Painful Pasts and Useful Memories. Remembering and Forgetting in Europe

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In order to bring research in Memory Studies conducted in the Nordic countries together, to connect existing knowledge and to promote cooperation, a group of scholars from the universities of Lund, Karlstad, Stavanger, Copenhagen, Helsinki and Tartu in 2009 initiated the Nordic Network in Memory Studies. That year the network was awarded financial support from NordForsk for three years, and a network project was launched with the title 'Towards a Common Past? Conflicting Memories and Competitive Historical Narratives in Europe after 1989.' The network presently includes about 45 researchers (both senior and PhD candidates). This book includes a selection of papers given by members of the NordForsk network during two workshop meetings in 2009 and 2010. Its aim is to demonstrate the variety of subjects and empirical cases that our network members deal with, as well as the range of disciplines they represent. The contributions to the volume are united by the authors' keen research interest in the functions and dynamics of cultural memory.
PAINFUL PASTS AND USEFUL MEMORIES
REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING IN EUROPE
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REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING IN EUROPE

Edited by:

Barbara Törnquist-Plewa & Niklas Bernsand

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Knowledge about the past and knowledge about how the past is interpreted, transmitted and used are of tremendous importance for the community. Researchers within the humanities and social sciences have always in one way or another dealt with these issues; yet the last two decades have seen a dramatically increased interest in them. Scholars speak of the memory turn within the humanities and social sciences, and a new multidisciplinary area of research called Memory Studies has been established. Its clearest manifestation was the creation in 2008 of the international interdisciplinary review Memory Studies. It is widely recognized that social memory (or collective/cultural memory), understood as emotionally loaded and durable representations of the past, is widely used by and within social groups and plays an important role for their identities, expectations and actions. Issues of memory are nowadays on the political and cultural agendas of most countries. The United Kingdom and France work through their colonial past; Spain tries to come to terms with the legacy of the Franco regime; Eastern European countries struggle with the legacy of Communism and ethnic cleanings of the twentieth century; Germany is dealing with both its Nazi and Communist past; and the Scandinavian countries, too, are reassessing and debating their history. A couple of examples among many are the Swedish debate on forced sterilization and racial research, and Norwegian and Finnish historians’ debates on their countries’ perception of their own roles in the Second World War.

It is no coincidence that the interest in issues of memory and use of history gathered momentum following the events of 1989, the end of the Cold War and the accelerated European integration process. These upheavals led to the need to question old collective (first and foremost, national) identities based on well-established ‘narratives’ about the past. New ‘narratives’, involving a rewriting of history, have emerged, dealing with events previously forgotten, hushed up or marginalized. The Holocaust has, for example, become a kind of founding memory in Europe, followed by interest in the memories of other ethnic cleanings and mass killings. The liberated narratives and memories have in many cases led to conflicts both within nations and between peoples and states (e.g. the conflict concerning the bronze soldier in Tallinn in 2007). At the same time, EU political and intellectual elites repeatedly attempt to create a common European identity; one based inter alia on shared history, shared collective memories, and a kind of unitary memory ethics stipulating what should be remembered, and in
which way. How do such ambitions relate to the innumerable ongoing memory conflicts in Europe? Are there any means of negotiating between these memories, between the various national identity projects and the European project? Intensified research is needed in order to answer these questions and others connected to them. On the basis of studies of concrete empirical cases, we need to investigate matters such as what kind of historical narratives are produced and how. How are memories of the past used, and how do they, in turn, affect people’s existence and their co-existence with others? Thus we also need to treat ethical and normative issues connected with memory issues. How is memory to be shaped in order to promote reconciliation and coming closer to the Other/s? How are traumatic memories to be handled?

These questions lie at the very heart of the research area called Memory Studies, but there are other important questions to be studied; for example, the actual dynamics of memory, memory mediation and the role of agency in this mediation, memory transmission across cultural borders, etc. The complexity of the field leads to the multi- and interdisciplinary character of research into memory politics and memory culture. It involves such disciplines as history, sociology, political science, psychology, cultural geography, anthropology, philosophy, educational sciences, urban planning (heritage maintenance), as well as aesthetic subjects such as literary studies, film studies and art history. This truly interdisciplinary research area is now firmly established in Germany, France and Britain, but is also growing rapidly both outside and inside other parts of Europe, including Scandinavia.

A number of Scandinavian researchers work within this sphere of cultural memory and the politics of memory that has emerged in Scandinavia since the end of the Cold War. An example thereof is the Swedish project ‘Living History’ (Levande historia) that started with a focus on the memory of the Holocaust, followed by research and information activities dealing with the crimes of the Communist regimes. Scandinavian researchers investigate the memory cultures of their own countries as well as those of others both within and outside Europe. At present there are a number of individual researchers in Scandinavia who work on memory issues in various ways, but the field is far from being consolidated. There is a strong need to bring this research together, to connect existing knowledge and promote cooperation. With this idea in mind, a group of scholars from the universities of Lund, Karlstad, Stavanger, Copenhagen, Helsinki and Tartu took the initiative to create a Nordic Network in Memory Studies. In 2009 the network was awarded financial support from NordForsk for three years. A network project was launched with the title ‘Towards a Common Past? Conflicting Memories and Competitive Historical Narratives in Europe after 1989.’ It presently includes about 45 researchers (both senior and PhD candidates) from five Nordic countries.

The core of the Nordic network consists of three dynamic, university-based networks on Memory Studies: one in Lund, established in 2007, around the research programme ‘Whose Memory? Which Future?’ at the Centre for European Studies, led by Barbara Törnquist-Plewa; one in Karlstad, the Memory Culture Research Group, launched in 2002 under the leadership of John Sundholm and Conny Mithander; and one in Stavanger in the programme area Memory Studies, established in 2008 and headed by Alexandre Dessingué.
The Nordic network, now active for two years, has among other things engendered such common activities as two PhD training courses, one PhD seminar, two workshops and several joint applications for funding of research projects to both EU and national research-financing bodies. The network has worked towards the internationalization of Nordic memory studies by inviting eminent researchers in the field from outside Scandinavia for guest lectures and including them in project applications that require greater international participation and collaboration (for example, the EU’s FP7 programme, the COST programme etc.). All these activities have been in line with the general aim of the network: to develop research in Memory Studies, to strengthen the position of this new research area in the Nordic countries, and make Nordic research on memory more visible in the international arena.

This book includes a selection of papers given by members of our network during the two workshop meetings in 2009 and 2010, made possible by a grant from NordForsk. Its aim is to demonstrate the variety of subjects and empirical cases that our network members deal with, as well as the range of disciplines they represent. What unites all the contributions to the volume is the authors’ keen research interest in the functions and dynamics of cultural memory.

It is important to underline that the present anthology should be regarded as work in progress. All authors continue to work on the subjects related to those presented here. The editors had no intention of providing the book with a unified theoretical and conceptual frame. It is meant to reflect the diversity of theoretical and methodological approaches present within Memory Studies and within our network as well.

Individual contributions

The contributions to the volume can be divided into a few thematic sub-groups. While six chapters relate to different aspects of memory cultures in Eastern European post-socialist societies and one text deals with memory culture in socialist Yugoslavia, two contributions analyse memory work in literature; either in the writings of a specific author or in a corpus of texts produced by writers from an ethnic group. The last two chapters present aspects of memory culture in Norway.

Several of the book’s chapters are devoted to post-socialist memory culture in Poland, Ukraine and Romania. Barbara Törnquist-Plewa (Lund University) in the first chapter provides an overview of the changing uses and non-uses of Holocaust memory in Poland, mainly highlighting history textbooks and political, intellectual and media debates. She also presents her own research on local memories of the pre-Holocaust Jewish population among present-day Poles in the small town of Szydlowiec. Agnes Malmström (Lund University) examines how memories of the Polish socialist model city of Nowa Huta are shaped by its contemporary inhabitants in the wake of a post-socialist re-evaluation and re-instrumentalization of the heritage from the recent past. Eleonora Narvselius (Lund University) explores how mnemonic actors in the political, intellectual and commercial fields in the Galician capital Lviv negotiate controversial
themes of regional and national memory narratives against the background of politically charged Ukrainian memory conflicts at the national level. A different look at the Ukrainian situation is proposed by Yuliya Yurchuk (Södertörn University College), who discusses the nexus between cultural trauma, collective memory and social trust in post-Soviet Ukraine. She shows how malfunctioning state institutions diminish citizens’ trust in state-sponsored memory narratives, which facilitates the work of other mnemonic actors in various media domains and in interpersonal communication. In the fifth chapter, Adrian Velicu (Karlstad University) draws on Aleida Assman’s notion of active remembering when analysing the historian Lucian Boia’s reinterpretation of key concepts of Romanian history and national identity discourses in post-socialist Romania.

Kristiina Korjonen-Kuusipuro (Lappeenranta State Technological University) and Anna-Kaisa Kuusisto-Arponen (University of Tampere) take into account oral narratives in their study of how Finnish refugees from those parts of Karelia ceded to the Soviet Union in connection with the Second World War remember the Finnish Karelia of the pre-Soviet period during visits made to their former homes in post-Soviet Karelia together with their families. In a chapter on the workings of socialist memory culture, Tea Sindbaek (Lund University) investigates how the Yugoslav regime after the Second World War tried to deal with memories of the multi-directed massacres and ethnic cleansing that took place in various parts of the Yugoslav territory during the war.

Alexandre Dessingué (University of Stavanger) is the author of the first of the book’s two chapters on memory work in literature. Dessingué focuses on Jorge Semprún’s autobiographical-cum-fictional work *Literature or Life*, which Dessingué analyses as a story both of and about memories. Miloslava Slavickova (Lund University) presents an overview of the emergence of a Czech- or Romani-language Roma literature in Czechoslovakia and the post-socialist Czech Republic. She pays particular attention to how Roma writers in their plays and stories have dealt with memories of the Nazi extermination policies directed against the Roma.

In the first of the two chapters devoted to Norwegian memory culture, Kjetil Knutsen (University of Stavanger) examines how contemporary Norwegian politicians from different ideological camps struggle for discursive ownership of the concept of the welfare state; a notion central to the development of state and society in Scandinavia in the twentieth century. In the concluding chapter of the anthology, Marie Smith-Solbakken (University of Stavanger) and Hans-Jørgen Wallin Weihe (Lillehammer University College/Maihaugen kulturhistorisk museum) discuss memorials and gravestones as artefacts of Norwegian memory culture.

We would like to express our gratitude to Mark Davies for the excellent work he did with the correction of the authors’ English.

Last but not least, we want to emphasize that this volume could be published thanks to economic support from the Centre for European Studies at Lund University, which is also the institutional coordinator of our Nordic network.

Lund, March 2012

*Barbara Törnquist-Plewa & Niklas Bernsand*
In the year 2000 Poland was shaken by a stormy public debate, the biggest one since the fall of Communism. The debate was caused by the book *Sąsiedzi (Neighbors)* published the same year by Jan Gross, a Polish-born American scholar. Polish media called this strong public reaction the 'Jedwabne affair', with reference to the name of the small town – Jedwabne – described in the book. The book documented how the Polish inhabitants of Jedwabne on 10 July 1941 killed their Jewish neighbours without any direct involvement from the Germans. Why did this fact upset the population so much that it made people on all levels of society engage in the debate? This can only be understood if we look at the memory of the Holocaust in Poland before the publication of *Neighbors*. In the following I will give an overview of how the Holocaust memory was shaped in Poland since the end of the Second World War and discuss the significance of Jedwabne affair for subsequently dealing with this memory.

‘Polonisation’ and Silence

In *The Bondage to the Dead* (1997) the American scholar Michael C. Steinlauf has convincingly shown how the Poles during the post-war years ‘Polonised’ the Holocaust. This does not mean that it was denied. On the contrary, the majority of Nazi crimes were documented and many criminals were tried. Immediately after the war, in the period 1945–1950, there was also considerable attention paid to the subject, resulting in the publishing of archive material as well as books and memoirs, mostly by survivors. The Polish public became familiar chiefly with such books as *Smoke over Birkenau* by S. Szmaglewska (1945), *Medallions* by Z. Nałkowska (1946), as well as *We Were In Auschwitz* (1946) and *Farewell to Maria* (1948) by T. Borowski. One of the first Polish films made shortly after the war, A. Ford’s *Border Street* (1948), dealt with the fate of the Jews of Warsaw. The same year a monument was erected in Warsaw commemorating the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. However, what occurred shortly afterwards was
that the focus was switched from the suffering and struggle of Jews to the struggle and suffering of the Communists\(^1\) and soon of the entire Polish nation. History books, both those written for scientific purposes\(^2\) and those directed at a broader readership, as well as documentaries and fictional films about the Second World War produced from the 1950s onwards, had a strong tendency to emphasise only Polish suffering and struggle. It was not denied that the Nazis wanted to exterminate all the Jews, but the Holocaust was presented as something that had hit Jews and Poles equally hard. This way of viewing the Holocaust grew constantly and became the only one the authorities accepted after the anti-Semitic campaign staged by the Polish Communist Party in 1968. The regime signalled this turn-about in the politics of memory already in 1967 by sacking the editors of the main, and prestigious, Polish encyclopaedia *Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna*, accusing them of erroneous statements in the entry ‘Nazi Concentration Camps’ in Volume 8, published in 1966. The entry stated, inter alia, that the extermination camps (Sobibor, Belzec, Chelmno, Treblinka II, Majdanek, Auschwitz-Birkenau), where about 5.7 million people were killed, had almost solely been intended for Jews, and 99% of the victims in these camps had indeed been Jews, while 1% had been Roma and others. The new editors were told to deliver a new text; one that was sent to all subscribers to the encyclopaedia, with the appeal to tear out the former and paste in the new one. The new entry conveyed the message: ‘extermination camps served the realisation of the biological destruction of the Polish nation … they were also a tool for the planned extermination of the Jewish people’ (quoted after Tych 1999). This version omitted to provide an explanation of the difference between concentration camps and extermination camps; the latter being intended for the mass killing of Jews and Roma. Thus the main Polish encyclopaedia and scores of other publications contributed to the blurring of the difference between the two kinds of camps in the consciousness of generations of Poles. Commemoration at the sites of the extermination camps became neglected. The state did not show much interest and consigned them to the care of local authorities. Until the 1990s there were no museums there. In the early 1960s monuments were erected, but with the exception of the memorial at Treblinka the other monuments – at Belzec, Sobibor and Chelmno – did not mention the Jewish identity of the majority of victims who had perished there.\(^3\) Generally speaking, almost all public attention was focused on concentration camps like Auschwitz, Majdanek and Stutthof, where Poles had constituted a large group of prisoners. These sites were raised to the status of central state museums. Auschwitz became a symbol of Polish martyrdom. Commemoration plaques placed at Auschwitz-Birkenau in 1967 informed visitors that ‘four million people’ had perished there. This very inflated number,\(^4\) and the fact that Jews were not explicitly mentioned, made many Poles believe that the majority of

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1 Jewish leftist Zionists and Communists in Poland had conflicting views about how to commemorate the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, and the Communist approach prevailed. For an analysis, see Shore (1998).

2 For an account of Polish historiography on the subject of the Holocaust, see Tomaszewski (2000).

3 In the 1990s the inscriptions were altered, and do now explicitly mention Jewish victims.

4 According to the most recent estimates, 960,000 Jews, 73,000 Poles, 21,000 Roma, 15,000 Soviet prisoners of war and about 15,000 people of other nationalities died at Auschwitz. For more about the commemoration at Auschwitz, see Huener (2003).
those killed at Auschwitz were ethnic Poles. An opinion poll conducted as late as 1995 showed that about 47% of Poles still believed this, while only 8% thought that the majority of victims were Jewish (Steinlauf 1997: 141). This false idea was able to gain a foothold because those Poles who grew up after the war were not informed about the number and proportion of Jews killed at Auschwitz-Birkenau. In fact, as late as the 1990s, there were few school textbooks that provided this information (Tych 1998:36).

Textbooks used in history teaching at school are far from being the only sources for young people’s image of the past, but are still important, especially since they for many pupils constitute the first contact with publications bearing the stamp of scientific authority. It is therefore interesting to investigate the kind of picture of the Holocaust that was conveyed in Polish history textbooks for about 50 years following the Second World War. There are some studies on this subject. The most comprehensive of them are Anna Radziwiłł’s analysis of Polish history textbooks for secondary schools from the period 1949–1988 (Radziwiłł 1989), and the quite detailed analysis of 39 history schoolbooks published in the years 1993–1997, carried out by a team of historians at the Jewish Institute of History (ŻiH) in Warsaw. Their findings confirm Steinlauf’s thesis concerning the ‘Polonising’ of the Holocaust in Polish public discourse. They also show that the Polonisation went beyond the Communist years studied by Steinlauf (i.e. 1950–1989), and changes in the post-Communist period came only very slowly.

Over the period from 1949 to the late 1990s there appeared several ‘generations’ of textbooks: 1950s textbooks, textbooks published in the early 1960s and, finally, the textbooks from the beginning of the 1970s, which were only very slowly replaced by the ‘new generation’ of post-Communist textbooks after 1989, while older books were simultaneously re-edited. Generally, there are major differences between textbooks from different ‘generations’: those from the 1950s blindly follow the Soviet model; those from the early 1960s drop the Stalinist language and bear the stamp of the ‘thaw’, while the books from the 1970s are marked by a nationalism that gradually diminishes in those published in the 1990s. However, as regards the Holocaust there is a striking continuity in the way this subject was presented during the whole period. The textbooks from the 1950s differ somewhat from the others by a relatively greater amount of information about the annihilation of the Jews and by the strong emphasis on their struggle in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, ostensibly led by Communists. Yet the Polonising tendency was already there, because the Uprising was presented as the work of the Polish Communist Party (PPR) and its underground military force, the People’s Army (see the textbook by Kormanowa (1953: 413–414).

Generally, a characteristic trait of all Polish history textbooks until the late 1990s was that the Holocaust in accounts of Second World War history was never given a special position. It was always presented solely as a part of Nazi policies in Poland, and information about it was included in chapters with such titles as ‘Hitler’s policy of the destruction of the Polish nation’, ‘Polish lands during the Second World War’,

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5 This analysis was commissioned by the Polish Ministry of Education in 1997 and should be seen in connection with the recommendations from the Polish–Israeli Commission for Schoolbooks in 1995. See the special issue of *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego* (1997: 183–184). See also Tych (1998).
or ‘The struggle of the Polish nation against the [German] occupier.’ In this context, the persecution and annihilation of the Jews became marginalised; an event among many others. In one quite popular (running to fifteen editions) textbook for the fourth year of primary school (9–10-year-olds) the authors describe the German occupation of Poland in 1939–1945 and never once mention the word 'Jewish’. The book states: 'The occupiers wanted to annihilate as many Poles as possible and force those who stayed alive to work for the Germans. … In order to destroy the Poles, the Nazis set up concentration camps called death factories. Thousands of Poles died in these camps of hunger, cold, hard work and beatings. The largest death camp was Oświęcim [Auschwitz]’ (see the 1998 textbook by Cętkowski/Syta. Quoted after Tych 1998: 37).

In textbooks for secondary schools, the annihilation of the Jews was described, but in a way that did not highlight the exceptionality of their fate. In her study Anna Radziwiłł gives examples of how this was achieved. The context in the book could for instance suggest that all camps, including extermination camps, were meant mainly for Poles. In the parts summarising the effects of the Second World War in Poland, the author limited himself to laconic remarks about the 6 million Polish citizens who had perished, including 3 million Jews. Other authors placed information about the Holocaust in a chapter entitled ‘The extermination of the Polish, Jewish and Gypsy population’ (Radziwiłł 1989, vol.4: 415). The impression given in the textbooks written this way was that the Nazis had planned to physically eradicate the entire Polish population – Poles, as well as national minorities including Jews. The suffering of the Jews was put on an equal footing with that of others, and generations of Poles who grew up with textbooks written in that spirit never fully understood the extremely vulnerable position of the Jews compared to other nationalities.

A question that has until recently never been discussed in Polish history textbooks is the attitude of the Polish population towards the Jews during the Holocaust. The general tendency, strengthened after 1968, was to emphasise Polish support and sympathy for them. The textbooks created the impression that attitudes of this kind dominated in occupied Poland (Trojański 1998:68). Anti-Semitism in Polish society was mentioned mainly only in schoolbooks written in the 1950s but described as characteristic only for ‘reactionary forces’ (Radziwiłł 1989: 414); a label put on all political opponents. Examples of Poles blackmailing and denouncing persecuted Jews reappeared in textbooks from the 1980s, when some authors became more daring in the wake of the Solidarity years of 1980–1981. However, the authors added comments to this information, stating that those Poles who denounced Jews originated exclusively from criminal circles and that their activities against Jews ‘met with general condemnation by the Polish people’. Even textbooks from the 1990s did not contain any information about the widespread indifference in Polish society towards the Jews, and asserted that cases of collaboration were extremely rare. What was more, as if aiming to counterbalance the examples of Polish collaboration, a few authors were eager to mention examples of Jewish collaboration with the Nazis (ibid: 416) and stress the supposed Jewish passivity towards Nazi oppression (see the textbooks by Szczęśniak

Nothing was said in this context about uprisings in ghettos (except that in Warsaw) or the lack of Polish support for Jewish fighters.

To sum up, the picture of the Holocaust transmitted in Polish schools from 1949 to the late 1990s was grossly distorted. Omissions were plentiful, as was false information. Being aware about this might help to understand the shock many Poles felt when they were confronted with Gross’ account of the murder in Jedwabne.

Analysis of the history schoolbooks demonstrates how the memory of Jewish life and annihilation in Poland was pushed aside in official discourse. However, the question remains: What happened with this memory on the local level in the multitude of Polish small towns, many of shtetl character, which had lost their Jewish population during the war and saw a total population change after the Holocaust? What happened in private discourse, on the local level and in family narratives? As for other events during the Second World War which were also taboo in official discourse, such as the Katyn massacre, there was widespread transmission of memories within families, on the private level, that often contested the official discourse. Was it the same with the memory of Jews? Or is Jan Gross (2000), the author of *Neighbors*, correct in claiming that the victims of the Holocaust had never been mourned in Poland?

In two studies (Törnquist-Plewa 2006, 2007) I tried to shed more light on these issues by analysing the memory of Jews and the Holocaust in Szydlowiec – a typical formerly Jewish-dominated small town in central Poland. There, 75% of the pre-war inhabitants were Jews, and almost all of them were deported to Treblinka and killed.

In order to capture the local memory of these past events I studied cultural preservation in the town (i.e. what buildings, names, etc. have been preserved and what has not been considered important enough to preserve); cultural performances (commemoration ceremonies, monuments, exhibitions), and historical writings about the locality. I also made use of ‘oral history’, conducting interviews with local Polish people, and surveys among pupils, from young children to teenagers, at local schools. It is not my intention here to present the study, but I would like to refer to some of its conclusions.

The study showed that the Jewish past of Szydlowiec has until recently been suppressed by its Polish inhabitants. No demolished buildings connected with Jewish life in the town were rebuilt. The street names referring to Jewish life – Rabbi Street, Synagogue Street – were changed. A secondary school was built on the site of the synagogue, and four blocks of flats on the site of the former Jewish Square that was once the main arena for the town’s trade. Children who grew up in these new blocks had no idea that they lived in the centre of the old Jewish neighbourhood.

There are still elements in the townscape which bring to mind the old shtetl life. One is a small, private synagogue that the Jewish owner of a local tannery built for his workers. However, very few people in the town know that this building, now a pub, was once a prayer house. This and other traces of Jewish life in the townscape are unrecognisable for most inhabitants, and therefore cannot function as sites of memory.

A remnant that through the years has challenged the collective oblivion of the Jewish past in Szydlowiec is the Jewish cemetery, with the oldest gravestones dating from the eighteenth century. After the war the cemetery became derelict. The local authorities turned a blind eye to the disappearance of gravestones, which were used as building
materials. In 1956–1957 the local authorities decided to clear the place and make room for a department store and a sports field for schoolchildren. Those gravestones that were still in fairly good condition were moved to the tiny remaining part of the cemetery, which subsequently sank into oblivion. The Jewish cemetery was conspicuously absent from the official list of town monuments and historical sites compiled by the local authorities in 1957. It was only in the 1980s that the authorities in Szydlowiec began to care more about the state of the cemetery and eliminated traces of the worst decay.

The material remains of Jewish life are thus still in the town, but they do not form part of the rhetoric of commemoration which was established in Szydlowiec after the war. Here, as well as in other places in Poland, local schools became the keepers of one or more historical sites connected with the Second World War. Ceremonies were held, scouts mounted guards and laid down flowers. This organised commemoration in Szydlowiec never included the Jewish victims of the Holocaust. A visitor will not find any commemoration plaques stating that the town lost the majority of its inhabitants during the Holocaust. The same visitor will not become more informed by reading local guide books. They do mention the large number of Jews in Szydlowiec, as well as their annihilation during the war, but the marginal space given to this information is remarkable. The Holocaust in local history writing is marked by marginalisation, dissociation and externalisation. This means that the Holocaust, which led to the death of nearly all Szydlowiec’s Jews, is depicted as if it took place only outside the town (in the death camps) and did not impinge on the life of the rest of the inhabitants. In local historical narratives, the killing in 1942–1943 of three-quarters of the town’s inhabitants does not constitute a dramatic break in its history. It is an event among many others, while the narrative emphasises continuity. The Jews are presented in Szydlowiec’s history in such a way that readers do not get a chance to realise that the town once was a shtetl. Nor can they grasp that the Holocaust took place in its streets and squares.

The results of the interviews, surveys and field observations I conducted in the town show that the oldest generation did not want to remember the Jewish past of Szydlowiec. They transmitted to the post-war generations a very limited amount of information about life in the town before the war, and practically no memories about events in the town during the Holocaust. However, the surveys I conducted among local schoolchildren show that the older people at the same time managed to transmit a considerable amount of negative ideas about Jews and even anti-Semitic prejudices. One can evidently adopt an attitude of antipathy when one’s nearest (parents or grandparents) clearly show that they dislike something or someone. They do not need
to explain. Gestures, tone of voice, mimicry and brief casual remarks are enough. The parents’ phobias become those of their children.

The young people in Szydlowiec started just recently, in the 1990s, to discover the Jewish past of their town, thanks to a few enthusiastic schoolteachers. These teachers hope that the memory of the Holocaust and of the Jews in their town may help in combating remnants of anti-Semitism among the youngsters and make the children more tolerant and open-minded towards other cultures.10

As for the young people in Szydlowiec, they were surprised when teachers and other people from outside Szydlowiec made them realise that they lived in a former shtetl (Törnquist-Plewa 2006: 209–214). To be given an identity which is completely unfamiliar produces an unpleasant feeling of amnesia. To overcome it, to find orientation and security in their local identity, many of the younger inhabitants of Szydlowiec wish to familiarise themselves with the Jewish history of their town; a phenomenon not unusual in the former shtetls of contemporary Poland.11

There are also those in the town who nowadays want to remember because they have realised that Jewish memorabilia have commercial value and attract tourists. What are the forces driving those who want to remember? Why do others want to forget? ‘The motives of memory are never pure’, Young (1993: 2) writes.

I would claim that as a former shtetl, Szydlowiec has not been exceptional in its unwillingness to remember its Jewish past. In fact, the results of other studies suggest that Szydlowiec is quite typical in this respect.12

Behind the processes of forgetting

What are the reasons behind the process of the Polonisation of the Holocaust in Poland? What are the reasons behind the repression of Holocaust memories in former shtetls like Szydlowiec?

An explanation is to be found in a number of social, psychological and political factors that are intertwined with each other, and with a legacy of anti-Semitism. In my view it is not possible to discuss the memory of the Holocaust in Poland without taking into account Polish–Jewish relations before the Holocaust, and especially anti-Semitism in inter-war Poland. The origins and development of anti-Semitism in Poland have been analysed by several researchers.13 My study of the former shtetl Szydlowiec

10 Interview with the local history teacher Slawa Hanusz in 2004. See also Törnquist-Plewa (2006: 197–198).
11 Extra impetus is provided by educational competitions for schools and pupils on the subject of the Holocaust and the Jewish heritage in Poland, arranged by organisations like the ‘Shalom’ Foundation, the Polish Institute for National Memory (IPN), the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw and others.
12 See, for example, Ewa Hoffman’s Shtetl (1987) and Rosa Lehmann’s Symbiosis and Ambivalence (2001).
13 For example, Cała (2005), Hertz (1998), Opalski/Bartal (1992), and Tokarska Bakir (2004). Moreover, many articles published throughout the years in the journal Polin, edited by A. Polonsky, touch upon this subject.
also confirms that strong negative attitudes towards the Jews existed before the war. In both Polish and Jewish narratives, the pre-war shtetl emerges as a place for deep social, cultural and national divisions, as well as ethnic competition for scarce economic resources. The picture of Poles and Jews in pre-war Szydlowiec confirms a claim made by the researcher Rosa Lehmann; namely, that the relations between Jews and Poles in shtetls had the character of a patron–client relationship (Lehmann 2001: 169–170). Lehmann argues that while the Jews with the collapse of feudalism lost their traditional role (in Poland) as brokers between landlords and serfs, they gained a new role as patrons in the new economy of growing capitalism, providing access to such resources as jobs and funds for their peasant clients. This was possible because Jews constituted a kernel of the urban population in the otherwise poorly urbanised Polish lands, specialising in trade and crafts, and they were usually also better educated than Polish peasants. My interviews with the inhabitants of Szydlowiec show that the economic dependency on Jewish patrons entailed social envy among Polish clients (poor peasants looking for work or loans in difficult times), as well as among competitors, viz. the Polish lower middle class who aspired to build up their own small businesses. The Jews were viewed as rivals and economic oppressors. The superiority of Jewish competitors was not accepted in the same way as that of Polish counterparts. Because of existing strong religious and ethnic boundaries upheld by both communities, Jews were defined as ‘the others’. They were seen as strangers who, according to some informants in my study, ’were not to rule us Poles in our own country’ (Törnquist-Plewa 2006: 216). This quotation echoes the nationalistic rhetoric of pre-war Poland and reflects the national dimension of the conflict. In the 1930s the majority of Poles adopted the definition of the Polish nation propagated by the National-Democratic Party, viz. an ethnic community with its language and Catholic religion as the main identity markers. In this way the Jews were by definition excluded from the national community. The National-Democratic propaganda represented the Jews as the great enemy of the Poles when it came to economic issues. It proclaimed that the Poles, as a nation forming a state, should recover their rightful place in the economy of the country. In a situation with a genuinely felt economic imbalance in many shtetls around Poland, this propaganda fell on fertile ground and anti-Semitism increased significantly. The exclusion of the Jews from the Polish national community meant that the solidarity and moral standards which applied to the Polish ethnic group did not extend to them. This became obvious when the Nazis occupied Poland and enacted their extermination policies against the Jews. Both Poles and Jews confirm such a situation in their accounts. Blackmail, betrayals, looting and various attacks were not rare (ibid: 205–208; see also Enkelking 2001 and Melchior 2004).

In Poland, where attempts to hide Jews were punishable by death, people were put to a severe test. Bearing in mind the anti-Semitism and estrangement between Poles and Jews before the war, it is perhaps not surprising that the Poles failed it. More than 90 % of Poland’s Jews were killed during the Second World War. Perhaps more would have been rescued if assisting Jews had received the same social support as other forms of resistance also punishable by death; for instance, assisting the guerrillas, military

14 For an analysis of this role, see Rosman (1990).
sabotage, etc. These activities were generally encouraged and supported by the Polish community, while helping Jews mostly was not. Moreover, after the war, many of those who had helped Jews preferred to keep silent about it, since these actions were far from appreciated in their communities.15

In Poland the issue of Polish anti-Semitism and its significance for the behaviour of Poles during the Holocaust is extremely sensitive and has for a long time been taboo. The Poles suffered considerably during the war and have always seen themselves solely as victims. An important element in Polish identity has for over two hundred years indeed been that of the victim. Since the end of the eighteenth century national calamities and suffering constitute the core of Polish national history: partitions of the country; oppression under foreign powers for more than a hundred years; and then again, but for a short respite of twenty years, the occupation and terror of the Second World War, which in turn was followed by Communist oppression. With such experiences, the Poles have been inclined to put their own tribulations in the centre of collective memory. The memory process implies a selection. People tend to see and remember what corresponds to their expectations or needs. There is a connection between memory and identity, and they are in a complex interaction. In this light, the Poles had no difficulty in internalising the Holocaust as only one of many Nazi crimes in Poland, and thus did not give it a prominent place in the Polish collective memory. Remembering oneself primarily in the role of victim also effectively pushed aside the question of one’s own responsibility. Trying to repress memories that cause pain, shame or a guilty conscience are well-known psychological mechanisms, which can contribute to the understanding of the Poles’ non-use of Holocaust memory.

The reasons for the difficulty of dealing with the memory of the Holocaust should also be sought in its social consequences. The Holocaust was a significant factor in the social and demographic transformation of Poland during and just after the war. About three million Jews disappeared and millions of poor Poles moved from suburbs and villages to the Jewish town centres, especially those in small towns. As soon as the Jews were gone, Poles were ready to take over their shops and small businesses. They moved into the empty Jewish houses and helped themselves to those Jewish possessions the Germans had left behind. Thus the Jews’ fate during the Second World War turned out to be economically advantageous for large groups of Poles. Perhaps the scale of the post-war silence about the Jews and the Holocaust is proportional to the scale of participation in the lootings? This was nothing to be proud of. The fact that those who took the place of the Jews did not want to tell their children and grandchildren about what had occurred would suggest that the memories led to a kind of guilt and moral discomfort. Anti-Semitism helped combat possible feelings of guilt. The old stereotypes, the belief that ‘Jews have always been the oppressors and enemies of Poles’, could thrive because they helped interpret events during and after the war as a kind of ‘historical justice’. They alleviated remorse and could be used to legitimise (for oneself and others) the right to the acquired Jewish property. In this way, the taking over of Jewish possessions by Poles created the breeding ground for a kind of secondary

15 For testimonies on this matter, see for instance Tych (1999b: 63–67).
anti-Semitism (an anti-Semitism without Jews) that could in some form be transmitted to post-war generations.

The new inhabitants of the Jewish houses gradually legalised their ownership. However, these owners are constantly worried that what was thus acquired might one day be taken from them. Some fear to this day that the Jews will return to take back what belonged to them (Törnquist-Plewa 2006: 218). This fear does not help in remembering the past. People want to forget the cause of their fear.

Anti-Semitism connected to a series of psychological and social factors might explain why memories have not been transmitted from one generation to another. That being said, this grass-root level resolve to forget might have been neutralised had there been a political will and institutions attempting to work through the memories and the legacy of anti-Semitism. However, for a long time after the war there were no such political forces in Poland. On the contrary, the Communist regime that ruled the country in the years 1945 – 1989 manipulated the Holocaust memory and did not hesitate to use anti-Semitism as a political weapon.

During the first post-war years the regime launched a campaign against anti-Semitism. Yet the problem was that accusations of anti-Semitism were used indiscriminately in order to discredit, both in the West and in Poland, the anti-Communist opposition enjoying considerable support in society. The regime’s depiction of all political opponents as anti-Semites and Fascists did not sound credible to the Poles. At the same time, the Communists’ condemnation of anti-Semitism was welcomed by the remaining Jews in Poland. Many Jews who feared anti-Semitism in Polish society had based their hopes for a future in Poland on the promises made by the regime about a discrimination-free and equal society. However, in this country, where the stereotype of Jewish Communism had prevailed since the 1920s, the slightest support given by the Jews to the regime nourished anti-Semitism.

This tendency can be illustrated by the situation in the shtetl I have studied. When the Red Army chased the Germans from Szydlowiec in 1945 and began setting up new authorities, Abram Finkler, the leader of a small Jewish guerrilla unit and formerly a teacher in the town, was appointed head of the local police. One of his tasks was to fight the Polish guerrilla units who were in opposition to the Communist rulers. It transpired from my interviews that the local Poles had been upset about this situation. The few Jews who had returned to Szydlowiec were viewed as the favourites of the new regime. The assistance they received from regional authorities and Jewish organisations was interpreted as privileges. This contributed to the hostile atmosphere that made the few Jewish survivors (about 100) leave the town.

The Polish Communist regime tried to quash the idea that there was a connection between Jews and the new powers by deliberately concealing the Jewish origin of some people in high administrative and political posts, but this only made the situation worse

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16 Such descriptions were, for instance, given in schoolbooks of the 1950s. See Radziwiłł (1989: 414) and Trojański (1998: 68).
17 The stereotype was reinforced during the Polish–Soviet War in 1920–1921 because of the support given by the Polish Communist Party to Soviet Russia. Communists of Jewish origin were visible among the Party leaders.
(Kersten & Shapiro 1989: 261). During the popular protests against the regime in 1956, voices were heard accusing ‘the Jews in government’ of the ‘anti-Polish policy’ of the regime and of Stalinist crimes. These voices were hushed up but the crack within the governing elite was revealed. Some Party members were clearly ready to use the Jews as scapegoats and wriggle out of their own responsibility. Thus the situation of the Jews in Poland in the years 1956 – 1968 was vulnerable.

March 1968 saw the implementation of the scenario left over from 1956. The Israeli–Arab conflict and student riots at universities around the country provided a suitable pretext. Communists of Jewish origin were accused of Zionism, expelled from the Party, harassed and more or less forced to emigrate. The so-called ‘Jews in government’ were pointed out as responsible for the mistakes and crimes of the regime.

Reactions abroad were swift, and Western media described the events in Poland as yet another example of ‘Polish anti-Semitism’. The regime answered by launching an intensive propaganda campaign stating that Jews and Germans together accused the Poles of anti-Semitism and participation in the Holocaust, including death camps and the like. Polish media firmly asserted that there had never been any anti-Semitism in Poland, and pupils in Polish schools were taught that Poles had always been friendly towards Jews (Trojański 1998: 68) who now showed their ingratitude. Any talk about anti-Semitism in Poland was described as evil rumours spread by Poland’s enemies. Thus Polish anti-Semitism was mentioned in a context intended to (and in 1968 in some circles actually did) arouse anti-Semitism. This made the issue so delicate that many Polish intellectuals, who saw what the regime was doing, had difficulties discussing it for many years to come, fearing that they would be misunderstood or receive unwanted reactions from the public. The subject of anti-Semitism and Jews generally became taboo for a long time.

The reconstruction of memory

The taboo around the history of the Polish–Jewish relations was gradually undermined by the late 1970s. This happened in connection with the emergence of a democratic underground opposition, first and foremost the organisation called KOR (The Committee for the Defence of Workers). Its activists and supporters took up the issue of Jewish–Polish relations and condemned anti-Semitism. According to the historians Kersten and Shapiro (1989: 265): ’Among the ideals of this movement was the need for authentic – and not illusory and alibi-creating – absolution for the sin of indifference towards anti-Jewish actions and for their silent concealment especially when they were undertaken by Poles.’ This oppositional movement made younger Poles, especially those from intelligentsia circles, interested in the history of Polish Jews; the history they had for so long been denied. This interest grew even more after the emergence of the democratic mass movement Solidarity in 1980, and actually continued in spite of the introduction of martial law in 1981. The leaders of the democratic opposition considered that tackling the legacy of anti-Semitism was very important for the moral renewal of society.
as a whole, which was part of the Solidarity programme. It should also be added that the Catholic intelligentsia grouped around the review Tygodnik Powszechny were particularly committed to this process; a fact of great importance in Catholic Poland.

In the 1980s the Communist regime tacitly acquiesced to the steadily growing interest for Jewish history. Apparently, it did not want to confront the opposition on this matter as well, since this was an issue that they could hold use against the authorities. In 1981 Solidarity managed to negotiate with the education authorities a new history curriculum for schools, in which ‘the annihilation of Polish Jews’ was specified as an important topic (Trojański 1998: 68). This curriculum remained largely intact even after the imposition of martial law in December 1981; but Solidarity, by then forbidden to act in any legal capacity, could not see to its implementation. Thus classroom teaching about the Holocaust and its treatment in textbooks changed only slightly. However, from 1981 onwards the regime allowed books and films on the history of Jews in Poland, and did not hamper initiatives to restore Jewish memorials. In the period 1981–89 there appeared more publications on this subject than in the previous thirty years (Tomaszewski 2000: 163). That being said, the sensitive subject of the Poles’ attitude towards the Jews during the Holocaust was generally avoided, while those publications that touched upon it were censored and published in only a minimum of copies.

This issue was first brought more publicly to the fore with Lanzman’s film Shoah in 1985, and then after the publication of Jan Błoński’s essay Biedni Polacy patrzą na getto (Poor Poles Watching the Ghetto) in 1987. While the picture of Polish–Jewish relations given by Shoah was generally dismissed by Poles as an unjust attack by a foreigner who failed to understand the situation, Błoński’s essay led to a long and rather bitter debate. However, the debate was mostly confined to the intellectual elite associated with Tygodnik Powszechny, the Catholic intellectual weekly that published the essay. Nevertheless, this debate drove more historians to investigate the issue and, after the breakdown of Communism, the 1990s saw a number of publications on this and related subjects. Let me mention just a few of them: Krystyna Kersten’s Polacy, Żydzi, Komunizm: Anatomia półprawd 1939-68 (Poles, Jews, Communism: an Anatomy of Half-truths, 1939–68) from 1992; Barbara Enkelking Boni’s Zagłada i pamięć (Holocaust and Memory) from 1994, Jan Gross’ Upiorna dekada (The Ghastly Decade) from 1998, and Feliks Tych’s Długi cień Zagłady (The Long Shadow of the Holocaust) from 1999. Moreover, the Catholic reviews Więź (1999) and Znak (2000) published special issues discussing these questions. These publications led to the emergence of a different picture of Polish–Jewish relations during the Second World War. However, this knowledge did not reach the broad public. It was not reflected in history textbooks used in schools in the 1990s. A breakthrough came first with Gross’ Sąsiedzi (Neighbors) in 2000, which received enormous public attention and

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18 See the analysis of the textbooks in the subsection ‘Polonisation and Silence’ in this article.

19 The Jewish cemetery in Szydłowiec can serve here as an example. In the 1980s it was ‘discovered’ by intellectuals from Warsaw. This interest made the town authorities view the cemetery as a site deserving maintenance and carry out the most urgent repairs.

20 A list of these publications is to be found in Tomaszewski (2000).
was discussed nationwide. This book was the first one taken into active use for the discussion of the image and place of the Holocaust in Polish collective memory. The question that imposes itself in this context is: why did the book play this role? Was it because of the provocative message of Neighbors? Or was it because the book was published and brought to the fore not only in Poland but also abroad. All this certainly played a part. However, as I argued in the study of the debate on Jedwabne (Törnquist-Plewa 2003), the main reasons for the reactions to the book must be sought in the specific needs and conditions of Polish society at the time of its appearance; a time of dramatic post-Communist transformations of Polish society.

