TY - JOUR
T1 - Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
AU - Larsson, Bo
AU - Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
PY - 2006
Y1 - 2006
N2 - In analyses of strategy-proof voting, two results feature prominently: the dictatorial characterization contained in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and the voting by committees characterization in the Barbera-Sonnenschein-Zhou theorem. The two theorems are based on voting procedures defined on the domain of strict preferences. In the present study, we derive corresponding results for voting schemes defined on the full domain of weak preferences and obtain a characterization by means of a combination of sequential dictatorship and voting by extended committees.
AB - In analyses of strategy-proof voting, two results feature prominently: the dictatorial characterization contained in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and the voting by committees characterization in the Barbera-Sonnenschein-Zhou theorem. The two theorems are based on voting procedures defined on the domain of strict preferences. In the present study, we derive corresponding results for voting schemes defined on the full domain of weak preferences and obtain a characterization by means of a combination of sequential dictatorship and voting by extended committees.
KW - Barbers-Sonnenschein-Zhou theorem
KW - strategy-proof voting
KW - Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
U2 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.008
DO - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.008
M3 - Article
SN - 0165-4896
VL - 52
SP - 272
EP - 287
JO - Mathematical Social Sciences
JF - Mathematical Social Sciences
IS - 3
ER -