Two Countermeasures Against Hardware Trojans Exploiting Non-Zero Aliasing Probability of BIST

Elena Dubrova, Mats Näslund, Gunnar Carlsson, John Fornehed, Ben Smeets

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikel i vetenskaplig tidskriftPeer review


The threat of hardware Trojans has been widely recognized by academia, industry, and government agencies. A Trojan can compromise security of a system in spite of cryptographic protection. The damage caused by a Trojan may not be limited to a business or reputation, but could have a severe impact on public safety, national economy, or national security. An extremely stealthy way of implementing hardware Trojans has been presented by Becker et al. at CHES’2012. Their work have shown that it is possible to inject a Trojan in a random number generator compliant with FIPS 140-2 and NIST SP800-90 standards by exploiting non-zero aliasing probability of Logic Built-In-Self-Test (LBIST). In this paper, we present two methods for modifying LBIST to prevent such an attack. The first method makes test patterns dependent on a configurable key which is programed into a chip after the manufacturing stage. The second method uses a remote test management system which can execute LBIST using a different set of test patterns at each test cycle.

Sidor (från-till)371-381
Antal sidor11
TidskriftJournal of Signal Processing Systems
StatusPublished - 2017 juni 1
Externt publiceradJa

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© 2016, Springer Science+Business Media New York.

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