The active use of the Holocaust memory during the Jedwabne affair and changes thereafter

The analysis of the debate on Jedwabne gives reason to claim that the book Neighbors met certain needs in Polish society in the years 2000–2001. The memory of the Holocaust that the book evoked could be used by different groups and fulfil a number of functions. Applying a typology of various uses of history formulated by the Swedish historian Klas-Göran Karlsson,21 I would like to distinguish several different uses of Holocaust history in Poland during the debate on Jedwabne. Firstly, it was used in a scholarly way: to establish facts and discuss various interpretations of the past. Thus, for the first time a broad and open scholarly debate took place regarding the connection between anti-Semitism and the behaviour of the Poles during the Holocaust. Secondly, it was used morally: to rehabilitate Jewish victims and seek reconciliation between Poles and Jews. Thirdly, the memory of Jedwabne and Holocaust history was also used ideologically, in the struggle between liberals, on the one hand and the nationalistic Right on the other. The liberals wanted to turn Jedwabne into an important turning point in Polish collective consciousness. They wanted to question the Polish ethnic definition of nation, national myths and the self-image of the Poles as innocent victims. They used the Holocaust memory for fighting nationalism and xenophobia.

The nationalists, on the other hand, hoped to benefit politically from the debate by presenting themselves as the defenders of Polishness against the attacks by liberals, Germans and Jews. According to them, Jedwabne was an attack on Polish interests, Poland’s international reputation and the Polish national cultural heritage.

The memory of Jedwabne was used both ideologically and politically. The political elite acted decisively in order to use Jedwabne in a way that could create a good image of Poland instead of a negative one. The ceremony in Jedwabne in 2001, and the public

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21 He distinguishes the following types of uses of history: scholarly, moral, existential, ideological, and a ‘non-use’. It is important to point out that his understanding of the concept of ‘history’ is very broad. It goes beyond the field of scholarly historical writing and encompasses all products of historical culture. Thus ‘collective memory’ is part of history understood in this way. See Klas-Göran Karlsson (2003).
apology made by Poland’s President, served this purpose. Last but not least, the memory of Jedwabne and the Holocaust history in Poland were used existentially. Jedwabne became the catalyst for a broad discussion, albeit led by intellectuals, about Polish national identity, its contents and its future. Polish liberal intellectuals used Jedwabne to discuss the compatibility of Polish national identity with modern society, with Europeanisation. They wanted Poland to be seen in Europe and the world as a modern, democratic, open society. They already identified with (and wanted to be identified as) Europeans, and Europe for them meant among other things a community possessing such values as freedom, democracy and tolerance. For this reason they could not refuse to rise to the challenge that Gross’ book constituted; namely, to deal with the legacy of anti-Semitism.

This explains to a great extent why Gross’ book received such huge attention. The discussion of traumatised memory was rendered possible through an interaction of the actors (Gross and leading Polish intellectuals) and changed conditions in society. It had taken more than ten years of freedom and normalisation of life in Poland, ten years of freedom of speech and democracy-building, before the Poles were able to discuss these sensitive questions which address their national identity. They needed to feel that their democracy was strong and stable before they could confront the dark pages of their history. You have to feel secure before you dare to question yourself; something the Poles have dared to do in the Jedwabne debate. It seems that the time that has passed since Poland became a free country has successively prepared society for a revaluation of old myths and representations. Moreover, the young generation who have grown up after 1989 and hardly remember Communist times do not have the same emotional attachment to those myths as their parents and grandparents.

Has the debate on Jedwabne caused a change in the Polish collective memory of the Holocaust? Opinion polls conducted immediately after the debate did not indicate such a change. However, during the years that followed the Jedwabne affair one could observe a clear change in public discourse about the Holocaust. The question concerning Polish guilt returned constantly. A new wave of research publications by a younger generation of scholars emerged, one documenting the Polish involvement in the Holocaust. Moreover, Jan T. Gross has continued to shape the public discourse on the Holocaust by publishing two other books: Strach (Fear) in 2009 and Złote żniwa (Golden Harvest) in 2011. Both have focused on Polish anti-Semitism in the immediate aftermath of the Holocaust and provoked lively debates, shorter than in the case of Jedwabne, but likewise intense. It seems that the Poles today engage in almost

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22 It is important to point out that all these uses of history can be separated on an analytical level, but in practice they are intimately connected.

23 For an analysis of the Polish discourse on Europe, see Barbara Törnquist-Plewa (2002).

24 In an opinion survey conducted in the autumn of 2001 by CBOS (The Polish Public Opinion Research Centre), 90% of one thousand randomly chosen Poles answered ‘yes’ to the question if they had heard about Jedwabne. At the same time the majority (about 80%) of those interviewed refused to accept the fact that the Poles should take upon themselves the whole responsibility for the crime. For the details, see Gazeta Wyborcza, 7, September 2001.

25 See for example, publications from the Center for Holocaust Studies at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw.
compulsive examining and re-examining of their relations to Jews, reinterpreting and battling over this memory. The debates show, however, that the Polish public is still very ambivalent and divided on the issue.²⁶ The memory of Polish guilt is politicised and ideologicised, with a sharp line between liberals and the nationalist Right. The debates indicate clearly that it is first and foremost the liberal Polish intellectual and political elites that stand for a changed view on the history of the Holocaust in Poland. However, they try to influence the broader public so that they, too, make this memory their own. The work on this is now underway. Clear examples thereof are changes regarding teaching about the Holocaust in textbooks and school curricula i.e., documents specifying what has to be taught by history teachers. The new curriculum issued by the Polish Ministry of Education in 2002 (about a year after the debate on Jedwabne) stated inter alia that Holocaust history is a compulsory topic and should be given special attention. During the years following the Jedwabne affair, there appeared at last a new generation of history schoolbooks that treat the Holocaust as a separate, important issue, differentiate it from Nazi policies towards Poles, and do not avoid the sensitive question of anti-Semitism among Poles during the Holocaust. Several textbooks also specifically mention the murder in Jedwabne.²⁷ Besides general textbooks, there are scores of new auxiliary publications that can be used in teaching about the Holocaust, such as: textbooks that specifically deal with the Holocaust,²⁸ published sources, educational packages, internet-based educational exhibitions,²⁹ and many others. For the first time since the Second World War, Polish schoolchildren have the chance to learn about the Holocaust as a catastrophe for both European and Polish civilisation; to try to internalise it and confront it morally and emotionally, both as Poles and as human beings.

For logistical reasons the Nazis chose Poland as the place to carry out the ‘Final Solution’. Poland’s connection with the topography of the Holocaust involves a tragic heritage; one that imposes obligations. The Poles have just started rethinking the Holocaust. There is much to be done, and the effects of the educational work initiated will hopefully appear in the years to come. We will see these effects the day when graffiti depicting the Star of David hanging from the gallows disappear from the walls of Polish cities, or at least are treated with general disgust and strong condemnation.

References


Gross, Jan (2011): Złote źniwa, Kraków.


In the summer of 2006 I visited a film marathon in Nowa Huta, a once-upon-a-time socialist model town founded in 1949, and incorporated into its sister city Kraków in 1951. The marathon took place under the open skies in central Nowa Huta and presented visitors with films from different periods of its history: from the heyday of Stalinism in the 1950s to the Solidarity struggles in the 1980s. I remember from that evening an exciting feeling of being exposed to a wild mix of images and stories from Nowa Huta’s past, while surrounded by people and buildings that had – so to speak – “been around when it all happened.” It was as though Nowa Huta had let me in for a moment on some of the memories it harbored in its monumental buildings, on its streets and in the stories of its inhabitants.

After the marathon I found myself more attached to this supposedly drab and dangerous and – still, after all these years – socialist (in appearance and mentality) suburb of Krakow. I read up on Huta’s history, visited its city center time and again, and soon realized that I was not alone in my fascination. Quite the contrary: Nowa Huta was becoming increasingly popular among tourists looking for the socialist past, artists searching for new venues and, most importantly, among young Nowohucianie hunting for their roots. This flow of people, ideas and identity projects had once again made Nowa Huta – a place with a long tradition of celebrating and discussing itself, and of being discussed by others – a “hot topic” in the public debate.
Particularly heated was the debate on Nowa Huta’s socialist past and on what kind of remembrance it deserved. Which of its memories ought to be highlighted, and which ought to be left to oblivion? Nowa Huta was far from alone in struggling with these issues. After the election of 2005, when the conservative party PiS (Law and Order) gained parliamentary power, the socialist past had entered the very center of political life and public discourse in Poland. As ardent critics of drawing a “thick line” over the socialist past – and, more generally, of “relativization” of history (Śpiewak 2005: 199) – PiS launched the project Czwarta Rzeczpospolita, The Fourth Republic, which, in comparison to its Third predecessor, would make a clean sweep of the remnants of the People’s Republic of Poland. New lustration and decommunization laws were introduced, and the official rhetoric on memory was dressed in a highly martyrlogic and nationalist language (Nijakowski 2008: 190-197).

As a product of the People’s Republic – its lovechild, actually – Nowa Huta now turned into a battleground over the past, with different political factions and interest groups pushing for different versions thereof. Fighting fiercely among each other on issues ranging from how to name places (is a former Party member an appropriate patron for a square?) and celebrate anniversaries (do the founding years of Nowa Huta deserve to be celebrated?), to how to attract tourists (are red stars and commie cars desirable on the streets of a former socialist town?) and educate the younger population about history (what should be highlighted – the everyday life or the oppositional struggles of the Poles in the People’s Republic?), these various stakeholders of memory did not merely polarize and tear their community into pieces. They also put it on the map, put it into being, through their endless debates, adding new stories to an already narrative-rich place (Linde 2000) and providing themselves and others with a solid base for identification.

Many were the public figures who appeared and reappeared in the ongoing Nowa Huta debates and events. One of them, Maciej Twaróg stirred my curiosity more than the others, for his tireless effort to “do something for Huta”, which entailed anything from political action to cultural organizing (of the film marathon just mentioned, for instance), and on his story this article is based. Maciej is a curator at an art gallery, with a political past in the nationalist-conservative party League of Polish Families (LPR), in coalition with PiS in the years 2006–2007. He was born in 1976 in Nowa Huta, the youngest of three siblings. Like tens of thousands of other Poles from farming families, Maciej’s parents left their rural homes for Nowa Huta in the 1950s, in search of a better life. His mother studied nursing and worked as a midwife in a Nowa Huta hospital until her retirement. His father enrolled in vocational training in Huta, and worked as a bricklayer later on. He passed away several years ago.

The great events and changes of the 1980s – strikes, police repression, papal visits and the subsequent disintegration of the People’s Republic of Poland – awoke in Maciej an interest in politics and history, coupled with a strong sense of belonging to his town and

30 The expression “thick line” stems from a speech by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in 1989 in which he proposed to draw a “thick line” between the socialist past and the present of Poland.
country of residence. After studying the works of Roman Dmowski, leader and head ideologist of the right-wing formation Endecja in the interwar period, Maciej joined the LPR and its youth formation Młodzież Wszechpolska (The All-Polish Youth). In 2002 he was elected to the city council of Kraków, where he pushed for a change of the image of and life conditions in Nowa Huta. Failing to be re-elected in 2006, Maciej withdrew from political life.\footnote{At the time of his withdrawal from party politics, the local LPR branch was facing fraud charges, while Młodzież Wszechpolska was accused of having Nazi sympathies, because of published pictures showing members of the organization displaying the Nazi salute. Maciej himself was not one of those saluting, but was present at the event. He later issued a public apology for this (Głuchowski P. & Kowalski, M. “Metamorfoza Wszechpolaka”: Gazeta Wyborcza 28/9/2009).} In an interview with Gazeta Wyborcza, he explained his disengagement in terms of a growing dislike of the ideology of LPR and a desire to return to his Nowa Huta “roots” (Głuchowski P. & Kowalski, M. “Metamorfoza Wszechpolaka”: Gazeta Wyborcza 28/9/2009). After leaving the limelight of politics, Maciej continued his involvement in and for Nowa Huta. Together with a friend he opened Club 1949, a café which alluded to the socialist past of the area in its decor and cultural program. Before it closed down in 2010, the basement of Club 1949 had hosted numerous gatherings and exhibitions, attracting young people interested to learn more about the history of their place of home.

This article stems from my own interest in these young people’s interest in Nowa Huta, or – put differently – in the “roots” previously mentioned by Maciej. How and why and to what effect do young people like Maciej “re-root” themselves in a place like Nowa Huta? Which memories do they make use of in this process? What does their memory work “do” to Nowa Huta, and what do the public discourses on the past – the memory politics of PiS and other political formations – “do” to their memory work\footnote{This article is, moreover, a pilot study for my dissertation with the preliminary title ”Tales of a (so-called) socialist town: Memory, Identity and Storytelling in Nowa Huta”.}?\footnote{For those looking for a comprehensive account of Nowa Huta past and present, see for example: Gut (1993); Lebow (2001); Stenning (2000); Zieliński (2009).}

I met with Maciej twice, once for a quick chat and once for a longer interview, and found many answers to these questions in the stories that he then shared with me. While this article focuses on his personal narrative and opinions, I treat these not only as individual expressions, but also as windows into Nowa Huta’s past and present. For, as most narrative researchers would agree, every personal story is entangled in the “cultural and social world” of its spokesman (Lieblich et al.: 1996: 9), thus providing insights about his/her wider context. Before we take a closer look at Maciej’s own story, I would like to briefly introduce its Nowa Huta context.
Tales of a (so-called) socialist town – a brief presentation of Nowa Huta

When censorship and official Party propaganda lost its grip on Poland, after 1989, the socialism of its “first socialist town” was publicly questioned (Stanek 2007: 293). Today, we learn from the National Institute of Remembrance that Nowa Huta was a town of “working and fighting” (Miasto pracy i walki), built to “overshadow the old Royal capital [of Kraków]” with its “modern, beautiful and comfortable” housing blocks. However, these “utopian plans soon collided with the communist reality”, turning Huta into a town of “gray blocks, serving only as a bedroom for the workers.” Out of the grayness of the blocks, the poor working conditions of the steel works, and the lack of churches, resistance was born34.

The location of Nowa Huta and its steel works is by far the most debated and controversial aspect of its history, making its relations with Kraków contentious and frosty from the start. Was the site of the polluting steel works handpicked by Soviet engineers, maybe even by Stalin himself, in order to punish the Krakowiacy for their many “No”-votes in the “Three Times Yes Referendum” of 1946?35 To curb their conservative, religious and bourgeois style of life, by “proletarianizing” their surroundings? Or was the location of the steel works chosen out of sheer pragmatism: for the water supplies of the Wisła river, the labor surplus in the poor and rural Galicja region, the proximity to educated staff from the Kraków Polytechnic? (Binek 2009: 69; Zieliński 2009: 2336).

Regardless of the people and the reasons behind the location of Nowa Huta, its creation was of huge economic and ideological importance to the People’s Republic of Poland. As a brand new industrial agglomeration, literally springing up from the fields on the northeastern outskirts of Kraków, it was presented to the Poles as a means to fulfill the first six-year plan of the People’s Republic of Poland, as well as an embodiment of this very Republic.

The ideological underpinnings of Nowa Huta were most visibly expressed in its cityscape – in its street names, socialist realist buildings, and monuments, such as the huge statue of Lenin which towered over the most elegant of boulevards in the town, Aleja Róż, from 1973 to 1989. While socialist realism was an obvious source of inspiration to head architect Tadeusz Ptaszycki and his team the planners of Nowa Huta were also drawing on the neighborhood unit concept as developed in Manhattan during the Depression. In accordance with this concept, the housing blocks in Nowa Huta were grouped around small, leafy courtyards, within walking distance to the nearest kindergarten, grocery store or playground (Juchowicz 2007: 28). This way, the built

34 www1.dziennik.krakow.pl/ipn/nowa_huta_miasto_pracy_i_walki/html/wstep.html
35 In this referendum Poles were asked to vote in favor of Poland’s pre-war borders, the liquidation of the Senate, and the nationalization and privatization of private enterprises and agriculture.
environment of Old Nowa Huta\textsuperscript{37} contributed to the forming of tightly knit, neighborly communities where people worked and lived and raised children close to each other.

During the first half of the 1950s tens of thousands of people, at first mostly young men from the countryside around Krakow, flocked to Nowa Huta. Many of them were brought here, voluntarily or involuntarily, by the organization \textit{Służba Polsce} (Service for Poland), founded in 1948 with the aim of infusing young people with ideological awareness and work discipline (Klich-Kluszewska 2009: 20). In Nowa Huta they were promised apartments, jobs, vocational training, as well as the possibility to “do something” for their war-ravaged homeland. Interestingly, the ideological aspect of the socialist town was somewhat downplayed in the official propaganda that greeted the newcomers to the town. The historian Kathrine Lebow writes: “In newspapers, newsreels, prose and poetry, Nowa Huta’s builders … appeared as the primary beneficiaries of their own work in the near future” (2001: 209). Now, this is not to say that the Party was indifferent to the ideological training of the \textit{Nowohucianie}, only that its Huta leadership seems to have been confident that “the forming of a model, socialist persona was … going to take place automatically, during work at the building site” (Zieliński 2009: 62).

Soon enough, it became obvious to everyone – and painfully so to the Party officials in the socialist town – that stacking bricks was not the road to ideological sensibility. Instead of turning into a much-longed-for vanguard of the People’s Republic, the builders of Nowa Huta gave rise to a “black legend” of themselves as heavy drinkers with a taste for street fighting (Gut 1993). While grossly exaggerated, this legend nevertheless reinforced the already existing animosity between Krakow and Nowa Huta. In 1955, when the Polish thaw was well under way, it went national, following the publication of \textit{Poemat dla Dorosłych} (Poem for Adults) by the poet and – hitherto – devoted Party member Adam Ważyk. Ważyk depicted Nowa Huta as a place of lost dreams, which fed its residents with nothing but “empty words” (Bikont & Szczęsna 2006: chap. 17).

If the publishing of Ważyk’s poem was the first public undressing of the “first socialist town in Poland”, more such events were to follow. In April 1960 street protests broke out, following the removal of a wooden cross that had marked the future location of the first church in Nowa Huta,\textsuperscript{38} in Osiedle Teatralne. Many people, “defenders of the cross” as well as policemen on the other side of the barricades, were hurt and wounded, and 493 \textit{Nowohucianie} ended up arrested, some serving long prison sentences for participating in the protest. It took nearly two decades until the believers of Nowa Huta saw their wishes for a place of worship fulfilled, when the Arka Pana church in Bieńczyce was consecrated by Bishop Karol Wojtyła, later Pope John Paul II, in 1978 (Franczyk 2010).\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{37} The central parts of Nowa Huta, which were built before 1956, when socialist realism was abandoned in the architecture.

\textsuperscript{38} In the wake of the thaw, the authorities had agreed to the building of a church in Osiedle Teatralne, Nowa Huta; a decision that was however revoked in the beginning of the 1960s when the relations between the church and the authorities had worsened.

\textsuperscript{39} Before the building of Arka Pana, the large religious community of Nowa Huta was making use of the older sacral buildings in the villages around Nowa Huta, such as the Cistercian monastery in the
The final blow to the socialist dream of Nowa Huta came in the 1980s, when a vast majority of the steel workers in Huta Lenina joined the ranks of the Solidarity movement, turning it into one of the largest centers of resistance in Poland. When martial law was introduced December 13th 1981, strikes broke out in the steel works, and were “pacified” by ZOMO forces on the 16th of the same month. All through the 1980s the streets and steel works of Nowa Huta acted as a battleground for strikers and protesters, on the one hand, and police forces on the other. If we ask the historians, the most important of the Huta strikes took place in April 1988, when the demands of the steel workers – which included wage increases, sick benefits and the reinstatement of fired Solidarity leaders – “set the standards for strike demands across the country, as enterprise after enterprise followed suit.” Eventually, this wave of strikes paved the way for the Round Table Negotiations in the winter of 1989, and for the subsequent disintegration of the People’s Republic of Poland (Stenning 2000: 106).

The unrest of the 1980s followed a decade of economic decline in Huta, caused by the overall worsening economic situation in the country, as well as the emergence of a rival steel works – Huta Katowice. Whatever status and (relative) economic security the Huta workers had possessed in the 1950s and 1960s, it started to dwindle from the 1970s, which contributed to their widespread support for the Solidarity movement (Stenning 2000: 106-107). However, what was lost in economic capital during the Gierek era was to some extent regained in cultural capital in the 1980s, when the gap between Nowa Huta and Krakow was temporarily bridged (Bourdieu 1984). According to ethnographer Dorota Gut, the Krakowiacy and Nowohucianie felt closer to one another during this turbulent decade, when the latter emerged as fearless defenders of values deemed inherent to the former: patriotism, freedom and religiosity (Gut 1993: 127 pp.).

But then came the year 1989 and with it the battles of the Solidarity movement stiffened into a heroic memory, while transformation had its harsh way with the industrial town of Nowa Huta. As Stenning writes (2000: 107), the “central irony of the steelworkers’ involvement in bringing down the socialist state has been that those events ushered in an era of political and economic practice that marginalized much of what Nowa Huta and HiL [the Lenin Steel Works] represented.” In addition to worries about work and money, which many Poles had in common during these times, the Nowohucianie were once again burdened by the reputation of their place of home. The removal of the Lenin statue, as well as the renaming of the steel works and the streets of Huta, did little alter to the image of the town as “one of the most important examples of ‘communist decrepitude’” (Majewska 2007: 195). According to the architect Lukasz Stanek, different, hitherto coexisting, representations of the town were now restructured into “unambiguous oppositions” (2007: 294):

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village of Mogila.
Nowa Huta, as an industrial workers town was juxtaposed to the image of neighboring communities constituting “a big village”; in a similar vein Nowa Huta as a “garden town” and “the most green area in Krakow” was contrasted by descriptions of “ecologic disaster.” The propagators of each of these oppositional representations found arguments in documents, statistics, in numerous published biographies or in the private histories of the inhabitants.

The existence of these seemingly contradictory narratives has, in the opinion of Stanek (ibid.), rendered Nowa Huta a “diagnosis in the media of it as a town of paradoxes,” which – in turn – has made it fertile ground for public debates on matters of past and present, as well as for tourists and artists in search of new terrains to explore and exploit. Put simply, the monumental buildings of Nowa Huta, its wide boulevards and its steel works chimneys, look all the more impressive/grotesque/out of place/beautiful (depending on who you ask) in the light of the meadows, allotments and villages which surround it and are nestled in it. In a similar manner, the story of the godforsaken, socialist town sounds all the more enticing when disrupted by a “paradoxical” narrative of heroic, religiously infused, resistance. Add to this the close proximity of a beautiful and proud big- sister city – and the urge to talk loudly about Huta, to make culture of and in Huta, to spin identities around Huta, makes all the more sense.

Belonging, remembering and fighting – a narrative analysis of Maciej’s story

When I went to interview Maciej, I was not aiming for his personal stories at first. Eager to pin down some facts and opinions on Nowa Huta from someone who knew the place from within, I had prepared a slew of questions on memory politics, history, the reputation of the area, and much more. However, as soon as I had posed my first question (What is Nowa Huta to you?), which was open-ended indeed, pieces of Maciej’s life began unfolding in front of me. Happily surprised with this, I put most of my prepared questions aside in order to let Maciej expound on a topic that seemed to be of utmost importance to him. I believe that Maciej’s ability to “take over” the interview says a lot about the bearing that Nowa Huta has on his sense of self and belonging.

Of course, however nice and friendly an interview is, it is never unaffected by the dynamics of power and emotions between the interviewer and the interviewee. How did my gender, age, academic background and dual nationalities (Swedish-Polish) color the interaction between Maciej and myself? While neither of these factors seemed to hinder – nor influence, really – Maciej’s flow of words, the fact that I interviewed him as a PhD candidate from a foreign university might have made him more inclined to speak freely. After the interview I asked Maciej if he wanted me to send him the transcripts later on, to which he laughingly answered that he had no need for them, as I seemed trustworthy enough, considering I was not from the daily Gazeta Wyborcza. Hinting here and at other times during the interview at his many – more and less positive – encounters with this large Polish newspaper, I remember thinking that Maciej spoke
from the position of a person who had “been there, done that.” However tough his life in politics had been, his experiences from the big world lent his story a particular kind of gravity.

In the following analysis, I will focus on the content of the interview, on the what of Maciej’s story, while at the same time keeping an eye on (or rather: an ear to) its form, on how he is expressing his memories and ideas. I have structured the analysis thematically, in the following groups:

**Belonging, remembering and fighting.** Suffice to say, this thematization is a construct of mine; a product of my own interpretation of the interview material. However, its aim is to present and discuss issues which are doubtlessly important and pressing in Maciej’s story.

**Belonging.** At the core of Maciej’s story, we find a strong sense of belonging to his home, family, circle of friends and local community. His affiliation with Nowa Huta is even inscribed into his arms, that are decorated with tattoos of red stars and places and people in the area, such as the Stakhanovite Piotr Ożański, to which he points during the interview.40

Maciej’s narrative begins with a poetic description of Nowa Huta as “a place which one breathes through”, a place where he feels safe and secure. This sentiment is particularly present when he mentions a plan he once made to leave Huta for Szczecin in northwestern Poland.

Let me tell you honestly, that when I returned to Huta after a couple of weeks of absence, when I returned to my home in Huta from Szczecin, where I had planned… I inhaled at Osiedle Kolorowe [an area in NH] the smell [there], such a September, fall-smell, so strong after the rain … and [slowly, looking for words] I almost started crying. I said to myself, what are you doing, man [człowieku], what on earth are you planning, you’ve got to think this over, where are you going to find such a smell, where are you going to breathe in this form?

Realizing the madness of his plans, Maciej decided to stay put in the smell and air of Nowa Huta. What is it, then, that makes this air so indispensable to him? Well, it is certainly not its quality. Ruined and destroyed are but a few of the epithets that he uses to depict it, none of which impairs his feelings towards it.

In the ‘80s the air was, so to speak, a huge mess. When the wind was blowing from the east, it was a drama of the air, but I cannot imagine life without it. It is such a, such an inhalation that, that, that is necessary, even though I’ve had problems with my lungs since I was a child … I cannot imagine another life than exactly this, the Nowa Huta one.

Embracing the unhealthy air, Maciej embraces his home and, in light of his overall story, sides with it in the ongoing Huta-versus-Kraków disputes; a sentiment that I believe is infused by a sense of class belonging. Class is, in general, a rare word in the public and private storytelling of Nowa Huta as I have come to know it. Here, class

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40 Later on, I learned that Maciej shares his fascination for tattoos with Huta motifs with other, young *Nowohucianie* (Ponikowska, “Huta na mej skórze”: *Gazeta Krakowska* 7/7/2010)
relations are articulated implicitly, in stories about polluted air, low status and hard, physical labor.

In his narrativization of self, Maciej emerges as a strong, independent fighter – as we will see later on in the article. Still, though, at the source of this strength lie his family and friends, of whom he speaks frequently and emotionally. When telling me about his seven-year-old daughter, her recent school trip, her artistic talent, and her fondness for his tattoos, there is unmistakable pride and love in Maciej’s voice. However, these feelings are coupled with regret for the times when he cared more for politics than for parenting, and he vehemently warns me that political involvement can “end tragically.” While I do not want to linger on this part of Maciej’s story – his own mention of it was brief, albeit intense – it does nonetheless deserve mentioning, as it gives us a better chance to understand his overall narrative.

If Maciej’s family – his mother, daughter, girlfriend and the baby they are expecting – make up his primary home, then Nowa Huta plays the role of extended living room. This is particularly noticeable when Maciej is talking about the many initiatives that he has undertaken; for instance, the petitioning against making Ronald Reagan the patron of Plac Centralny, the main square in Nowa Huta. When sharing his memory of this event, Maciej comes across as a person who knows pretty much everyone worth knowing in Nowa Huta, including his adversaries:

I go out, I enter the street and look at those people who are for that Reagan and I say “yes, I know you, people, I have known you for years” … “I don’t know, Sir, [here Maciej mumbles the name of someone] what you did during the PRL [People’s Republic of Poland] years. I will tell you honestly, I never heard of you being an honorable member of the [Solidarity] union, that you distributed papers, that you were publishing anything… Your neighbor, Leszek Jaranowski, he put his career at risk … but under your name I haven’t heard [any such thing], no.”

Let me save the Reagan controversy for later, and point out here the ease with which Maciej traverses the streets of Nowa Huta, and the knowledge that he possesses (or claims to possess) about the whereabouts and life stories of various Nowohucianie – a knowledge used to determine who is worthy of respect and trust, and who is not. Given Maciej’s political and public past, this hardly comes as a surprise. And yet it does illustrate how his sense of belonging is constantly reaffirmed out on the streets of Nowa Huta, by his supporters, but also by his opponents, who make his need to stand up for it that much stronger.

Remembering. The issue of remembrance is multilayered in Maciej’s narrative. First, there are his own memories of growing up in Nowa Huta. Then, there are the memories of the formative years of the town, passed on to Maciej by his parents, particularly his father. Lastly, ideas on memory politics and activities, on what to remember from the past and how to do it, are recurrent in Maciej’s story. Here, I will focus on the first two aspects, while the issue of memory politics and memory work will be saved for the next section.

In Maciej’s story the past is constantly present. I ask him what kind of home Nowa Huta is and he answers that life is very different here from what it used to be like when he was a child in the 1980s, although it has been “a comfortable place to live in for
all of this time, for all of the 60 years it has been developing.” A comfort so obvious, it need not be spelled out: “I’m not gonna bludgeon those clichés to death [tłukł tych farmazonów], about the length and the width of the streets, or the sidewalks.”

Its comfort notwithstanding, Nowa Huta was a place in decline in the “sad decade for Poland of General Jaruzelski” when Maciej grew up. For the kids of the area, the situation of the country was particularly visible in the state of their playgrounds and soccer fields:

Slowly, everything began to decompose, right, those, these... what surrounded me, where I grew up. Suddenly there were no goals on our concrete soccerfields. The sidewalks, very nice ones, that we were running on, walking on, strolling on, began to get ruined. The pools, all of a sudden, suddenly they were closed. Suddenly the sport associations were liquidated, in which we had taken part energetically …

As we know all too well, it was not only the playgrounds that took a beating in Poland of the 1980s. Together with other Nowohucianie, Maciej lived through a time when large strikes, demonstrations and police violence were commonplace on the streets and in the steel works of Nowa Huta. He often returns to this in his narrative, emphasizing that it made childhood different here from childhood in other parts of Kraków.

Young inhabitants of Nowa Huta, my generation and the older generation, the generation of my brother, grew up faster, I think, also politically, than children in other areas of Kraków, because everything happened [right here], everything that they [the other children] could see, I don’t know, somewhere on the television …. For them Nowa Huta was like a land [kraina] completely, oh-ho-ho, to Huta they went once in a blue moon, for holidays, to some aunt, if there happened to be an aunt here, or they drove through Huta. We lived in Huta, we were from Huta, so this all took place in front of our eyes.

The most tragic event taking place in front of the eyes of the Huta community was the shooting of the young steel worker Bogdan Włosik, during a demonstration on October 13th 1982. On the day after Włosik’s death, Maciej’s father took him to the mourning site, where they witnessed “the despair of those people, the sadness [here Maciej’s own tone is quiet and sad], the red- colored water that was poured around, the ocean of flowers, the breakdown [of the people], such an affliction [przygnębienie].”

Upon sharing this, Maciej goes on to tell me that he knew very well who was to blame for Włosik’s death – the “evil komuna” (a pejorative term for the communist system). However, his characterization of the communist system as evil, and the 1980s as a sad decade – a sadness discernible in his voice – is accompanied by several “buts” and “althoughs,” as the following sentences illustrate:

Recalling my childhood, in the decade of Jaruzel [pejorative term for general Jaruzelski], I remember this as very, very, very sad, because, because this was a sad childhood, a gray childhood [said quietly and sadly]. Although I don’t know the world championships in soccer in 1982 in Spain, Boniek’s three goals, he became my king [with joy in his tone].
As important as these goals were to a true soccer fan like Maciej – who as a politician put a lot of effort into improving the soccer fields of Huta – they do not wipe out his sadness over the 1980s and the predicament that this decade left Nowa Huta in. Still, though, this short passage does reveal a general tendency in the storytelling of Maciej to see and talk about things from different angles. Thus, in his story we find understanding for General Jaruzelski’s actions and unhappiness over their consequences; appreciation for Ronald Reagan’s politics and disapproval of making him the patron of Plac Centralny; disdain of communist ideology and two arms covered by red star tattoos, steel works chimneys and a Stakhanovite worker. Is there, then, anything special about having (seemingly) conflicting feelings towards the People’s Republic of Poland? Don’t many Poles harbor these kinds of mixed feelings? Most definitely so. What in my mind makes Maciej’s ambivalence noteworthy is its centrality to his storytelling and the bearing that it has on his political and cultural involvement. However proud Maciej might be over the Solidarity past of Nowa Huta, he never lets this memory cast shadows on the earlier development of his town. At a general level, Maciej’s ambivalence can serve as an important reminder that memories are not merely objects for negotiation between different people and groups, but that they are fought and contested also within the life story of the single individual, trying to explain to him- or herself what s/he did when his/her neighbors where struggling for a church, or on any other grey or sunny day in the People’s Republic of Poland.

Maciej’s own story is guided very clearly by a need to understand and depict his father’s coming to Nowa Huta and making a life for himself and his family here. Armed with this successful story, he defends the socialist town against the most common accusations: that it never lived up to its grandiose promises, and that it forced farmers away from their land. While not condoning the land requisitions that preceded the building of Nowa Huta, Maciej’s strongest criticism is directed toward those who – in his opinion – idealize village life prior to 1949. In the following quote he is criticizing a photo exhibition – Czas Zatrzymany (Frozen in Time) – with photographs from the rural land upon which Nowa Huta was later built.

At a certain point I started seeing this project, Czas Zatrzymany, as geared, used for the purpose of juxtaposition, right… Here came the year of [19]49, the steel plant was built, right, for some kind of great rabble [holota], that came and trampled, destroyed this land of milk and honey [sarcastically]

In Maciej’s words, his father came to Nowa Huta with “zero shoes, nothing, barefoot”. However, neither his social advancement, nor his hard work on behalf of the new town, have been properly acknowledged, according to his son. At the end of the interview Maciej returns to this injustice, telling me about an article in the local paper Glos Nowej Huty which, in his own view, insinuated that the builders of Nowa Huta were agents from Moscow. Upon reading this article, Maciej publicly relinquished the title of Nowohucianin Roku (Nowa Huta Inhabitant of the Year) which he had received in 2005.
I’m thinking: What? What kind of Moscow agency [moskiewska agentura] was my father [belonging to]? The boy came from the countryside, where he barely passed elementary school, zero chances of getting anywhere, a godforsaken village. Here he was studying, here he learned his profession, he learned to read and write properly and so on. He got a taste for life, brought himself a woman from his village, an educated nurse. They started a family, lived here, found what their village hadn’t been able to give them. They gave us the chance to live in a wonderful place... How does this make my father a Moscow agent, a Stalinist bastard, or something like that? So I call Franczyk [the editor-in-chief of Głos Nowej Huty] and say that “I will not write [for you] anymore, you pissed me off [wkurwil mnie Pan]”? …? I am returning, I hereby announce, I don’t give a shit [mam w dupie] about the title Nowohucianin of the year, given to me by the editors of Głos Nowohucki, if the first people of Nowa Huta are offended in it, including my father [very upset]. I would feel terrible, to say it ugly, in a vulgar way, like a dick [chujowo] standing by my father’s grave, and praying for his soul, if I knew I was keeping that Nowohucianin diploma somewhere [calm in a serious way].

Let us keep this emotionally laden passage in mind when we now take a closer look at Maciej’s involvement on behalf of Nowa Huta and the memories of his father.

Fighting: In Maciej’s depiction, Nowa Huta has only recently begun to rise from the hardships of the 1980s and the image problems of the 1990s. Accused back then of “everything that was bad in Kraków”, shame became a cornerstone of the identities of the Nowohucianie. Looking back at his political past, Maciej singles out as his biggest success his “identity initiatives”, and the “change of mentality” that they brought about in Nowa Huta, at least among its more “enlightened” inhabitants. In this section I will give a few illustrative examples of how Maciej has taken action on behalf of his place of home.

In light of his stories about the city council and the lazy, albeit power-hungry, “dumb heads” [matoly] who work there, Maciej emerges as a lone fighter for Nowa Huta’s cause. Only one politician is spared criticism from him: Jacek Majchrowski, the mayor of Kraków, who is politically unaffiliated but endorsed by the leftist, post-communist party SLD (The Democratic Left Alliance). Although in a quite passive way, Majchrowski has always – in the opinion of Maciej – shown support for his projects and ideas concerning Nowa Huta. Among these we find a new museum, Muzeum Dziejów Nowej Huty (The Museum of Nowa Huta’s History), opened in 2006, numerous exhibits and film events, and an effort to put the oldest parts of the area on the UNESCO World Heritage List, a process which is still pending. Why have other politicians failed to see the potential of Nowa Huta? Maciej explains:

Being on the city council, in that memorable decade 2002–2006, [I noticed] that getting onto the council from Huta are generally people for whom the history of Nowa Huta began at the moment when they started striking, the strikes in the steel plant, right, around the 80s, the beginning of Solidarity, or, right, and so on. Generally, all of a sudden Nowa Huta, so to speak, was caught somewhere, right, in the big ocean of history. “We caught it – oh, Nowa Huta. I caught it exactly at this point and from this moment when I caught it, its history began” [imitating the politicians on the council].

The unmistakable sarcasm of this passage conveys Maciej’s disdain for those who use their own oppositional past for political gain and, in general, for anyone reducing the history of Nowa Huta and the People’s Republic to the Solidarity years. Moreover, Ma-
ciej has no mercy for outsiders (or insiders with different opinions) meddling with the memories of his place of home, as the following examples will illustrate.

Let us head back, then, to the heart of Nowa Huta – Plac Centralny. Following a city council decision of 2004, this square now bears Ronald Reagan’s name, hence honoring the president for his role in the “subjugation of communism”, as local politician Ireneusz Raś from PO (Civic Platform) put it (in Kozik & Radłowska, “Nie wolno zapominać o historii”: Gazeta Wyborcza 31/1/2008). This change did not fall into good soil, with thousands of Nowohucianie signing petitions in favor of the original name of the place. In the end a compromise was struck, and the American president’s name was added next to the old one instead of erasing it. Today the central square of Nowa Huta is officially called Plac Centralny im. Ronalda Reagana (The Central Square in the name of Ronald Reagan).

As one of the initiators of the petitioning, Maciej stresses his ideological affinity for Reagan’s politics, such as his “sympathy toward a free market, toward liberalism, defense of life from conception to natural death … and [his] anti-communism.” So why, then, didn’t he want to let this “nice dude [fajny gość]” who “subverted communism together with the Pope” have his own square in Nowa Huta?

I say nooo [strongly emphasized], we don’t like things like this on the living organism of Nowa Huta, of Plac Centralny, and so on. In three weeks we gathered 13,000 signatures. I brought these 13,000 signatures, put them there, and then the dumb heads, one after another come out and tell me that I am exploiting the high school students for [the purpose of] gathering signatures, that it is despicable. I say go, go and get them. I say nooo, those young people sought me out when I had representative duty [dyżur radny], because they came to the conclusion that I am the only one who will dare to say no to you, no, no [imitating himself back then]. In the end, instead of Plac Reagana [it got the name] Plac Centralny im. Reagana. But people still use the name Plac Centralny.

The lively tone of this passage bespeaks of the heat of this battle, while the expression “the living organism of Huta” says something about its nature. Maciej and the other petitioners are not merely gathering signatures to keep a good old name – they are fighting for the identity of their home, for their right to define it in accordance with their own wishes and sentiments.

Since we are on the topic of names, I would like to bring up yet another controversy of this kind. This particular one concerns a small, hidden Nowa Huta square, called Plac Pocztowy (The Postal Square) due to the post office on one of its corners. In 2005, Maciej and a group of Nowohucianie suggested that it be named after the Huta Stakhanovite Piotr Ożański, whose life has been depicted in Andrzej Wajda’s motion picture Man of Marble. An outstandingly productive bricklayer and member of the Party organization ZMP (The Polish United Youth Organization), Ożański was put forward in the propaganda as a role model for an entire generation of Polish youngsters in the early 1950s, only to fall into oblivion after a flaming hot brick had impaired his work capacity. Initially, the proposal to make Ożański patron of Plac Pocztowy was accepted by the city council; a decision that was however revoked later on, with politicians from PiS arguing that there were “enough prominent people in the field of culture and art, who could give name to squares and streets, instead of people who
were members of ZMP and stacked the largest amount of bricks on the walls” (Kozik & Radłowska, “Nie wolno zapominać o historii”: Gazeta Wyborcza 31/1/2008). Maciej countered this argument by writing an open letter to the city council, which reads as follows (ibid.):

… was [Huta] built by ants, dwarfs and cosmonauts? Did it fall down from heaven? No, the “socialist realist wonder of the world” came into being, partly thanks to the selfless dedication of people like Piotr Ożański, and thousands of others, it came into being in such, and not another, time thanks to such, and not other, decisions of the government, it came into being in such, and not another, system. And in no way did the ‘Ruscy’ [pejorative term for Russians] throw it at us, and its real history did not begin in 1980 or 1989. The beginning of the newest history of Nowa Huta is the year 1949, whether people like it or not.

Here, Maciej comes across as a defender of the Huta builders, with Ożański in the foreground, embodying the struggles, aspirations and disappointments of the first Huta generation. Putting aside the obvious link between Ożański, Maciej’s father and himself as his son, I wonder if there isn’t more to Maciej’s involvement on behalf of the fallen Stakhanovite? Shouldn’t his sympathy for Ożański be understood also in the light of his own life story; of how he, too, lost his career, convictions and political companions? When sharing with me the tale of the destiny of the bricklaying master, Maciej says, in a quiet, almost mumbling way: “in reality he didn’t manage to handle this life, right, but that wasn’t… That, that didn’t matter at all to me… I, too, didn’t manage to handle many issues.” The implicit message of this passage is that neither Ożański’s nor his own missteps should render either of them to oblivion. “Poland has no holy cows”, states Maciej in another part of the interview, in regard to the biography of Ryszard Kapuściński, which had recently been published and garnered a lot of media attention due to some controversies surrounding the public and private life of the famous author41. And so, by mentioning the un-holy cows of Kapuściński and Ożański, Maciej gives meaning to the darker nooks of his own life story.

