We-intentions and immunity to error through misidentification

When I intend to J, I may be wrong about what I intend but not about who intends
it. In this sense, action intentions appear immune to error. A standard explanation
of this immunity is that the subject of the intention is not represented in the content
of the intention in the first place. When I think that we intend to J, it seems obvious
that I can misjudge who ‘we’ are. This may seem to indicate that the ‘we’ must be
represented in the content of the intention. This argument from misidentification is
an objection against purely perspectival accounts of the distinction between I- and
we-intentions. However, in several relevant respects we-intentions and I-intentions
are on a par in relation to errors in identification, and the argument from misiden-
tification against the perspectival account of the distinction backfires.