to a perfect world without evil. This makes room for the possibility that this world, with all its evil, may be preferable to a world with less evil. We argue that our proposal is different from apparently similar views such as soul-making theodicy.
Originalspråk | engelska |
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Sidor (från-till) | 221-235 |
Tidskrift | International Journal of Philosophical Studies |
Volym | 29 |
Nummer | 2 |
Tidigt onlinedatum | 2021 |
DOI | |
Status | Published - 2021 |
Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ)
- Filosofi