This having been said, being a fallen hero is not the main trait of Maciej’s identity; at least not in the shape in which it is narrated to me. Rather, it is as a strong and strident underdog that he emerges during the interview, as illustrated for instance in the passage about Plac Centralny. An underdog who, furthermore, enjoys his position as a truth-teller and fighter from below, much like a rowdy child might enjoys the annoyed attention from the grown-up world. Now, I am not saying this to diminish Maciej’s actions on behalf of Huta, but to illustrate an important trait in his storytelling: the mixed glee, pride and shrewdness with which he presents his battles. In the following quote, Maciej is talking about the time when he was accused of “promoting communism”, due to a portrait of him, with tattoos and all, sitting beneath a socialist realist painting of a Stakhanovite. Taken by the Huta photographer Grzegorz Ziemiański, this portrait was included in his exhibition Nowohucianie, which was, in turn, a part of the 60th Anniversary of Nowa Huta (see also Handzlik, “Niepoprawna wystawa na 60-lecie Huty”: Gazeta Wyborcza 19/5/2009).

41 The biography referred to is Artur Domosławski’s Kapuściński Non-Fiction (2010)
Grzesiek [a friend of Maciej’s and photographer of the exhibition] said: … “they are thinking of filing a report… that you are propagating…[communism]” I said: “Grzesiek, fuck [kurwa] of course, let them, I would be very happy, of course” [laughing]. This was of course picked up by Wyborca [which] wrote an [article], and gave my portrait, of course. Grzesiek [had] said “Hey, let’s provoke them, we will even give your picture to the paper” imitating the joy and shrewdness of Grzesiek]. So I say, give it [to them], and allegedly the buzz [halo] around it was enormous [happily].

Maciej’s pride and joy in causing a buzz is unmistakable. But is he really a rebel and an underdog? As other parts of his story indicate, Maciej is not, in any way, a lone fighter. Thousands of people signed the petition against the renaming of Plac Centralny; “tons” of youngsters gathered in the basement of Club 1949 to learn more about Nowa Huta, and the support for the Ożański idea was widespread. This is not to say, however, that Maciej and his like-minded Nowohucianie have had the upper hand in the ongoing controversies on the past in Nowa Huta. The aforementioned buzz did, for instance, contribute to the exclusion of Ziemiański’s exhibition from the official celebrations of the 60th Anniversary of Nowa Huta. In a political landscape colored by PiS and their politics on memory, anyone proposing competing versions of the past could appear as a rebel and an underdog to the establishment. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the Polish establishment is hardly monolithic – not now, nor when PiS had parliamentary power – and that the politics of memory à la PiS were fiercely disputed from day one. Among their strongest critics we find the liberal newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, singled out by Maciej as a faithful ally in his struggles, which were never so lonely, after all.

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42 Ziemiański’s exhibition Nowohucianie contained 60 photographs of different inhabitants in Nowa Huta. The main criticism against the exhibition stated that it didn’t give a “representative” picture of the area and its history, as it did not include many important people from the Solidarity movement (Handzlik, “Niepoprawna wystawa na 60-lecie Huty”: Gazeta Wyborcza 19/5/2009).

43 A quick look at the recent debates on the past indicates how delicate and divisive certain issues are in present-day Nowa Huta. For instance, prior to Huta’s 60th Anniversary, some Nowohucianie stated that celebrating the birth of a socialist town might equate with “propaganda of communism,” while others argued that omitting the formative years of the town was disrespectful to its builders and untruthful to its real history (see, for example Kozik & Radłowska, “Nie wolno zapominać o historii”: Gazeta Wyborcza 31/1/2008) Feeling neglected by the official celebrations, which did emphasize the Solidarity years of the area, a group of Nowohucianie founded the association “Moja Nowa Huta” (My Nowa Huta), which declared its openness to all of Huta’s inhabitants, “regardless of world view and political opinions” (www.mojanowahuta.pl). As my later research into Huta shows, this openness was also geared toward people who had, in one way or another, been affiliated with the Party. The debate surrounding the 60th Anniversary is but one of many examples of how the past is worked in present-day Nowa Huta, and on how productive these workings at times are, giving rise to new groups, homepages, cultural events, etc.

44 While PiS and its coalition parties lost their hold of Parliament in 2007, they have maintained their influence over the memory politics of Nowa Huta through their representation on the city council, and due to their many allies on this topic among the members of the party PO – Civic Platform - which today is in power in Poland. However, after the Smoleński disaster of 2010, it seems as though PiS has shifted its focus away from the past of the People’s Republic and toward the memory of this horrible event.
Some reflections at the end

In his 2010 book *Där jag kommer från. Kriget mot förorten* (Where I Come From. The War Against the Suburbs), Swedish journalist Per Wirtén describes the hopes and fears that accompanied the establishment of high-rise areas in Stockholm at the end of the 1960s. Built to make room for newcomers to the capital, to put an end to cramped living conditions, and to bring people closer to nature, shopping malls and other amenities, these wonders of modernity were soon deemed a social disaster by socially involved researchers and journalists. Whilst outdoing each other in tall-block-bashing, their news articles and research reports failed to include the stories of the people who lived in the blocks; stories that differed significantly from the grand narratives in circulation. For, contrary to the official media image, the major problem for the high-rise inhabitants was not anonymity and alienation, but the stigma and low status that had been attached to their homes (by, not least, the journalists). “Yes, we are those who are called the Negroes of Sweden”, an inhabitant of Skärholmen explained about his situation in an article in the newspaper *Aftonbladet* (in Wirtén 2010: 43).

When the ethnographer Dorota Gut interviewed a group of *Nowohucianie* in the beginning of the 1990s, they expressed similar sentiments, calling themselves the *Murzyni* (black people) of Kraków (1991: 131). Like Skärholmen and other such areas around the globe, Nowa Huta had been built with great expectations for a better – socialist, in this case – tomorrow. Soon enough, these expectations were replaced by black legends about the town, which did reflect but also exaggerated the hard existence of the *Nowohucianie*. To be sure, Skärholmen and Nowa Huta differ both in form and content, embedded as they were – and are – in different political, social and cultural contexts. Nevertheless, by putting them next to each other for a moment, we catch sight of a downward process that they have both gone through, as the prodigies of social engineers and political visionaries that they once were, and the objects of class-based fears and stereotypes that they later became.

It is not without hesitation that I begin this discussion by pointing to the problems haunting Nowa Huta. Of course, to understand Maciej’s story it is necessary to emphasize time and again that his place of home is associated with a range of negative traits – dirt and danger and a troublesome past. After all, Maciej himself articulates this. It is because of this, because of the image problems of Nowa Huta and the actual problems at their roots, that he undertook his “identity initiatives.” His own sense of identity, and the identity that he claims for Nowa Huta, is shaped in interplay with all of its black legends, which are negated and contested and – also – recharged with new meanings, as when Maciej talks poetically of dirty air. It is precisely this poetic talk that makes me cautious in my own portrayal of Huta as an outcast town, tainted by its past and stigmatized by its big-sister city. Yes, Huta *is* different and at times despised, but this is not only a source of weakness, at least not any longer, but also of strength, at least to its “enlightened inhabitants”, who have found ways to turn its burdens into assets. Moreover, Huta possesses many assets which need no poetic embellishment or recharging. Never having been purely pitch dark, its *repertoire of narratives* (Somers
1994) contains stories of community bonds, social advancement, religiosity and resistance. More so, its wide boulevards, monumental buildings and green areas stand there as solid proof of the hard work that was put into building the town. In his own story, Maciej oscillates between the obvious strengths of Nowa Huta and its stigmas, turning the latter into strengths in their own twisted and subverted kind of way.

In my understanding, Maciej’s desire to work and talk on behalf of Nowa Huta is intimately connected with the memories that his father once shared with him. All the work his father put into the building of Nowa Huta, and the social advancement that it brought about for himself and for his family, is as we have seen a crucial element in the life story of his son. The meaning of this far-flung past in Maciej’s present-day storytelling, the way its memories are honored and preserved by him, and guarded against those who dismiss them, brings the term *postmemory* to my mind. Coined by Marianne Hirsch, postmemory “describes the relationship of the second generation to powerful, often traumatic, events that preceded their birth but that were, nevertheless, transmitted so deeply as to seem to constitute memories of their own right” (2008: 103). Since Hirsch deals with the postmemory of the Holocaust in her own research, there is no comparison between our respective objects of study. However, even if the memories that Maciej’s father passed on to his son were hardly traumatic (at least not judging from my interview material), they were powerful nonetheless, touching upon poverty, migration and social advancement. His own story, intertwined with that of thousands of Polish men and women – who, let’s not forget this, had just lived through a war – fits right into a grand narrative, alive up until today, of the People’s Republic of Poland as a land of possibilities for the poor.

It is fair to assume, and my later research also indicates this, that Nowa Huta is a place where many young people have found themselves exposed to narratives about the past, be it through the stories of their own parents or grandparents, or through public screenings of propaganda movies from the 1950s. Some of them, like Maciej, chose to pick up and pass on this “memory torch” to friends, visitors and public figures in need of mnemonic enlightenment. Having myself been exposed to Huta’s past in the most vivid of ways, as during that film marathon in 2006, or simply by listening to Maciej’s story, has gotten me interested in what Alison Landsberg calls *prosthetic memories* (2004). That is: memories which “belong” to “other” people, towns and countries but which despite their temporal or spatial distance come to feel like memories of “our own”. Films and experiential museums are, according to Landsberg, particularly potent carriers of such memories, as they surround us with motion pictures and objects.

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45 As the Polish sociologist Sławomir Kapralski writes, “space plays an active role even when nothing is ‘happening’ in it, it exercises influence through its very presence, giving an aura of obviousness and ‘naturalness’ to the meanings that it carries within, also to these which are connected to the past” (2010: 29). In other words, the cityscape of Nowa Huta is a participant in the identity formation of the area and its inhabitants, even when it is not used or emphasized in any particular way.

46 The question whether the People’s Republic of Poland brought modernization, economic advancement and more equal living conditions with it, or not, has been vividly discussed by historians. On good grounds, most of them have pointed to the economic and social stagnation that socialism wrought in Poland over the course of time (Stobiecki 207: 313-335). This, however, does not detract from the fact that many Poles did climb the social ladder in the years of the People’s Republic (in particular during the early years), which has a clear effect on their judgment of it.
that embody the past. On a quite optimistic note, Landsberg imagines that prosthetic memories “enable the formation of grounded identities … that are nevertheless nonessentialist.” (ibid.: 148). In other words, all the movies, pictures and commie cars in circulation in present-day Nowa Huta could potentially inspire outsiders of different sorts – researchers, tourists, new inhabitants – to become insiders in some capacity.

While the terms postmemory or prosthetic memory refer to different modes and forums of memory transmission, they both hint at people’s needs to set memories in motion, by sharing stories and images from their own past, or by treading the paths on which others have earlier walked. Through this kind of motion certain memories prevail and gain significance, while others remain untouched, unstirred – seemingly forgotten. Consider a memory missing in Maciej’s story and memory work: that of his mother and all the other women who took part in shaping Nowa Huta. To be sure, Nowa Huta was dominated by men during its formative years, but there were also occasional female bricklayers and other personnel in place, and with time the balance between the genders evened out. Why, then, have the Huta women not been granted the same representation as the male Stakhanovites, priests and strikers of Nowa Huta in Maciej’s identity initiatives? Is this due to the absence of a female Ożański? A deficiency which, in turn, was caused by the schizophrenic gender politics of the People’s Republic, that asked women to build houses and drive tractors, while never letting them loose track of their true, traditional calling as mothers and wives (Toniak 2008)? Or, is the shortage of “grand-/mother memories” a result of the gender (im)balance among the young and involved Huta generation? Do the Huta boys have the upper hand in the memory work of their area, thus putting forward “masculine” memories to which they feel most attached? Either way – and I think that both explanations hold some truth – we are dealing here with memories that are not pushed for, nor pulled, explored, displayed, put into public questioning; that are (for the time being) “stuck” in the life stories of older Nowa Huta women.

Another topic that vies for attention are the red stars, Stakhanovites and steel works chimneys that decorate not only Maciej’s arms, but also Huta graffiti, T-shirts, and homepages marketing “communism tours” (see: www.crazyguides.com). While this kind of commodification and commercialization (Kwiatkowski 2008: 64-72) of memory is hardly unique to Nowa Huta, it does nonetheless raise many questions. Does it signify a relativist and lighthearted attitude toward the People’s Republic of

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47 Doing field work in Nowa Huta, has made me cautious about deeming certain memories forgotten. In my experience, what is forgotten by the public or in the public sphere has an ability to live on in the everyday storytelling of people and – at times – re-surfaces into the public realm.

48 An important exception is the memory of the defense of the cross in 1960, an event in which women took an active part, for which they have later been honored in movies and exhibitions depicting the event.

49 Maciej himself used to sell “red-starry” T-shirts in Club 1949. However, not all Huta T-shirts in circulation are adorned with socialist symbols; most of the T-shirts available from the company Unicut, run by a group of Huta activists, allude to the Solidarity past (www.unicut.org.pl).

50 For more on this topic in Central and Eastern Europe, see Czepczyński (2008).
Poland, typical of a generation which doesn’t really remember its harsh days? Is it perhaps an expression of nostalgia, of longing for – and thus promoting and idealizing – a lost, socialist home?

In her book *The Future of Nostalgia*, Svetlana Boym makes a distinction between “restorative” and “reflective” nostalgia, whereby the former “puts emphasis on nostos and proposes to rebuild the lost home”, while the latter “dwells in algia, in longing and loss, the imperfect process of remembering” (2001: 41). Mitja Velinkoja (2008: 32), in turn, introduces a new word for the ironic and playful treatment of the past which is common in popular culture: neostalgia. What bearing might these terms have on Maciej’s story? On the red stars of present-day Nowa Huta?

I think we can start by concluding that Maciej’s story is not one of longing for and wanting to restore the People’s Republic of Poland. Time and again, Maciej highlights his anti-communism, anchoring it in his own experiences from the “sad decade” of the 1980s: martial law, the killing of Bogdan Włosik, the decay of the soccer fields. At the same time, he does express warm feelings about his childhood in Nowa Huta and about those who once built his place of home; his father first and foremost. Regarding himself as a beneficiary of their sweat and toil, Maciej does acknowledge, if not defend nor embrace, the system in which he lived and climbed the ladder. Put differently, by acknowledging the People’s Republic of Poland, he strives to “un-taint” the life stories of those who shaped, formed and passed their lives in its (supposedly) most socialist outpost – Nowa Huta. At the risk of putting words in Maciej’s mouth, I would also argue that he is expressing a sense of class- belonging when siding with the builders of this working class town and mocking its critics.

If Maciej does not long for a socialist home, he surely does reflect on the past and on “the imperfect process of remembering” (Boym 2001: 41); a reflection prompted by official memory politics as well as by the narrative and physical assets (the built environment, for instance) of Nowa Huta. Perhaps Maciej’s tattoos could be seen as a manifestation of such a reflection: ironic and serious, neostalgic and somewhat nostalgic, at one and the same time, just like Maciej himself, who does show a lot of irony, humor and shrewdness when talking about present-day debates on the past, but then turns serious in an instant, when the actual past of Nowa Huta is mentioned. In my view, his tattoos do not merely serve a rebellious cause in the heat of public debate, but also act as vital props in his ongoing storytelling of self, home, class and belonging.

In this storytelling – or identity formation, if you will – Maciej is not alone; not in Nowa Huta, nor outside its realms, where many (young) people handle the increasing globalization and flow of jobs and goods by staying put and cherishing what is local, be it the songs, traditional dishes or the polluting steel plant of their community (Kapralski 2010). While searching for stability and identity at home, they blow new life into objects, places and local figures that seemed dead or forgotten long ago. Thus, when Maciej re-rooted himself among the bricklayers of Nowa Huta, and revived the public memory of Piotr Ożański, he was part of a larger movement, global in reach but strikingly local in content.

51 For more on the topic of young people and the memory of PRL (The People’s Republic of Poland), see Bogusławska & Grębacka (2010).
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Collective Memories and “Blank Spots” of the Ukrainian Past as Addressed by the Lviv Intellectuals

Eleonora Narvselius

New Emphases in the Politics of Memory in Ukraine in the Beginning of the 2000s

This paper offers a brief examination of the recent intellectual debates unfolding in Lviv, the “least Sovietized, least Russified” (Ignatieff 1993: 125) city of Ukraine, focusing on “local” historical narratives and symbolically charged figures that became issues of national concern. By “recent”, I mean primarily the presidential period of Viktor Yushchenko (2005–2010), a presently concluded chapter in Ukraine’s political history. These five years have been marked by the ambitious vision to consolidate the new Ukraine, whose socio-political unity would be based on a common vision of the nation’s future and supported by a broad consensus about the nation’s past. The first part of the equation was propelled by the hope to incorporate Ukraine into the European structures and NATO, while the second part brought to the fore the necessity of an ideological consensus about the contentious history of Ukraine in the 20th century. From the perspective of the present day, one may conclude that the efforts made in both directions were not crowned with success under Yushchenko’s presidency, and today’s Ukrainian authorities drive an essentially different political line. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the immediate results of this period, the quite radical political initiatives in the sphere of the politics of memory, as well as the intellectual discussions and popular responses triggered by these initiatives, may have a long afterlife.
There is no exaggeration in the statement that, at least during Yushchenko’s presidency, “the national re-evaluation of the history of World War II is a central element in constructing an anti-Soviet, Ukrainian national history” (Jilge 2007: 104). The special place of this period is defined not only by the particularly massive suffering and innumerable human atrocities that took place, and not only by the enormity of the task of rescuing the “real” history of the wartime from the captivity of the Soviet myth. In Galicia and Lviv, as elsewhere in Ukraine, the Second World War remains an unburied past; still alive in contradictory cultural memories (Erll 2008: 2); still full of conceptual “blank spots” as well as newly discovered sites of mass executions, and still not moulded into an intelligible narrative based on historical evidence rather than on assumptions and speculations. Moreover, the topic of the Second World War proved to be a real minefield for the “Orange” politicians. Taking into account the exterminatory policies of the Nazis towards the Slavic population of the occupied territories, it would be logical to make an effort to present the enormous atrocities directed against Ukrainians during the war in terms of a genocide – as in the much debated case of the Great Famine. Nevertheless, Yushchenko and his allies proved to be reluctant to pursue “the policy of legal recognition and public commemoration of the extermination of a significant part of the Ukrainian population by Nazi Germany as genocide” (Katchanovski 2010: 983). This occurred because of the fear of putting at risk relations with one of the EU pillars, Germany, on the one hand, and the infected issue of participation of the Ukrainian nationalists in the wartime genocide of the Jews and ethnic cleansing of Poles, on the other hand. Hence, the Second World War remains a domain where the clash of “traumatic” collective memories, insufficient academic knowledge and contradictory political rhetoric is particularly evident. This is especially true in respect to such topics as the wartime activities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), its military formations such as Nachtigall and Roland battalions, the Ukrainian Resurgent Army (UPA), and evaluation of their leaders and symbolic figures.

In Lviv, the legacy and symbolic meaning of the wartime leader of the OUN, Stepan Bandera\textsuperscript{52}, has been a permanent topic of public discourses since the late perestroika time. The figure of Bandera – as well as his political supporters and rank-and-file Ukrainian insurgents referred to by the name banderivtsi – became a focal point in the counter-narratives on the Second World War which were rooted in the collective memory and circulated in Western Ukraine throughout several post-war decades. Although on a national scale the region is often perceived as a stronghold of the Bandera myth and the place where OUN and UPA members have always been unanimously hailed as national heroes, an examination of the recent Lviv-based polemics surrounding them shows that, in fact, the actual state of affairs is more complicated than that. The recent “Bandera debate” was triggered by granting the title of Hero of Ukraine upon the chief commander of the UPA, Roman Shukhevych, by President Yushchenko in 2007 (in connection with the 65th anniversary of the UPA), and by the bestowal of the

\textsuperscript{52} To be correct, during the war Bandera was the leader of OUN only nominally, as almost immediately after declaration of an independent Ukrainian State he was arrested by Nazis and spent the rest of the war in German custody. The real leadership of OUN-B was taken over by other top figures of the party.
same title upon Bandera at the very end of Yushchenko’s presidency. Despite Bandera’s totalitarian ideology, since 1991 he has officially held one of the chief positions in the all-Ukrainian national-democratic pantheon of the greats of Ukrainian nation-building. This prominent position is explained by the historical fact that Bandera’s faction of the OUN (OUN-B) declared a Ukrainian state on 30 June 1941, in the turmoil that accompanied the marching of Nazis into Lviv. The new state proved to be a very short-lived, as its instigators were immediately suppressed by the Nazis. Nevertheless, it restores a continuity of the historical narrative about persistent efforts of the Ukrainian nationalist movement to establish a sovereign state since the beginning of the 20th century. Hence, after 1991, the OUN, the UPA and their leaders were almost without exception presented in schoolbooks as both heroic and tragic figures; as “the avant-garde of the Ukrainian nation of victims” (Jilge 2007: 108). The chief object of controversy within the official political and public political discourses is, however, not the symbolic status of the leader of the ideologically split OUN, in the first instance, but rather the evaluation of his legacy in present-day Ukraine (and, by extension, in Europe and Russia, in whose different parts his name is synonymous with either “national hero” or “nationalist cut-throat.” David Marples points out with good reason that “It is probably impossible at the present time in Ukraine to obtain an objective and dispassionate assessment of Bandera because he evokes such strong emotions even fifty years after his death” (Marples 2007: 96).

The “Bandera Debate”: Controversies of Historical Imagery and the Liberalization of Public Discourses in Lviv

The optics of envisioning Stepan Bandera in the debate stemming from Lviv is determined by three both partly convergent and partly opposite discursive fields: the political, the professional historical/academic, and the popular historical. The discussion of the “Bandera myth” among Ukrainian and Western scholars stretches over both pre-war and post-war decades and covers a plethora of such infected issues as terrorist acts of the OUN in the 1930s; efforts to convey the truth about the Great Famine to the West; collaboration with the Nazis; anti-Semitism as a significant part of the OUN platform; participation of the organized detachments of Ukrainian nationalists in the extermination of the Jews; massacres of Polish civilians by the UPA detachments in Volhynia in 1943–44; armed resistance to the Soviets; the killing of the civilians incriminated in collaboration with Bolsheviks, and the influence of ethnic cleansings in the region on post-war deportations of Poles and Ukrainians (ibid.: 17–29). Since 1991, a great deal of biographical, commemorative and popular literature has been published about the OUN, the UPA and Bandera in both Ukraine and abroad (USA, Canada, Poland)53. In

53 See David Marples’ book Heroes and Villains... for a survey of the most significant scholarly works on Bandera in both Ukraine and beyond.
Western Ukraine, especially Galicia, a hagiographic paradigm of historical writing on the subject has been established since independence. This can be explained not only by the stronger position of nationalist-democratic discourses here, but also by the modality of the local collective memory about the Ukrainian nationalist movement. As the Swedish historian Per Anders Rudling points out:

In the collective memory of Galicia the OUN–UPA is associated primarily with their post-war activities as UPA turned into an underground partisan army, fighting the Soviets. Few Galician Ukrainians and even fewer diaspora Ukrainians have any experience of the ethnic cleansing [of Poles, conducted by UPA groups– E.N.] in Volhynia. To many people, the OUN–UPA is remembered as a freedom fighter, standing up to one of the most brutal tyrants in history (Rudling 2006: 180).

As two excerpts from polemical essays written by two renowned Lviv historians demonstrate, the factor of positively-toned collective memory about the wartime and post-war liberation movement cannot be neglected in the professional historical debate, even though it can be used for contrary arguments:

The Ukrainian resistance movement was extremely sacrificial. The mere thought of those people going to death for the freedom of their Fatherland and fighting to the end induces respect and endless admiration. However, the fact is that among the [Ukrainian] policemen there were many villains and ordinary bandits as well. Therefore, maybe we should not stain the honorable memory about the genuine heroes by adding sadists and criminals to them? (Rasevych 2008, August 14).

The present-day wave of the popular commemoration provides a simple answer to the question about whether nobleness [lytsarstvo] or wickedness prevailed in that resistance movement. An exaggerated heroization does profanes the movement of national liberation, because instead of the real personalities who were able to rise above their own fears and temptations we encounter fearless and faultless half-mannequins. We need such commemoration which would spiritually comprise the entirety of this phenomenon (Marynovych 2010, May 25).

Nevertheless, some Lviv participants of the Bandera debate have also been quick to point out that generally positive collective memories of the “westerners” about the nationalist insurgence should not be used as a justification for the hagiographic historical imagery of the elites. As Volodymyr Pavliv, the political scientist from Lviv, rightfully points out, collective memory is an ambivalent phenomenon, one that cannot be used as the benchmark for establishing historical truth about the events and figures of that dramatic period:
Memory about that time was preserved at emigration and in family stories as a counterweight to the communist propaganda and lies. However, any oral stories are prone to mythologization and mystification, considering that these stories become gradually dissociated from the events, the eyewitnesses die, and access to the [archival] documents is limited. Enslaved peoples have a right to create their own myths and mystifications, in particular when this becomes a part of their patriotic and heroic identity. Banderism [banderivshchyna] was such an element for the majority of Western Ukrainians in the period of Soviet occupation. The bitter truth was silenced because people did not want to echo the occupants, the sweet truth was whispered in each other’s ears... But... in practice people have never forgotten the harm which Banderism inflicted indirectly and the grievances which individual Banderites caused directly. That is why before the independence in many villages people did not use the name “UPA”, but said “partisans,” “Banderites” and “bandits” instead (Pavliv 2010, May 25).

Allegedly monolithic and unanimous West Ukrainian discourses on collective memory became a springboard for the encroaching politicization of historical narratives about Bandera, the OUN and UPA. During Yushchenko’s presidency the field of historical studies of the wartime nationalist movement became even more politicized, as this branch of historical research became not only prioritized, but also concentrated to such state-subordinated institutions as the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, the affiliated Center for the Study of the Liberation Movement (established in Lviv in 2002), the Security Service of Ukraine\(^54\) (SBU, a successor of the Soviet KGB in Ukraine) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The marginalization of professional, dispassionate research focused on the Ukrainian nationalist movement in the 20th century sent the Lviv intellectual and academic community a signal about their dispensability and the limitation of their intellectual autonomy. Under such circumstances, intellectual polemics on Bandera took a new course. Instead of finding wholesale justifications for the “Bandera myth” and advocating his symbolic significance for the whole nation, the recent debate stemming from Lviv brought to the fore nuances of the ideational/ideological project unfolding with reference to the the leader of the OUN. The main questions which engaged the Lviv intellectuals proved to be: The strivings of which community does he symbolize? What ideological legacy does Bandera represent? Who defines the parameters for an evaluation of this figure?

Bestowing the title “Hero of Ukraine” upon Stepan Bandera seems to be a logical culmination of the radicalization of the politics of memory undertaken during Yushchenko’s presidency. Arguably, this symbolic gesture was dictated by the necessity to spur a reconciliation of the historical memories and political cultures between the Ukrainian East and West. However, a matter-of-fact presentation of Bandera as

\(^{54}\) As Grachova points out, “SBU, in fact, is the most active link in this association. Along with its special political status and funding, SBU inherited the republican archives of NKVD-MGB KGB, which, among other materials, contain a great mass of documents about all forms of anti-Soviet resistance. Unlike analogous archives in some countries of East-Central Europe, in Ukraine these doculents are, for the most part, still unaccessible to general public and researchers. In other words, SBU enjoys a monopoly on information and uses this monopoly to political ends, publishing selections of documents that represent historical events according to the current official perspective, and authorizing the official position on controversial issues” (Grachova, “Unknown Victims: Ethnic-Based Violence of the World War II Era in Ukrainian Politics of History after 2004,” 9).
an all-Ukrainian symbol not only further antagonized the “two Ukraines.” In the west it revealed an apparent split between national-democratic politicians, patriotic intelligentsia and a wider public, on the one side, and critical public intellectuals and dispassionate historians on the other. The latter camp expressed no optimism about the voluntarist political effort to fill the gap between the divided landscapes of collective memory by way of, figuratively speaking, putting dynamite between them. In this connection, the authoritative Lviv historian Iaroslav Hrytsak has expressed quite a controversial opinion that, instead of establishing heroes for a divided nation, politicians should “mind their own business” and leave the discussion about the toxic history to the professionals. If politicians feel the need to express opinions on the politics of memory, then they, in accordance with the European model, should first and foremost acknowledge and commemorate the victims (Hrytsak 2010, March 8). Vasyl Rasevych, another historian from Lviv, has also pointed out that the efforts of Ukrainian politicians to impose Bandera as an all-Ukrainian canonic “figure in bronze” were a step in the wrong direction (Rasevych 2010, January 29).

The split and radicalized Ukrainian memory, in line with this argument, may be remedied by way of a “broad internal discussion” which will establish historical truth about the antagonizing past. The political scientist Volodymyr Pavliv agrees with the opinion that Bandera and the wartime Ukrainian nationalist movement should first be purified from both nationalist and Soviet-totalitarian myths, revealing the “truth” as the result (Pavliv 2009, February 12). This task of bringing historical truth into view is not so easy to realize, however. Nevertheless, as Rasevych argues, even if in the future the intellectuals will be able to present a maximally de-ideologized picture of the Ukrainian historical landscape, it is naïve to hope that revelation of the truth alone will immediately erase the contradictions of the divided historical memories and different cultural traditions. The intention to enlighten the “ignorant easterners” may prove to be just another self-delusive “mission” of the Western Ukrainian intelligentsia (Rasevych 2009, January 29).

The idea that unbiased historical knowledge may be only a precondition, but not a guarantee of reconciliation, has gained wider acknowledgement over the last decades (Gloppen 2005). Therefore, while not denying a possibility of non-antagonistic historical narratives in Ukraine in a distant future, the option that Ukrainians should learn to live with the divided collective memories and other dividing factors seems to be more realistic for some public intellectuals (see, for example, Hrytsak 2010, March 8). Hence, one of the important points articulated in the course of the Bandera debate has been the necessity of a liberalization of the national politics of memory, i.e. a process of opening the political discourses and public debate to a circulation of diverse voices and narratives concerning the national past; a circulation unrestrained by political pressure. Besides, the vicissitudes of the “Bandera debate” in post-1991 Lviv have revealed not only disagreements regarding how to treat the “blank spots” within the public sphere, but also noteworthy tendencies in the continuing development of the “national paradigm” in Western Ukraine.

The polemics concerning Bandera once again demonstrated the difficulty (if not impossibility) of condensing conflicting historical narratives and memories
into an orthodox nationalist account which pinpoints victimization and heroism as indispensable attributes of a fully-fledged nation. As immoral and criminal deeds are a part of any national history, the point is not to silence them or whitewash their perpetrators, but rather to acknowledge them as part of the national history and be ready to meet the consequences of such acknowledgement\textsuperscript{55}. In this vein, the all-Ukrainian and international debate on Bandera, the results of which were summarized in a special issue of the Kyivian magazine Krytyka (2010), also made it clear that, whether revisited and re-defined from the vantage point of present-day historical knowledge or not, Bandera stays here. As a venerable figure of West Ukrainian historical memory and symbol of resistance to the Soviet totalitarianism, Bandera cannot be, figuratively speaking, “thrown from the ship of Ukrainian history.” Or, as the political scientist Volodymyr Kulyk expresses it:“When the time to select common heroes for all Ukraine comes, it may happen that Bandera will not be among them. But such a Ukraine has yet to be won” (Kulyk 2010: 14).

The glorification of Bandera may make little ethical sense today, as it tacitly confirms a totalitarian principle that political transformations justify violence (Snyder 2010). Neither may it make ethical sense to condemn Bandera out of respect for “European values,” as the European Parliament’s recent resolution on Bandera recommended, nor because of the pro-Russian political course of Yushchenko’s successor, President Yanukovych. The latter spoke of stripping Bandera of his posthumous hero title in order not to jeopardize relations with Russia, where he is commonly viewed as the “personification of absolute treachery” (Okara 2010, August 23). In Lviv, liberal intelligentsia circles criticized both acts and defended Bandera, not as an all-Ukrainian hero whose non-democratic legacy is a common denominator of the national ideological course, but rather as a symbol of the distinctiveness of Ukraine’s historical development and anti-colonial struggle. Iryna Magdysh, the editor of Ï magazine in Lviv, was quick to point out, in her rather straightforward manner, that “the deputies of the European Parliament – having no great knowledge of Ukrainian history – want to forbid us from having our own vision of our national past” (Magdysh 2010, March 4). As Hrytsak explains, with more composure: “There have and must be ‘uncomfortable heroes’ who break out from a monopolist version of the past. And ‘small’ peoples have the right to have them, as long as they commemorate them not as symbols of violence over other peoples, but as symbols of resistance in the struggle for their own survival and dignity” (Hrytsak 2010, March 8). To summarize, the Lviv public intellectuals and liberal intelligentsia have by and large supported the idea that the right to define a society’s “own” heroes and decide what exactly is manifested by these symbols belongs to communities of memory themselves. Some voices have forwarded a reservation that such communities are not necessarily equal to nations; thus Volodymyr Pavliv’s sarcastic remark: “Well, let’s call Stefko [Stepan Bandera] a symbol of the epoch, a symbol of the struggle, but not a symbol of the nation. Otherwise, the response will be like this: there is no nation whose symbol is Bandera” (Pavliv 2009, January 26).

While the Bandera debate accentuated a notable tendency of liberalization of the public discourses on history and collective memory, it also revealed that this tendency is

\textsuperscript{55} This opinion was expressed, for example, by Iaroslav Hrytsak (2004: 110–11)
still evolving against the background of polarized historical imagery, where competing actors strive to monopolize objectivity. This has testified that inertia of treating national history in the Manichean terms of heroism or treason, victory and defeat, glorification and victimization—the approach that was immanent in the Soviet ideological paradigm—may perfectly correlate with an instrumental view of history and historical memory appropriated both by the nationalist politicians and their opponents (Grachova 2008: 18; Dubasevych 2008; Frunchak 2010: 435–63; Kravchenko 2004). In this context, one can recall an apt formulation by Tony Judt: “The mis-memory of communism is also contributing, in its turn, to a mis-memory of anti-communism.” (Judt 2004: 175).

While the main emphasis in the Bandera debate was put on the symbolic meaning of the OUN leader for Ukrainian national history, the discussion about his legacy in the history of other nations which used to populate the West Ukrainian borderland, became obviously marginalized (Jilge 2007: 103–31; Grachova 2008). As a result, despite a present-day liberalization and pluralization of the public discourses on Bandera in Lviv, his symbolic representations in the urban public space convey another message.

The Bandera monument erected in Lviv is one of the most obvious examples of this ambiguity. Notably, while the Soviet monumentalist aesthetics of the Bandera memorial stirred criticism, another important aspect of this lieu de memoire seems to be overlooked: namely, the logic behind erecting it just beside the former Roman Catholic St. Elżbieta cathedral, formerly used by a Polish congregation. For the majority of Poles, Bandera is a loathed figure, deemed responsible for instigating massacres of the Polish populations in Volhynia and Galicia in 1943, which, in turn, was one of the factors behind the exodus of Poles from the region at the end of the war and thereafter. Despite efforts by the Ukrainian community to “normalize” Bandera as a heroic figure, the Poles’ attitude to him is diametrically opposite. Hence, from the perspective of Polish visitors and the local Polish community (see Fastnacht-Stupnicka 2010), the monument sends an unequivocal message about the vindictive triumph of Ukrainian nationalists over Polish rivals for control of the city; a triumph that resulted from ethnic cleansings and forced migrations.

Curiously, the debate surrounding the erection of the Bandera monument in Lviv has not addressed this “outsider” perspective. Negative signals that the choice of place for it might send to the Polish neighbours, who are officially viewed as geopolitically important partners of Ukraine, were left beyond the parameters even in the discussions of Lviv’s intellectuals. The memorial was strongly criticized in the local media, but mostly for its undesirable associations with Soviet monumentalism and the aesthetics of socialist realism. Even in circles of the liberal Lviv intellectuals, discussion about the symbolic implications of the monument was largely “self-centred”, in that it focused on its ideological meaning on the scale of Lviv and all of Ukraine (Amar 2008, July 8; Pavlyshyn 2007, October 29).

It is easy to criticize insufficiently thought-out commemorative practices and ethical implications of the support of the Bandera cult by politicians, academics and common urbanites in Lviv. What often goes unnoticed is that the emotional attachment and admiration surrounding this figure connects not so much to what Bandera actually did, but rather what he symbolically represented. He personified not only a charismatic
politician, but also a figure endowed with cultural authority. The combination of these two dimensions resulted in the aptness of Bandera for the role of a symbolic figure “larger than life.” As Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, historian from the University of Alberta, remarks:

...Polish representatives loved the Polish national culture, and Bandera admired the Ukrainian one. This common interest in national culture, as well as claims for the territory populated by the both peoples, resulted in conflicts and fights. ...adherents of both national cultures were a part of the process of heroic modernization which they neither comprehended not controlled. In this heroic modernization, Bandera played a role of a political myth with several faces – the myth that is not ended for anyone, and that did not lose its mythological sense (Rossoliński-Liebe 2009, January 22).

David Marples’ observation about the importance of Bandera’s symbolic dimension also evokes an idea about a certain cultural framing behind his outstanding attraction for his followers: “According to one former UPA soldier, rank and file fighters never saw Bandera or Melnyk. They were symbols... his importance as a thinker or philosopher was minimal, and the most significant facet of Bandera’s personality was his implacable and uncompromising position and willingness to abandon all principles to attain the goal of an independent Ukraine” (Marples 2006: 556, 565).

The son of a Greek-Catholic priest, a “romantic terrorist” who dreamed about the national revolution (Hrytsak 2008, May 12), and an uncompromising politician who “does not seem to have undergone any fundamental change of views from those embraced in his youth” (Marples 2006: 563), he may be viewed as a personification of the pre-war, nationally conscious “old” Galician intelihent. Such envisioning of Bandera has been explicitly formulated by, for example, Volodymyr Parubii, head of the Lviv branch of the Congress of Ukrainian Intelligentsia. He has pointed out that both Bandera and the leader of the UPA, Roman Shukhevych, were charismatic representatives of the intelligentsia and leaders of the people (Zaxid 2010, July 16).

Hence, one may summarize that in Lviv and Galicia the turnarounds of the debates about the “blank spots” in local and national history of the 20th century, and persistent efforts to propose a streamlined anti-communist vision of the past, should also be examined against the background of a continuous “domestic” account about the intelligentsia’s uninterrupted evolution as an avant-garde of the Ukrainian nation. Despite all those who point to the dubious value of Bandera’s political legacy, for the patriotic Galician circles he exemplifies, first and foremost, an uncompromising nation-builder with “his own” vision and active ideological line – i.e., something allegedly non-existent in the contemporary Ukrainian political establishment (Bondarenko 2001: 183–94). With all his extremes, Bandera may be viewed as an outstanding representative of the Ukrainian Galician intelligentsia, whose militancy and ideological rigidity was not only a result of his own agency, but part of a wider cultural pattern of “an intelihent as a knight” (Narvselius 2009: 138–42). The same pattern was evident in the collective heroization and mythologization of the OUN-UPA’s rank-and-file members (Marples 2010: 36). A continuing fascination with Bandera in present-day Lviv indicates, in turn, the continuing importance of cultural authority, ideological/ideational autonomy, and political influence as yardsticks of the transformation processes in Western Ukraine.
Bringing History to the People? Commercialization of Historical Narratives in the Urban Space of Lviv

The recent debate on the “toxic” past of Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation has revealed new facets of the ongoing struggle for intellectual autonomy in Lviv, and, at the same time, exposed the aspiration of Lviv’s intelligentsia to monopolize the right to form a national cognizant public. As in the case with the “empowering” narratives focused on Lviv’s specificity, the intellectual debate about the national past unfolded in the constant interplay and opposition with the official rhetoric and popular historical narratives underpinned by collective memories. The uneasy relationship between the “objective” historical narratives provided by professional historians and visions of the past “manipulated” by the politicians has been a principal leitmotif in the Bandera debate. Notably, both academic historians and politicians (as well as politicking intellectuals) addressed the “authenticity” of collective memories as a benchmark of historical objectivity in envisioning the national past. Hence, popular collective memories and historical accounts of the 20th century, despite their fragmentation, polarity and inconsistency, became invested with undeniable moral value. This opened the door to efforts to use references to collective memories as an argument underscoring one’s democratism and moral supremacy in various sorts of polemics. In this way, one would, for example, contrast the matter-of-factness of an academic historical narrative addressing “genuine” collective memories to the “distortions” of history supported by powers that be and other elite actors.
Despite the eagerness of professional historians and public intellectuals to justify certain arguments (for example, the advocacy of Bandera as a symbol of the fight for national liberation) by references to the collective memory, the popular historical narratives circulating among “the population at large” have also become a target for intellectual criticism. Kost Bondarenko, the political scientist and historian who used to study and work in Lviv, and who addressed the history of Ukrainian nationalist organizations in his research, was among those who drew public attention to the one-track popular interpretations of history. In an article from 2002, he formulated the core of the problem: “...the overwhelming majority of the country’s population is absolutely historically illiterate. And worst of all, nobody is eager to fill in the gaps in their knowledge of history, or even correct their misconceptions. ...the population at large, including our politicians, prefer easier reading.” Another respected historian based in Lviv, Marian Mudryi, developed this line of argument further:

Is Ukrainian society ready to reject its naive, childish realism when it comes to consideration of the past? No, it is not. This is not because of a lack of a special education, but because of consumerist egotism, which this society got deeply stuck in. …people stubbornly expect that historians will provide clear answers to all questions about the past, will examine “all” facts and circumstances, will send a sort of “divine revelation” to them. ... If something is incomprehensible, it means it is wrong. …Against this background, historical fantasies or obvious speculations of the politicians are much more attractive due to their simplicity and comprehensibility than complicated explanations of the historians (Mudryi 2010, January 29).

Laments about an estrangement between intellectuals and “common people” on the one hand, and between intellectuals and politicians on the other, have been a persistent topic of the intellectual discourse in post-Soviet Ukraine. According to this line of argument, present-day Ukrainian society lacks the capacity for intellectual reflection, which explains its uninterest in sober and rational conceptualizations of history. Nevertheless, an unwillingness of the “population at large” to accept “incomprehensible” explanations of historians may depend not only on the alleged stupefaction of the masses by consumerism and political demagogy. Turning the tables, one might argue that another aspect of the problem is the quality of the historical narratives stemming from the circles of professional historians. As the chief domain of historical research in Ukraine has been national history, the issues of inter-ethnic and inter-state conflicts, competition and injustices, come to the fore, while inter-cultural exchange, peaceful coexistence, daily life, and the hybridity of numerous historical phenomena fade into the periphery. If academics and public intellectuals focus on the elucidation of embarrassing historical

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56 In fact, there have been done efforts to overcome this tendency in historiography of Ukraine. One of the most resonant was the work of the commission on monitoring school history textbooks headed by the authoritative historian Natalia Iakovenko. From 2007 to 2009, twelve professional historians from different regions of Ukraine held a series of meetings under the auspices of the Ukrainian National Memory Institute. The working group suggested the conception of “maximum detailization (mul’typlikatsija)” of the society” which presupposes focusing history teaching on illuminating the motivations and mechanisms of actions of different groups in society. Nevertheless, as Oxana Shevel notes, “Because Iakovenko’s conception effectively deconstructs both the main competing narratives of the Ukrainian past in general and of World War II in particular, the acceptance of this conception at the state level appears problematic under any government” (Shevel 2011: 159).

