The Money of Monarchs: The Importance of Non-Tax Revenue for Autocratic Rule in Early Modern Sweden

Klas Nilsson

The Money of Monarchs: The Importance of Non-Tax Revenue for Autocratic Rule in Early Modern Sweden

Klas Nilsson

Statsvetenskapliga institutionen

Forskningsoutput: Avhandling › Doktorsavhandling (monografi)

2118 Nedladdningar (Pure)

Sammanfattning

Enligt en etablerad teori om utvecklingen av politiskt styre i Europas förflutna går beskattning hand i hand med folkrepresentation. Härskare i finansiella trångmål blev nämligen mer eller mindre tvungna att erbjuda politiska fri- och rättigheter i utbyte mot folkets bidrag till statskassan. I denna avhandling undersöker jag det rakt motsatta antagandet: är det även så att icke-skatter går hand i hand med icke-representation? Jag argumenterar för att tidigmoderna härskare som hade tillgång till vad jag kallar ‘proprietary revenue’ (privaträttsliga inkomster)—som till exempel avkastning från landägande, naturresursutvinning, statligt ägd verksamhet, kolonial plundring—kunde använda dessa inkomster till att samla politisk makt i sina egna händer och härska som autokrater. Deras finansiella självständighet gjorde dem politiskt obetvingliga. I avhandlingens empiriska del använder jag mig av insikter om politisk utveckling i moderna oljestater för att förstå möjligheterna till autokratiskt styre i tidigmoderna Sverige, ett fall som inte riktigt låter sig förklaras av existerande teoribildningar. Mina resultat pekar bland annat mot att kungar som Gustav I (r. 1523-1560) och Karl XI (r. 1672-1697) skulle haft svårt att bli autokratiska om det inte vore för deras kraftigt ökade landegendomar. Genom att utvidga kronans godsinnehav kunde de regera mer som ‘landägande kungar’ än som ‘skattekungar.’ Avhandlingens främsta bidrag är att (i) den utvecklar vår begreppsliga förståelse av icke-skatter; (ii) den förklarar varför och hur denna typ av inkomster påverkar politiska styrelseformer; och (iii) den erbjuder en ny förklaring av Sveriges politiska utveckling under tidigmodern tid.

Originalspråk	engelska
Kvalifikation	Doktor
Tilldelande institution	Statsvetenskapliga institutionen
Handledare	Hall, Martin, handledare Teorell, Jan, handledare
Tilldelningsdatum	2017 feb. 10
Utgivningsort	Lund
Förlag	Lund University
ISBN (tryckt)	978-91-7753-155-5
ISBN (elektroniskt)	978-91-7753-156-2
Status	Published - 2017

Bibliografisk information

Defence details
Date: 2017-02-10
Time: 10:15
Place: Edens hörsal, Paradisgatan 5H, Lund
External reviewer(s)
Name: Møller, Jørgen
Title: Professor
Affiliation: Aarhus University
---

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ)

Statsvetenskap

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statsinkomster
statsstyre
politisk utveckling
Rentier State
Rentierism
skattesystem
tidigmodern statsbildning
Sverige
europeisk historia

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abstract = "According to a venerable argument about the formation of political regimes in historical Europe, taxation goes hand in hand with representation, as financial needs forced rulers to trade rights for revenue. In this dissertation I explore the reverse assumption, asking whether it is the case that non-taxation went hand in hand with non-representation? I argue that early modern rulers who had access to what I conceptualize as {\textquoteleft}proprietary revenue{\textquoteright}—including profits from landownership, natural resource extraction, state-owned enterprise, and colonial plunder—could use such revenue to concentrate political authority in their own hands and rule as autocrats. Their fiscal independence made them politically impervious. In the empirical part of this thesis I use insights from the study of regime formation in modern oil states to guide my analysis of autocratic rule in early modern Sweden, a case that does not seem to fit existing theories of European political development. Most importantly, I find that rulers such as Gustav I (r. 1523-1560) and Karl XI (r. 1672-1697) would have been hard-pressed to set up autocratic regimes had they not been able to expand their royal domains and rule more as {\textquoteleft}landowner kings{\textquoteright} than {\textquoteleft}taxation kings.{\textquoteright} The main contributions of this dissertation are that (i) it develops our conceptual understanding of non-tax revenue; (ii) it explains why and how access to such revenue influences political arrangements; and (iii) it provides a novel explanation for regime formation in early modern Sweden.",

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N2 - According to a venerable argument about the formation of political regimes in historical Europe, taxation goes hand in hand with representation, as financial needs forced rulers to trade rights for revenue. In this dissertation I explore the reverse assumption, asking whether it is the case that non-taxation went hand in hand with non-representation? I argue that early modern rulers who had access to what I conceptualize as ‘proprietary revenue’—including profits from landownership, natural resource extraction, state-owned enterprise, and colonial plunder—could use such revenue to concentrate political authority in their own hands and rule as autocrats. Their fiscal independence made them politically impervious. In the empirical part of this thesis I use insights from the study of regime formation in modern oil states to guide my analysis of autocratic rule in early modern Sweden, a case that does not seem to fit existing theories of European political development. Most importantly, I find that rulers such as Gustav I (r. 1523-1560) and Karl XI (r. 1672-1697) would have been hard-pressed to set up autocratic regimes had they not been able to expand their royal domains and rule more as ‘landowner kings’ than ‘taxation kings.’ The main contributions of this dissertation are that (i) it develops our conceptual understanding of non-tax revenue; (ii) it explains why and how access to such revenue influences political arrangements; and (iii) it provides a novel explanation for regime formation in early modern Sweden.

AB - According to a venerable argument about the formation of political regimes in historical Europe, taxation goes hand in hand with representation, as financial needs forced rulers to trade rights for revenue. In this dissertation I explore the reverse assumption, asking whether it is the case that non-taxation went hand in hand with non-representation? I argue that early modern rulers who had access to what I conceptualize as ‘proprietary revenue’—including profits from landownership, natural resource extraction, state-owned enterprise, and colonial plunder—could use such revenue to concentrate political authority in their own hands and rule as autocrats. Their fiscal independence made them politically impervious. In the empirical part of this thesis I use insights from the study of regime formation in modern oil states to guide my analysis of autocratic rule in early modern Sweden, a case that does not seem to fit existing theories of European political development. Most importantly, I find that rulers such as Gustav I (r. 1523-1560) and Karl XI (r. 1672-1697) would have been hard-pressed to set up autocratic regimes had they not been able to expand their royal domains and rule more as ‘landowner kings’ than ‘taxation kings.’ The main contributions of this dissertation are that (i) it develops our conceptual understanding of non-tax revenue; (ii) it explains why and how access to such revenue influences political arrangements; and (iii) it provides a novel explanation for regime formation in early modern Sweden.

KW - revenue

KW - autocracy

KW - regime change

KW - fiscal sociology

KW - public finance

KW - state-building

KW - Sweden

KW - Early Modern Europe

KW - Rentier State

KW - royal power

KW - statsinkomster

KW - statsstyre

KW - politisk utveckling

KW - Rentier State

KW - Rentierism

KW - skattesystem

KW - tidigmodern statsbildning

KW - Sverige

KW - europeisk historia

M3 - Doctoral Thesis (monograph)

SN - 978-91-7753-155-5

T3 - Lund Political Studies

PB - Lund University

CY - Lund

ER -

The Money of Monarchs: The Importance of Non-Tax Revenue for Autocratic Rule in Early Modern Sweden

Sammanfattning

Bibliografisk information

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ)

Fria nyckelord

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