The Mirror Account of Hope and Fear

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Sammanfattning

I provide a unified account of hope and fear as propositional attitudes. This “mirror account” is based on the historical idea that the only difference between hope and fear is the conative attitude involved, positive for hope and negative for fear. My analysis builds on a qualified version of the standard account of hope. The epistemic condition is formulated in terms of live possibility and the conative according to a non-reductive view on desire and aversion. The account demonstrates the theoretical fruitfulness of accepting Jack M. C. Kwong’s distinction between hope and fear as propositional attitudes and experiential states.
Originalspråkengelska
Sidor (från-till)209 - 223
Antal sidor15
TidskriftCanadian Journal of Philosophy
Volym53
Nummer3
DOI
StatusPublished - 2023 apr.

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ)

  • Filosofi

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