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facts and map almost all recent history as a minefield dangerous for non-professionals to trespass on, then one may expect that the deficit of “non-embarrassing” historical knowledge will be compensated by other actors in other ways.

Throughout the 1990s, the idea that the rich historical legacy of Lviv and the region fascinated the public and, hence, needed sooner or later to be exploited commercially, was repeatedly expressed by the city fathers, planners, intelligentsia and intellectuals. Nevertheless, the most notable developments in this direction began in the 2000s, in connection to the accelerating debate about the “blank spots” of national history. One of the most resonant commercial projects relating to the not-so-distant history of the city was the launching of a network of thematic tourist restaurants: Hideout (Kryivka, 2007), Masoch café (2008) and the Galician Jewish Restaurant Under the Golden Rose (Halyts’ka Zhydivs’ka knaipà Pid Zolotoiu Rozoiu, 2008). Behind this chain of both famous and infamous restaurants are the young L’viv businessmen Iurii Nazaruk, Andrii Khudo and Dmytro Herasymov. The intellectual motor of the trio is a graduate of the L’viv Ivan Franko University, Iurii Nazaruk, also one of the creators of the L’viv daily Lvivska hazeta and a former consultant for the L’viv art enterprise Dzyga. In one interview he stated openly that “Our cafés confirm the myths. People need this. … It’s a transmission of a piece of history … a piece of L’viv” (Interview with Yurii Nazaruk).

Figure 2. Hideout’s interior. Photo by the author
The most commercially successful, and at the same time most scandalous of the restaurants, *Hideout*, exploits the heroic myth of the Ukrainian nationalist wartime and post-war insurgency. The winning concept of this establishment has been the combination of interactivity, humour, provocativeness and free play with historical references. Notably, as Yurii Nazaruk pointed out in another interview (see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BlI5S_iEo0Y&#feature=related#криївка), *Hideout’s* launching was preceded by expeditions to the countryside with the aim of collecting memorabilia associated with the Ukrainian insurgents, and by consultations with historians from the Centre of the Liberation Movement in Lviv. At present, *Hideout* possesses a collection of authentic pictures and other items, some of them displayed in the venue. Hence, as a hybrid form, the restaurant is not a purely commercial enterprise. Its mission is not only to feed and entertain, but also to educate. In *Hideout*, the visitors are served not only an array of meals with tongue-in-cheek names, but also a historical narrative whose entirety emerges in the fusion of several aesthetic forms, such as museum, mini-theatre, adventure centre and art gallery.

Critical or indignant reactions against *Hideout* came from a range of public actors with diametrically opposed political agendas. One of the first harsh critics which demanded the closing of *Hideout* was the Association of the UPA Veterans, whose members protested against the profanation of the Ukrainian insurgency and capitalizing on the memory of the dead heroes. The Jewish organizations and Soviet veteran organizations of Ukraine raised their voices against light-hearted references to the movement which collaborated with the Nazis. Outraged articles about *Hideout* also appeared in the media outside Ukraine, primarily in Russia and Poland. Neither were the reactions of the moderately nationalist intellectuals and cultural personalities in Lviv particularly welcoming. Although the idea of titillating the imagination of tourists with allusions to violent recent history draws negative publicity, this is not the only factor behind *Hideout’s* scandalous fame. All in all, in Europe alone there are plenty of *lieux de mémoire* which both commemorate the tragic pages of history and bring commercial profit. The crux is rather the boldness of the volte-face on envisioning the not-so-distant history suggested by *Hideout’s* creators.

Obviously, launching the venue in 2007 coincided with the wave of political efforts to radicalize the all-national politics of memory championed by President Yushchenko. Keeping this in mind, but also taking into account the well-connectedness of the *Hideout’s* creators within the circles of the powers that be in Lviv, one may conclude that the enterprise is a typical illustration of the fusion of political and commercial interests so typical of the post-Soviet “oligarchic” Ukraine. As a cultural commodity, *Hideout* referred to the political idea of integration of non-Soviet wartime experiences of Western Ukraine into the all-Ukrainian historical narrative and, viewed from this perspective, was completely in line with the official discourse. Simultaneously, the restaurant’s founders added an original emphasis, as they dared to stylize Banderites as sympathetic and cheerful figures, and so hardly suitable for the politics of regret (see Olick 2007) articulated by the political elites. In a way, the *Hideout’s* winning

57 Nevertheless, the high-brow Lviv magazine І is mentioned among the partners of *Hideout* on the restaurant’s website.
concept is not only politicization and commoditization of a historical period, but also its
carnivalization. As Iurii Nazaruk stated in one of his interviews, the commercial success
of Hideout results from reversing tragic aspects of the official historical accounts and
turning them into a self-glorifying “optimistic” story where rank-and-file insurgents are
not overshadowed by the monumental figures of the nationalist leaders (see http://daily.
lviv.ua/index.php?module=write_about_lviv&view=56). Such carnivalization may certainly
be liberating and exciting, but there is another side to the coin, too. Enjoyable digestion
of tasty meals and internalization of historical imagery offered by the restaurant goes
in tandem with a simplification of historical knowledge. The authentic details of
the interior and feel-good consumer experiences invite acceptance of a streamlined
story about brave, cheerful guys who heroically fought against both Nazis and Soviet
occupiers for the freedom and glory of Ukraine. Obviously, another part of the story,
which tells about numerous Polish, Jewish, Russian and Ukrainian civilians who fell
victim to the Ukrainian nationalist militia and insurgent troops during and after the war,
is left aside.

Figure 3. *Wipe your feet when entering Hideout!* A poster on sale from the restaurant’s website http://www.kryjivka.com.ua/info/souvenirs/
Curiously, an emphasis on the “authenticity” of the events, people and artefacts referred to and displayed in *Hideout* contrasts with its location in the very historical centre of Lviv. *Hideout* imitates the milieu of forest shelters used by the nationalist insurgents, which seems to be misplaced in the rooms of a 16th-century stone house decorated with a statue of the winged lion; a symbol of the Venetian Republic whose consulate used to be located there. Although this association is missed by many visitors, the physical location of *Hideout* nevertheless evokes an idea that the urban milieu of Lviv was for centuries dominated by other people and other stories than the Ukrainian ones. Notably, the presentation of “authentic” Galician Ukrainianness in terms of the nationalist insurgency also evokes the idea that the principal base of this movement remained the Ukrainian-dominated countryside – where, by the way, *Hideout* enthusiasts collected some of the original artefacts presently stored in the venue. Hence, behind the innovative concept and provocative visual presentations in *Hideout*, one can distinguish a well-known sentiment of the present-day Lviv intelligentsia to the “authentic” Ukrainianness, which in many contexts is the same as “unspoiled” rural roots.

This touch of rurality in the “tourist-accommodating” narrative about the Ukrainian resistance movement of the 20th century has been partially compensated for by a recently published tourist guide: *The City of Our Heroes* (*Misto nashykh heroiv*). This richly illustrated book presents Lviv as the site of “heroic events”, and suggests that the readers “not only travel, but also discover the truth for yourselves and confirm the idea that Lviv is a city of heroes!” (Kozytskyi 2009: 246). Such a symbolic project of claiming back the city and presenting it as an organic part of the non-interrupted narrative of national glory and tragedy unavoidably involves the demanding intellectual work of stitching together both “authentic” and “non-authentic” thematic pieces: representations, narratives, artefacts and symbols provided by academic discourses, political rhetoric and popular culture. In itself, such creation of identity narratives from diverse symbolic material is both a necessary and legitimate part in the process of forging solidary communities. Hence, the existing patchwork of “places of memory” in Lviv – which are commercial, commemorative, artistic, political and educational at one and the same time – confirms that cultural entrepreneurs in the city comply with mainstream modern strategies of identity creation that presuppose, among other things, the cultivation of so-called prosthetic memory. This new form of memory, as Alison Landsberg explains, “emerges at the interface between a person and a historical narrative about the past, at an experiential site such as a movie theater or museum. ...the person does not simply apprehend a historical narrative but takes on a more personal, deeply felt memory of a past event through which he or she did not live. ...Prosthetic memories are transportable and therefore challenge more traditional forms of memory that are premised on claims of authenticity, “heritage,” and ownership” (Landsberg 2004: 2, 3).

*Hideout*’s creators did not limit their project to a presentation of the “Lviv myth” through the prism of Ukrainian historical memories and cultural narratives alone. The rich urban semiosphere of the city prompted other stories and figures which could be both commemorated and commercially exploited. Another two potentially resonant and controversial topics were served to the public in the form of another two thematic
restaurants – this time with an urban theme and facets of bourgeoisness coming to the fore. Like Hideout, these restaurants immediately became both famous and infamous in the city and beyond. Masoch café fully lived up to the expectations of those clients who wished to be titillated by the erotic overtones and references to the decadent air of the Habsburg fin-de-siècle. The main point of reference in this conceptual package is the figure of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, who was born in Lemberg and whose literary works written in German address Galician life and mores at the end of the 19th century. Piquant descriptions of erotic master-and-servant play in his renowned novel Venus in Furs led to dubbing a sexual perversion by his name, i.e. “masochism.” Representatives of Lviv intellectual circles were annoyed not so much by the erotic allusions of Masoch café as by the alleged disrespect of its creators towards this prominent personality associated with Lviv (Sereda 2008, April 8). However, the much discussed bronze statue of Masoch placed in front of the café was conceived as an allusion to masochism rather than a monument commemorating a historical figure. Therefore the statue awakens curiosity and indeed invites tourists to make frivolous gestures. All in all, the tone of the Masoch café may be called equivocal and exoticizing rather than repulsive. It seems to express a seldom articulated nuance in the present-day, popular and stereotypical perception of the urban bourgeoisness and upper-class cultures in Galicia under the “good old” Danube monarchy.

The effort of Hideout’s creators to make a profit on easily recognizable representations of urban Jewish culture provoked a much harsher reaction from professional historians and public intellectuals. As there exists historical evidence that the Ukrainian nationalist militia took part in the war-time extermination of the Galician Jews58, the idea to match the themes of the Jewish inter-war life and the Ukrainian nationalist insurgency as equally exciting parts of tourist entertainment was seen as blasphemous. Moreover, the practical application of Hideout’s concept of playfulness, interactivity and provocation to the extremely sensitive Jewish issue was not especially felicitous. The brave and, one may guess, well-intentioned striving to suggest an attractive and commercially viable presentation of the “Jewish theme” resulted not only in articulation of the old stereotypes, but also in an ethically dubious, distorted account of the history of the Jewish community served to guests at the Galician Jewish Restaurant Under the Golden Rose.

Vasyl Rasevych has summarized the main criticisms against the restaurant: the improper location of an entertainment venue in the vicinity of the old synagogue destroyed by the Nazis; a focus on “pleasant” exoticisms of Jewish culture and omission of the “unpleasant” topic of the Holocaust; inaccurate or tactless commentaries about the history of Galician Jews, which the visitors may read alongside the menu; an unholy mixture of sacred symbols and erotic pictures by Bruno Schultz in the restaurant’s interior; kosher food alongside pork meals, and so on (Rasevych 2008, October 29). This list of faults prompts the conclusion that the objections raised against the restaurant are well-founded. In this case, the mishmash of contradictory representations testifies not to the “normal” work of prosthetic memory, but rather an absence of reflection (Sabic 2004: 171). Unlike sections of the intellectual public and policymakers in Lviv, who are

58 See, for example, Himka 1999, Himka 2005.
unwilling to touch upon sensitive issues of the Jewish past, *Hideout*’s creators intended to turn the “toxic” topic into a part of public knowledge that deserved to be addressed, interpreted and enjoyed. As restaurants, cultural events and tourist attractions exploiting the Jewish theme and attracting, among others, Jewish tourists have already become part of the cultural landscape in, for example, Cracow, the idea to launch a similar venture in Lviv was not improper in itself. However, the *Galician Jewish Restaurant* was created without a broader involvement of Jewish cultural actors. While *Hideout*’s project was partly justified by relying on still vital collective memories of the eyewitnesses, and legitimized by the supposed necessity of interpreting “our own” Ukrainian history from “our own” Ukrainian perspective, the *Galician Jewish Restaurant* failed to meet these criteria.

Hence, the intellectual project of presenting “the Other,” the vanished neighbours in the pre-war cityscape of Lviv, to the wider public proved to be a free-floating amateur interpretation provided by a non-representative group of local businessmen and business-minded intellectuals. Contrary to the initial intention to make the pre-war Galician Jewish culture a site of admiration and excitement, this degraded it to a site of farce. This is, unfortunately, not the only example of a lack of cultural sensitivity in the treatment of a multicultural heritage, historical memories and lieux de memoire in Lviv. The core of the problem is not the lack of professional expertise or engagement from various non-governmental organizations and cultural associations, but rather “compartmentalization” of the intellectual debate and the absence of regular dialogue between policymakers, academics, concerned intelligentsia, NGOs and public “mnemonic actors” about cultural heritage and prospective ways of developing the urban space of Lviv.

**Summary**

A radicalization of the national politics of memory in Ukraine during Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency, notwithstanding its immediate results, occurred in tandem with the proclaimed pro-European political course of the “Orange” authorities. The ambition to bring Ukraine closer to Europe, by way of synchronizing the national debate over the legacy of the Soviet past and the Second World War with the quest for overarching frames of historical memory in the EU, opened the door to articulation of the different non-Soviet experiences of Western Ukraine. However, instead of balancing historical debate and mitigating cultural-political tensions between the Ukrainian West and East, an unskilful elevation of “diverging” collective memories of the region in the political discourse of the national elites further aggravated antagonism around prospective ways of nation-building and modelling national identity.

In Lviv and Galicia, efforts to propose a streamlined anti-communist vision of the national history have been undertaken by various circles of patriotic intelligentsia – both politicking and academic ones. It might be argued that these efforts to externalize the Soviet period as a “distortion” imposed on both the regional and national past
by an oppressive foreign power should also be examined through the prism of the efforts of the Galician intelligentsia to create a continuous “domestic” account about their uninterrupted evolution as an avant-garde of the Ukrainian nation. Despite these aspirations, visions and evaluations of the 20th-century past stemming after 1989 from Western Ukraine and, in particular, from Lviv, present a fragmentary and contradictory picture. For instance, discussions about the national insurgency and anti-Soviet struggle in the region have been torn between polar lines of argument as well as between different perspectives addressed by “ordinary people”, professional historians and public intellectuals, and political elites (see Figure 1). Intellectual discourse on the topic lacks contingency and a clearly articulated regional perspective. As the Bandera debate has made clear, when intellectuals advocate the regional perspective as a legitimate part of national discourse and do not insist on projecting “authentic” popular attitudes towards admired regional figures onto the whole nation, a number of misunderstandings and antagonisms can be avoided. Generally, however, discussion on the contentious past of West Ukraine is still entrapped in the tenets of national discourse. This, in turn, entails the dominance of a moral approach and, as the West Ukrainian intellectuals themselves admit, invites a dubious volte-face when appraising the Ukrainian nationalist movement during the Second World War.

In Lviv, the timely intellectual discussion on the wartime period, as well as the changing optics of historical imagery which suggest alternatives to the politics of regret, has enhanced the interest of the broad public towards the previously silenced pages of the “authentic” history of the region. During the past decade, a certain liberalization of the politics of memory and democratization of collective memory discourses did take place in Lviv and Western Ukraine. One can, however, still observe a notable gap between the historical knowledge confined to academic and intellectual circles, and narratives suggested to the broader public. As the example of a chain of thematic restaurants (Hideout, etc.) demonstrates, the “light-hearted” interpretations of a contentious past suggested to the public by intellectuals involved in the popularization and commercialization of historical knowledge may have far-reaching, unpredictable implications.
References


Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 1–18.]


The Nexus Between Cultural Trauma, Collective Memory and Social Trust: A Glass Half-Full, Half-Empty or Shattered. The Case of post-1991 Ukraine

Yuliya Yurchuk

This paper approaches changes of collective memory in post-Soviet Ukraine from the perspective of the cultural trauma theory proposed by Jeffrey C. Alexander et al. As the fall of the Socialist Bloc and the disintegration of the Soviet Union are seen by many scholars as traumatogenic events, the problematic encounters and a rather challenging process of coming to terms with the past can be perceived as the symptoms of trauma the post-Soviet nations have to cope with. The capacity to cope with trauma differs depending on the conditions of the society before the crisis. Therefore, it has its own peculiarities in each post-Soviet state. Moreover, it depends not only on the past conditions but also on the range of present factors, e.g. the speed of democratization of the society, the establishment of trustworthy and legitimate institutions, as well as a degree of consolidation of the society and readiness to accept changes. Some of the changes the society in transition has to cope with are related to an understanding of history that involves re-evaluation of the past, opening up silenced topics, and filling in blank spots of history – all these processes can be referred to as coming to terms with the past. Readiness to accept these changes very much depends on the consolidation of the society and the social trust among the people. Therefore, the process of coming to terms with the past is closely related to the notion of social trust. My argument is that in a society with low social trust in state institutions, the process of coming to terms with the past takes place in the spaces alternative to the state-sponsored institutions of memory (schools, museums, official commemorations). Instead, people tend to look for and produce a trustworthy picture of the past through other sources: family stories, counter-memories, oral histories, films, literature, etc. Distrust in institutions does not preclude trust in smaller collectives: family, neighbours, friends, etc. Under such con-
ditions, regional, local, translocal and transnational memories gain more sense-giving weight in identification of the community.

Collective Memories: A Chance and a Challenge

Since the concept of memory is very broad and far-reaching, it is necessary to outline how it is used in this paper. Almost all the discussions on memory include reflections on the collective and individual dimensions of memory. The present paper follows the intersubjectivist approach to memory that avoids both theories rooted in social determinism and visions of the individualistic approach. Instead, the intersubjectivist approach points out that ‘individual memory is socially organized or socially mediated, [it] emphasizes the social dimension of human memory, without, however, necessarily being a straightforward projection of the shared remembering’ (Misztal 2003: 5–6). According to the intersubjectivist view on memory, individual memory is never totally conventionalized and standardized. James Young argues that ‘memories need to be placed into patterns so that they could make some continuing sense in the changing present’ (1988: 97–98). To understand the collective dimension of memory, one should think about the ways in which memory is realized. As Andreas Huyssen points out, ‘[t]he past is not simply given in memory, it must be articulated’ (Huyssen 1995:3). Such articulation takes place in the social space. In order to be realized, it needs collectively shared means of articulation: language, commemorative practices, rituals, monuments, memorials, the art, etc. Although on the level of cognition memory works individually, it needs the collective to be preserved, transmitted and become embedded into a broader picture of the past. To put it succinctly, society provides means for an individual to remember. State institutions are among those means that help articulate memories. In contrast to other means of articulation, state institutions have the capacity to address most of the population of a country through national channels: school curricula, calendars, official commemorations, state museums, etc. Jan-Werner Müller notes that ‘memory is personally reworked, officially recast and often violently re-instilled’ (Müller 2002: 2). Memory is never a closed space; it is open to contestation and negotiation. Furthermore, ‘reconstructing collective memory and instituting new foundational myths do more than ”deal with the past”; they act as legitimating moments for and shape the character of new regimes’ (Norval 1998: 250). In this regard, the character of memory work sheds light on the character of the regime itself. If the regime is not (yet) democratic and excludes a plurality of voices, then memory work tends to be monistic – affirming only one possible interpretation and evaluation of the past. This kind of memory work is characteristic of societies in transition.

As I focus on the memories shared (or not shared) by the people in one state – namely Ukraine – the concept of memory inevitably leads us to the relationship between

59 See more in Mizstal, pp.6, 10–11.
60 For a broader discussion of memory as a process of negotiation, see the dynamics of memory approach in Mizstal, pp. 67–74; Schudson, 1997; Kammen 1995; Olick & Levy 1997.
collective memory and national identity. Such a relationship reveals the inherent link between memory and values. As the Canadian anthropologist Allan Young notes, ‘the proof as well as the record of the self’s existence, and the struggle over memory is the struggle over the self’s most valued possessions’ (Young 1995:221). Opening up a ‘forgotten’ or ‘suppressed’ past in the post-Socialist societies did not only engender a struggle for the establishment of ‘new’ memories, but also a struggle for re-evaluation and devaluation of the ‘old’ most valued possessions: one’s views on the self, on the collective, on the past, and on the future. In contrast to history that strives to see the past as passed away, memory is rooted in the present and it projects itself to the future. In this way, memory provides analogies in decision-making processes, and thus shapes the present and influences the future.

The political scientist Aletta Norval, in her reflections on the most central characteristics of national memory, notes that it is ‘above all archival: it relies on the immediacy of the recording and on the visibility of the image’, and at the same time it is ‘acutely aware of the efforts of each group to make its version the basis of national identity. It is thus aware of conflicting accounts of the past’ (Norval 1998: 255). In this regard, articulations of national memory take place under the conditions of conflict and struggle for the determining of an all-inclusive picture of the past that denies the differences of competing identities (ethnic, local, regional, etc.)

Communities that constitute the nation certainly share some memories, but the collective memory of the whole nation does not reflect the whole range of the memories of its constitutive communities. Yael Zerubavel reminds us that collective memory is ‘quite different from the sum total of the personal recollection of its various individual members, as it includes only those that are commonly shared by all of them’ (Zerubavel 1997: 96). In this respect I share the views of James Young, who prefers to speak about collected memories emphasizing the plurality of memories and the fact that memories of some groups are not reflected in the collective memory on a national scale, but are still crucial for the identity of these groups that constitute a nation (Young 2000).

Taking into consideration the differences of an experienced past among the people in Ukraine, we can hardly claim that personal recollections of all the people shape national memory. Nevertheless, we can speak about the collective memories of different communities. These communities ‘speak’ to each other about the historical events that have strong meaning-generating potential for shaping the communal identity. In a national arena each community is struggling to impose their own particular memories, their own version of the past, as authentic, trustworthy and the only valid one. As will be further emphasized, there are two main camps in the struggle for a ‘correct’ past: one promotes the Soviet historical scheme that persists now in the neo-Soviet discourse, while the other adheres to the Ukrainian nationalized historical scheme. What is common to both of them, though, is the belief in a single truthful view on history. Moreover, these two schemes share strategies of glorification and

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61 See the discussion on differences and similarities between history and memory in Misztal, pp. 99–108.

62 ‘Nation’ is used in constructivist terms as a socio-cultural construct.
victimization in constructing historical narratives.\textsuperscript{63} The Canadian historian John-Paul Himka links the strategy of victimization to the unwillingness of the community to take responsibility for crimes committed in the name of one’s nation (Himka 2005). Following these strategies, the guilt for committed crimes is shifted to the external or internal ‘others’. The impossibility of dealing with the nation’s own guilt can be seen as a symptom of trauma that hinders an open encounter with atrocities committed by those who belong to the nation.

In his demarche ‘On Collective Memory’, Maurice Halbwachs states, that if the society is strong enough, it does not need to search for heroic histories and represent them in the present. In his view, only weak societies need heroes and heroic events (Halbwachs 1992). Michael Billig, though, demonstrates that even in societies with a long history of nationhood and statehood, the narratives of a heroic past are constantly used in order to discursively endorse the nation (Billig 1995). In contrast to well-established nations, Ukraine is in the midst of the process of state-building, and this process is full of contests and disputes between different groups referring to the past in the search for legitimacy, analogy, and orientation. In this context, there is a strong interest in establishing some local or regional historical narratives and heroes as national. Thus, competition and contestation have together become the core feature of collective memory and collective identity in Ukraine.

Contested Ground

As noted above, Ukraine is a battleground between two schemes of Ukrainian history: the official Soviet scheme that persisted in neo-Soviet historical discourse, and the Ukrainian national scheme. The basis for the official Soviet scheme is the Russian imperial scheme that emphasizes the unity of Eastern Slavs in the period of Kyivan Rus’, composed of three ‘brethren’ proto nationalities: proto-Ukrainians, Russians and Belarusians. Within this conceptual framework Russians are depicted as a more ancient and more powerful people who can protect their younger Ukrainian brothers. Hence, following this scheme, Ukrainians always strived to ‘reunite’ with Russia and break free from the Polish yoke. This ‘natural’ desire was fulfilled by signing the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654. In this scheme, the Soviet Union is a logical outcome of the urge of Ukrainians and Russians to live together. The Ukrainians’ attempts to establish their own state in 1917–21 are depicted as marginal and influenced from the outside (mainly the Germans and Poles). The same interpretation is applied to Ukrainian nationalist movements against the Soviets during the Second World War, whereby the nationalists are seen as Nazi collaborators.\textsuperscript{64} This scheme underlines that Ukrainians eagerly joined

\textsuperscript{63} For strategies of glorification and victimization in Ukrainian history writing, see Marples 2007 and Himka 2005.

the Red Army and together with other peoples of the Soviet Union defended their Soviet motherland against the Nazi occupiers.

The Ukrainian national scheme is based on the populist Ukrainian historiography established by mid-nineteenth century historians that was derived from traditions of romanticism and positivism. This scheme underlines the distinctiveness of the Ukrainian people among other Slavs and demonstrates that Ukraine had followed its own separate historical paths (Kohut 2011: 219; Velychko 1992). The Ukrainian historian Georgiy Kasianov distinguishes two stages of the nationalization of history in Ukraine: the first began in the mid-nineteenth century and reached its height in Mykhailo Hrushevsky’s *History of Ukraine-Rus’*. In Ukraine, this tradition was destroyed by the Soviet authorities after the Second World War. The second stage of the nationalization of history began in the late 1980s and continues today (Kasianov 2009: 7). Within this scheme, the main aim of Ukrainian history is national independence and state sovereignty. Thus within the Ukrainian national scheme, deeds beneficial to the goal of independence are glorified and people who are devoted to these deeds are idealized. In such a framework, Ukrainian nationalist movements against the Soviets during the Second World War are seen as the pivotal events in the history of national liberation.65

In general, the history of Ukrainian nationalist movements against the Soviets during the Second World War generates the most ambivalent and even diametrically opposed attitudes among people in Ukraine. A particularly contentious topic is the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (the OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (the UPA – Ukrainska Povstanska Armiiia) and their role in the war. The OUN was founded in 1929 in Galicia, on territory that then belonged to Poland. Its members shared overtly nationalistic ideas and envisaged the future of Ukraine as an independent state. When the war broke out, many Ukrainians in Galicia regarded Hitler’s Third Reich as the only force capable of facilitating the establishment of an independent Ukraine. Diverse Ukrainian nationalist groups set up military units to fight the Soviet Red Army. One such group was the UPA, formed in 1942–43. In the beginning the UPA encompassed different guerrilla groups dispersed on the territory of Volhynia, but towards 1943 the revolutionary faction of OUN (OUN-Bandera) seized control over these groups.

The most problematic fact for historiography and memory politics in Ukraine is the huge range of atrocities in which UPA soldiers were involved: the murder of Poles, Jews, Russians, and Ukrainians who were unwilling to cooperate with them. The history of the OUN and the UPA was mainly silenced in the Soviet historiography because it contradicted the myth of the Great Patriotic War, which in the 1960s successfully superseded the myth of the October Revolution in its function as a founding myth of the USSR.66 The Soviet historical scheme stigmatized the OUN and UPA as marginal formations supported by a minority of Ukrainians (labelled as backward ‘bourgeois nationalists’ and ‘Nazi collaborators’), whilst the overwhelming majority of the population – so goes the canonical Soviet narrative – supported the Soviets and were

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eager to join the Red Army in the struggle against fascism. The Ukrainian national historiography, on the contrary, conceptualizes the history of the OUN and the UPA as one of the most important elements in the history of the nation.\(^{67}\) Nowadays, these two interpretations co-exist and they give rise to new interpretations.

The Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak remarks that both of these versions are regionally anchored: one is ‘more eastern’ and the other is ‘more western’ (Hrytsak 2004: 17). Hrytsak metaphorically calls the problem of the UPA ‘one of the historical mines under the [Ukrainian] society’ (Hrytsak 2004: 91). The Canadian historian Zenon Kohut holds a similar view: ‘[i]t is very difficult to reconcile images of the heroic Red Army defenders against the Nazis and the UPA into a common historical consciousness’ (2011: 233). He adds that the histories of the OUN and UPA are ‘regionally based and have the potential to be divisive rather than creating a unifying vision’ (Kohut 2011: 233). Qualitative and quantitative studies conducted by many scholars confirm Kohut’s and Hrytsak’s views (Sereda 2007; Rodgers 2007; Rodgers 2006: a, b, c).

Heated debates on the issue of the heroization of Stepan Bandera, the leader of the OUN, and Roman Shukhevych, a commander of the UPA, are illustrative examples of a regional struggle for the correctness of one of the two historical schemes.\(^{68}\) For those Ukrainians who share the Ukrainian traditional version of history, Bandera is an outstanding hero; he is commemorated as a symbol of the liberation movement and struggle for Ukrainian statehood and, as such, is idealized for the values he symbolized – a revolutionary spirit, non-conformism, devotion to the national ideals, etc. Since Ukrainian independence is conceptualized as the raison d’être of the national history paradigm, the struggle for national independence, the emphasis on the sacrifice and the glory of the fighters, overshadow the issue of atrocities committed by Ukrainians against other peoples, mainly Poles and Jews.\(^{69}\)

In the Soviet version of history, though, Stepan Bandera is an accomplished villain who sanctioned the killing of Poles, Jews and his own compatriots who had different ideological views. Within this paradigm the fact that Bandera was imprisoned by Nazi Germany in 1941, held in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp from January 1942 to September 1944, and did not actually take part in the insurgency, is neglected. Nevertheless, the contest for the representation of the past often has not so much to do with past experience. What really matters here is emotions, expectations, hopes or frustrations related to the present and the past political regimes. In this contest of memories, Bandera is used either as a symbol of the struggle against the Soviet regime or as the symbol of collaboration with Nazis, depending on the version of historical scheme one adheres to. In this way, the main discussions about conflicting history deal not with the facts, but rather the question of whether the truth about the past should be said or not. On this point, the principle of ‘a sweeter lie is better than the bitter truth’ wins in these arguments (Hrytsak 2008).

\(^{67}\) On the Ukrainian national history canon, see Kasianov 2009.

\(^{68}\) Yushchenko conferred the title of Hero of Ukraine on Roman Shukhevych in 2007 and Stepan Bandera in 2010.

\(^{69}\) See Marples 2007; Dietsch 2006; Kasianov 2009. For an account of the Ukrainian – Polish conflict, see Iljushyn 2009.
The two main schemes of history mutually exclude each other. In such a tension of positions, several crucial questions arise. Is it possible to reconcile these polar views on the past? Is it possible to establish a master narrative of the national history that could be accepted by all the population of Ukraine? Can historians present a narrative that can give points of reference for all the people of Ukraine so that they can claim it as their history? Is it possible to tell the monolithic story when the experiences of war are asymmetric in different regions of Ukraine?

These questions are related to a democratization of history, whereby history, just as whole societies, is expected to undergo a transition from the monist history characteristic of totalitarian societies to pluralistic history envisaged by democratic societies. In this respect, the politics of history can be regarded as a litmus test for the preparedness of the state for transformation from a totalitarian view of history, as something monolithic and single-faceted, to pluralistic and multi-faceted views on history, without a necessarily heroic glorification and ‘monumentalization’ of the past. Democratization of history gives a chance to build an inclusive nation based on the principle of a dialogue, whereby people become aware of both heroic and barbaric deeds in the past and cooperate together in order to build the common future. Dialogue does not mean that there should be no discontent; rather, it means that there is a free flow of discussions and opposing voices are heard and included in the discourse. Far too often, though, a plurality of voices and memories succumb to chaos and mutual exclusions deliberately forged by contesting political powers in their individual fight for power. Conflicting memories are unfrozen at the moments when they are needed to consolidate communities for political outcomes. This is the situation post-Soviet Ukraine has found itself in 1991. Since history is a very sensitive issue that easily resonates in the hearts of people, the populists of all political hues are using it to stir the emotions of the people and ‘buy’ their votes. As a result, the re-opening of old wounds and possibility to speak on the topics that were silenced has not consolidated society, but rather disintegrated it and deepened the cultural trauma.

Cultural Trauma

It should be stressed that in my discussion I do not refer to psychological or physical trauma since I believe in a clear distinction between the cultural trauma and psychophysical trauma. As many scholars contend, cultural trauma can be considered a social construct, and I believe that psychophysical trauma exceeds the social constructivist perspective. As Jeffrey Alexander points out:

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70 Such attempts are made by some scholars who act as public intellectuals and try to reconcile both poles in their discussions on memory: Hrytsak 2004, 2008; Portnov 2009; Portnov, A. and Portnova, T. 2010, who in their writings emphasise the difference of experienced pasts by people in Western and Eastern Ukraine.

71 On ‘monism versus pluralism’ in totalitarian and democratic societies, see: Kattago: 2009.
Cultural trauma occurs when members of collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways (2004: 1).

Cultural trauma often results from an abrupt change that brings ‘shocks and wounds to the social and cultural tissue’ (Sztompka 2004: 157). Even if the change is generally seen in a positive light, it still can be traumatic. As the British historian Mark Mazower notes, it is often ‘easier to dream the old dreams – even if they are nightmares – than to wake up to unfamiliar realities’ (Mazower 2002: 7). People generally feel more secure and safer in the known conditions, even if these conditions of life are worse in comparison with other societies that are, though, unknown. When the known system collapses, the sense of security and safety shatters and the grounds for cultural trauma arise. Piotr Sztompka emphasizes that not all changes in society bring about trauma. There are, nevertheless, certain changes that are more traumatogenic than the others. The most traumatogenic changes are those that are: (1) rapid and sudden; (2) wide and comprehensive in their scope, which means that they affect many aspects of life and/or many actors; (3) radical, deep and fundamental, in the sense that they affect the very core of social life and the fate of the individual; (4) those that bring about a sense of disbelief – a specific mental frame in which people encounter the unexpected, shocking situation (Sztompka 2004: 158–159).

All these characteristics have been present in Ukrainian society since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Here one can speak about a dual trauma. On the one hand there is a post-war trauma, whereby some war memories had been frozen and doomed to silence by the Soviet regime, while, on the other hand, there is a post-Soviet trauma, by which a revival of the silenced topics of history occurs in the shocking and disorientating situation of the shattered society, where new silencing and exclusions take place. At a certain point, traumatic memories per se were called for in order to disintegrate the community. In this way, the opening up of some of the silenced topics of history in the late 1980s in the Soviet Union contributed to the disintegration of the Union. This disintegration did not happen strictly along the borders of new states; it happened within the borders of each new state, too. The insecurity that followed the disintegration of the known society consequently led to the search for common ground for the collective identification. This search became one of the existential needs of the community. This need is partly fulfilled through references to the common past as a uniting factor.

In this regard, cultural trauma is closely and intricately connected to collective memory. At times of crisis people tend to turn to history with the hope of finding answers to the existential questions. They look for analogies that provide instructions on how to act, for models to follow, for justifications of the present conditions or predictions for the future. The past, and hence memory of the past, starts to matter to an even greater

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72 We do not argue that only the opening up the silenced topics lead to the disintegration of the Soviet union, but it certainly was a part of the complex intertwining of political, economical, social and cultural process. In Ukraine e.g. the topics on Ukrainian history brought up by the national political movement “Rukh” contributed largely to the mass popular movement that followed. Among the topics were Chornobyl, Holodomor 1932-33, Kruty, Babyn Yar, the UPA. See discussion in: Pakhliovska 2008: 10-60.
degree in moments when it is threatened; when one view of the past is shattered and another view (sometimes contradicting) comes into light. ‘Seldom does history seem so urgently relevant or important as in moments of sudden political transition from one state form to another’ (Bell 2010: 6). Re-evaluation of the past, formation of new memories, establishment of new master narratives – all these processes are inherent to the social crisis and related to cultural trauma. Duncan Bell argues that ‘certain harrowing events … generate serious and often catastrophic challenges to communal self-understandings, and … the ”memory” of such ”traumas” plays a significant and sometimes elemental role in shaping subsequent political perceptions, affiliations and action’ (2010:5). Collective memory is related to cultural trauma not only because it is the memory of traumas from the past, but also because these traumas are shaped by the present traumatic experience. The difficulty of coming to terms with the past has a reciprocal effect: it results from past traumatic experience, on the one hand, and endorses the divided and traumatic memories, on the other hand. So, the past is not only a point of reference and a ‘curing’ factor, but also a traumatogenic factor. Which of these factors prevails depends on the memory work the society undertakes.

When it became possible to dig up the history which was silenced, widely un-known, or even forbidden; when the archives opened and the historians started to re-write the history, not all people were ready to accept new ‘stories’. To accept some of the histories – for example, the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, ‘active’ or ‘passive’ participation of local people in the Holocaust, the Stalin terror against some of the Soviet nations (including Ukraine) – would mean for many Ukrainians losing a sense of their lives rooted in the past. The ‘new’ history would corrode the grounds of people’s existence; it would become a burden too heavy to cope with. In this case, memory work succumbs to the mutual accusations of contesting parties of falsifying history. The result is that past ‘pacts of silence’ are replaced with new ones. Most often the heroic past of the nation is brought to the public’s attention, whereas less heroic events are known only within the small circle of professional historians. A lack of trust in those memory agents who distribute the representations of history adds to the negative responses from part of society. Michael Schudson observes that ‘re-working of the past is more likely to be transmitted if it happens in high-prestige, socially consensual institutions than if it happens at or beyond the edges of conventional organisations’ (Schudson 2003:12). In Ukraine, though, institutions that transmit the re-working of the past do not always enjoy high-prestige and socially consensual status. Whereas for a certain part of the population state institutions seem to be trustworthy transmitters of history, for some other parts they are seen as ‘falsifiers of history.’ In this case, other memory agents gain more trust. Mass media, literature, films (often of foreign origin), and family are among those sources which people trust most in the formation of their knowledge about the past.

73 In this regard, see Rodgers 2007 on the perceptions of the state-sponsored history by history teachers in eastern regions of Ukraine.
Social Trust in Ukraine

Students of social trust emphasize that in Ukraine, the low social trust in state institutions relates to a malfunctioning of these institutions. Sociological surveys demonstrate that in post-Soviet Ukraine there is a significant difference between the level of social trust in institutions and social trust in close communities, where it is considerably higher (Mishler & Rose 1998). Trust in close communities and informal networks is strengthened through its continuation from a well-established system of personal networking, known as ‘blat’, inherited from the Soviet period. According to surveys in present-day Ukraine, there is a significant regional discrepancy between the level of trust in institutions and in personal contacts (see Table 1).

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<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Trust in state institutions</th>
<th>Trust in people</th>
<th>Trust in mass media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>–0.08</td>
<td>–0.02</td>
<td>–0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>–0.06</td>
<td>–0.03</td>
<td>–0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Average indexes of social trust in Ukraine. (Source: Pogorila 2008)

To sum up, the highest level of trust in institutions is in Western Ukraine, whereas in other regions of Ukraine it is significantly lower. As for trust in people, there is no statistically significant difference among regions. In Western Ukraine, trust in state institutions is higher than trust in people and in the mass media, whereas in the East trust in people is higher than in institutions. Pogorila argues that Western Ukraine had some experience of the civil society that existed in Poland and Austro-Hungary, which is why after the collapse of the Soviet Union it was easier for people there to ‘remember’ this past experience. The high value of national independence also adds to the higher level of trust in state institutions in Western Ukraine, Pogorila concludes (Pogorila 2008). Where the degree of social trust in institutions is high, the trust in state-sponsored memory agents is also high. So in Western Ukraine, where trust in institutions is higher, education is found among the main factors that form one’s views on history (see Table 2 and Table 3).

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74 Partly blat was a way of filling the lacks of malfunctioning state system. For the study of ‘blat’ see: Ledeneva 1998.

75 Analytical report of the results of the sociological survey ‘Attitudes of the population of Ukraine to the questions related to the World War II’, Kyiv: All-Ukrainian Sociological Agency, 2009, P. 10. In the survey 2489 respondents took part. It was done in 18-27 June 2009 in 16 regions of Ukraine.
What influenced your knowledge about the Second World War? 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What influenced your knowledge about the Second World War?</th>
<th>How do you evaluate the activities of the OUN and UPA in the Second World War?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National liberation struggle of Ukrainians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian mass media (radio, press, television, Internet)</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian mass media</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational programmes (school, university)</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older generation</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet heritage</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Evaluation of the activities of the OUN and UPA in the Second World War.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What influenced your knowledge about the Second World War?</th>
<th>How do you evaluate the activities of the OUN and UPA in the Second World War?</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National liberation struggle of Ukrainians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinnytsia and Chernkassy oblasts</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volyn and Rivne oblasts</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipropetrovsk oblast</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk oblast</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakarpattia oblast</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhytomyr and Kyiv oblasts</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halychyna</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirovograd and Poltava oblasts</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhansk oblast</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmelnitxs oblast</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv oblast</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernigiv and Sumy oblasts</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernivtsi oblast</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Regional distribution of opinions on the activities of the OUN and UPA in the Second World War.
In Eastern regions of Ukraine, on the contrary, social trust in institutions is low and the views on history propagated by the educational channels are low, as well. Instead, other sources of historical knowledge become more influential: older generations, literature, documentaries, films, and thematic TV programmes are seen as more trustworthy in creating a picture of the past than the state-sponsored educational programmes. As is demonstrated in Table 2, the respondents who adhere to the views on history that were propagated by the Soviet master narrative consider the Russian mass media as having the greatest influence on their perceptions of the past. The role of mass media should not be underestimated in memory work. According to the media scholar Alison Landsberg, ‘prosthetic memory’ – memory represented through and shaped by mass media – can generate social solidarity, create alliances between various marginalized groups, and help people to understand past injustices (Landsberg 2004). The surveys confirm that mass media play a significant role in forming Ukrainians’ views on history. It is worth noting that Russian mass media have almost the same level of trust as Ukrainian mass media. As the official discourse on history in Russia is now propagating almost the same narratives as in the Soviet times, the representations of history through Russian channels provide the consumers of these representations with feelings of recognition and security. These representations fix meanings that seemed to be lost during the turbulence of change and transition. This determining of meanings is a functional strategy for coping with cultural trauma. People thereby gain a sense of belonging and share memories with an extended community that often transcends state boundaries. This kind of transnational interaction may well contribute to the feeling of belonging with what Brubaker calls ‘external national homelands’ (Brubaker 1996). On the one hand, the difficulty of identifying with the political entity strengthens distrust in political elites and political regimes; on the other hand, it solidifies strong territorially based identities: regional, local, translocal or even transnational.

Focusing on my case study of memories about the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the following results are observed: 34.7% of respondents consider the activities of the UPA and OUN as collaboration with Nazi Germany; 26.1% as a national liberation struggle of the Ukrainians; 20.4% see them as the partisan insurgency, and 19.3% as resistance to totalitarian regimes.

First, one can observe significant generational differences. The majority of those who share the national historical scheme and consider the OUN and UPA as having been engaged in the national liberation struggle of the Ukrainians are under 30 (32.1%), and the majority of those who adhere to the old Soviet conceptualization and consider the OUN and the UPA as collaborators with Nazi Germany are over 60 (44.6%). Second, there is an educational disparity. Those who have higher education consider the OUN and UPA as having fought for the national liberation of the Ukrainians (30.0%), while

76 In this paper we present mainly the findings of surveys made in 2009, as they are more detailed and more fully presenting the regions of Ukraine.


78 Analytical report of the results of the sociological survey ‘Attitudes of the population of Ukraine to the questions related to the World War II’, Kyiv: All-Ukrainian Sociological Agency, 2009, P. 10. In the survey 2489 respondents took part. It was done in 18-27 June 2009 in 16 regions of Ukraine.
those who have only school education consider the OUN and UPA as having collaborated with Nazi Germany (58.3%). Third, there is a discrepancy between the sources of information that influence the formation of attitudes of the respondents to the OUN and UPA. The Ukrainian mass media are ranked first (37.3%) and educational programmes at schools and universities ranked second (32.3%) among the sources of information for those who consider the OUN and UPA as fighting for national liberation. The Russian mass media are ranked first (60.7%) for those who adhere to the old conceptualization of this specific episode from the past. Fourth, those respondents who identify with the national historical scheme (in the Table this is represented by the statements in the first three columns) or the old Soviet one (the fourth column) are almost equally distributed among the respondents of all the regions of Ukraine. The exceptions are the Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts, and Crimea, on the one hand, and Halychyna, on the other. Since the answers clustered in the first three columns represent the Ukrainian national historical scheme, one can state that majority of the respondents in all the regions of Ukraine, except the East and South, started to internalize the state-promoted representations of history promoted by Yushchenko’s politics. As discussed above, the East and South demonstrated a higher level of distrust in state institutions.

When Viktor Yanukovych became president in 2010, Throughout the 1990s, the idea that the rich historical legacy of Lviv and the region fascinated the public and, hence, needed sooner or later to be exploited commercially, was repeatedly expressed by the city fathers, planners, intelligentsia he started to implement changes in the politics of history that are closer to neo-Soviet views. Due to the limited scope of this article, I can merely point out some new features of the politics of memory introduced by Yanukovych’s government. One of the first changes was the appointment of a new head of the Institute of National Memory, Valeriy Soldatenko, born in Donetsk oblast and a member of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Many commentators think he represents an overtly pro-Russian version of history. Especially well known is his negative attitude to Shukhevych and Bandera, which became the most discussed issue among the intellectuals, journalists and some politicians. Another illustrative step in the turning of official politics towards the old Soviet scheme was a joint Ukrainian-Russian-Byelorussian celebration in 2010 of the Second World War victory, and the returning use of the term ‘Great Patriotic War’ in Ukraine. During the 2011 celebrations of the 66th anniversary of victory, the red flag was officially used as ‘the flag of the victory’, which aroused a wave of protests among many Ukrainians. Some of the changes touched upon school textbooks.

Concerning social trust, I should add that the level of trust in state institutions after Viktor Yanukovych came to power remains low. The latest surveys demonstrate a level of 15.4% for parliament and 19.9% for the government. The highest levels of trust in institutions are for the Church and mass media (63.5% and 50.6% respectively).
Russian media are ranked almost as high as Ukrainian (41.4%). In contrast, Western media are considerably lower ranked. This leads us to believe that in comparison with state institutions, other sources of historical knowledge are becoming more important in forming the collective memories of Ukrainians.

Conclusions

The nexus between cultural trauma, collective memory and social trust is complex and intricate. The malfunctioning of state institutions results in low social trust in them. In such a situation, state-sponsored channels that influence the formation of a collective memory of the nation, for example school curricula, are not seen as the most trustworthy sources. As a result, other sources become more influential: media, family, older generations, literature and films. As these sources are rather diverse, the memories influenced by them are likewise more diverse and heterogeneous. On the one hand, this increases the possibility of multi-voiced history, but on the other hand can lead to discontent and a cacophony in which none of the individual voices is heard.

Coming to terms with the past seems to be an emblematic feature of democratic societies. As Kattago notes, ‘trauma and democracy are linked together as two sides of the same coin. ... Learning process, individual and social change and, perhaps most importantly, trust are built during the difficult process of the acknowledgement of guilt’ (Kattago 2009: 380). Ukrainian society seems to be at the very beginning of this most important process – the acknowledgement of guilt. Apart from the academic discussions among historians who work on multilateral historical commissions with Polish and Jewish scholars, there are almost no other public spaces where the problem of guilt is addressed. This demonstrates that Ukrainian society is still traumatized and insecure. Consequently, it is still focused on self-victimization, self-glorification, and a black-and-white picture of the past. A turn towards the multiplicity and complexity of history, though, could help overcome one of the symptoms of trauma – the incapacity to face one’s own guilt. This could contribute to the development of a historical narrative where there is room not only for glory but also for regret.
References


Analytical report of the results of the sociological survey ‘*Attitudes of the population of Ukraine to the questions related to the World War II*’ (2009), Kyiv: All-Ukrainian Sociological Agency.


Relearning to Remember: Romania’s Cultural Legacy and European Aspirations

Adrian Velicu

The removal of political constraints in Eastern Europe after 1989 has allowed a fresh scrutiny of the cultural history of the area. The version of nationalist communism practised in Romania, particularly in the 1980s, contained sycophantic poems representing Nicolae Ceausescu as the culmination of two thousand years of history in the country and developed “theories” claiming that, unbeknown to the rest of the world, Romanian thinkers anticipated quite a few intellectual achievements generally known as having originated in the West. The collapse of the dictatorship raised hopes that one could start disentangling perception from fact, specious from reasonable claims or political use from justified practice. The important work by the Romanian historian Lucian Boia, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, is a representative undertaking in this direction; equally significant are the reactions it provoked. The book is a significant test of the post-1989 intellectual mood in Romania, revealing unexpected susceptibilities regarding the Romanian cultural identity.

This chapter discusses Boia’s revisionism as an example of an effort to establish a nation’s cultural memory on a new foundation. Consequently, the present analysis explores the role of the imaginary in shaping this particular instance of cultural memory. The focus and the relevance of this approach derive from the significance that Boia ascribes to the imaginary in his challenge to what he considers a misconceived cultural and historical outlook. While the present analysis treats the material within the conceptual framework of Aleida (and to some extent Jan) Assmann’s work on cultural memory, it suggests that the imaginary has a more significant role than these scholars have allowed for.

82 I am grateful to Professor Lucian Boia for providing background material and for a helpful discussion. I would also like to thank Professor Barbara Törnquist-Plewa for scrutinizing the text and for providing a number of valuable suggestions and comments.

Three factors structure the arguments of this work: origins, continuity and unity. They all concern the Romanian people: the ethnic components of its origins, its uninterrupted presence in one area, and its linguistic, ethnic and territorial unity. The Latin legacy has been decisive in the discussions of all these issues. The book challenges a number of views derived from the Romanian historiography of the last two centuries which has stressed nationalism and a certain image of the Romanian nation’s place in Europe determined by its Latin inheritance. This challenge could only have occurred after 1989: the exacerbated nationalism during the last decade of communist rule in Romania had disappeared. Yet, the appearance of the book provoked a number of reactions indicating the survival of certain sensitivities about national identity. Most reviewers saluted the book as the long-awaited detached scrutiny of the Romanian cultural tradition. The critical reactions were fewer in number but more visible and strident. The former head of the Romanian Cultural Centre in New York, as well as Professor of History at Cluj University, Ioan-Aurel Pop, accused Boia in his book-length response, *Istoria, adevarul si miturile*, of excessive relativism, flawed reasoning and intellectual arrogance. Arguments similar to those published in *History and Myth* had in fact appeared in the collection of studies entitled *Mituri istorice romanesti* edited by Boia which encountered a barrage of criticism from such unexpected quarters as a prime-time TV programme sponsored by the army. Lucian Boia answered his critics and discussed the reactions to his book in the introduction to the second edition of *History and Myth*. Subsequently, Boia clarified even more his outlook when he explained that his own history of Romania published in 2007 (*Romania. Borderland of Europe*) would complement *History and Myth*.

Boia’s book of 1997 and the reactions it caused provide a rare opportunity to examine attempts to revise or justify aspects of cultural memory in the wake of the 1989 political upheaval in Romania. The disappearance of censorship enforced by the communist regime allowed cultural and historical claims to find their own level. Challenges to the established image of national identity thus became possible, but encountered resistance originating in intellectual inertia and in political movements drawing on the very nationalist myth whose imaginary nature Boia has highlighted. That is why the present

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84 Mircea Iorgulescu exclaimed in *Dilema* (15—21 August 1997) “At last, the first critical, radical and systematic scrutiny of contemporary Romanian culture” Dan C. Mihaiulescu points out in *Review* 22 (6—12 October 1998) that Boia “dispels illusion after illusion” of the supposedly homogeneous national historical outlook, while Constantin Pavel concludes in *Adevarul literar si artistic* (20 July 1997) that Boia’s book is an event. Ioan Buduca emphasizes in *Cuvintul* (October 1997) that the book is “the most important cultural event of 1997” and Z. Ornea states in *Romanian literara* (10—16 September 1997) that Boia’s book is “an act of great scholarly and moral courage, most useful and which had been necessary for a long time.”

85 Ioan-Aurel Pop, *Istoria, adevarul si miturile* (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedica, 2002), passim. Adri-an Cioflinca points out in *Monitorul* (26 February—3 March 2000) that Boia has been attacked as a “denigrator of national history” and as a dilettante who produces lightweight essays.

86 *Mituri istorice romanesti* [Romanian History Myths], ed. Lucian Boia (Bucharest: Editura Universitatii, 1995).

analysis seizes this opportunity to explore the dynamics whereby Boia establishes the importance of the imaginary in what he calls “historical consciousness” but this investigation prefers to call cultural memory.

The Meaning of Objects, the Object of Meaning

A series of theoretical clarifications are in order at this stage. As far as the concept of cultural memory is concerned, I present Jan Assmann’s view and then concentrate on the manner Aleida Assmann has subsequently developed this concept. Aleida Assmann’s approach has particular explanatory power for the present case study and serves as one of the chief theoretical tools.

Jan Assmann starts from Halbwachs’ view of memory as a social phenomenon; however, he goes further and adds a cultural “basis”. As part of this strategy, he proposes the concepts of communicative memory and cultural memory. According to him, communicative memory is synchronic, covering at most three generations, while cultural memory is diachronic, going far back in time. In the diachronic case, where a considerable time span is involved, it is sites, objects, rituals, and customs that store what appears worth preserving in the memory of a nation. The crucial point here is that the meanings thus encapsulated are “handed down, learned, taught, researched, interpreted and practiced” (Assmann 2006: 24). Jan Assmann supports his argument by referring to Aleida Assmann’s distinction between functional and stored memory and to the shifting borderline between these two kinds of memory, with implications concerning canon formation and revision as well as archive establishment.

Aleida Assmann has taken this distinction a step further, outlining a concept of cultural memory that, on reflection, proves fruitful for the present analysis. Thus, her additional distinction between active and passive remembering takes further the elaboration of

88 Jan Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford UP, 2006), pp. 1, 8. This work was originally published in German in 2000.

89 Before moving on beyond Jan Assmann’s view of cultural memory, one aspect needs to be mentioned and clarified. Jan Assmann makes the apparently confusing point that “cultural memory is a special case of communicative memory” (Assmann 2006: 8). The clue to making sense of this apparent contradiction is his statement that “only with the emergence of writing does cultural memory ‘take off’ and allow the horizon of symbolically stored memory to grow far beyond the framework of knowledge functionalized as bonding memory [my italics]” (Assmann 2006: 21). “Bonding memory” is for Assmann “the collective memory par excellence” which he contrasts with “learning memory” (Assmann 2006: 20). The kind of (communicative) memory that does not need to be symbolically stored, that does not need writing to bond people over three generations, differs from the kind of (cultural) memory, indeed “learned memory”, handed down through texts by specialized memory carriers throughout centuries and millennia. The latter resembles the former, but has a symbolic, metaphoric dimension which indicates that it initially emerged from the former. It is the difference between two kinds of memory, rather than between their time ranges, that determines Jan Assmann to claim that cultural memory derives from communicative memory.

the concept of cultural memory.\textsuperscript{91} For Aleida Assmann remembering, as opposed to forgetting, requires an effort and, therefore, in a context of collective memory it requires institutional frameworks to ensure its implementation. Active remembering entails maintaining the “past as present”, while passive remembering presupposes keeping the “past as past.” The former is associated with the canon, the latter with the archive, with the proviso anticipated by Jan Assmann that the frontier between the two is subject to fluctuations. Moreover, cultural memory as active remembering implies selection and, above all, “[t]he active dimension of cultural memory supports a collective identity . . .” (Assmann, in Erll & Nünning, eds. 2008: 100). Out of the three areas — art, religion and history — where this process of producing a collective identity occurs, it is history that is relevant in the present analysis. Aleida Assmann further argues that active cultural memory can be seen at work in the realm of history through the manner in which nation-states elaborate accounts of their past: a kind of narration that receives the apposite name of “collective autobiography” (Assmann, in Erll & Nünning, eds. 2008: 101).

It is precisely such an example of active cultural memory resulting with its impact on collective identity that defines the nature of Boia’s contribution discussed in this paper. Boia has questioned that strand of active cultural memory that has resulted in the present “collective autobiography” of Romania. Examining his argument and the reactions to it in the circumstances of post-1989 Romania provides an insight into the dynamics of the cultural memory as proposed by Aleida Assmann.

When Jan Assmann expressed his reservations concerning Halbwachs’ concept of collective memory, he emphasized that the relevant point is the extent to which individual memory “is socially and culturally determined” (Assmann 2006: 8). The social and cultural determinants show that we are dealing with factors that condition memory. One of these factors is the imaginary. In the present investigation the imaginary carries the meaning of an organizing principle that adapts developments to expectations, which compensates for what is absent, and which imposes meaning on what is incomprehensible. This is Boia’s definition in his concise history of the imaginary and it is appropriate to utilize it in a discussion of his use of the concept.\textsuperscript{92} My treatment of the material makes use of this version of the imaginary in an attempt to outline the dynamics of conveying various accounts of cultural history. The analysis confronts the imaginary with the concept of “continuous perennialism” (as opposed to the “recurrent” version): the view that a nation has been present “throughout recorded history.”\textsuperscript{93} In questioning the continuity of Romania’s “collective autobiography”, Boia proposes a different way of exercising active cultural memory: a sensitive issue, as can be seen by the responses to his proposal.

\textsuperscript{93} In his \textit{Myths and Memories of the Nation} (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999), Anthony D. Smith argues that “continuous perennialism” presupposes the existence of nations throughout centuries or longer, whereas “recurrent perennialism” entails the emergence, disappearance and re-emergence of nations (pp. 5, 100—101, 174). The latter concept has been proposed by John Armstrong in his \textit{Nations before Nationalism} (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).
In order to provide an additional clarification of Boia’s idea of the imaginary, one should add that for him the imaginary manifests itself in a series of patterns slightly modified from place to place, and from epoch to epoch. He regards these patterns as archetypes but his examples differ from those of Carl Jung. Boia’s examples contain the archetypes of “unity” and of “l’actualisation des origines” (Boia 1998: 33-34). This “revival” of origins implies ascribing particular values which result in the creation of founding myths. The more exact concept of “semantic memory” indicates rather clearly in what way this form of recollection is susceptible to being manipulated or misrepresented in the heat of a political or social crisis. It also becomes more obvious why imaginary elements emerge in the successive stages of shaping the semantic memory. Boia’s use of the imaginary differs therefore from Benedict Anderson’s use of the concept in the emergence of nationalism, and from Bronislaw Baczko’s “imaginaries sociaux” as “repères spécifiques dans le vaste système symbolique que produit toute collectivité…”94

Since myth is one of the main concepts in the texts discussed below, it is relevant to emphasize in what way myth could be re-stated in terms of concern with aspects of memory. Jeffrey Blustein supports his remark about “features or functions that collective memory shares with myth” by Pierre Nora’s view of memory in ancient societies.95 Nora argues that memory connects the community with a nebulous past. While admitting that there is a clear distinction between collective memory and myth, Blustein has argued that “collective memory has myth-like functions” (Blustein 2008: 194). Myth contributes to the creation of identity and to “self-understanding”, and it contains “shared values” that make up a “framework of meaning” for everyday life (Blustein 2008: 194, 196—197).

An important claim in Boia’s work has a conceptual significance that ties in with Blustein’s. As he defines his terms early on in History and Myth, Boia controversially explains that he sees no difference between the imaginary (which subsumes myth) and reality (Boia 1999: 45). The point stated in Boia’s history of the imaginary reappears here focused on the notion of myth: myth presupposes a structure which comprises both what is real and what is imaginary (Boia 1999: 45—46). Consequently, myth shapes important values of the community and consolidates its cohesion (Boia 1999: 46). This is not far from the “shared values”, the “self-understanding” and the creation of meaning that Blustein regards as the functions of myth and therefore of collective memory.

A sketch of the historical background is in order at this point. The Romans occupied Dacia (roughly, the area known today as Transylvania) and the neighbouring southern regions for almost 170 years. After the military withdrawal beginning in A.D. 271, a number of Romans remained in the area. There is little evidence of what happened to the original inhabitants; the Dacian language vanished virtually without trace. Not much is known about the movements of what became the new local population during the subsequent centuries of migrations from Asia to Europe. About the only certain piece of evidence is the survival of a Romance language derived from Vulgar Latin, in time known as Romanian, spoken by the local population. Whether the speakers of Roman are descended from the Romans, from the mixture of Romans and Dacians, or from a more complicated ethnic combination including the Slavs, has been the subject of a number of controversies, but less so in Romania where the view of the ethnic Latin legacy has prevailed. Whether these people have dwelt in the same area or migrated elsewhere and then returned has again been difficult to ascertain. Hungarian historians have disputed the Romanians’ continuous presence in Transylvania, Romanian historians have inferred it, while most of the other historians have suspended judgment. The arguments that stressed the Latin origins and the continuous residence in the area have shaped the Romanian cultural and national identity; other arguments have questioned this identity. Both lines of argument have carried with them assumptions concerning territorial and civic rights.

The Ottoman domination of the area for almost five centuries complicated matters even more as did the emergence of Russia as a great power in the area. Therefore, the accounts of the origins, unity and continuity of those speaking a Romance language close to the eastern extremity of Europe became ideologically fraught. As historical accounts became part of social, cultural and political justifications, the emphasis shifted according to the interests of the moment. For instance, two centuries ago the Romanian intellectuals from Transylvania stressed the Latin element; during the 1980s, the communist regime emphasized the Dacian element. 96

Romanians learn that they are descended from the Romans, they speak a language that proves that on the whole they have not intermingled with the newcomers from Asia and the motif of the survival of a “Latin island in a Slavic sea” has been endowed with particular virtues: the endurance of a national/cultural identity that has survived against the odds. This is one of the chief foundations of their nationalism. The dearth of solid evidence, apart from the language, meant that historians, archaeologists and anyone else interested in the matter had to resort to assumptions and interpretations more than is usually the case. There was also room for more or less extravagant accounts and, indeed, for the creation of national “myths.” Political and social circumstances also meant that arguments to do with cultural history have been deployed defensively. The lack of certain rights for the Romanians of Transylvania before 1918, or the Soviet

attempts of the 1950s to reinforce their political domination by a cultural offensive perceived as “Russification”, created certain nationalist, reflexive arguments about the Romanian national identity, both within the scholarly world and among the public at large. It is this defensive and at times strident intellectual outlook that Lucian Boia questions.

The Present

Boia’s statement that part of his purpose is to highlight the “artificial maintenance and even amplification of certain historical and political myths” at the present moment points to the assumption that underlies the entire book (Boia 1999: 47). The assumption is that his historical and cultural argument is politically charged and only the collapse of communism has allowed him to discuss the matter publicly. The implication is that 1989 has had an impact on the perception of cultural history, indeed of cultural memory. The chief critical reaction to his argument, articulated by Ioan-Aurel Pop, claims the opposite: namely, that it is cultural history which has had an impact on the significance of 1989 by toning it down and incorporating it within its wider framework. Without denying the political importance of 1989, this latter argument allots the moment a place in a sequence of events and constellation of components which make up the nation’s cultural identity. While Pop grants that there were distortions of historical accounts under the communist regime, he appears to regard any revisions as part of an ongoing process without attaching any significance to 1989 (Pop 2002: 28—29). Significantly enough, in Pop’s lengthy reply to Boia’s History and Myth, he remarks that Boia does not “condemn anything or anybody”, but that there is a very strong and omnipresent “impression” that the book rejects some opinions and historians, while favouring others (Pop 2002: 55).

Boia’s further aim is to facilitate the kind of modernization and European integration which, he claims, a large majority of Romanians want to achieve. In the light of his argument, the opponents seem instead to favour safeguarding perennial values. Anthony D. Smith’s “continuous perennialism” captures the conviction of these opponents, who would rephrase the concept as the “continuous existence” of the nation.

The kind of cultural framework at issue here rests on the Romanian historiography of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This dispute, at the end of the 1990s, deals with the perception of history and with a cultural outlook, and only indirectly with politics. However, the complicated circumstances in this part of Europe have led to the interweaving of history with politics: most intensely and recently with the politics of the communist regime in Romania, above all in the last decade of its existence. Historical and cultural matters have always provided ammunition for the participants in political disputes. The strident claims of the 1980s turned issues of cultural history into political stances, with effects on the perception of national identity. Aspects of foreign relations, territorial claims and national prestige received support from an arsenal of historical
and cultural arguments. In the process, simplified versions of what were already rather
tendentious arguments ended up as standard explanations.

The reliability of the historical facts varies. The only undeniable evidence is the
language. Over the years, the adepts of the Latin origin, continuity and homogeneity
thesis, i.e. most Romanian historians, have shaped a narrative in which, at times,
conviction replaces proof. Continuity is important in this context. It presupposes a set
of facts to be remembered. It also presupposes an accumulation of memories over the
years: real or imaginary, depending on whom one listens to. The Romanian historian
Nicolae Iorga argued in 1911 when he was elected to the Romanian Academy that the
historian should constantly remind the people of their national tradition (quoted in Boia
1999: 98). This was part of the national romantic turn in history writing at the start of
the new century and Iorga, a future prime minister as well, highlighted the increasingly
important role of what nowadays would be called cultural memory. On this particular
question Pop argues that, in the circumstances, Iorga could hardly have said anything
else, and that his enormous production includes a variety of other opinions (Pop 2002:
74). The references to Iorga by the two sides in this dispute illustrate their options vis-à-
vis this particular component of the cultural memory: one historian allots it an important
place, while the other demotes it to one opinion among several. These rival recollections
on a piece of historiographic evidence lead to competing views of a particular segment
of cultural history. An immediate comment would be that such a confrontation would
hardly have been allowed to take place before 1989. The very subject of such a clash
of opinions in a highly visible dispute on historical matters reveals the sort of acute
concerns to do with perceptions of national identity in the 1990s. Both Boia and Pop
offer subjective (imaginary-based) contributions to “semantic memory”, although one
is aware of the matter while the other is not.

It may be argued that cultural memory has been too active in consolidating versions
of a continuous collective autobiography, and Boia’s enterprise is to reassess the
circumstances that have conditioned cultural memory and thus change its course,
taking into account the problematic evidence and the hitherto unacknowledged use
of the imaginary. In her scheme of the active, as opposed to passive, cultural memory,
Aleida Assmann includes the activity of selection (Assmann, in Erll & Nünning, eds.
2008: 99). I would suggest that Boia’s undertaking can be best understood as an attempt
to offer another choice of memories. His proposal that the discussion should proceed in
terms of the effect of myth and of the imaginary on historical “consciousness” shows
the extent to which the account that shapes the national cultural identity is a matter
of various options. These options may well comprise “learned” or “communicated”
memories rather than experienced ones.

At least one critic has perceived Boia’s objections in a different manner than Ioan-
Aurel Pop. Sergiu Ailenei has pointed out that it is the “aggressive ethno-centric
mentality” which is Boia’s target and not any specific “nationalist theses.” Sergiu
Ailenei, “Cum se scrie un eseu” Convorbiri literare, September 1997, p. 5.

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the national romantic perspective of the turn of the century. An insidious phenomenon that complicates matters is that aspects of this national romantic outlook resurfaced during the middle and latter parts of the communist regime in Romania, becoming part of the official ideology to be challenged at one’s peril. It is therefore a question of a “discourse” that after 1989 needs to be adjusted to the European one.

Boia’s observation that “a historical mentality, long obsolete in Western Europe, continues to have a great influence on the Romanian culture and society” (Boia 1999: 126) is one useful way of explaining the heated reactions to his book. The collapse of communism did not entail the collapse of all that was connected with communism. Resentments, interests, guilt, but, above all, habits of mind survived: “[i]ntellectual constellations have a longer life than material structures” (Boia 1999: 126). That is why an analysis of the controversy provoked by this book benefits from the use of concepts derived from memory studies in a context of intellectual history. Boia argues that the dominant discourse during the Ceausescu period was a nationalist one; it could be quietly avoided, but could not be challenged by another discourse.

After the “internationalism” of the 1950s when Romania, along with most other East European countries, felt obliged to follow the Soviet cultural mode, nationalism returned. This time, as History and Myth points out, nationalism became an instrument of manipulation in order to lend legitimacy to, and strengthen the domination of, the communist dictatorship (Boia 1999: 118). Political pressure, opportunism or genuine commitment meant that many historians and other intellectuals presented facts selectively and drew tendentious conclusions. This was the course of cultural and political history as Boia recollects it at the end of the 1990s. In his comprehensive response, Pop points out that there were also historians who kept up scholarly standards in highly specialized studies published in academic periodicals, or who refused to publish at all (Pop 2002: 86ff.). Yet these were hardly part of the nation’s “consciousness” (or cultural memory), which is Boia’s subject. Thus one side opts for saving the prestige of the profession, while the other attempts to identify questionable perceptions in the overall view on the nation and its identity.

A Choice of Memories for the Future

A choice of memories is in fact what Boia alludes to in his own history of Romania. In the preface to the third edition of his Romania. Borderland of Europe, the author mentions the “critical analysis of various constructions of Romanian history” that he pursued in History and Myth and adds that now he carries on by presenting his own “construction” (Boia 2007:5). That is why the later book functions as an exemplification of the arguments developed in the earlier one.

The revival of nationalism in Romania in the 1960s as a quasi-official ideological component brought to the fore a version of national identity that had been silenced in the 1950s. Restoring the place of these memories in the overall cultural history meant an emphasis on the origins of the Romanian people, which further implied
consolidating arguments on the role of the Romans, the fate of the native Dacians and the Latin legacy. According to Boia’s terminology, this would be a “political myth” which distorts (or imagines) the past in relationship to the present. I would argue, though, that the distinction between “political myth” and “historical myth” (which reverses the distortion) proves questionable, at least in this case: the two kinds of distortions fuse by means of manipulating memory in the interests of “redefining” cultural identity, with inevitable exaggerations and omissions. Over the decades the emphasis shifted, depending on the then current claims and the ways in which the local political entities or social groups attempted to assert themselves, whether politically, culturally or socially. For instance, the Latin connection proved useful in highlighting Romania’s link to Western Europe. This was the case with the historiography of the nineteenth century, whose underlining of the Latin element amounted to a “desperate attempt” to exit the Slavic sphere (Boia 1999: 162). The overall process within which this occurred was that of modernization, which presupposed the emancipation of the Romanian people. Later, in the twentieth century, when the state became independent and consolidated, there were recurring moments when explaining the ethnic origins in terms of the ancient local population became important in order to assert Romania’s independence and regional importance.

Pop admits that the emphasis on the Latin origin of the Romanians was a question of “political-national militantism” (Pop 2002: 99), particularly in nineteenth-century Transylvania, he disputes the claim that Romanians lacked a sense of their ethnic belonging by referring to what one can only call a variety of cultural memory. He suggests that a “latent memory” or “the convictions of a certain elite” constitute “undeniable evidence” which proves that “some Romanians” knew that their people were descended from the Romans (Pop 2002: 97). Where Boia sees an instrumental use of quasi-imaginary evidence in a concrete political context, Pop detects a persistent memory that undeniably points to the final state of things: the specific nature of the Romanian people based on a certain origin. Both arguments relate to an active cultural memory but they differ in what and how they select the necessary memories: Boia sees the deliberate and contextual process of constructing a coherent sequence, while Pop contemplates a seamless sequence whose meaning is its goal. The fact that these two outlooks co-exist at the end of the 1990s in Romania is revealing enough; their clash in public is even more significant for the impact of 1989, which turns out to be at least as important culturally as it has been politically.

On the question of origins, Boia cuts the Gordian Knot in his own account of Romanian history by arguing that the ancestors are less important in themselves than the way they are used in modern times (Boia 2007:45). Thus, he sidesteps the risks of distorting the past for the benefit of present goals. This strategy also involves the cancellation of dubious instances of cultural history, to be replaced by a less nationalist outlook on the distant past.

After the question of the ethnic origins, the second issue that figures in this dispute is the continuous presence (much debated in some quarters) of the Romanian people on the territory known today as Romania, and especially in Transylvania. The issue concerns territorial claims through the right of the first occupant. The Hungarian point
of view is that there is hardly any connection between the Roman occupants of Dacia and the present Romanian population: the Romanians emerged south of the Danube and moved into Transylvania after the twelfth century, meaning that the Hungarians found the region deserted a couple of centuries earlier. The Romanian stance is that there is a continuous line from the inhabitants of the Roman Dacia to the present ones and that this ethnic group never left the area. Historians who are neither Hungarian nor Romanian have usually referred to the scarce or inconclusive evidence and have refrained from committing themselves one way or the other.

Once more, Boia’s point is not to take sides but to draw attention to the contrived rather than reasonable aspects of historiography. In terms of the present study, his argument deals with how different memories are taught, learnt and selected at different times rather than bequeathed in an uninterrupted sequence. Again, what Boia perceives as a framework containing various hypotheses appears to Pop as a continuous sequence where decisive evidence may fade out but is “revived” when acutely needed (Pop 2002: 126). The sense of recollection and that of hidden but present memories points once more to the teleological character of Pop’s argument.

In the 1970s and 1980s the authorities strongly discouraged the pre-1945 scholarly compromises with their plurality of hypotheses and imposed the version that the Romanian people emerged and developed “exactly on the territory where it lives today . . .” (Boia 1999: 184; italics in the original). The ethnic continuity was officially reinforced by the argument of political continuity throughout two millennia. The first Romanian state-like political entities appeared in the thirteenth century. In order to close the gap between that moment and the withdrawal of the Romans about a thousand years earlier, the 1975 programme of the Communist Party affirmed that an “unorganized state” existed during that period (quoted in Boia 1999: 189). This is a rather spectacular demonstration of the imaginary as an official exercise in imposing coherence. Indeed, it is one of several distortions perpetrated by half a century of communism, and now the time has come to correct them, according to the review in a scholarly publication. Pop offers an alternative point of view: he does not disagree with the fact that distortions occurred under political pressure, yet, holds once again that Boia has overlooked the activity of honest historians which went on quietly (Pop 2002: 140). A further difference of opinions between these two historians justifies the remark of the reviewer in an influential weekly magazine, *Revista 22*, that Boia’s book has provoked extreme reactions.

While Florescu, the reviewer in the Romanian Academy’s periodical,

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98 A recent study has discussed Boia’s work as an instance of the “demythologizing turn” and has underlined that Boia’s *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness* criticizes “both the national Communist historical master narrative and the ‘national’ tradition of historical writing to which many Romanian historians wanted to return after 1989” (Cristina Petescu and Dragos Petrescu, “Mastering vs. Coming to Terms with the Past: A Critical Analysis of Post-Communist Romanian Historiography”, in *Narratives Unbound: Historical Studies in Post-Communist Eastern Europe*, eds Sorin Antohi, Balázs Trencsényi & Péter Apor (Budapest: CEU Press, 2007) p. 324. This study has also noted Ioan-Aurel Pop’s response as coming “from a theoretical position that is no longer tenable . . .” (Petrescu & Petrescu 2007: 325).


regards Boia as “a reformer of the collective mentality”, Pop sees in Boia’s appeal to tone down the discourse on ethnic origins a “veiled invitation to avoid the truth” for the sake of good understanding in a new united Europe (Florescu 1997: 441; Pop 2002: 143). The difference between these two historians also lies in their perception of the post-1989 and its impact on the components of the still current nationalist view or on the sequence of facts that amount to the truth: the former celebrates the fact that the time has arrived for realizing the relative nature of the circumstances and for reforming this view: the latter places the search for absolute values above all else.

Because the dispute examined here addresses varieties of historiography, John Breuilly’s distinction between national and nationalist historiography is particularly relevant. Breuilly argues that national historiography regards the nation as a “framework within which historical study takes place and historical accounts are ordered”, while nationalist historiography is teleological because “it sees implicit in the early stages of a national history the ripening of the later stages, and often regards that later ripening as some kind of final cause.”

I argue that the teleological nature of the latter kind of historiography presupposes an uninterrupted sequence of memories, encouraging the insertion of unacknowledged contributions supplied by the imaginary in the manner suggested by Boia’s definition. However, the kind of historiography that treats the nation as a framework permits accounts interrupted by blank spaces which may openly be filled by the imaginary, but for that very reason are open to scrutiny and revision. Restating matters in terms of Aleida Assmann’s concept, the choice of memory underlying these versions of historiography shows how “active cultural memory” depends on the process of selection.

After the difficulties raised by trying to establish questions of origins and continuity, the problem of the unity in its various guises (nation-state, ethnic homogeneity) presents fresh challenges. The starting point of the argument can differ; one option is to see it as a form of subjective commitment by considering the idea of the nation-state in the last two centuries as a “secularized religion” (Boia 1999: 195). Thus, from the outset, the coherence of cultural memory is subject to the action of particular interests. The nation as a favoured form of unity becomes the “aim” of the historical process, particularly as conceived by the Romantics at the beginning of the nineteenth century (Boia 1999: 195). Breuilly’s attribution of teleological habits of mind to the nationalist historiography proves once more apposite. As is the case with the earlier notions, Boia questions the existence of unity and lists a number of instances in historiography that insist on the presence of unity despite the shaky evidence. This statement concerns the situation in Europe in general, including Romania, whose case Boia then concentrates on (Boia 1999: 196). The reading of this section by his chief critic is that Boia accepts the value of the idea of the nation state in Western Europe but condemns it when it comes to Romania (Pop 2002: 144).

Further, there is a basic difference between Boia’s and Pop’s views on the emergence of the nation and of a sense of national identity. Unlike a majority of historians,

including Boia, who place the beginnings during the late eighteenth century, Pop opts for the end of the Middle Ages: a view close to Anthony D. Smith’s theory. In order to reinforce his point, Pop inadvertently confirms Boia’s point regarding the imaginary in the very process of objecting to the latter’s statement that there was no aspiration towards national unity around 1600. He explains that at that time “people thought” increasingly in terms of the nation despite the lack of overt proof (Pop 2002: 151). Normally, Pop counters Boia’s arguments by referring to the value of factual evidence. This time, at a crucial stage of the discussion, Pop assumes an (imaginary) missing element in order to increase the coherence of the historical sequence outlined from the vantage point of the present with the nation triumphantly united. It is a statement that can only serve as an example of teleological historiography.

As adumbrated above, this sort of historiography incorporates the 1989 moment within a comprehensive sequence of cultural history in order to buttress its claims about the continuous existence of the nation throughout the extended period of time mentioned by Pop. However, while Pop agrees with Boia that the obsession with “unity” and “permanence” marked the decades of nationalist communism, the former invokes, again, the professionalism of the genuine historians who quietly kept up the standards of scholarship, and doubts that people in general were influenced by the official line (Pop 2002: 156). These doubts are not shared by the reviewer in the Romanian Academy periodical who writes that people knew and accepted only what they kept hearing from the authorities or the official media (Florescu 1997: 442). By way of an anecdote, Boia gives an example of the official obsession with territorial unity: in the 1980s the weather reports were not any longer allowed to mention separate regions, so that instead of saying that it was going to rain in Moldavia the presenter had to announce that it was going to rain in the north-east of Romania (Boia 1999: 214—215).

Boia has noticed a change in what he calls the “nationalist orientation” after 1900 (Boia: 1999: 90—91). Whereas during the nineteenth century the national identity was connected to the tradition of European civilization in the hope of becoming part of it, after the turn of the century the focus was on the specific characteristics of the national identity. Paradoxically, the chief focus of the post-communist 1990s in defining national identity—European integration—is similar to the initial efforts (1830—1890) of outlining the national identity. In contrast, the criticism of Boia’s “revisionism” derives its intellectual inspiration from the post-1900 nationalism.

Specifically, Boia sees the problem in the authoritarian and “autochthonous” way of writing history in Romania (Boia 1999: 357). He looks forward to a (European) integrating and modernizing manner of producing history. Boia states specifically that the solution is not to “forget” history, but to change the “selection criteria” and to “attenuate” it, presumably meaning an attenuation of the more strident claims. Warnings that “forgetting” could be a serious danger recurred in the more specific context of the communist period. These warnings contain the obvious implicit appeal to remember,
and since Boia admits the impossibility of eliminating the imaginary, the challenge is that of reconciling memory and the imaginary.

The reassurance that it is not a question of forgetting one’s history leads to the immediately subsequent point that the great decisions required today by Romanian society presuppose a “break” with the past (Boia 1999: 357); two sentences that contain appeals both to remember and to forget. In other words, people must go on remembering, but in a different manner. The time has come to learn a new way of extracting memories from the past. While Boia admits the impossibility of completely objective history writing, his suggestion of revising the foundation myths reduces the role of the imaginary. This attenuation requires distance. The critics have misunderstood the kind of distance that Boia recommends. Critical scrutiny of an ideologically fraught version of history necessitates taking a step back; yet ceasing to identify oneself with a particular narrative does not mean that Boia denies being part of an identity-creating narrative. He simply sees the Romanian identity as being somewhat different from the one disfigured by various accretions over time. Among the remedies suggested by Boia’s revision is the acceptance of a new hierarchy of values. This presupposes a lucid and relaxed intellectual outlook; one that has appeared increasingly possible in the post-1989 circumstances.

A distinction between the contexts in which these historians consider truth and the importance of available evidence further clarifies the issues at stake. Boia considers truth in a context of cultural identity; Pop in a context of historical research. The former can afford to tone down the importance of truth because he deals with symbols and myths that define the image and the claims of a nation. The sort of cultural memory that such an image prefers to perpetuate need not be suspended or bracketed in places because of a lack of historical evidence or of less than fully established facts. Boia’s manner of dismissing the (need for) absolute historical truth under these circumstances may appear more provocatively relativistic than it need be. One can approach this matter by means of Blustein’s claim that the functions common to collective memory and myth are truth-independent (Blustein 2008: 193, 222). Since Boia relies so much on the concept of myth and its helpful or unhelpful aspects, Blustein’s more specific observation on myth may be edifying: “The relevant question about myths is not whether they are true but whether they are appropriately directed to their audience, and this will depend on features that are peculiar to the particular audience addressed” (Blustein 2008: 193).

The questionable truth of myth presupposes the action of the imaginary as defined for the purposes of this analysis. Boia’s argument has been provocative because he has highlighted how versions of facts and interpretations have been “directed” to an audience in forms suitably adapted to its “features.” These features, i.e. self-perceptions of a particular cultural identity that have survived after 1989, appear to belong to a version of cultural memory whose meanings are still being articulated and handed down by historians and other intellectuals. In combining the real with the unreal, the imaginary adds sense to what seems baffling and completes unfinished sequences. Thus the imaginary turns out to be a significant force in adjusting the chain of recollection and this adjustment is an illustration of the dynamics of cultural memory as employed in
the present analysis. The imaginary compensates for the missing evidence concerning
the Latin legacy, creating a coherence communicated consistently enough to become
part of cultural identity.

In their exchange of arguments, Pop refuses to accept the dynamics of adjustment
that Boia suggests. Pop perceives the emphasis on the role of the imaginary in shaping
a set of “learned memories” as a challenge to the professionalism of earlier scholars
(Pop 2002: 143, 154 & passim). Boia’s aim is to discuss the Romanian historiography
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on the history of Romania and the way it has
been related to social and ideological development. He dwells on those exaggerated
accounts that have contributed to the national mythology (Boia 1999: 47). While Boia
recognizes the inevitability of the imaginary, he points out that some of its products
need to be disposed of because they hinder the democratization, modernization and
European integration of Romania. Two extreme examples illustrate this point. Firstly,
in the middle of the nineteenth century a Romanian historian from Transylvania wrote
a history of the Romanians which started with the foundation of Rome in 753 B.C. The
second example is from the 1970s and ‘80s and concerns the theory of “protochronism”,
strongly encouraged by the communist authorities and according to which Romanian
culture had anticipated some of the main achievements of European civilization (e.g.
Neagoe Basarab’s teachings anticipating Machiavelli’s The Prince).

In sum, the imaginary has had an impact on the three main elements that structure
Boia’s book: the origins, the continuity (perennialism) and the unity (ethnic
homogeneity) of the Romanian nation. What has antagonized some historians and a
number of groups with vested interests and access to the media is Boia’s relativism.
He actually sees a connection between a fallible objectivism with its insistence on one
truth, and the communist ideology with its emphasis on one political solution. Since
he refers to a wide range of methods that helped pass on suitably adjusted cultural
values, the contributors to the formation of cultural identity are not only scholars, but
the community of intellectuals, artists, writers and the public at large. Along the way,
certain elements of the constantly adapted accounts of origins, continuity, etc., are left
out. They are consigned to oblivion. The remaining views and perceptions acquire the
status of established memories and make up the Romanian “consciousness” that Boia
has questioned.

This is where Pop begs to differ. For him the determining components of cultural
history are the product of scholarly activity. Pop confines his views to the effects
of stringent intellectual activity, missing in the process its ideological nature. The
controversy turns on the effects of the imaginary as perpetuated through the “tradition
of meaning”, to use Jan Assmann’s phrase. Under these circumstances, the resulting
cultural memory appears as a vulnerable creation to be treated with suspicion. Since
Boia’s challenge addresses basic aspects of national and cultural identity, and since
these aspects have been part of the political outlook, his challenge has managed to
reveal the survival of an unsettling strand of nationalism after 1989.

Questioning essential components of cultural identity has had resonances of an
existential nature as well. Once more, Boia does not necessarily deal with particular
pieces of doubtful historical evidence but with the overall tone of expounding the
significance of the evidence such as it is. He turns against certain extravagant claims handed down over time. The nostalgia that preserves a more- or less- self-defined image of the capital is another questionable component of the cultural tradition. When Boia suggests that Romanians should cease to regard Bucharest as “Little Paris” and become aware that it is more of a “Little Istanbul” (with all respect for Turkey), he touches on very sensitive aspects of self-perception. Such remarks are therefore no longer a question of specialist debates about clearly outlined memories, but of a challenge to the manner in which the process of shaping cultural history has proceeded over the decades and centuries.

It has to be emphasized that Boia does not want to eliminate the imaginary from the creation of national identity, but to have it accepted as an inevitable component. As cultural tradition, in its turn, reinforces national identity, a paradoxical dimension of the imaginary emerges: namely, that of accepted reality. Whatever the ways in which national identity has come about, its existence becomes a firm reference point that enters the process of recollection.

The arguments advanced on either side define the overt meaning of the controversial book discussed above and the responses to it. However, the material examined here serves as indirect evidence concerning the dynamics of the post-1989 period (at least in Romania), related to the post-communist political options. Still on the issue of the material as indirect evidence, it is not so much the contents that provide the information, as the manner, indeed the rhetoric, in which the exchanges proceed, the stridency of the critical reactions, the telling imbalance between action and reaction. Boia’s opponents want to preserve particular accounts that define Romanian identity and that lend a particular set of significances to the Romanian cultural history. Boia wants to interrupt a sequence of contrived recollections and rearrange the accounts and, consequently, their significances. Implicit views of memory, and above all memory after 1989, are at work in both cases. Boia simply cannot accept the evaluation of cultural history that has accumulated under the impact of particular circumstances at certain moments in history. In a way, he performs a therapeutic action as far as the importance of the past is concerned and a politically pragmatic one as far as the future of Romania (above all, Romanian cultural discourse) in Europe is concerned.

**Conclusion**

Boia’s intentions are determined by professional criteria as well as by the emancipatory wish to adapt the Romanian intellectual discourse to the European tone in order to facilitate the country’s overall European integration. His opponents’ intentions are determined by the need to defend an identity where memory plays an important, albeit suspect, role. This controversy offers an intriguing example of the connection between the outlook on a particular cultural tradition and the effort to have that tradition recognized as part of a more widely accepted set of values. This is the second time Romania endeavours on a large scale to “become part of Europe”, the first having occurred about
the middle of the nineteenth century, as Boia has argued (Boia 1999: 49). According to him, the recognition of the impact of the imaginary on what memory chooses to preserve or leave out will help the local cultural history to tune into the Continental one.

When developing her concept of active cultural memory, Aleida Assmann has included deliberate actions such as selection but, otherwise, has left the field open for further exploration and elucidation. The present discussion has suggested that the concept of the imaginary, related to the concept of myth as employed by Lucian Boia in his controversial book furnishes an example of the kind of dynamics envisaged by Aleida Assmann’s view of cultural memory. The aspect of cultural memory that perceives the “past as present” proves relevant to the post-1989 options in Romania. These options may have been intellectual alternatives of understanding and redefining the nation’s cultural identity that are rediscovered or newly available, but they have certainly emerged in a context where ideological and specifically political interests straddle 1989 and therefore have been coexisting uneasily. The investigation of Boia’s arguments, as well as of the praise and criticism they have occasioned has taken into account this very context when pursuing the impact of the imaginary for alternative kinds of cultural memory. Consequently, this case study has shown that the imaginary can find a place in Aleida Assmann’s conceptual outlook on cultural memory.
References


Introduction

In recent years, attention has been paid to the banal practices of everyday politics and particularly to the role of memory in the construction of space and place (Hoelscher & Alderman 2004; Thien 2005; Till 2005; Anderson & Harrison 2006; also Connerton 1989). However, Western political theory has firmly emphasised rationality, and, for example, some political geographers have claimed that studying everyday practices has led to a downgrading of the concept of politics (e.g. Mamadough 2003). We strongly disagree that the “politics” in social and geographical knowledge would be put in danger by studying daily life and embodied socio-spatial practices of identity construction in particular (Kuusisto-Arponen 2009). Instead, we argue that studying the bodily practices of remembering is crucial in understanding the various spatial identifications of people.

This article discusses the practices of remembering and assesses the importance of these practices in the formation of people’s identity. The two basic questions of the social construction of identity are: who we are and where we come from. Therefore, personal conceptions, feelings and experiences of places are central to the formation of identity (af Forselles-Riska 2006: 218).

The Karelian Isthmus is a place that has faced major political, economic, social and cultural changes during the last couple of hundred years. It has always been a border area: a border area of different cultures and religions, and a border of different nations (Sweden and Russia; Finland and Russia; Finland and the Soviet Union). Approximately 430 000 Finns (of whom 407 000 were Karelians) lost their homes when about 10% of Finland’s territory was ceded to the Soviet Union after the Continuation War in 1944.
The evacuees were resettled in various parts of Finland and, in the long run, adapted to their new lives. When the border began to open up in the 1980s and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it became officially possible for the displaced to visit their old home districts.

Several narratives of displacement are found in the Finnish context. National narration of displacement and war has focused on the loss of national territory, which however was considered a necessary sacrifice to retain the independency of Finland. In national narrative Karelia was geopolitically delicate subject which was hardly ever discussed of. Collective Karelian surviving narrative stressed the ceded home area and the strength of the community during and after the evacuation years. This collective narration was twofold. On the one hand it has been defined by unity claim: “we displaced Karelians”, but at the same time their collective identity strategy defined Karelian people as part of larger “we” category i.e. the Finnish nation. This twofold identity politics most likely also led to successful adaptation of Karelians to the local social spheres. National and collective narrations did not, however, give space to personal or family memories to be discussed publicly. The practices of family and private memorising were vivid but only since the 1990s they have also became more public and accepted part of Karelian memory culture (Kuusisto-Arponen 2011).

The particular history of Karelia as a borderland has created a situation where even today many different Karelias and Karelians exist. There are still people who have personal memories about living in the ceded Finnish Karelia, but the majority of the Finnish people who often feel and identify themselves as Karelians have never lived in the Karelian Isthmus. Karelianism is also very much alive. For decades, it has been placed in the realm of political discussion. Karelianism, as we see it, can be also understood as a right to remember the past, as a right to be Karelian. It does not automatically include a claim to the Karelian territory. Thus, Karelianism has a strong and vivid existence in people’s everyday memories and both in written and spoken collective narratives. Some researchers argue that there is actually a new wave of Karelianism, which is exclusively based on the experiences and memories of the expelled inhabitants and their ancestors (cf. Fingerroos & Loipponen 2007; Parppei 2006).

The narratives of the Karelian district have always been full of myths and utopias. This is a common feature of many borderland contexts where constant contestation of the sites of belonging occurs (Kaplan & Häkli 2002). Not surprisingly, for many Finns and even for Finnish researchers, Karelia remains a place described with a great deal of emotions (Böök 2006, Fingerroos 2007: 17-18; Lähteenmäki 2009: 7; Uino 2007). One of the main reasons for Karelian utopias was its distinctive geopolitical position in the border of West and East. Until the late 1980s many parts of Russian Karelia and Leningrad area were entirely closed or had very restricted access to Finnish tourists (Raivo 2007: 65–66). In the early 1990s situation changed radically and since the collapse of the Soviet Union, former Karelians have conducted several travels back to their ceded home districts. In 1991–1992 1.6 million Finns crossed the border to Karelia (Armstrong 2004: 12). Many of these trips can also be seen as pilgrimages (Paasi 1996, 1998; Kuusisto-Arponen 2008a, 2009). We argue that today’s pilgrimages
are excellent sources of studying the process of reconciliation between different narratives of displacement. Rather than to continue to construct the seemingly different versions of forced displacement, we show how intertwined the national, collective and personal (or family) narratives actually are.

This article centres on the main questions: What kind of practices of remembering do the displaced Karelians and their descendants have? And what is the meaning of these practices for their socio-spatial identification? However, what is said aloud in oral narrations is not the whole story. Collective and personal narrations of the past are always partial. A defining feature of how Karelia is remembered is the ambivalence of what is and what is not remembered (Kuusisto-Arponen 2007, 2008a). Therefore, in this article, we also discuss what the role of emotional silences in the personal and collective place politics is and how the silence becomes visualised in the ritual behaviour of remembering.

Observing Performative Rituals and Silences

Empirical data in this article is based on a field trip made by Kristiina Korjonen-Kuusipuro to Kurkijoki in the Karel1an Isthmus in June 2010. Kurkijoki in 1939 was a parish of little more than 10 000 inhabitants. Today, it is part of the Russian Republic of Karelia and the Lakhdenpokhsky Municipal District. The village is rather small and has only a couple of thousand inhabitants. Its main livelihood historically was agriculture, and several sovkhozes were established there during the Soviet times. Today, the economic future of the area lies in tourism because of the vicinity of Lake Ladoga.

The Finnish history of the village remains visible in architecture, even though the majority of the houses of the Finnish period have been demolished. Contemporary Russian citizens have undergone some serious efforts to preserve few of the remaining Finnish houses as part of the new town plan. Russians also have founded a local museum (Kurkijokskij krajevedtšeskij tsentr) that collects, preserves and documents items from the Finnish period. These examples of the intersections of local historical awareness are important in understanding the silent pasts of the borderland communities.

The fieldwork for this article was conducted by Kristiina Korjonen-Kuusipuro. Kristiina attended a bus tour, and, as participant observer, she observed approximately 30 people for four days during their journey back to their own or their forefathers’ home district. For Kristiina, this trip, while not the first of its kind, differed from the previous ones because she was accompanied by her whole family: father (who was born in Kurkijoki in 1925), mother, two sisters and two brothers with their wives and husbands. Furthermore, whereas Kristiina, her father and mother had visited Kurkijoki before, the rest of the family had not, which made the trip even more special.

The aim of the field observation was twofold. First, Kristiina was to observe her own family members very closely and discuss their experiences with them. Second, her task was to observe other participants. At first, Kristiina intended to keep her identity as researcher hidden during the trip because she wanted to avoid situations where people
would begin to perform for the researcher. Unfortunately, this failed when some of the people in the bus recognised Kristiina as researcher; she even ended up having to make a short presentation in the bus. However, the main idea of the field trip was to act more like a member of the family rather than a researcher, which in anthropology is called unobtrusive observation. This part of the article is also partly based on autoethnography because Kristiina uses her own experience as research material. (e.g. Bernard 2006: 413; Uotinen 2010: 179)

In the fieldwork, the researcher observed the acts of remembering and the ways through which the older generation transferred their knowledge and memories of the ceded home to the younger ones. In addition, the contacts and dialogue between the Finns and contemporary inhabitants of Kurkijoki were noted and analysed. The researcher also conducted personal discussions with several people. Most of the time she tried to stay at the background in case people began changing their behaviour because of her presence as researcher. The research material consists of field notes, diaries of Kristiina’s family members, discussions with the co-travellers, a couple of newspaper articles published in the Kurkijokelainen magazine, and family photographs taken during the trip. Through different types of empirical data, we have analysed how ritual behaviour is visualised and how particular emotional silences are overcome.

Identity, Sense of Place and Memory

There is a vital connection between human identity, memory and place. We understand identity as something constantly changing, roughly divided into individual and collective identity based on social relations. Basically, identity refers to our reflective view of ourselves when we ask who we are as persons. Identity also includes other perceptions of our self-images. We are able to choose what characteristics of our identity we will emphasise: for example, it is possible to identify ourselves as Karelians during a trip like Kristiina’s but choose other aspects of our identity in different circumstances. Klaus Eder has also stated that “collective identities are narrative constructions which permit the control of the boundaries of a network of actors.” (Eder 2009: 431) The connection between identity and memory is defined, for example by McBride (2001: 1), who argues that there can be no sense of identity for national communities, or individuals, without remembering.

Memory and remembering are closely connected to a place. In a sense of place, the spatial, identity, community, and history are combined. It also functions as a necessary part of collective identification. According to Duffy (1997), the sense of place is formed out of the ways in which people experience representations of present and past landscapes, and it forms an important part of territorial identity and geographical understanding (Duffy 1997: 64). Referring to communal identity politics, Graham (1994) uses the concept of representative landscape. He defines it as follows: “an encapsulation of people’s image of itself, a collage, based upon the particularity of territory and a shared past which helps define the communal identity (ibid. 258).” While
using different concepts, Graham (1994) and Duffy (1997) are referring to the same set of phenomena, that of collective spatial imagination and the construction of the sense of place. In contrast to the sense of place, ‘placelessness’ (Relph 1976) refers to a lack of unifying narrative of place – i.e. the place-community relation which has not been able to combine history, territory and social memory together. In place-bound identity politics, this interplay between the sense of place and placelessness becomes crucial, particularly in a conflict or war situation where displacement creates rootlessness. (Kuusisto-Arponen 2003)

Societies reconstruct and remember the past in different ways: some practices are more visible than others. In the case of forced displacement, the personal and collective spatial imaginations are changed permanently. Thus, several practices and rituals of claiming the ceded place and remembering the past are occurring. Claiming the place can vary from naming places to establishing memorial sites, and from writing personal biographies for grandchildren to collecting stones from the lakeside. All these practices aim at making the invisible social place visible again. In these trips to Karelia, the fragments of personal and collective experiences are put together and somehow seem to create a coherent event of place. This place comes into existence only momentarily, enabling the telling of the stories of the ceded place in a contemporary situation. It also includes next generations into this narrative and performative formation of place (e.g. Karjalainen 2006; Kuusisto-Arponen 2009).

In order to understand these performances and dialogues of the place and the self, silence becomes a crucial analytical tool. Silence is a social process, involving different actions and agencies. Thus, silence should always be analysed in connection with remembering and forgetting. Forgetting, on the other hand, is a tacit form of remembering and should not be considered equal to silence. This means that silence does not refer to something totally absent in the social sphere, but rather to the absence of narration. According to Winter, silence is a boundary condition to narration (Winter 2006, 2010a). In addition, we argue that it is important to analyse the many forms through which silence becomes expressive also on the scale of the body, i.e. in our case in the multiple bodily practices of remembering the ceded home place.

The Ways of Remembering and Ritual Behaviour

In Finland, post-war identities were manifested rather peacefully, even though re-location process always includes a tremendous potential for conflict. There are several reasons for this peaceful change. The state subsidies and legislation had a wide influence, but the social environment between the evacuees and local people made the greatest contribution to the identity politics at that time. Familiar relationships developed quickly and people worked, lived and socialised together. The sense of place and belonging of the expelled people was constructed through several dimensions: the ceded home place, new social and cultural context, the national survival rhetoric and communal narratives of the ceded Karelia (Kuusisto-Arponen 2008b, 2008c). However, the ceded
Karelia was not forgotten, quite the contrary, multiple collective practices of remem-
bering were developed.

Kevin Hetherington (1998) has pointed out that identity is not only achieved through
identification with groups of individuals, but also through performative repertoires that
are expressive and embodied. These performative repertoires are extremely important
in the conflict situations when bodily reactions and memories become subdued by
the more powerful narrative expressions, such as the national hegemonic discourses.
Performativity is often actualised in multiple rituals of remembering. Kinnunen
(2001: 313) has also argued that identity is born through a dialogue with the inner
and outer body. The body is simultaneously a biological and social phenomenon. In
this framework, the body can be analytically seen both as a subject and an object in
performative practices, a key site at which identity is articulated and expressed (e.g.

Rituals are formalised, rule-bound, structured and repetitive activities of a symbolic
character restricted to specific times and places (Boosted 2007: 70–71). They are
reflective modes of action that secure peoples’ identity; they also transmit participants’
identity via behaviour. Rituals are patterned, ordered and predictable symbolic forms
of communication that are repeated in a stereotypical fashion. Thus, rituals often
provide satisfaction and special meaning to participants (Bennett et al 1988: 218). The
observed Karelian rituals are not performances of everyday life. As Emile Durkheim
(1912/2001) has argued, rituals form a circle within which things gain an extraordinary,
almost sacred meaning. But outside this circle, things appear unremarkable, profane.
Seen this way, the act of remembering in the rituals such as leaving flowers in the
graveyard makes Kurkijoki sacred for those attending the ritual. Furthermore, in regard
to the relationship between rituals and memory, we can say that “rituals are almost
universal means of collective commemoration”. Rituals are a performative form of
communication, but ritual action is not dependent only on participants’ intentions to
create meaningful messages. Ritual practices can therefore be seen both as a way to
perform culture as a structural whole and as a way to experience culture. In other words
rituals are not only something done, but they are also experienced. (Boosted 2007;
Köpping et al 2006: 20; Saarikoski 2008; Senft and Bosso 2009: 3-4).

Back to Karelia: Reviving the Family Ties of Belonging

Trips to the Karelian Isthmus usually last from one to three days, and for travellers, an
opportunity to stay in their former home villages is extremely important. Previously, it
was difficult to find somewhere to stay overnight for a large group of people in Karelia.
Hotels were also in a much poorer condition. Nowadays, there are many well-kept,
some even luxurious, places of accommodation all over the Karelian Isthmus. Staying
closer to former home sites makes it possible for travellers to move around more freely
and practice everyday acts of remembering. For example, the first evening Kristiina’s
family stayed at Kurkijoki, they made a walking tour around the village, during which
they saw several of their fellow travellers doing the same thing: some people were looking for old houses while others were looking at the familiar landscape. Every time these small groups met, they stopped and discussed the place with each other.

Walking tours to old home districts and storytelling are the most commonly observed practices of remembering. In the act of remembering, personal experiences are intertwined with oral and written histories of the place (see Picture 1). On the morning of their second day in Kurkijoki, Kristiina’s family were taken by the bus close to her father’s old home. Accompanied by the former neighbour Pirkko and his spouse Pekka, the act of remembering started while they were all walking. Pirkko left Kurkijoki as a young child and did not know Kristiina’s father at that point. Nonetheless, they had a lot of things to remember together: what colour Pirkko’s family house was, where their fields were, where the road went, etc. Kristiina’s father told Pirkko about his recollections of Pirkko’s family and their house. Pirkko’s parents have told her a great deal about their former home. Her spouse Pekka, also from Kurkijoki, has much knowledge of the old days from his family but part of it he has attained by reading history books and listening to older people. This mixture of personal and historical awareness was characteristic of his storytelling.

Picture 1: Walking tours to old home sites are typical rituals of remembering. The easiest place to observe bodily performances is during these walking tours (Korjonen-Kuusipuro 2010).

The house Kristiina’s father was born in was demolished already before the war, but what is not lost is the surrounding nature and the house of the closest neighbour. The landscape in Kurkijoki is very hilly and Kristiina’s whole family wandered on the cliffs.
where her father used to play as a child. Even now, at the age of 85, Kristiina’s father climbed all the way to a high hill that used to be his skiing hill. He seemed so enthusiastic that Kristiina started to think that had it been winter, he would have skied too. Moving around in the familiar environment seemed to bring back childhood memories to Kristiina’s father, who began to tell several stories and details about his life to the rest of the family, sitting down to listen to him. The actual moment of remembering became almost tangible in this event of place. Kristiina felt that she almost saw how these memories returned to his father, even things he had previously thought forgotten. He also appeared younger. He talked and walked faster and his age did not seem to bother him at all. The revival of the old and almost forgotten memories is extremely common when displaced people return to their home places (Kuusisto-Arponen 2007, 2008c). In this case, we can clearly see the importance of visiting the actual sites and bodily practices for the acts of remembering.

The same evening when the Finns returned from their walking tours, another interesting ritualistic feature was revealed. Almost everyone had taken with them some items to take back home. These items are equal to travelling objects that many displaced people have “as treasures” (see Lury 1997; also Sheller and Urry 2006: 218; Kuusisto-Arponen 2009). The items in this case were usually bunches of wild flowers or birch twigs for sauna whisks (“saunavasta”), even stones or sand from the old home site or water from Lake Ladoga. In other occasions, some people have pulled out roots of flowers. Even the tour guides tend to be prepared for this ritual by keeping shovels in the bus. It is forbidden to take flowers across the border but the border guards rarely confiscate roots or flowers from passengers.

Rituals can be seen as uniting the collective and individual identity. Rituals are also important for families and family identities. Family identity can be seen as one form of collective identity, but Eder (2009: 428-429) argues that families are among several social forms situated as intermediate cases of identity between the two poles of identity construction, namely individuals and nations. For Kristiina’s family, this trip also strengthened their identity as a family: for the first time in years, the whole family was together, spending all those days together talking and walking. Remembering and discussing their father’s childhood was important, but the village of Kurkijoki also reminded the second generation of the city they were born during the 1950s and 1960s and their own childhood and adolescence in a small Finnish village during the 1970s. Kristiina’s sisters and brothers started recalling their own childhood and telling stories to one another of the time when they were children or teenagers. Kurkijoki acted as a catalyst for everyone’s own memories. This illustrates the intertwined nature of personal and collective identities.
Meeting the Other

When “Us” is defined, there always is multiple “Others”. In our case study, the other is the Russians living in today’s Karelia. But for the Russians living in Kurkijoki, the Finns are the other. In the borderland context, the practices that construct the sense of belonging and not belonging go hand in hand. Sometimes meeting the other or the unfamiliar everyday practices among the other community are interpreted as threats. In some other occasions, face-to-face contact creates mutual understanding and can even open up new ways of understanding the contested past. In the following, we examine several examples of the rituals of remembering that the field trip to Kurkijoki illustrated.

The history of Finnish Karelians survives in the area in the form of buildings, monuments and remains. Regardless of the importance of this history for the identity of former or later local inhabitants, Soviet national history-writing and identity construction paid little attention to it. As a result, the place lacks a common narrative, that is, even the present inhabitants experience a sense of placelessness. The current local Russians, however, are interested in the history of the area, and the line separating “us” from “them” is gradually getting blurry. In Kurkijoki, present and former inhabitants work together, for example in the local museum project. Russian people have collected items in the museum that they have found in their houses or fields while Finnish people have helped them to identify these items and connect them to the former life in Kurkijoki. Today the museum is regularly visited by Finnish groups, thus providing it necessary funding. Even though some other positive examples of intercultural contacts were noted during the field trip to Kurkijoki, most ways of remembering tell a more contested story of the sites and ties of belonging.

In fact, one way to “meet” the Russians is to try to avoid meeting them altogether and think through stereotypes. The stereotypical image of Russians is based on memories of wars and is rather one-sided and fairly negative. This line of thought often surfaces during the bus tours. On the tour Kristiina attended, she heard many stories of ruined Karelia, how the Russians have mistreated everything, and how peculiar people they are. “This is a Russian way of doing things” was a very commonly heard sentence, always referring to something negative. In practice, however, meetings with the other are unavoidable. Some people on the tour even silently wished these meetings would occur. Some Finns have occasionally befriended locals and as a result have a more straightforward relationship with them.

Visits to memorials and graveyards are the most common rituals in Karelian tours. These visits also force people to see the other and their cultural practices. Finns have set up almost 80 memorials on the Karelian Isthmus; the official program of every tour includes a visit to a memorial and placing a wreath at it (see Picture 2). The Russians have erected their own memorials next to many Finnish memorial sites. Some Finns interpret this as competition and view it negatively. Unfortunately, to make things worse, Finnish memorials have sometimes been destroyed by Russians. It is for this reason that Finnish visitors have included a ritual of checking and evaluating the
condition of the memorial sites in their tours. Memorial sites are one way of reclaiming the place that once was theirs. Leaving physical markers in the place in a way justifies “us” among the “other”, and vice versa. In the borderland contexts, the overlapping cultural histories become easily visualised, as this example illustrates. We argue that even though these memoryscapes often are seen as a battlefield of the ownership of cultural memories, there should be room for more constructive approaches as well. Only that way the dialogue between different groups of people and the dismantling of the cultural traumas that constitute the Finnish as well as post-Soviet Karelia could be attained.

Picture 2: Kristiina’s father placing a wreath at the memorial for the victims of the 1918 Finnish Civil War in Kurkijoki with another member of the tour. The statue was found in the ditch nearby and moved to its old place after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Next to the Civil War memorial, there is a Finnish memorial for the victims of the Winter War and the Continuation War, as well as a Russian memorial dedicated to the Unknown Soldier. Different memorials reveal the layered history of the place (Korjonen-Kuusipuro 2010).
In Kurkijoki, visits to the memorial sites form the skeleton of the village tour. Altogether three Finnish memorials were set up in the Kurkijoki graveyards in the end of 1990s and in the early 2000’s, while an old memorial commemorating the victims of the Finnish Civil War 1918 was found in a ditch nearby and re-erected. The setting up a memorial in 2001 generated a small conflict between local authorities and Finnish visitors. Local authorities did not authorised the erection of the memorial, even though Finns thought they had applied all the needed permissions beforehand. Apparently some official permissions were still missing and part of the Finnish construction group was taken into an interrogation by Russian authorities. This incident lives on as a story retold every time people stop by this specific memorial. In addition, the story of how the 1918 memorial was found has become part of the narration of the ritual. The war memorials stand next to the ruins of the old church. The church of Kurkijoki survived the war, but burned down in 1991. The reason for this accident remains unknown, yet the common Finnish version of the story claims the church was deliberately burned down by Russians.\textsuperscript{104} But in the Russian version of the story, it is the Finns who are responsible for burning down the church (Böök 2006). The viewers often interpret the meaning of these war memorials differently depending on the national narrative they are most comfortable with. In such situations, the divergent symbolic elements of the memorials become the main source of cultural contestation. For example, Finns have erected a memorial at the Elisenvaara railway station to commemorate the bombing of the evacuation train in 1944. Next to this Finnish memorial, stands a Russian statue of a mother and a child. Since the figure of mother commonly symbolises Russia, Finns tend to interpret this statue as competing with the Finnish one, and as stating a clear claim of the Russian ownership of the place.

In Kurkijoki, there are three old Finnish Lutheran graveyards. While old Finnish graves are rarely found, some old gravestones nevertheless survive. Older people recall quite accurately where their family members were buried, and for them, it is crucial to locate these sites during the visits. This also happened to Kristiina’s family when they found her grandfather’s gravesite. Even though he died when Kristiina’s father was only seven and no one else in the family had ever met him, the whole family felt that the place was important for them. In general, searching for the sites of former family graves is a performative strategy. In this ritual, the initiative of searching is more important than the actual end result.

An interesting observation on Kristiina’s field trip was that not all official rituals interested all people. For example, during the graveyard tours, some people stayed in the bus and some wandered around by themselves, not paying attention to the guides’ presentation. But when it came to the rituals aimed at paying respect to the deceased and the act of placing the wreaths, the tour guides practically demanded people to view and attend the ceremony. The guides had brought the wreaths with them and simply went around telling people to take part in the ritual. Forcing people to participate in a ritual is a sign of multiple discourses embedded in the visits to the ceded Karelia. One explanation for this, we argue, is that the national narrative of Finland surviving the horrors of the Second World War still subdues the more personal and emotional

\textsuperscript{104} The Finnish version of the story is commonly mentioned in books too (cf. Nevalainen 2010: 468).
narratives of the importance of the ceded place. Karelia was lost in the war but Finland remained independent - this is the story passed on from one generation to another. To show respect for the victims of the war can be seen as a national duty, binding everyone in these trips. This practice illustrates the invisible force of nation-state that still exists in contemporary world. The territorial trap of the nation-state system is best visualised in the conflicted narrations and through contested spatial identifications, such as illustrated in our example (e.g. Agnew 1994).

In Kurkijoki, one of the old Finnish graveyards is used by Russians whose Orthodox funeral practices differ from the Finnish Lutheran or Orthodox practices. Some Finnish people who visit the ceded home place find this too divergent (see Picture 3). Inkeri, the wife of Kristiina’s brother, describes the Russian graveyard in her diary as follows: “I have never seen such a graveyard before. Russian culture is very visible there, but my slow feelings cannot yet warm to that colourful splendour. It is very beautiful, but I do not really understand the atmosphere. The graveyard seems to be in a more natural condition than those in Finland with their strict rows of gravestones.” Her feelings in meeting the other were quite mixed: she wondered about the foreignness of Kurkijoki, its “foreign items” and foreign language visible everywhere from street names and signs to current residents. Without understanding the language, she did not find it easy to grasp the place. At the same time, she viewed current residents as “ordinary people” who adhere to the property they have purchased. “High fences and locked gates surrounding the houses tell us how the local people are protecting their property and belongings against crime.” This kind of attitude indicates the strangeness of the other, but also curiosity towards the habits and customs of the other. It is clearly evident that she has controlled her mixed feelings and thought very carefully about what to write down in her diary without offending anyone.

Picture 3: The difference between Finnish Lutheran graves and Russian Orthodox graves is significant. Old Finnish graves are nowadays hard to find because the graveyard is used by present inhabitants (Korjonen-Kuusipuro 2010).
According to Kristiina’s observations, occasional meetings with Russians do occur, but do not develop into deeper relationships. During their walk near Kristiina’s father’s home site, Kristiina’s family met Sascha, the man who currently lives there. This experience of the other was expected but also feared in a way. In general, though, all the family members considered meeting Sascha a very positive experience. A former soldier from St. Petersburg, Sascha has his summer cottage, dacha, at the site where Kristiina’s father’s home used to be. The family met Sacha doing his morning exercise in the road. Although he must have been surprised, he welcomed all very warmly and gave them a permission to walk around and look for the old places where Kristiina’s father lived and used to play as a child. Kristiina’s father was very worried about meeting this man in advance and wanted to have a piece of paper in Russian stating who he was and why he was there. When the family actually met Sascha and saw how he was, they became very curious about his life, wishing they could discuss it more with him. Fortunately, Sascha spoke some English so they were able to do that. Kristiina’s father found most moving that Sascha said this was the best place he had known and would not want to return to St. Petersburg unless he had no choice.

There is, however, one example in our empirical data that clearly shows how one-sided interpretation of the local narratives can lead to a cultural confusion. For the last evening in Kurkijoki, the tour operators had organised a Karelian party where some local Russian musicians played and sang Finnish and Russian songs. Some Finns watched the show with mixed feelings, astonishment showing on their faces. Russians do not sing Finnish songs in the traditional Finnish way but in their own style which caused confusion. The song evening mainly celebrated the Finnish narrative, i.e. the target of remembering was almost exclusively the Finnish Karelia before the wars. This led to a situation where a performance was set up to show that there were no others in this remembrance act. The feeling of fake authenticity of the remembrance was perceived with mixed feelings by the Finns, but the audience remained polite because they knew that this festivity was an important means of income for the local Russian people.

Emotional Silences

The Second World War created particular and long-lasting silences for many European countries. Finland has her own geopolitical reasons for “silencing” some voices from the war history and the narrative of survival has become the main national interpretation after the war. Loyalty to the nation-state was shown by paying the war reparation and hiding personal pain behind the scene. Cultural silences do not mean that the events would have been forgotten, rather they illustrate that there is something there, but the words are lacking. Therefore, our approach that combines the textual and non-verbal forms of analysing ritual behaviour is crucial in gaining a better understanding of the multiple silences.

Kristiina’s brother wrote only one sentence in his diary: “Beautiful Karelia – the evacuees did not lie about everything”. While the quantity of his writing is
disappointingly low, the sentence is remarkable in many other ways. First, this act tells us about the silence. Second, it tells us about Kristiina’s brother’s expectations: he thought old Karelians (like his father and grandmother whom he remembers well) had exaggerated when they told about the beautiful Karelia they missed. As a child, he had been bored with the stories old people told, and had initially been very reluctant to travel to Karelia. There is nothing to see, he had stated many times. Maybe he was also a little bit frightened. Third, the sentence tells us about his present feelings. For him, Karelia became a beautiful place that is part of his own identity. He saw with his own eyes the past of his father, and, perhaps for the first time, understood the meaning of this lost home for his father. He even started to plan a new trip by motorcycle. Later during the summer he also joined the Kurkijoki association and participated in its annual summer festival.

Silence is not a space for forgetting, as Winter (2003: 3) argues. As Raimo O. Kojo writes in Kurkijoki magazine, visiting the Kurkijoki graveyard caused him such a surge of emotion that he had previously expressed his emotions so strongly only in hypnotherapy (Kojo 2010). In the same way, Kristiina’s brothers and father do not express their strongest feelings and if they do, they try to hide their feelings under embarrassed laughter. For Kristiina’s father, the strongest feelings for Karelia were experienced years ago and what was left today, is the joy he felt at being fit enough to travel to Kurkijoki at the age of 85 and being accompanied by all his children. He was unable to say or write anything himself but his wife interpreted his feelings in her diary: “Matti has had plenty of memories to share with the children. Tomorrow we will leave Kurkijoki with mournful feelings. For Matti and me, this may be our last visit here.”

Writers often use humour to break or violate silences; humour has been widely used as a coping strategy in horrible, difficult or stressful situations. (Lefcourt 2001; Watson 2008: 90-91; Winter 2010b) Humour can also reveal silences and difficult issues that are hidden behind laughter and jokes. This happened also during Kristiina’s fieldwork trip. A couple of her family members did not want to share their experiences by writing a diary, and one of them made the whole idea look ridiculous by only writing down jokes in his diary. Yet, this way he also showed that some things were more important to him than others. Every time he picked up the diary from his pocket and joked about it, Kristiina knew that the place or the thing that happened at that specific moment was important to him, even though he did not want to write it down.

The people who have once lived in Kurkijoki most certainly have bad memories, or things they want to forget. Yet during the trips, people very rarely talk about these difficult memories. If they are asked about these issues, the answer most certainly is: “Well, that is something I cannot remember.” In many of these occasions, bodily reactions reveal that people are in fact remembering something, contrary to what they say: they turn away, their eyes start wandering, they change the subject of conversation, or even pretend not to have heard the question. During their pilgrimages, people tend not to remember old difficulties. On the contrary, the old life back in Karelia is viewed nostalgically as something totally good, without any everyday conflicts or difficulties.

For Kristiina’s family, the trip to Kurkijoki was about shared roots, and the family felt greater togetherness than ever during the trip. Yet, the actual place, Kurkijoki, even
though particularly important for Kristiina’s father, remained somewhat emotionally
distant to Kristiina. She wrote down in her fieldwork diary: “The landscape in Kurkijoki
is beautiful, but the place does not feel my own.” On the other hand, Kristiina’s sister
wrote that “I enjoyed a lot sitting at Ristkallio cliff and imagining how father played
there as a child while granny was walking nearby in her long skirt. I must say that
tears came out of my eyes. Father gets 10 points for telling us all the history.” It was
important for the whole family to see in a very concrete manner what the place the
old relatives talked so much about was like. Those members who still remember the
old relatives will most certainly start reviving their own memories about them. This
example shows that people’s socio-spatial identification is not one coherent narrative
but a constantly changing one. The question of family roots can in fact become more
important in a displacement situation as it would otherwise be. An equally important
notion is that the years of social silence have created national narrations that differ from
the personal social and spatial identifications. Also many issues still continue to remain
silenced, hidden and forgotten for several reasons: some due to family histories, others
due to the national narratives of Finnish wartime.

Conclusions

The rituals of remembering include both oral narrations and bodily performances. The
body in ritual behaviour can be seen as a subject, an object and a tool in representatio-
nal strategies. Often, the body may reveal more of identity politics than an exclusive
focus on the oral narration of the same issue. In our case study, we argued that it is
exactly the combination of body-centred practices and verbal communication that is
required in order to understand the complexities of the socio-spatial belonging and the
rituals of remembering the ceded home place. Therefore, we studied very closely the
rituals and sites of remembering.

This approach enables developing the fieldwork of silence. In our approach, we
applied observations, diaries, interviews and photography to catch the visual, oral
and performative. The fieldwork revealed that silences in particular are illustrated
in various ways. Therefore, the role and position of the researcher must be carefully
considered. Rituals that expressed the communal values, meanings and beliefs exposed
communal and individual silences that can have a crucial meaning in understanding
peoples’ identity. A close observation of ritualistic behaviour made the articulation
of these silences visible. Our research approach on emotional silences and ritual
behaviour among ceded communities might also benefit from, video-taping the rituals
by thus providing new insights into bodily reactions otherwise possibly left unnoticed.
In our case, however, we decided not to use the video camera for two reasons: first,
our aim in the fieldwork was to create as little confusion as possible among Kristiina’s
family members and co-travellers, and, second, the video-recording might have caused
changes in the actual ritual practices and ruined the commemorative practices. In such
a case, the chance to catch the varied silences would have been rather poor.
A sense of belonging is built on memories of the past and present-day experiences. If one is missing, the sense of belonging is not complete and a sense of placelessness defines the socio-spatial identification. The travels of those Finnish Karelians who were displaced in 1944 to their old home districts have served both as a way to construct present-day experiences and a sense of belonging to the place once lost. Current local Russian residents of Karelia, however, lack the history of the place and are searching for it. The dichotomised and exclusive understanding of the history, strict separation of “us” and “other”, and stereotyping are common features of borderland mentality. To overcome this kind of historical “siege mentality”, requires more everyday encounters with us and them (cf. Kuusisto-Arponen 2003). As the ritual trips to the ceded home place illustrate, meeting the other is actually empowering rather than offensive or frustrating. These trips often release personal memories and feelings that have been unspoken and unperformed for many decades. Moreover, the awareness of equally complex place relations among the other community creates a possibility to reach across the boundaries of mistrust created by the war years. We argue that the banal approach – in other words, the appreciation of the everyday emotions and ties of belonging – to collective identity politics of displaced communities should focus on the multilayered histories and cultural contexts. It should also be inclusive of the bodily memories that constitute the sense of place and belonging. This way it would be possible to create space for multivocal emotions that often continue to remain subdued by the national hegemonic narratives of the Finno-Russian relations and particularly the distinct war histories that created this borderland context.

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The Yugoslav communists and the construction of a usable past out of the history of the inter-Yugoslav massacres of the Second World War

Tea Sindbæk

This chapter investigates how the Yugoslav communist regime coped with – or maybe rather attempted to cope with – the immensely complex and painful history of the internal Yugoslav massacres committed during the Second World War. Under the chapter heading “The bloody cloth of Krajina” (or, alternatively, “The bloody dress of Krajina”), some of these massacres, committed by Yugoslav armed forces against civilians in the region of Krajina, along the border between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, are described in the memoirs of a high-ranking Yugoslav communist, Vladimir Dedijer, published in in 1945. Elsewhere in his memoirs, Dedijer describes other massacres committed in various Yugoslav regions during the war. Dedijer’s memoirs and similar writings from other Yugoslav communist leaders show how the history of these massacres was narrated and defined from the very top of the Yugoslav Communist Party. In

105 The title could also be translated as “The bloody dress of Krajina” or “Krajina, Bloody Dress” (Dedijer 1945: 230)
this chapter I seek to demonstrate what kind of memory of these massacres the communists encouraged and, as part of this, how they envisaged reconciliation. In other words: how did they attempt to come to terms with what we may expect to be traumatizing elements of the Second World War in Yugoslavia?

In the following, I will introduce a handful of examples of how the Yugoslav communist regime represented the wartime massacres. The aim is to exemplify and discuss how the representations of massacres relate to the questions of memory, trauma and reconciliation. Firstly, I will briefly sketch the main patterns of the massacres committed by Yugoslavs against Yugoslavs during the Second World War.

Second World War massacres in Yugoslavia

The Second World War in Yugoslavia was as much a civil war as it was a war of occupation and liberation. Various Yugoslav groups, divided along political, national and regional lines, fought against the Axis occupiers, and they fought each other. Persecution, war crimes and large-scale massacres of civilians were perpetrated by the occupiers, but also by Yugoslav forces (Tomasevich 1969; Pavlowitch 2008).

The Second World War reached Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941, when Nazi Germany bombed Belgrade and several Yugoslav airports. Yugoslavia was invaded by Germany and its Axis allies. The badly prepared Yugoslav army was unable to resist the forceful attack, and on 17 April an armistice, which was in fact an unconditional Yugoslav surrender, was signed in Belgrade. Yugoslavia was disintegrated, and its parts were given to different Axis allies to control, either directly or via Yugoslav puppet regimes. Serbia was occupied by Germany and a quisling government was established headed from late August 1941 by the pro-German general Milan Nedić, who possessed very little real power.

Most of Croatia and Bosnia was under the chaotic and feeble control of the Croatian fascist Ustasha movement, installed in power in April 1941 by the German and Italian occupiers to do their bidding. The Ustasha cooperated in the Nazi genocide of Jews and Roma. On its own initiative it conducted a genocidal campaign against Serbs. It is estimated that several hundred thousand Serbs were murdered in concentration camps, village massacres and round-ups. The Ustasha also terrorized and killed real or suspected opponents of their regime (Jelić-Butić 1978: 158–187; Tomasevich 2001: 335-415; Dulić 2006).

The Partisans, headed by General Secretary of the communist party Josip Broz Tito, and the conservative and royalist Serbian nationalist Chetniks under the formal leadership of a colonel in the royal Yugoslav army, Dragoljub ‘Draža’ Mihailović, both initially fought the Axis occupation forces and the Ustasha. Attempts at cooperation between Partisans and Chetniks at the beginning of the war foundered, as both their strategies and long-term political aims were incompatible. Soon they engaged in a civil war that was to decide which political system would characterize a Yugoslavia after the war. Chetnik forces carried out terror actions and massacres in supposedly pro-
communist villages. And, partly in retaliation for Ustasha crimes, they massacred tens of thousands of civilian Croats and Muslims, attacking Muslim villages especially in Herzegovina and Eastern Bosnia (Dedijer & Miletić 1990a; Redžić 2005: 124–151; Dulić 2006: 194–215; Tomasevich 1975: 256–261). Partisan units terrorized and murdered suspected Chetnik sympathizers. During the early phase of the war, as part of a radical programme of socialist revolution, Partisan brigades also persecuted and murdered what they saw as class enemies or ‘kulaks’ (Hurem 1972: 142-162; Redžić 2005: 210–216; Djilas 1977: 147–156). As the radically revolutionary line alienated large parts of the Yugoslav population, the communist leadership downplayed its revolutionary zeal and increasingly promoted an ethnically tolerant, all-Yugoslav patriotic liberation struggle. This line proved far more appealing and gave the Partisans a larger recruitment base than the Chetniks. In 1943 the Allies started to support the Partisans as well as the Chetniks, and when Italy surrendered, large parts of both territory and weaponry went to the Partisans, significantly strengthening their position. Whereas most fighting until then had taken place in Bosnia and Croatia, in the autumn of 1944 the Partisans moved into Serbia and, with some assistance from the Red Army, conquered Belgrade in October. They were then well on their way to winning the war in Yugoslavia, pursuing the retreating Axis forces out of the country. At the end of the war, the victorious communist-led Partisan army settled accounts with their enemies by murdering, it is assumed, tens of thousands of surrendered Ustasha, Chetnik and other anti-Partisan forces in massacres, prison camps and during forced marches (Žerjavić 1992: 77-79).

The brutality of the warfare in Yugoslavia as well as the genocidal practices by both the occupiers and Yugoslavs resulted in a very high number of casualties. Based on demographic analyses, it is now estimated that around one million people were killed during the Second World War in Yugoslavia. More than half of these are thought to have been civilians (Bogosavljević 2000; Kočović 1985; Žerjavić 1992).

According to Cathy Caruth, trauma is a pathological condition, not of falsehood or displacement of meaning, but of history itself. She suggests that “The traumatized ... carry an impossible history within them, or they become themselves the symptom of a history that they cannot entirely possess” (Caruth 1995: 5). History in such cases becomes too large, unbearable and painful. I would not want to argue that we can transfer the psychological pathology of trauma directly to history on a societal level, but to a certain extent societies may be said to “carry an impossible history”, or, to use Charles Maier’s famous phrase, an “unmasterable past” (Maier 1988).

The Second World War in Yugoslavia, I would suggest, carried a significant potential to become traumatic history – on the personal level of the individuals who suffered immensely in this complex and brutal conflict, of course, but also on a social or societal level. Besides being potentially traumatic, a history of large-scale internal and inter-ethnic massacres, such as those committed during the Second World War in Yugoslavia, must be deeply problematic for the reconstruction of a multi-ethnic state. Such a history carries within it the potential to destabilize both the state itself and fragile inter-ethnic relations. So, how did the Yugoslav communist regime cope – or attempt to cope,
Titoist Second World War history

Having won both the war for national liberation and the internal war for political power, the Yugoslav communists moved swiftly to consolidate their position and begin the construction of the socialist society they had fought for. The political aims of the Yugoslav communists were similar to those of the Soviet Stalinists, whom they idolized. Early post-war Yugoslavia was a highly centralized police state, with an oppressive political security apparatus which ensured that all opposition was silenced (Pavlowitz 1971: 175–187; Lampe 2000: 233–240). A cult of leadership was constructed around Tito and the Communist Party, drawing heavily on the increasingly mythologized history of the Partisans’ “National Liberation Struggle” (Höpken 1994).

Having secured their position and established hegemony over public communication, the Yugoslav communists were in a position to dictate their own preferred version of recent history and public memory. The history of the Second World War in Yugoslavia was particularly important, and its image was guarded and cultivated. In the first decades after the war, accounts of the Partisans’ heroic National Liberation Struggle were the property of Partisan veterans, and much of the material published consisted of personal memoirs (Höpken 1994: 204; Dimić 1996: 201-203; Gross 1996: 239–241). The authors of one of the earliest historical overviews of the war, first published in 1952, plainly stated that only the Communist Party of Yugoslavia could describe this history fully and accurately (Čubelić & Milostić 1963: 5). Under the supervision of the Communist Party’s Department of Agitation and Propaganda, a simplistic Manichaean image of the war was forged, one stressing a joint heroic and patriotic struggle of all the Yugoslav peoples, headed by the formidable communist leadership, against their evil opponents; the prime enemy by far being the Germans, supported by their Axis allies and Yugoslav traitors and collaborators.

This version largely ignored the significant variation in support for the National Liberation Struggle among the Yugoslav peoples. The purpose of this was not only to consolidate communist power, but also to strengthen post-war national equality. This insistence on national equality or symmetry in the contribution to the Partisan war was, according to several historians, one of the fundamental principles in Tito’s Yugoslavia (Marković 2001: 154; Djilas 1991: 162). In spite of a certain loosening of the dogmatic policy and ideological changes over time, this black-and-white narrative of the National Liberation Struggle against the Germans and their collaborators was to remain the central theme of Yugoslav historiography until the 1980s (Lampe 2000: 236–237).

How did this narrative include the history of the internal Yugoslav massacres? In spite of its painful and potentially destabilizing and traumatic content, the history of the massacres was fairly widely present among the Yugoslav public in the immediate
post-war years. It was certainly not the main theme of history writing on the Partisan war, which tended to focus on the heroic and superhuman efforts of the Partisans and on the war’s strategic developments. But the history of massacres was present: in general presentations, as a well-known part of the background of the warfare, and in more specific works such as reports and studies of war crimes. Also war memoirs, poetry and other literature contained detailed descriptions of massacres (Sindbæk 2011: chapters 3–5).

In the following, I will quote a handful of examples of these descriptions and attempts to explain the wartime massacres. As the communists in Yugoslavia were modelling their state after the Soviet Union, with a Stalinist-style security and propaganda apparatus, any publication of these issues was completely in their control and would not have happened without their blessing. Yet the examples have also been selected with the aim of emphasizing how much the image of wartime history was styled at the top of the Communist Party. Furthermore, I have favoured representations that have been widespread and influential.

Titoist representations of the massacres

At the 5th Yugoslav Party Congress in the summer of 1948, just after the Cominform had banned the Yugoslav communists from the international communist community, the General Secretary of the Yugoslav Communist Party and Supreme Commander of the Partisan warfare, Josip Broz Tito, gave an 8-hour speech, or ‘report’, in which he endeavoured to explain the Party’s course and history to its members. The Partisan war took up a very substantial part of the report.

Through the 75 pages of the report concerned with the period of the Second World War, massacres and other war crimes are regularly mentioned as part of a general and well-known background to the Partisan warfare. But only a few times are they discussed over more than one sentence. Explaining the beginning of the war, Tito states:

When the Ustashe started already in the month of May to commit mass slaughtering of Serbian citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Lika and Kordun, and the people started to flee into hills and forests to save their lives, the Party sent its staff to take the lead of this unfortunate people, in order to resist the bestial Ustasha mass murderers (Tito 1951: 187–188).

Clearly, mass slaughter and mass murder are referred to; there is no ignoring the awful events. The culprits are pointed out as the Ustasha, and the victims, Serbs, are identified by ethnicity. They flee to save their lives, but luckily the communists come to the rescue.

Later, when discussing the so-called “first enemy offensive” in the autumn of 1941, Tito says:
See, such a criminal gang burnt, killed, and plundered in the month of September in the peaceful
villages of Mačva and in Pocerina: Ustashas, Nedić’s people, Ljotić’s people, Pećanac’s Chetniks – all
these bandits together with the German fascist beasts committed this terrible cruelty on the peaceful
citizens of Mačva, Pocerina and Jadar. Eight hundred and sixty Serbian peasants, women, children,
and old people, who were found killed in the valley of Jadar, were strewn with flour to make the swi-
ne eat them. They were victims of an organized bestial gang, made up of German, Ustasha, Nedić’s,
Ljotić’s, and Pećanac’s bandits. … But in spite of this cooperation of German, Serbian and Croatian
degenerates, in this offensive they did not succeed in defeating the heroic partisans (Tito 1951: 211).

Again the crimes are described, not in detail, but well enough to let us know that the
massacres were aimed at all Serbs, and that the perpetrators acted disrespectfully
towards the corpses. The culprits are bundled together; they make up a bestial gang of
degenerate Germans, Serbs and Croats (Ljotić’s and Pećanac’s forces were paramilitary
groups that served Nedić’s quisling administration in Nazi-occupied Serbia). There is
hardly any differentiation between the Yugoslav collaborators – they are all traitors, all
committing atrocities – and none of the Yugoslav collaborators are essentially worse
than the others. This lack of distinction between the different groups of culprits has
also been pointed out by Ljubodrag Dimić as one of the fundamental characteristics
of Titoist representations of Second World War massacres (Dimić 1996: 203-205). It
obviously helped to balance guilt and avoid apportioning different degrees of blame to
different groups – or different nationalities.

Tito’s report thus produced a simplified picture of the warring parties, with the
‘heroic partisans’ on the good side together with the unfortunate people, and an almost
undifferentiated group of ‘occupiers’, ‘quislings’ and ‘collaborators’ on the bad side.
In Tito’s report, as well as in other presentations, the descriptions of massacres served
to emphasize the bestial character of the Partisans’ opponents, and thereby to underline
the saviour role of the communists and Partisans and the greatness and necessity of the
Partisan warfare and victory.

Tito’s report provided an overall framework for how the Yugoslav war and revolution,
and as part of this the history of wartime massacres, were to be understood. Indeed, it
retained its status as a main reference for the following decades of history writing on
these subjects (Banac 1992: 1085–1086).

Elsewhere, however, the massacres were described in much more detail.

‘The bloody cloth of Krajina’ – massacres in memoir literature

Immediately after the war, high-ranking Partisans published memoirs of the war years.
While these were of course personal accounts, they also served as official memories
of Partisan warfare, and were regarded as significant and authentic contributions to the
history of the war (Novak 1948). The most influential diaries, among them those of
Vladimir Dedijer and Rodoljub Čolaković, were reprinted numerous times throughout
the communist period.
During the war, Vladimir Dedijer, who was a journalist by profession, stayed with the supreme staff of the Partisan army, recording in his diary large and small daily events and developments within the Partisan movement. His work was encouraged by Tito, and the diary was published immediately after the war. It thus constitutes an official inside account of the Partisan warfare from the view of the supreme staff. It was reprinted several times, in a shorter edition in 1951 and in its full length in 1970 and 1981.

In Dedijer’s wartime diary, massacres and war crimes are regularly recorded, in detail and in touching prose. The chapter entitled “The bloody cloth of Krajina” recounts events in the Krajina region in July–August 1942 and contains several descriptions of Ustashe slaughtering of Serbs and to the praxis of throwing corpses and living people into deep natural pits (Dedijer 1945: 230ff.). Included in this chapter is an emotional account by Milovan Djilas, Tito’s close associate and member of the very top echelon of the Yugoslav Communist Party. Djilas describes his visit to the village of Urije shortly after an Ustash attack and massacre:

We continued down the road, hedges of ferns and hazels on both sides, and, at once, in the middle of the road, I don’t remember the exact number, ten or twelve bodies. It seemed to me, just two middle-aged men. The rest were women, girls, boys, little children. Three or four steps from this pile of blood and flesh – an empty cradle, without napkin, without child, with the hay still damp from the child’s urine. This hay in the cradle seemed as if it was still warm from the child’s body. The child lay in the pile of bodies … What had killed this child? Maybe a bullet, maybe a rifle but, maybe a stone or maybe the infant’s head had been sufficiently soft for a hobnailed Ustasha boot? (Dedijer 1945: 237–238).

It does not say here that the victims were Serbs, but does so elsewhere in the text. Djilas further recounts how he walked through the village, from one house to another, all filled with blood and dead bodies. As Djilas was then one of Tito’s most trusted lieutenants, his account represents a wartime testimony from the very top of the Partisans’ communist leadership.

Ustasha massacres in eastern Bosnia were described in the wartime memoirs of Rodoljub Čolaković, Political Commissary of the Partisans’ General Staff in Bosnia, and later minister and president in the Bosnian Republic in Yugoslavia. Čolaković’s war memoirs were first published in Sarajevo in 1946 and thereafter reprinted repeatedly throughout the communist period, both as excerpts and in their full length. In the autumn of 1941, according to the memoirs, Čolaković was travelling from Serbia to the headquarters in eastern Bosnia. One morning he talked to an old lady, whose three sons had been murdered, and Čolaković recounts the incident, which he had also heard about in a café the evening before:

Just a few hundred metres away was the local warehouse, in which the Ustashe had slaughtered about one hundred Serbian peasants from the surrounding villages. They had led them here, locked them in the loft and then one by one to “interrogation”. In one part of the warehouse was a large barrel. They led the victim there, cut his throat, and collected the blood in the barrel. Before the slaughter, the Ustashe chopped off the nose or mouth of some victims, on some they crushed an arm or a leg (Čolaković 1956: 309-310).
What characterizes the Ustashe in Čolaković’ account is their senseless anti-Serbianism and their lust for blood. There is no attempt to downplay the ethnic element of this violence.

Elsewhere, Čolaković mentions local ethnic violence, mainly by Chetniks against Muslims, and that mutual hostility among the peasants led to reciprocal attacks on Serbian and Muslim villages (Čolaković 1956: 314).

Dedijer’s diary also contains descriptions of Chetnik massacres of Muslims in eastern Bosnia. In late January 1942, when the supreme staff of the Partisan movement was near Foča, which had recently been taken over from the Chetniks, Dedijer describes the scene he met:

Today I walked next to the Drina. Clear, icy. I watched the rocks. Some people stood at the edge of the bank. One cried: ‘That is Ibro’. Corpses in the water – one, two, three … on the bank lay one – like a statue of wax in the Museum of Madame Tussaud. It threw its head back. That was Muslim families who buried the victims of the Chetniks. The tailor tells me that they slaughtered 86 people in one night! (Dedijer 1970: 90).

Again in Dedijer’s text there is horrible graphic detail in the description, and again we are talking about civilian victims, clearly defined ethnically, and a clearly identified perpetrator. Other massacres of Muslims and Serbs, including some in Herzegovina, are described in similar ways in Dedijer’s diary (Dedijer 1970: 78–88).

What these quotes show is that the communist regime was remarkably outspoken about the inter-Yugoslav massacres of the war. The ones they did not mention are, of course, those committed by the Partisans themselves.

In their descriptions of massacres, Čolakvić and Dedijer even admit that the Yugoslav peasant population somehow took part in them. The ethnic element of the conflict is clearly recognized – it is repeatedly pointed out that war crimes were aimed at specific ethnic groups. The perpetrators, however, are always identified as one of the Yugoslav warring factions, limited and often politically defined units. They are not associated with the Yugoslav peoples as such.

I argue, therefore, that the potentially traumatic elements of Yugoslavia’s Second World War history were generally revealed and out in the open – or most of them, at least. So how could the Yugoslav communists explain these bestial events and still insist that a multi-ethnic Yugoslavia was viable; indeed, a Yugoslavia based on ‘Brotherhood and Unity’? How could these accounts of massacres contribute to a usable memory of the great Partisan war?

This leads us to the issue of guilt and reconciliation. The communists dealt with this swiftly and rather instrumentally.
Guilt and Reconciliation

In Tito’s speeches, the planning and responsibility for war crimes were ascribed to foreign occupiers and internal, now dead, traitors and enemies. The single most important enemy and aggressor in Tito’s accounts were the Germans. By presenting the war in this way, Tito laid the basis for a narrative that could rally all Yugoslav peoples together against external enemies.

According to Tito, it had been a strategy of the invaders and their domestic collaborators, by use of massacres and war crimes, to tear the Yugoslav peoples apart by inciting bloody internal conflicts between them. At his first public speech held in Zagreb after the war, on 21 May 1945, Tito said:

Did you see how the German conqueror that terrible year of 1941 with the help of his servant Pavelić, and with the help of the traitors of the Serbian people, Nedić and Mihailović, and the traitor of the Slovene people, Rupnik, did everything to deepen the chasm not only between the Croatian and Serbian peoples, but also between all the peoples of Yugoslavia? (Tito 1948: 13).

Thus, according to Tito, the inter-Yugoslav warfare and massacres were mainly caused by the occupiers and their strategies, and Yugoslav traitors had only been the tools used to realize these strategies.

By laying all responsibility on the occupiers, it was possible to externalize the guilt for war crimes and thus remove responsibility from the Yugoslav peoples. Tito repeatedly emphasized that the Yugoslav peoples were indeed innocent of the crimes. Speaking at a public gathering in Serbia on 7 July 1945, Tito praised the Serbian Partisans and stressed how they were “true bearers of unity and brotherhood”. Though during the war the occupiers attempted to place responsibility for the slaughtering of Serbs in Croatia on innocent Croats, the Partisans, according to Tito, felt no hatred towards them:

For them it was obvious that the Croatian people were not guilty because the Ustasha criminals committed such crimes, that the Slovenian people were not guilty for what the domobran criminals did, that the Serbian people were not guilty for the crimes of various criminals belonging to Nedić or Draža (Tito 1948: 72).

In effect, war guilt was not attached to the peoples, only to the Yugoslav traitors and collaborators. These traitors were often mentioned en masse, as a common unity, probably with the aim of underlining that they should be seen as a similar phenomenon, and that every nation had its share. Guilt was thereby both externalized and distributed equally according to a Yugoslav national balance.

To further remove causes for regret and mutual incrimination, Tito claimed that all these traitors had received their punishment and were now dead or, very few of them, had fled. Thus, according to Tito, the internal enemies and collaborators were now “a matter of the past” and should no longer be worried about (Tito 1948: 23). This also meant that there would be no further reasons to discuss guilt and responsibility among the Yugoslav peoples.
Retribution

Having attributed all the guilt of war crimes and massacres to the enemies of the Partisans, and thereby, according to the communist representation, to the enemies of the people, the new Yugoslav regime still endeavoured to publicly settle accounts with their wartime opponents. While most representatives of these parties had either fled or been annihilated by the Partisan army at the end of the war, in the immediate post-war years regime soldiers still pursued remaining Ustasha and Chetnik units, and representatives of the Catholic clergy were put on trial for collaboration with the Ustashe and participation in mass killing and other war crimes.

In 1946, however, two major trials were held against Chetnik leader Draža Mihailović and the Archbishop of Zagreb, Alojzije Stepinac. These trials were certainly intended, at least partly, as public statements. In the courts, wartime massacres were represented and referred to partly for specific political purposes.

From 10 June to 15 July 1946, Draža Mihailović was tried together with 23 other “traitors and war criminals” with connections to the Chetnik movement. The indictment against Mihailović personally consisted of 47 counts, holding him responsible for the actions of Chetnik units throughout Yugoslavia, including the so-called legalized Chetnik units under Serbia’s collaborative Nedić administration. The greatest focus and by far the largest part of the indictment (counts 1-40) concentrated on collaboration, betrayal, attacks on Partisans and their supporters, and other anti-Partisan activities of the Chetniks. Yet some particular counts (41–47) concerned Chetnik war crimes (Anon. 1946a).

Most of the mentioned victims of these war crimes were Partisans, but the indictment also contained several accusations of murder and large-scale massacres of Muslims and Croats. Sometimes bestial details were included, as in this short description of a series of massacres in Dalmatia: “In September 1942, the Chetniks of Petar Baćović killed 900 Croats in Makarska, skinned several Catholic priests alive and set fire to 17 villages” (Anon. 1946a: 56). Massacres of thousands of Muslims, particularly in East Bosnia, were also described. Some instances of the mass murder of up to thousands of civilians were recounted without stating the ethnicity of the victims – most probably Muslims in these cases (Anon. 1946a: 57). The accused were all sentenced to death. The summation and verdict of the trial largely repeated the text of the indictment; again focus was on the collaboration with the occupiers and anti-Partisan activity of the Chetniks, while war crimes were included in a separate, minor, chapter.

Significant efforts were made for the trial of Draža Mihailović and the other Chetnik leaders to reach the public domain. According to the official records, approximately 100 journalists were present, many from foreign countries, and the trial’s proceedings were broadcast by Radio Belgrade (Anon. 1946: 9). This all testifies to the intention on the part of the communists to stigmatize Mihailović as a national traitor in the widest possible sphere, inside as well as outside Yugoslavia. The inclusion of Chetnik war crimes in this widely publicized trial demonstrates again that the regime had no qualms about addressing these issues in public, as long as they were connected to traitors and
enemies of the Partisans. In fact, the accounts of the massacres could be used by the communists to emphasize the brutal and criminal character of the Chetnik movement and thus further glorify the Partisans’ victory over these brutes, while at the same time delegitimizing Chetnik ideology as a possible alternative. A similar line was followed in a collection of *Documents about Draža Mihailović’ betrayal*, published by the Yugoslav “State commission for ascertaining crimes of the occupiers and their helpers” as early as 1945 (Državna Komisija 1945).

A few months after the Mihailović case, on 9 September 1946, another trial, also much publicized, began in Zagreb against Erih Lisak, a prominent Ustasha official and police chief, Pavao Gulin, leader of the Slovene legion of Chetniks, and a number of Catholic priests and friars, some of them members of the Archbishop’s administration in Zagreb. Lisak was accused of mass murder and, together with the others, convicted of organizing a conspiracy to overthrow the new regime. The prosecutor’s questions, according to Stella Alexander, were designed to point suspicion towards Zagreb’s Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac (Alexander 1987: 141). On 18 September, the trial was interrupted and Stepinac was arrested the same day.

The trial resumed on the 28th, now with Stepinac among the indicted, accused of collaborating with and supporting the Ustasha regime, cooperating in the forceful conversion of tens of thousands of Serbs, and participating in the conspiracy orchestrated by Lisak and others. Among the numerous witnesses for the prosecution, Serbian villagers gave gruesome testimonies of forced mass conversion (Alexander 1987: 166, 141). On 11 October, Stepinac was declared guilty and sentenced to 16 years’ hard labour. Lisak and Gulin were sentenced to death. Most of the remaining indicted received prison sentences; two were found not guilty.

That this trial, like the one of Mihailović, was to a large extent intended as a public event is clear from the fact that extracts and reports were published in great detail in several Yugoslav newspapers, and that an official account of the trial’s proceedings was published shortly after the verdicts were given (Anon. 1946b; Alexander 1987: 148).

The trial against the Archbishop of Zagreb followed a period of growing tension between the communist regime and the Catholic Church, which tended to criticize the new government harsher than they ever had the Ustashe, at least in public. At the trials of Lisak and Stepinac, the highest level of the Church was linked to the Ustashe and their terror regime, and the Church was held responsible for parts of the Ustasha crimes, the forced mass conversions in particular.

The communists’ retribution politics often hit priests and friars with some evident reason, but there is hardly any doubt that the trial of Stepinac was also an official statement against the Catholic Church, aimed at de-legitimizing a major ideological enemy of the communists. Reminding the public about Ustasha massacres, war crimes and forced conversions, and pointing out Catholic involvement and co-responsibility, supplied the communist regime with strong moral arguments in their case against the Catholic Church. Similar arguments were made in a collection of “Documents about the work and crimes against the people by one part of the Catholic clergy”, published the same year (Anon. 1946c: 54, 66, 124–180).
As well as calling central figures to account for the crimes of the war, there is little
doubt that these trials of representatives of the Chetnik, Catholic and Ustasha lead-
erships were also planned as great public showdowns with the main enemies of the
communists. The trials highlighted and confirmed the official version of the history of
the war. Though war crimes and massacres received far less attention than the issues of
national betrayal and anti-Partisan activity, they were openly included and described in
the testimonies and accounts of the trials.

The memory strategy of the Yugoslav communists

What do these quotes tell us about the strategy behind the Yugoslav communists’ at-
tempt to cope with the traumatic and unmasterable parts of the history of their Second
World War?

First of all, it is clear that they never attempted to deny or silence the inter-Yugoslav
massacres – considering the scale of them, that would probably hardly have been
possible, and it would definitely have left the communists’ version of history less
credible. The only crimes that were hardly ever mentioned, only to return in the early
1990s, were the massacres committed by the Partisans against their enemies at the end
of the war.

Rather, the communists aimed to include the history of massacres as a usable element
of the general official memory of their Second World War as a great and heroic Partisan
War.

Ascribing blame and responsibility for the massacres to the occupiers and to
collaborators and traitors of the Yugoslav peoples, the Yugoslav communists aimed
to externalize guilt completely from the Yugoslav peoples. Instead, it was to be
seen as a victory that the Yugoslav peoples did not allow themselves to be split, and
that they did not blame each other for the war crimes. Furthermore, descriptions of
massacres served to stigmatize the Partisans’ opponents and thereby underline the
heroism and righteousness of the Partisan movement. Indeed, the newly established
communist regime, while prosecuting perpetrators of war crimes, also managed to use
retribution policies to eliminate their wartime opponents. Prosecuting and sentencing
the communists’ wartime enemies for national betrayal and war crimes at large, widely
broadcast trials served both to ensure that these crimes were officially punished and to
publicly criminalize, and thus also delegitimize, regime enemies and their ideologies.

Thus, one might say, the strategy for a usable memory combined the recognition
of crime and suffering with the removal of guilt and blame, which were passed on to
common external (now eliminated) enemies. At the same time, the overall focus of
wartime history would be on shared, communist-led Yugoslav heroism.

Needless to say, this image of the war was at once oversimplified, manipulated
and false. Though the internal Yugoslav war had been fought largely between peasant
populations supporting different war parties – some of them promoting violent
nationalism – in the communist version of war history, national hatred was blamed
on the foreign invaders, the ruling class and the bourgeoisie in general, and not on the Yugoslav working people. The communists’ narrative thus downplayed the ethnic and national ideologies that had been important elements of the wartime reality and the essential motivation for many participants; it backgrounded the fact that national politics and warfare to a large extent involved Yugoslavia’s peasant masses, who were pardoned in the official memory of the war; it kept silent about crimes committed by the Partisans and did not allow room for the chaotic and complex wartime reality.

This version of Yugoslavia’s Second World War history was to remain unchallenged for decades to come. In the immediate years after the war, Yugoslavia’s new communist regime had secured itself a near total hegemony over public discourse. Though alternative voices and versions of wartime history inevitably existed, there was very little room for them to be expressed publicly. In particular, interpretations of the recent past were carefully supervised by the communists. Teaching, publication and public representations of recent history were guarded and guided through historical commissions, associations and Party research institutions (Stanković & Dimić 1996: 239-240). At times, when tensions ran high or sensitive issues were on the agenda, the Communist Party elite intervened directly in history debates (Marković 2001: 154-155).

While public discourse was well-controlled, there is no way of knowing what people discussed behind closed doors. The issue of Second World War massacres was certainly discussed among Yugoslav émigré communities, and books presenting alternative perspectives on the wartime history were published in such circles (e.g. Nikolić 1963; Nikolić 1976). In 1977, Milovan Djilas, the former top communist turned dissident, touched upon some of the problematic aspects of Partisan warfare in his memoirs, which were published in English outside Yugoslavia (Djilas 1977). As a result of the opening of Yugoslavia’s borders from the early 1960s and the abolishment of tourist visas in 1967, such émigré publications may well have been imported to Yugoslavia – but were hardly mentioned in public debate.

Indeed, the major narrative framework of the Partisan war remained largely unchanged until the 1980s. Yet within historians’ circles and in the relationship between the historians’ environment and society, important changes took place, which again influenced the ways in which war history was researched, communicated and commemorated.

Changing perspectives on wartime history

During the 1960s and 1970s, the environment for Yugoslavia’s historians was significantly expanded. New generations of historians, with academic qualifications and theoretical and methodological training, populated the numerous research institutions that were established in all Yugoslavia’s republics and provinces (Gross 1966; Djordjević 1969). The growing field of historical research and education – as well as the continuing political decentralization that made the republics ever more powerful and self-suffi-
cient in relation to the Yugoslav federal centre – also led to the creation in each republic and province of substantial research environments dedicated primarily to the history of that particular republic or region (Roksandić 1983; Kačavenda 1984). As Yugoslavia’s republics and provinces were founded as essentially ethno-national units within the multinational federation, these research environments increasingly became ethno-nationally oriented, researching the history of that republic’s main national group.

These changes influenced representations of the war and the inter-Yugoslav massacres in several ways. In the 1960s and 1970s Yugoslav historiography repeatedly experienced fierce historical polemics across the borders of Yugoslavia’s federal republics, and Tito and the League of Communists more than once saw the need to intervene in debates condemning bourgeois nationalist tendencies (Marković 2001; Vucinich 1969: 277–281; Shoup 1968: 198-201; Petrović 1978). Nevertheless, in the 1970s Yugoslav authorities seemingly felt sufficiently safe in power to relax their firm hold of Second World War history. In 1972, on the occasion of his 80th official birthday, Tito personally admitted that the war had in fact also been an internal Yugoslav political conflict. He said: “It was ... a civil war. But we did not want to talk about that during the war, because it would not have been useful for us” (Politika 1972: 6; Pavlowitch 1988: 33, 132). By this statement, Tito appeared to signal that the strict narrative of war history could be cautiously explored and challenged. This contributed to opening new approaches to war history. The opening was certainly limited: a brave attempt by Rasim Hurem to explore the crisis of the Partisan movement in late 1941 and early 1942, including examples of revolutionary terror and violent class struggle, met with strong criticism and condemnation from the academic establishment (Hurem 1972; Kamberović 2006: 25-29). Nevertheless, during the 1970s excellent historical investigations, especially of the Ustashe and their politics, were carried out (Jelić-Butić 1978; Krizman 1978). Furthermore, two studies were published which focused explicitly on the inter-Yugoslav wartime massacres and referred to them as genocide – thus emphasizing the national aspects of the conflict (Božić et al. 1972; Ćolić 1973). In doing so, they anticipated what was to become a general tendency in the following decade.

From the early 1980s, Yugoslavia was troubled by severe political and economic crises. A drastic fall in living standards and the government’s obvious inability to find solutions led to decreasing trust in state and government. National clashes in the province of Kosovo brought national questions and grievances increasingly into the public sphere. Though the main political debates stayed within the framework of the League of Communists, the general atmosphere of crisis and instability was reflected culturally, as historiography, fictional literature and intellectual discourse increasingly uncovered dark sides of Yugoslavia’s twentieth-century history. Even Second World War history, the main myth of Yugoslavia’s communist regime, was subject to revisions (Ramet 1985; Banac 1992).

During the 1980s, Second World War massacres and the question of genocide became a dominant theme within the Serbian historians’ environment. In 1984, the Serbian Academy for Sciences and Arts (SANU) established a commission with the
aim to “collect material on genocide of the Serbian and other Yugoslav peoples in the 20th century” (SANU 1985: 188, 179).

Characteristic of the Serbian thematization of wartime massacres was its emphasis on genocide as an overlooked perspective within Yugoslav historiography and of national, primarily Serbian, victimization. Within the framework of SANU’s genocide committee, it was planned to publish 21 studies and source collections on cases of genocide committed mainly in Yugoslavia (Dedijer & Miletić 1990b: 8). By 1990, eleven large volumes had been published, of which only one, a collection of sources on genocide against Muslims in 1941–1945, did not have Serbs as the main victim category. At times it was even argued that Ustasha crimes had been deliberately silenced (Borović 1985: 7; Gligorijević 1988; Dedijer & Miletić 1990b: 8). What further characterized Serbian genocide historiography of the 1980s was the explicit linking of the horrible wartime past with the perspectives of the present. In 1986, in a reprint of a large study of Ustasha politics and massacres first published in 1948, the new introduction stated that “the dark forces that this book discusses are still alive” (Blažević 1986: vii).

The claim that massacres and other suffering during the Second World War were deliberately hidden does seem absurd, considering how detailed and how widely the horrors of the war had been described as far back as the 1940s, as documented earlier in this chapter. While elements of Second World War history were indeed silenced in communist Yugoslavia, Partisan war crimes being the most obvious example, it is difficult to argue that the crimes of the Ustashe, the Chetniks and other anti-Partisan forces were ever ignored or silenced. However, in contrast to the heroic narrative of the Partisan warfare, these crimes were not a main theme of Titoist representations of wartime Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the national politics that lay behind some of these massacres were neither emphasized nor thematized as genocide before the 1970s. Thus, to a certain extent, the issue of nationally motivated war crimes was indeed backgrounded in Yugoslav public discourse until the 1980s.

The focus on internal massacres and genocide fitted well into a broader iconoclastic intellectual culture of Yugoslavia in the 1980s. The crisis of Yugoslav communism also led to de-legitimization of Partisan history, which left more space for revising history. In turn, the loss of legitimacy of the communist version of wartime history paved the way for a gradual rejection of communist retribution policies, and rehabilitation of some of those national war parties hit by them. In the 1980s, Draža Mihailović was gradually recast as anti-fascist by some historians in Serbia, and in the 2000s his movement was completely rehabilitated (Ramet 2007: 49; Sindbæk 2009).

The 1980s’ establishment of national historians’ environments and the growing public focus on national confrontations and grievances inside Yugoslavia made the national

perspective on history acutely relevant. The nationalist political turn in Serbia from 1987 facilitated both the revision of history and the national approach to it. At the end of this decade, the increasingly frozen and polarized relationship between the representatives of Yugoslavia’s mainly nationally based republics, and the rise of nationalist leaderships in other republics also, meant that history disputes across republican and national borders often became suspicious or directly hostile. Thematization of the history of massacres and genocide during Yugoslavia’s Second World War was bound to stir strong emotions; and this even more so in an atmosphere of hostility among Yugoslavia’s nations. Yet the influence worked both ways – Yugoslavia’s disintegration, nationalist politics and warfare caused nationalism to completely penetrate historical culture, and history to be rewritten from purely nationalist perspectives.

Conclusion

Did the Yugoslav communists overcome the trauma, then? Did they succeed in mastering the impossible history?

A central problem of traumatic history seems to be that traumatic events cannot easily be recounted in a way that sufficiently recognizes the uniqueness and individuality of the experience; that the stories cannot be told in a way that does not become trivial, repetitive, yet another story of suffering. In essence, it is difficult for history writing to be sufficiently true to the events, and to do justice to the traumatic experience. By attempting to master their Second World War history so thoroughly, the Yugoslav communists did not leave much room for the individual traumatic experiences.

The fact is that the history of Second World War massacres came to dominate Yugoslav historiography and public discussions of history in the 1980s. The massacres also became essential elements of the reinterpretations and rewritings of history from the perspective of exclusive national victimization in the post-Yugoslav republics in the 1990s (Sindbæk forthcoming: chapters 8–10). While it is characteristic for trauma that events are involuntarily re-experienced, it is also a generic feature of history that events from the past must be reconsidered and re-examined.

From an academic historians’ perspective, a re-examination of the history of wartime massacres was highly relevant. When it took place from the late 1980s, a major problem was the lack of trust from the general public in communist historiography, which was seen as utterly biased and manipulated. This also meant that post-Second World War politics of retribution lost legitimacy, which paved the way for rehabilitation of ‘national heroes’, disregarding crimes they may have committed.

The Yugoslav communists probably did the right thing in exposing (at least most of) the history of the Second World War massacres. But they failed utterly in explaining their own history. They certainly caused damage by trying to master their history completely.
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Looking at the Past with Jorge Semprún

Literature or Life (1995): An Aesthetic Reflection on the Use of Memories

Alexandre Dessingué

Introduction

In the early 21st century, the work of Jorge Semprún (1923–2011) occupies an uncommon place, not only regarding the quantity of his novels or film scripts, but also regarding the quality of his work, which should be considered a real cultural heritage.

Semprún’s novels, and his work as a whole, have unique value, since they represent a privileged testimony of an historical witness deeply involved in the European history of the 20th century, during which the paroxysm of nationalism and populism have been reached. At the same time, his work provides an essential reflection on the understanding of many historical facts, and the uses of history and memory.

Before starting this analysis, I would like to recall briefly some central biographical aspects of Semprún’s life which are important for the understanding of the future comments and reflections.

107 Jorge Semprún wrote 18 books (novels, essays) and 14 film scripts.
As a child, Jorge Semprún was forced to flee the Franco regime in Spain with his family, and found refuge in the Netherlands before arriving in Paris. At the age of 18, he joined the French resistance and, two years later, in 1943, was taken prisoner by the Gestapo. He was then sent to Buchenwald concentration camp where he remained until the end of the war, attending regularly “his master”, the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, author of *On Collective Memory*, who died in Buchenwald in March 1945. Upon his return to Paris in August 1945, Semprún joined the resistance to the Franco regime through the Spanish Communist Party. In 1964, he was excluded for not following the “official party line”.

Semprún and his work cross the entire second half of the 20th century and introduce a logic of retention and protention, to use the terms of Husserl’s phenomenology. In other words, Semprún’s work is clearly situated in a perpetual tension: between a logic of representation or remembering of the past, and a logic of interpretation or understanding of the past:

Husserl uses the terms protentions and retentions for the intentionalities which anchor me to an environment. They do not run from a central I, but from my perceptual field itself, so to speak, which draws along in its wake its own horizon of retentions, and bites into the future with its protentions. I do not pass through a series of instances of now, the images of which I preserve and which, placed end to end, make a line. With the arrival of every moment, its predecessor undergoes a change: I still have it in hand and it is still there, but already it is sinking away below the level of presents; in order to retain it, I need to reach through a thin layer of time. It is still the preceding moment, and I have the power to rejoin it as it was just now; I am not cut off from it, but still it would not belong to the past unless something had altered, unless it were beginning to outline itself against, or project itself upon, my present, whereas a moment ago it was my present. When a third moment arrives, the second undergoes a new modification; from being a retention it becomes the retention of a retention, and the layer of time between it and me thickens. (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 60)

Six of Semprún’s novels are clearly linked to what Philippe Lejeune has called “the autobiographical pact”:

Questioning the meaning, the means, the scope of his actions, this is the first act of the autobiographer: the text often begins, not by the birth of the author but by the birth of speech, “the autobiographical pact.” (Lejeune 1975: 44)


The novel *Literature or Life*, which I will focus on in this study is, in my view, a model of its kind. It is both a story of memories and a story about memories, their

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108 Federico Sanchez is the pseudonym he used when he was in Spain during the Franco period.
109 I will refer to the Spanish or French titles when there is no English translation.
usefulness and their uselessness. By outsourcing, via an autobiographical fictional work, memories related to his commitment to the resistance during the Second World War, his experience of Buchenwald concentration camp, and his active involvement against the Franco regime and then against Stalinism, Semprún not only undertakes to report, but also tries to understand and explain. The tension between the retention and the protention of the past is, in my opinion, established in Semprún’s narrative through three main topics that I will discuss in the following: the circularity of time, a clear reflection on the objectivity of the language and, finally, an attempt to universalize “the own”.

The circularity of time

First, the representation of memory in Literature or Life could be defined as “chaotic”, both on a temporal and thematic level. Time is certainly not linear, and the narrative is not continuous.

During the very first lines of the novel, Semprún addresses the themes of the ‘look’ and the ‘mirror’: “They are facing me, eyes wide open, and suddenly I see a look of horror: their terror.” (EV: 13). The opening of the novel, in media res by definition, surprises the reader. The main character in the text, “me”, is mistaken for the narrator, who is also easily identifiable with as the author, as long as we “recognize” some contextual elements in the life of Semprún.

Although this equation “author = narrator = character” is obviously linked to “the autobiographical pact”, it surprisingly fails to identify the different characters involved in the text. Semprún is not immediately identifiable because he embodies, in these first lines of the novel, the archetype of the ‘returning experience’ from concentration camps. He has lost all his personal characteristics, basically everything that makes each human being unique and identifiable. At that time, and in the eyes of those who contemplate, Semprún is not Semprún, but rather the result of the Nazi barbarism. This effect of the non-identifiable and generalization is also accentuated by the fact that those in the novel who are watching are not identified immediately. The “they” also remain unidentified, at least until the end of the second page, where we finally discover that “they” are the British and French soldiers. Initially, the encounter between a concentration camp survivor and his liberators happens in a completely decontextualized and depersonalized context.

It is a well-known fact that in the “literature of the Holocaust”, written by eyewitnesses shortly after their concentration camp experience, the “message” often remained inaudible. The testimony, which was very often direct and violent, did not manage to find an audience ready to listen to or understand the message. The accumulation,
almost naturalistic, of facts and descriptions did not have an impact on the reader, who was unable to receive it. It is also evident at this level that the work of Semprún is interesting, since there is ongoing research to involve and integrate the reader not only in the telling of the historical facts but also in understanding them. Despite the fact that *Literature or Life* was published 40 years after the liberation of the camps, Semprún does not place his work in a naturalistic style. His experience is always part of a much wider context. In other words, although the Holocaust is everywhere in Semprún, it is not constantly told. This requires the establishment of a temporal distance between the narrative and narrated, as in the first few pages of *Literature or Life*.

After the meeting between the British and French soldiers and the camp survivor in the first pages, the reader is quickly led to another context, in a different “picture”. The mere presence of the French soldier, wearing an escutcheon with the Cross of Lorraine, triggers analeptic memories for the character-narrator, in relation to what Aristotle would have called the *mneme*:

I remember the last time I saw French soldiers in June 1940. From the regular army, of course. Because irregulars soldiers, from the resistance, the *francs-tireurs*, I’ve seen many of them. Relatively many, enough to keep some of them in my memory. (EV: 15)

This phenomenon of “rebounding time and memory” is widely used in Semprún, as if the memories were linked to each other, creating remarkable time sequences and a tangled narrative. The memories recall new memories. Thus, after the character-narrator starts a discussion with the soldiers and finally realizes that their surprise was generated by “the smell of burnt flesh” from the crematoria, he bounces back in time and narration and refers to Leon Blum, head of the French government between 1936 and 1948. Leon Blum was sent to Buchenwald in 1943. The reference to him is integrated into the narrative through the mention of his book of testimonies, *À l’échelle humaine*, published in 1945. While Blum was living under house arrest in a small house, located just outside the concentration camp of Buchenwald, he wrote:

> The first clue that we found was the strange smell that came to us often at night and haunted us the whole night when the wind blew in the same direction: it was the smell of crematoria. (Blum 1945)

The topic of the ‘smell’ is also associated with the memory of the character-narrator a few pages later in *Literature or Life*:

> Strange smell, really haunting. At this time, it would be enough to close my eyes. ... The strange smell arises immediately, in real memory. ... I would open up myself, permeable to this haunting smell of mud from the estuary of death. (EV: 17)

On the one hand, the memory of the facts in Semprún plays with the ambiguity of representation, the depersonalization of people and characters, even with the impossibility of the telling. On the other hand, the memory of the senses leads to a reflection of existential nature, situating a central past experience in the understanding of the human action. The concentration camp experience is everywhere and nowhere at the same
time; it functions as a metonymy which places the narrative constantly “on the wire”, ready to destabilize it.

When Semprún sometimes authorizes himself to describe more directly the “real” concentration camp, he is able to interrupt the narrative and to talk directly to the reader in the next paragraph, indicating that he did not have the intention of telling his life story, nor time to go into detail. He reminds the reader that the officers are waiting, an element that again indicates the lack of chronology or logic in the narrative:

We knew that SS groups armed with flamethrowers had arrived in Buchenwald. I will not relate our lives, I do not have time. I won’t go into detail, which is the salt of the story. Because the three British officers in uniform are there, planted in front of me, their eyes are bulging. (EV: 19)

Finally, starting on page 13, the story of the encounter between the character-narrator and the three officers continues on page 21 after being suspended for over five pages. The same process is used later in the narrative when the story of the three officers stops again on page 23 and then reappears on page 29:

Before I die in Buchenwald, before I disappear in smoke from the hill of the Ettersberg, I have the dream of a future life where I would wrongfully incarnate myself. But I’m not there yet. I’m still in the light of the horrified look of the three officers in British uniform. (EV: 29)

In Semprún’s narrative, the narrative time can be confused with the time of the event. In this way, it creates a constant “time tension” in which the reader is totally immersed and included.

The objectivity of language

A second essential topic in Semprún, which is undoubtedly linked to the temporal and narrative chaos that has been discussed previously, is precisely the continuous, and almost obsessive, reflection about the impossibility to tell. The aesthetic question is at the very heart of the work of Semprún:

But can we tell? Would we be able to? I had a doubt from that first moment. We are in April 12, 1945, the day after the liberation of Buchenwald. The story is recent, in a way. No need for a special effort to remember. ... Those of them who will succeed in telling the substance, the transparent density, will make their witness as an art object, a creative space. Or a recreation space. Only the artifice of a controlled narrative will manage to convey, to a certain extent, the truth of the testimony. But this is not unique: it happens with all great historical experiences. (EV: 26)

This reflection of Semprún not only concerns the telling of memories, but also the manner of telling memories; a reflection about the historical representation and the role that memory can play in the transmission of the past. This theme is at the very heart of Literature or Life on several occasions:
Telling in an appropriate way means “in order to be heard”. We will not succeed without narrative artifacts. Enough narrative artifacts in order to make it become art! ... The truth that we have to say – if we want to, many people will never do! – is not easily believable ... it is even unthinkable ... How to tell a truth implausible, how to arouse the imagination of the unimaginable, if not by developing, or working with the reality and putting it in perspective? (EV: 166)

The revisionist discourse that is rooted in the denial of historical evidences which are undeniable is easily removable. It is the role of historical research and admirable work, including that of the historian Pierre Vidal-Naquet (Vidal-Naquet 1993). The problem is often related to the transmission of the evidences, the transmission of the historical arguments or to the reading and understanding of these facts. The transmission, interpretation and understanding of facts from the past not only depend on the work of the historian as a scientist. The transmission of the memories not only depends on the meticulous description of facts described one after the other. It must also aim to surpass its own context to print a trace in the receptive context, in the sphere of the reader, as Semprun states here. If the update of historical evidence must respect an ethical, rigorous and scientific discipline, to get as close as possible to a “rebuilt truth”, the transmission of the mnemonic trace dives into the world of the receiver, sometimes succeeding to convince him or simply questioning him, sometimes not. In this sense, the transmission of memory is closer to a verbalized aesthetic, aesthetic in a classical sense; that is to say, aethes 

This blond kid with blue eyes. (Note that I am fantasizing. I could not see the colour of his eyes at this time. Only later, when he was dead. But it seemed to me that he had blue eyes. (EV: 49)

Questioning the objectivity of the language even leads Semprun to correct a story he told in an earlier novel: *L’évanouissement* (1967). We get to know in *Literature or Life* that Semprun shot a young German soldier near the city of Semur-en-Auxois when he was a member of the French resistance. The correction that Semprun brings to the text is linked to the friend who accompanied him on this mission. The name he used in *L’évanouissement* was Hans Freiberg, while this young man’s name was in fact Julian, a fellow of the French “maquis”. Changing the name of his friend has to be related to the authorial intention of creating a “friend of fiction” who was a Jew, and of paying tribute to all those Jews he had been in contact with in the concentration camp. In this way, the transmission of the mnemonic trace, in contrast to the historical trace, has to be considered primarily in relation to its effect on the reader. The questioning of the objectivity of the language is also present throughout the novel, when the narrator does not hesitate to introduce linguistic expressions such as “what I mean is...”, “I remember... / I do not remember... “, “I’m not sure if...”, placing once again his own words in perspective.
This tension between a reconstructed historical truth and the attempt to affect the reader through the mnemonic trace is also well summarized by Semprún himself when he concludes the story of the German soldier with these words: “This is the restored truth: the whole truth of this story that was already truthful” (EV: 55). Historical discourse and mnemonic discourse maintain both an ambiguous and unstable relationship with the notion of truth. It is, in my view, a matter of tension more or less pronounced in the direction of the documentary, on the one hand, and in the direction of the effect, on the other hand. If the ultimate goal of historical science is to be treated as a “science of the archive”, memory can play with a much broader register: from the historization of memorial testimony to the fictionalization of the historical record. However, as stated by Paul Ricoeur in “Interweaving of History and Fiction” in *Time and Narrative III*, fiction should not be considered as a problem for historical science, as long as it aims to involve the reader on the path of understanding:

One and the same work can thus be a great book of history and a fine novel. What is surprising is that this interlacing of fiction and history in no way undercuts the project of standing-for belonging to history, but instead helps to realize it. (Ricoeur, 1982: 180)

The fictionalization of history in the novel has to respect the ethics of history but, at the same time, it has to develop aesthetic strategies. This is certainly a difficult balance, which can also be “effective” on the path of the transmission and understanding of the past.

**Universalizing the “own”**

The last topic that seems crucial for the transmission of memory traces in the work of Semprún is linked to its attempt to universalize. Despite the fact that *Literature or Life* begins with the liberation of Buchenwald and the narrative of the concentration camp experience of Jorge Semprún, his testimony also opens transhistorical, cross-cultural and pluri-linguistic perspectives.

Semprún’s work is strongly influenced by the fact that the concentration camp of Buchenwald is situated on the Ettersberg hill near the city of Weimar; the city of Goethe and Schiller, “a city of culture and camp concentration” (EV: 243). The narrator refers several times to Goethe in his work: “Wind of the four seasons on the hill of Goethe and the smoke from the crematorium” (EV: 56). He thus reminds us that culture and barbarism are inseparable parts of human history. In his novel *What a Beautiful Sunday!*, Semprún even refers to the “Goethe Oak”, a symbol of the paroxysm of the Nazi contradiction. The legend tells that there was an oak in the camp of Buchenwald and that it was the oak of Goethe. Under this tree, Goethe would have come to rest and seek inspiration, but this has never been formally verified. This is the reason why the Nazis would not have felled this tree. However, this tree, whose existence has been proven, for example in a famous cliché of the photographer George Angeli dated June
1944,\textsuperscript{112} represents the incredible symbol of the meeting of barbarism and culture in one and the same place.

The phenomenon of universalizing is also related to the use of transhistorical references in Literature or Life, for example when the narrator uses Malraux to draw a parallel between the use of gas during the First World War and in the extermination camps:

\begin{quote}
... I told him about the episode of the German attack by gases in 1916, on the front of the Vistula, which is the dark moment of the novel. Albert was struck by the surprising coincidence but full of meaning, the strange premonition that led Malraux in his novel to describe the apocalypse of using gas in war situations at a time when the extermination of Jews in gas chambers in Poland began to start. (EV: 79)
\end{quote}

He also introduces transhistorical references in his account when he starts thinking about the treatment of black men in the 1940s in American society, while the liberators of Buchenwald are received as true heroes in Europe:

\begin{quote}
... I wondered what they thought about this war, these black Americans so numerous in the assault companies of the Third Army, what they would have to say about the war against fascism. Somehow, it was the war that made them full citizens. At least according to the law; and if not, in the practice of their daily military life. However their social origin, the humility of their condition, the open or insidious humiliation to which they were exposed to by the colour of their skin, the conscription had made them potentially equal citizens by the law. As if to kill gave them the right to be free at last. (EV: 109)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{112} This photo is available in the digital database of Buchenwald: http://www.buchenwald.de/fotoarchive/buchenwald/image.php?f_provenienzen_0=14--1&page=1&inventarnr=1 (Accessed 14.12.2010).
Once again, the reflection that Semprún introduces on his own experience from the concentration camp acquires a new dimension: the highly localized and highly identifiable character of the perpetrators and victims often leaves room for reflection on human nature as a whole, taken in a permanent tension between culture and barbarism. Regardless of skin colour, social origin or nationality, barbarism is an inalienable part of human nature. Culture and barbarism are like two sides of the same coin and this duality is clearly present in the work of Semprún.

The reflection on totalitarianism Semprún introduces in his work also contributes to universalizing his experience. The reflection is not limited to Nazi Germany; the relationship between Nazism and Stalinism is very frequently mentioned, as in the passage where, after the liberation of Buchenwald, Semprún chats with a young Soviet called Nikolai:

– The end of Nazism will not be the end of the class struggle! He exclaims, peremptorily and teaching.
I thank him politely. ... 
– Should we conclude that there isn’t class society without concentration camps? I say. ... 
– No class society without repression, at least! He advances cautiously.
I nod.
– Rather without violence. It is a more specific and more universal concept. ...
He probably wonders what I mean. But I am getting nowhere. I’m just trying to fight off the idea that his words suggest. The idea that the end of Nazism will not correspond with the end of the world of concentration camps. (EV: 87)

This dialogue between Semprún and Nikolai is also somehow premonitory, since it is known that Buchenwald concentration camp, after the liberation, will become a detention camp for former German soldiers, but also for political opponents of the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that this aspect of Buchenwald II, as it has been called, and this particular historical context, have not escaped Semprún, especially in this passage with the young Soviet man, who is ideologically very committed.

Transhistorical references are also present when the character-narrator links individual memories from the concentration camp experience to his commitment to the resistance against Franco in Spain. This is particularly true when he introduces a reflection on death in the novel. The end of the concentration camp experience for Semprún seems like a new birth, but it also has the “power” of carrying him away from death, each day a little bit more, making sense of the term “returning”. The camp experience in Semprún is often compared to the “death experience”. In the Nazi barbarism, and in the concentration camp experience, there is the continuous experimentation of daily death and “radical Evil”, to quote the famous words of Kant:
We could tell about any day, starting the clock at half-past four in the morning until the hour of curfew: the exhausting work, the perpetual hunger, the permanent sleep deprivation, the bullying from the Kapo, the drudgery of latrines, the “schlag” of the SS, the line work in weapons factories, the smoke from the crematorium, the public executions, the numerous calls in the snowy winters, exhaustion, the death of dear friends ... The essential, it is the experience of Evil. Certainly, this experience can be done everywhere... You don’t need concentration camps to experience the Evil. But here, it has been crucial, and massive, it has invaded everything, devoured everything ... It is the experience of the radical Evil ... (EV: 120)

And it is from this particular reflection on his crossing through death that Semprún justifies his involvement in the Spanish resistance to Franco, linking different historical experiences by using a regressive method and relating their meaning:

Everything had happened to me, nothing else could happen to me now. ... It was with this assurance that I crossed, later, ten years with underground activities in Spain. Every morning, at that time, before diving into the adventure of daily meetings, appointments made sometimes weeks in advance, activities Franco’s police could have been informed of because of carelessness or spying, I prepared myself for a possible arrest. For a certain torture. However, every morning, after this spiritual exercise, I shrugged: nothing could happen to me. I had already paid the price; spend the deadly part that I had within me. I was invulnerable, temporarily immortal. (EV: 28)

The transmission of memory in Semprún is transhistorical, establishing an internal logic in the narrative, not merely chronological but a circular logic that it might be called “hermeneutical”. Semprún’s memory has to make sense and it happens through establishing a particular time perspective, including the mnemonic trace in a transhistorical dimension. The memories are related to each other, not chronologically narrated, and in this way they highlight each other and make sense. Semprún’s involvement in the resistance has to be considered in the light of the concentration camp experience. Similarly, it can be assumed that the disillusionment of the experience of his commitment to communism in the 50s and the 60s had led to a more comprehensive reflection on the role of the totalitarian ideologies during the 20th century and their relation to radical Evil.

The last element I would like to introduce, in connection with the establishment in Semprún of the universal character of the mnemonic trace, is obviously related to the use of cultural references and multilingualism. Language, like culture, is never related in Semprún to the idea of the nation. There are indeed numerous languages and cultural references made in the original language, mainly Spanish, French and German. There are a huge number of intertextual references, cultural and literary links to Halbwachs, Bloch (120), Goethe and Schiller (56, 107), Paul Valéry and Heinrich Heine (59), Baudelaire (60), Malraux (67, 73–75), Camus, Sartre, Malraux (102), Merleau-Ponty, Aragon (103, 232), Giraudoux (104), Kant (120), Maspero (121), Heidegger, Husserl, Levinas, St Augustine (122–127), Hermann Broch and Bertolt Brecht (135, 141, 233), Rubén Darío (138), Vallejo (190, 255), Huidobro, Juan Larrea (190), Proust (193–194), Faulkner (218), Wittgenstein (219, 252), Rene Char, Paul Celan (219), Alberti (233), and Primo Levi (304), to name just few of them.

However, besides this abundance of cultural references in Literature or Life, the function of the language is also to give a universal character to the mnemonic trace, in
the way that the “enemy” is never identified through his culture or his tongue. Thus, while the character-narrator is at the bedside of a dying friend, he tells us that the first words that come to him as he starts to sing “La Paloma”, which is a Spanish song, are in German:

The beginning of the song comes back to my mind. As strange as it may seem, the beginning comes back to me in German. Kommt zu Dir eine weisse Taube geflogen ... I say the beginning of “La Paloma” in German. (EV: 48)

The presence of these plurilingual and multicultural aspects gives a real narrative density to the work of Semprún. The historical background is never Manichean and memories play a central role, making the story complex, diverse and centrifugal. There is never one language in Semprún, but always languages; there is never a single text or a single narrative, but countless intertexts, time and mnemonic cycles.

Conclusion

Semprún tells us a personal story, conveys individual and sometimes traumatic memories, but the memory of the individual is permanently set in conjunction with a multidimensional “collectiveness”. In his book On Collective Memory, Maurice Halbwachs creates a very natural bridge between the collective and the individual, which makes quite clear the nature of the mnemonic testimony in the work of Semprún:

... our memories remain collective and are reminded to us by others, even though it is events in which we have been involved alone, and objects that we’ve seen alone. The truth is that we are never alone. It is not necessary that others are there, others that differ materially from us, because we always carry with us and in us a number of persons who are easily identifiable. (Halbwachs 1950: 14)

The work of Semprún is thus characterized by a clear retrospective method. The past is always highlighted from the present, but it is also defined by a dialogical structure; one expressed here by Halbwachs, but also present in Bakhtin, particularly in his essay about “Author and Hero: Seeing other Bodies and being Seen” (1922–1924), in which otherness is defined beyond the self, but also confronting the “I” with an internal otherness (Bakhtin 1984: 51).

In Semprún, talking about the past and telling the past is a complex and multidimensional process. There is a structural complexity and an essential complexity. After 40 years of insatiable political and social commitment, it is understandable that Jorge Semprún tries to make sense of his traumatic and individual memories. But this authorial quest, clearly expressed in Literature or Life – “Will I come back to myself one day? … Am I forever this other who had crossed the dead?” (EV: 141) – never leads to an established truth. It remains an open question where the involvement of the reader is also central. The quest for the “I” in Semprún deals with the constant issue of
the relationship between individual and collective responsibility. The uses of memory lead from the “existence in itself” to the “existence as a task”, between a clear logic of retention and protention. In this way, Semprún remains true to the ambiguous nature of memories. Between the immanence and transcendence of the past, he clearly chooses to pose this problem in terms of an interrogative aesthetic representation.
References

Memory of a Tragedy and the Beginnings of Roma Literature in Czech and Slovak Culture

Miloslava Slavičková

Introduction

My conception of Roma literature

For this article I take Roma literature as that being written by ethnic Roma, whether in Romani or the majority languages; that is, in Czech or Slovak in the former Czechoslovakia and in today’s Czech Republic (or, exceptionally, in Hungarian). To restrict Roma literature to works in Romani would substantially impoverish this literature and would exclude a number of prominent Roma writers who have written exclusively in Czech (for example, Elena Olahová) or a part of the work of those writers who have written both in Czech and in Romani (for example, the Czech short stories of Gejza Horváth). In this article I will deal with literary texts in Roma and Czech (the Roma ones have appeared in bilingual editions) published in the former Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic. I will follow the literature written in Slovak only up to the division of Czechoslovakia (i.e. until 1 January 1993).

113 Translation from Czech by Lubomír Doležel. The quotations from the English translation of Lacková 1999 were slightly changed by a comparison with the Czech original.
The Czech and Slovak Roma

When it comes to Roma people, the border between the Czech territory and Slovakia has been porous. Over 80% of the Roma in the contemporary Czech Republic were born in Slovakia or in Slovak Roma families who immigrated from Slovakia. An exodus of Slovak Roma into the Czech part of former Czechoslovakia began immediately after the Second World War (Kramárová 2005: 17). I will call this population the „Slovak“ Roma to distinguish them from the original „Czech“ Roma (who now represent about 10 % of the Roma population in the Czech Republic).Of the Roma writers born in Slovakia, let me name the following: Tera Fabiánová, b. 1930; Andrej Giňa, b. 1936; Margita Reiznerová, b. 1945; Vlado Oláh, b. 1947; Agnesa Horvátová, b. 1949; and Erika Olahová, b. 1957. Roma writers born within Czech territory in “Slovak” families are, among others: Gejza Horváth, b. 1945; Emil Cina, b. 1947; Ilona Ferková, b. 1957; Jan Horváth, b. 1959; and Michal Šamko, b. 1967. Elena Lacková (22 March 1921–1 January 2003) was born in Slovakia, but worked in various Czech cities and studied at Charles University in Prague, earning a bachelor’s degree.

During the Second World War, however, the fate of the Roma in the Czech lands (the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia) and Slovakia was quite different. In the Protectorate, systematic annihilation of the Roma occurred on the basis of the Nazi racial laws. Of the 6,000 Czech Roma deported to various concentration camps, especially Auschwitz, only 583 of them returned (Nečas 1999:173, 2000:169–172; Sniegon 2008:173–211).114

The literary production of the “Czech” Roma is slight, restricted to the lyrics of a few songs. For our topic, however, it is important to note that the main theme of these songs is the suffering of the Roma in concentration camps. The best known is the song brought back from a concentration camp by a Roma woman, Růžena Danielová. This song circulated in several versions recorded in the Polish, Moravian and Slovak regions. Růžena Danielová’s version was set to music by the composers Miloš Štědroň and Arnošt Parsch under the title Weeping of Růžena Danielová from Hrubá Vrbka over Her Husband Martin’ (Holý & Nečas 1993; Nečas 2008:107–113). Since this paper deals with prose writings, I am, however, leaving song composition aside.

In Slovakia during the war a systematic slaughter of the Roma did not occur initially. That being said, persecution by the fascist government, and especially the Hlinka guardsmen, was very widespread (Hübschmannová 2005; Kramářová 2005:11–18). Some historians define the persecution as a Holocaust (Porrajmos) (Kamenec 2003:50–54); others liken it to the preparatory phase of the Roma genocide (Balvín 2001; Horváthová 2002:48; Hübschmannová 2005:52–53). A drastic deterioration of the situation began after the suppression of the Slovak National Uprising in the summer of 1944 and following the Nazi occupation of Slovakia (Hübschmannová 2005:56; Kramářová 2005:16–17; Sniegon 2008:217). A massive liquidation of the Roma commenced.

114 The most recent treatment of the fate of the Roma in the Protectorate is Cederberg 2010. Unfortunately, the author does not support any of her claims by reference to sources, and therefore her conclusions have to be judged by knowledgeable historians.
The Roma “cultural revolution”

Traditional Roma verbal culture was purely oral: fairytales (*paramisa*), stories from life (*vakeriben*), riddles and anecdotes (Hübschmannová 1973b, 1991, 2003; Sadílková 2006; Scheinostová 2006). The most important kinds of artistic expression in this culture were not verbal; they were and still are music, songs and dance. Roma literature in Czechoslovakia could arise and develop only under more beneficial political and cultural conditions; that is to say, during the short period of the Prague Spring in 1968 and especially after the fall of the communist regime, since the early 1990s.

Roma literature in the 1970s and 1980s

In the period of the dying Prague Spring, the Roma intellectuals founded the first representative Roma organization, the Federation of Gypsies-Roma, which in the years 1969–1973 published the journal *Romano l’il* (Roma Paper). In this journal the early literary texts in Romani appeared (by, for instance, Tera Fabiánová, Andrej Giňa, and František Demeter). An important work of the Federation was the preparation of spelling rules for Romani, specifically for the version of the written language based on *servika*; the vernacular, oral language used by the east Slovak Roma. It is this written Romani that has been cultivated by all Czech and Slovak Roma writers: “Almost 80% of Roma people in the Czech Republic and Slovakia speak the East Slovak Romani dialect, not only in Slovakia, but also in Moravia and Bohemia where they emigrated after 1945.” (Davidová 2004:257.) The activities of the Federation greatly increased the Roma’s self-awareness, something in clear contrast to the the assimilation policy pursued by the communist regime. According to this policy, the use of Romani and the spreading of “romipen” – i.e. the understanding and strengthening of the Roma tradition, culture and identity– was an obstacle in the process of assimilation of the “citizens of the gypsy origin” (about “romipen”, see Hübschmannová 1996:2 and Scheinostová 2006: 37–41). After the final suppression of the ideas of the Prague Spring, *Romano l’il* was prohibited in 1973.

However, Romani continued to be studied by a few linguists, the most important of them being Milena Hübschmannová (1933–2005). She was a specialist in Hindu, Urdu, Bengali, and Professor of Romani at Charles University in Prague. She became the foremost Czech specialist on Roma culture. As early as the mid-1970s, she pushed through the teaching of Romani at The State Language School in the capital, and in 1991 the opening of the Roma Studies Department at Charles University. She was
the head of these studies until her death in 2005. Even written Romani could appear again in print, thanks to her efforts: she compiled the anthology *Romani giš’a* (Roma Songs) (Hübschmannová 1973a) in which she collected texts of the writers grouped around *Romano j'il*. However, the anthology appeared only as material for internal academic use and was not for sale. Hübschmannová also succeeded in presenting some texts of Roma writers on Czechoslovak radio. She also wrote *The Roma Manual* (Hübschmannová 1973) and was later co-author of the *Romani – Czech and Czech – Romani Pocket Dictionary* (1998).

In the 1970s and 1980s, the cultural activities of the Roma were restricted to folkloristic ensembles. The Roma founded them and also performed in them successfully. Active participation in these ensembles was very important because it strengthened Roma identity and stimulated further cultural activity. Thanks to their participation in the ensembles, Margita Reiznerová and Ilona Ferková started developing their writing (about Reisnerová, see even Lundgren 2003: 153–163).

However, finding a publisher was not easy, even for those writers using the majority language. The first work by a Roma author was written in Slovak; it was the play *Horíaci cigánsky tábor* (A Burning Gypsy Camp) by Elena Lacková. Although completed in 1946, it could not appear until ten years later, published by the Prague Theatre’s DILIA, but only as an internal text. I will return to this work later.

The development of Roma literature since the 1990s

Immediately after the fall of communism in 1989, the creativity and publication activity of the Roma almost exploded. Milena Hübschmannová was finally able to publish an earlier compiled anthology *Kale ruži./Černé růže* (Black Roses), where older writers such as Elena Lacková, Andrej Giňa, František Demeter and Andrej Pešta were joined by new authors: Vlado Oláh, Margita Reiznerová, Jan Horváth, and Helena Horváthová (Hübschmannová 1990).

Since the 1990s many Roma periodicals have been founded; among them *Amaro lav* (Our Word), *Romano gendalos* (Roma Mirror), *Nevo Romano Gendalos* (New Roma Mirror) and *Romano kurka* (Roma Week). Several important journals continue to be published – *Romano džaniben* (Roma Volume), *Bulletin Muzea romské kultury* (Bulletin of the Museum of Roma Culture), the daily *Romano hangos* (Roma Voice) and a periodical for children, *Kereko* (Circle). The Roma poet Margita Reiznerová with others founded a Roma publishing house, *Romano čhib*.115 From the beginning of the 1990s Roma writers also started to have their works accepted by Czech publishing houses and

115 According to Věra Havlová, between 1990 and 2000 Roma writers published in Czechoslovakia and in the Czech Republic 655 literary texts, including 32 books. Up to the year 1990 only 21 literary texts appeared in print, the majority fairy tales and song lyrics. (This section is based on the research of Havlová 2000; Hübschmannová 1990, 1996; Sadílková 2006; Scheinostová 2005, 2006)
literary journals (for example, in *Souvislosti* (Connections) and *Revolver-Revue, Host* (The Guest), and their texts are reviewed in prominent Czech literary journals such as *Literární noviny* (Literary Newspaper) and *Tvar* (Form). Roma literature is financially supported by several ministries, grant agencies and organizations; for example, the Obec českých spisovatelů (Community of Czech Writers). A meeting organized by the Community of Czech Writers around the theme “Gypsies–Roma” resulted in a volume with contributions from both Roma and Czech writers (Devla 2008). In 2010 Roma literature was presented at the World of the Book trade fair in Prague. Of great importance was the creation in 1991 of the Museum of Roma Culture in Brno. It serves as a documentation and information centre, includes a library and exhibition halls, and moreover provides and promotes wide-ranging cultural activities, publishes a bulletin (*Bulletin Muzea romské kultury*) and has set up well-organized web pages.

Specific features of Roma literature

The oral production, especially the fairytales, was a sort of Roma moral codex, as testified for example by Lacková: „As best we could, we tried hard to live in accordance with paťiv – with honour, virtue, politeness, which we were constantly reminded of in vitejziko paramiza – in heroic tales, in songs, sayings, in wise words of old Roma“ (Lacková 1997:133, 107).

The process of the transformation of oral literature into written literature can be followed in the activity of Milena Hübschmannová. She recorded orally transmitted Roma fairytales (Hübschmannová 1973b), songs (1973a), proverbs (1991), and riddles (2003). She also recorded Elena Lacková’s autobiographical narrative and then published it under her name, with the title *Narodila jsem se pod šťastnou hvězdou* (I was Born under a Lucky Star) (Lacková 1997).

Obviously, the emerging Roma written literature could draw especially on oral stories from Roma life.

The variety of genres of Roma literature

Roma written literature includes poetry, prose and drama. An important theme of the poetry is the celebration of Romani and of the Roma tradition, but the hard life of the Roma is found in poetic representations as well (J. Horváth 1999, 2007). There also exists significant spiritual poetry (Oláh 2005, 2006), as well as intimate and reflective poetry (Reiznerová 2000). So far, a few dramatic works have been performed, but only one published (Lacková 1956). A single novel (Erős 2008) has appeared. The most popular genres of narrative prose are traditional, especially fairytales (Ferková & Hübschmannová 1991; Lacková 1999a; Haluška 2003; Horvátová 2003; Cina 2008)
and short stories inspired by daily life (Fabiánová 1992; Ferková 1996). Frequently, the life of the Roma in interwar Slovakia is nostalgically depicted, lamenting the loss of traditional values and stable social conditions (Giňa 1991; G. Horváth 2007). There is, however, no lack of themes from contemporary life. It is especially Ilona Ferková and Erika Olahová who realistically, even naturalistically, portray Roma problems in the community as well as in their contacts with the majority society (Ferková 1996; Olahová 2004, 2006). In many of the Roma prose texts, fantastic, supernatural motifs are present.

Roma literature and Romani – two pillars of the Roma national revival

Roma literature became a means of self-awareness for the Roma and their efforts to integrate into the majority society. This idea pervades the work of Elena Lacková (Lacková 1956, 1997, 2001) and partly also the work of Andrej Giňa (Giňa 1991) and Jan Horváth (Horváth 1999). By analogy with the Czech national revival, we can speak of a Roma national revival; a historical process in which Romani literature and language play a crucial role. Romani became the second essential feature of Roma identity, and we can therefore observe a significant increase in the use of Romani as a literary language.

The road to literature written in Romani was not easy. In her autobiography, Elena Lacková explains the reasons for her originally hesitant attitude towards the use of Romani: „I had within me a thousand- year-old shyness with „whites“. We took over a contemptuous attitude towards our own language, in which not a single public sign was written, no book was printed, which was not heard on the stage, on the radio, on any public medium; therefore I actually did begin persuading Roma parents: Speak Slovak with your children, so that they would not have problems in school!“ (Lacková 1997:204,1999b:166).

Some writers started writing in the majority languages: Andrej Giňa in Czech, Elena Lacková in Slovak, and Tera Fabiánová in Hungarian, i.e. the language of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia (but a majority language in neighbouring Hungary). They switched to Romani only when they recognized that it was possible to write in that language. Often their decision was influenced by Milena Hübschmannová. It was thanks to her help that authors such as Ilona Ferková and Margita Reiznerová began writing in Romani. Ilona Ferková wrote in the Introduction to her short-story collection Čorde čhave Stolen Children): „Already as a girl I wanted to write down everything that my father told me, but I did not know how to. I could not imagine that it is possible to write in Romani, and Czech did not come to me easily...I began writing in Romani only when I met Milena Hübschmannová. She gave me to read what was written in Romani by Terka Fabiánová and Margita Reiznerová. Then I saw that Romani is suitable not only for speaking, but also for writing“ (Ferková 1996: 9).
Andrej Giňa’s evolution is interesting: he turned to Romani gradually – first he wrote only in Czech, then combined Czech with Romani, and in the end switched completely to Romani. In the Afterword to his short-story collection *Bijav/Svatba* (Wedding) he wrote:

„I began to write in Czech because I could not imagine that one could write in Romani. But how the people in the village spoke to each other, their jokes and sayings, curses and blessings, all that stayed in my memory in Romani – and when I wrote it down in Czech, it was like a shadow, it lacked any juice. And so I combined it: the narrative I wrote in Czech and the dialogues in Romani“ (Giňa 1991:59–60).

Margita Reiznerová bears witness that the first text in Romani stimulated the literary work of further Roma writers:

„I began to write two years ago. I came across a poem in Romani written by Terka Fabiánová – the first Romani words I saw written on paper... Tera Fabiánová, although I do not know her personally, showed me that it is possible to write in Romani. And only now, when I write, I see what a beautiful language Romani is“ (Hübschmannová, ed. 1990:106; Kramářová & Sadílková, eds. 2007:13).

Similar pronouncements can be found in the work of Vlado Oláh (2006:11) and Elena Lacková (1997: 79, 260–261).

The theme of the persecution of the Roma population in Roma fiction

The Czech Roma, as I mentioned in the introduction, were almost exterminated. Within the territory of the Bohemia and Moravia Protectorate were notorious concentration camps for the Roma, especially Lety and Hodonín near Kunštát (Polansky 1998; Horváthová 2002: 43–48; Sniegon 2008: 173–211; Cederberg 2010), but this genocide was not reflected in Roma literature. Therefore, my contribution has to deal exclusively with „Slovak“ Roma writers whose fictional works represent the persecution of the Roma in the Slovak state. This persecution (in the years 1939–1945) is the strongest historical experience of the „Slovak“ Roma. It was even the inspiration for the first work of Roma literature, the above-mentioned drama by Elena Lacková. Roma fiction thus became – besides the study of historical documents and the recording of the memories of eyewitnesses – a further important source for the historical reconstruction of these persecutions. It also puts into question the stubborn opinion that Roma memory is of ahistorical character (Davidová 2004: 144; Scheinostová 2006: 35; Kramářová & Sadílková 2007:18; Vaculík 2008:11). The theme of the persecution of the Roma in Slovakia is treated particulary in the works of Elena Lacková (1956, 1997, 2001) and in several of the texts selected for the prose antology *Čalo vod’i* (Sated Soul) (Kramářová & Sadílková, eds. 2007). I will leave aside the fiction in which the holocaust is only a
marginal theme; neither will I analyse Roma poetry in which the holocaust theme occurs (poems by Vlado Oláh from 1996, and Jan Horváth from 1999).

Elena Lacková’s drama

Lacková created her typical fictional world already in her first work, the drama *Horiaci cigánsky tábor* (The Burning Gypsy Camp), written in 1946 but not published until 1956. Drama, just as written fiction, was a completely new phenomenon in Roma culture. Lacková’s drama engendered social and cultural engagement of the Roma population and increased their self-esteem. The central theme of the drama is an active fight of the Roma against the fascists and the Nazis, in distinction to the short stories where the theme is the persecution and suffering of the Roma. A motif in the play which is absent from Lacková’s later short stories is the contribution of a „Gadj“ (Gadj - who is no Rome) to the self-awareness of a Roma woman (Angela). A way to the integration of the Roma is suggested – Anton and Angela fight together and ultimately live together.

In the drama we can trace the political ideals of the time, which then pervaded the media and Czech literature: the emphasis on revolutionary deeds, on the significance of re-education, on building socialism, equal rights for women, and especially the belief in a future just society which would arise from the victorious struggle of the oppressed (in this drama, the Roma in a forced-labour camp) against their oppressors (fascist policemen and gendarmes). The fighters against fascism in the drama are all positive, politically aware; the fascists are all negative. Lacková, active in the Slovak Communist Party, learned the political language: “After all, it was my job to spread the political teaching blessed by mouth of the highest party and government figures!” (Lacková 1997:261, 1999b:210.) But she was also searching for another model. She found it in the historical adventure novel *Čachtická paní* (The Lady of Čachtice) written by the Slovak writer Jožo Nižnánsky. She acknowledged this influence in her memoirs: „The Slovak engineer Anton falls in love with Angela. He is idealistic, just and humane. I was inspired to write this part by the character of Kalina from The Lady of Čachtice, the fictional hero of my childhood and youth“ (Lacková 1997:168, 1999b:135). Lacková’s heterogeneous style was characterized by Milena Hübschmannová in the following words: „In her verbal expression the Red Library romance [the Czech equivalent of a Harlequin Romance] blends wonderfully with Marxist ideology“ (1998:63).

Lacková herself took care of the staging of her drama. Immediately after finishing it, she assembled a theatrical group of amateurs, mostly her relatives and friends. This ensemble lasted for over two years and staged 106 performances in various Czechoslovakian cities. The drama attracted the interest of the press, received a grant from the Ministry of Culture and was very successful with audiences, especially those composed of Roma. The Roma people, after initial hesitation and even resistance to this unknown cultural phenomenon, accepted the play. Lacková wrote about it: „The word went through the village that our play had čačipen – meaning truth, law, justice, reality
– and suddenly all the Roma wanted to see what we actually do and what a theatre is“ (Lacková 1997:158, 1999b:126).

Lacková was led to writing the drama by her endeavour to make visible the Roma population and its integration into the majority society. She formulated her authorial intention as follows: „I began thinking that we have to force ourselves into human society in a different way than the gadže have imagined. At the same time thoughts of our wartime experiences kept coming back to me, composing themselves as scenes on the stage... And so on a full-moon night I decided to write a play for the theatre. Our Roma theatre! And that we will show to the gadže who we are, what we lived through and what we are living through, how we feel and how we want to live“ (1997: 156, 1999b: 124).

The theme of the persecution of the Roma in the stories of Elena Lacková

The short stories of Elena Lacková dealing with the persecution of the Roma appeared in a volume co-authored by Jaroslav Balvín, who also translated them from Slovak into Czech and had them published under the title Holocaust v povídkách Eleny Lackové (The Holocaust in the Short Stories of Elena Lacková) (Lacková & Balvín 2001). Fiction creates, of course, fictional worlds, but often draws material from the actual world. In the Elena Lacková collection the actual world is a gypsy community in eastern Slovakia just before the establishment of the Slovak state, in the years of its existence, and a short time after the liberation. The Roma live destitute, but passionate and even self-destructive lives, but in stable conditions. Lacková’s method is clearly naturalistic. The chronological representation of the lives of her fictional individuals reflects an intensifying persecution of the Roma, beginning with various humiliations, restrictions, and acts of violence carried out by gendarmes, Hlinka guards, and later by German Nazis. It intensifies with the forced resettlements of the gypsy communities in inaccessible regions, culminating in deportations to labour camps and ultimately to the Auschwitz extermination camp. The stories indicate that this persecution strengthened the Roma ethnic identity and led to their identification with another persecuted ethnic group, the Jews. The persecution also forced the Roma to cross a strict social barrier and cooperate with the „Gadji“, and even to participate in the struggle of the partisans (Hübschman-nová 2005). Lacková based her description of the Roma world mostly on her own experiences, as can be verified in the book of her reminiscences (Lacková 1997).
Character of Elena Lacková’s short stories

Already in the title of the first short story in her book, Lacková expresses her intent: to preserve the memory of the Roma holocaust. The title is „Mrtví se nevracejí“ (The Dead Do Not Return), and its subtitle „Na památku umučených Romů za 2. světové války“ (In Memory of the Roma Tortured to Death in the Second World War). At the beginning of the story, the life of the Roma community experiences the first symptoms of a major threat: the loss of earnings from service to the „Gadj“, shortages and hunger, uncertainty and fear. „Instead of policemen, gendarmes and guardists began arriving. The Roma feared their poisonous looks“. The feeling of threat changes into a real invasion of „the black uniforms“, of members of the Hlinka guards. The guardists order the Roma to tear down their huts within three days and to move to an uninhabited hill. They claim that, in accordance with a Slovak law, the gypsies have been excluded from society. The life of the Roma in their stable settlement, with its positive, as well as negative features, has definitely ended. (The Slovak Roma lived permanently for approximately three hundred years in so-called gypsy settlements not far from Slovak villages or small towns – Hübschmannová 1993:20, 1998:59.)

In their settlement the Roma could live in their own accustomed way: in work, in intensive family, erotic and neighbourly relations, with marital problems and with conflicts and fights. In exile, on a steep hill and far from the Slovak village, they suffer from hunger, cold and shortage of water. New laws restrict their access to the village and to work. They are allowed to come to the village for only two hours a day, at noontime.

In their new colony typhus rages, killing especially old people and children. The Slovak health workers disinfect the dwellings, shave people’s heads, but do not give them any medication, do not take care of them. During cold nights the gendarmes chase the gypsies, including children, from their huts and force them, the „dirty ones“, to bathe in a small river. Those who resist are cruelly beaten. The life of the men in the colony ends when one night the gendarmes and guardists encircle the colony and take all of them between 17 and 64 away in handcuffs to the forced-labour camp in Petiš. There the suffering becomes even greater. The Roma men work on building the railway from Prešov to Strážska. It is hard work, and moreover the Roma are humiliated, beaten and tortured by hunger. The attempts to flee usually fail and the prisoners are cruelly punished, or even killed while trying to escape. However, the Roma are not without hope: they learn, and are encouraged by the news that near the camp a partisan headquarters – Čapajev – operates, and some of them succeed in fleeing the camp and joining the fight against fascism in the Slovak National Uprising. Some of the Roma fall in this fight.

The young heroes of Lacková’s story, the lovers Janko and Šarika, escape the colony, flee to a town, but are caught by the police, taken to a forced-labour camp, and ultimately to Auschwitz in a transport of Hungarian Roma. The concentration camp is seen through Šarika’s eyes: it is threatening, devoid of everything human and incomprehensible. Janko is immediately gassed, but Šarika works first in the camp
hospital. On 1 August 1944, Hitler orders the complete destruction of the Roma camp. All are killed, including Šarika, whose last thought is: the dead do not return. With this thought Šarika negates the ancient Roma belief that the dead return to the living („The Roma believe that the souls of the dead return to the living“ – Lacková 1997:29; even Jakoubek & Poduška 2003:111). The slaughtered Roma will never return.

The second short story of the collection, „Život ve větru“ (Life in the Wind), is provided with the subtitle „Dedicated to the Roma children in the Second World War“. This signals the main theme of the story: the suffering of the Roma children during the war. Two worlds are contrasted: the world of the Roma and that of the Slovak gadji. After the gendarmes take away their parents, two Roma siblings, Julaj and Julajka, are saved by a Slovak woman, Anna, who has lost her own children. She provides them with good care, which they repay by working for Anna and her husband. But the children are dragged away by the gendarmes and guardists, despite Anna claiming that they are her own. In the story’s conclusion, the author connects the fate of her fictional heroes Julaj and Julajka with the actual fate of all the children killed in the Nazi concentration camp: „Among the five thousand Roma children who perished in Auschwitz were also Julaj and Julajka“ (79).

It is clear from the story that the persecution of the Roma is racially motivated: even the Roma who lead an orderly life in a Slovak family become victims of the holocaust. At the same time, the story indicates that the Roma and the gadji can live together.

The third and final short story of the collection, „Bílí krkavci“ (White Ravens), describes the suffering of the Roma exiles as defenceless victims of the Slovak guardists and German SS-men, and connects it with the suffering of the Jews. Again, as in the previous short story, the persecution is shown as having a racial base. And the story ends with the claim that the crimes against the Roma were not punished after the war.

Several motifs express the racial base for the persecution of both the Roma and the Jews. A Roma woman, Zuska, living in a village witnesses how the guardists drag out Jews from their houses, carrying the very old and the sick on stretchers, and force them into trucks. „The guardists called them satan’s breed and that finally the Slovak nation will be purified of them“ (83). The Roma begin fearing that after the Jews it will be their turn. And indeed, the SS-men and the guardists attack the Roma settlement under the pretext that they are helping the partisans. The Roma are burned in their huts. „The SS commander shouted: ’Thus we will liquidate all the inferior and degenerate races. We, the Germans, have lit the purifying fire and will rid the world of dirt. We created a new world of pure race!!!’“ (86). The guardists’ commander Marcinko is convinced that he is acting in accordance with the law and will not be punished: „The Jews will no longer speak and the inferior gypsies, this stupid people, they don’t understand anything and will remain silent like ghost“ (91). He also suggests that the guardists should send the Roma to Auschwitz without the assistance of the Germans.

After the war, all the guardists and gendarmes return to the village, and the villagers accept them. From the burned settlement only one eyewitness is saved, the young Julko. But his testimony is brusquely rejected. An old Roma woman, Ester, expresses one of the principal ideas of the story: „You see, Julko, our gypsy truth will never be heard“ (99). Her words are confirmed by the ending of the story: „And so it happened. After
the liberation, the gypsies did not complain about their tyrants and murderers again, because they knew well that it would be in vain“ (99).

Michal Šamko’s short story

In the anthology Čalo vod’i, the theme of the holocaust appears, for example, in the short story „Dědečkova pohádka“ (Grandfather’s FairyTale), written by Michal Šamko (Kramářová & Sadílková, eds. 2007:91–100). He was born in 1957 and therefore, unlike Lacková, did not experience the Second World War. His story is a first-person narrative about the Roma chased out of their settlement by the Germans.

Šamko contrasts the peaceful life of Slovak Roma and their belief in the good with the brutality and wrath of the German Nazis. At the beginning of the story, he describes the settled life of the Roma in a Slovak village. In his fictional world the Roma are a firm part of the village community, working since early youth for Slovak landowners. The Roma children take the landowners’ goats to pasture, the older children and adults dig wells and build houses for them. Their reward is food. „Sometimes we were hungry, sometimes we had feasts“ (91).

The war puts a sudden end to this life. The Germans chase the Roma from their huts and load them into wagons, the men separated from their wives and children. After a long journey, they chase the mothers with children and old people into a meadow, where they sit and wait– cold, hungry, thirsty and subjected to German violence – while the men continue their journey towards an unknown destination. The narrator never sees his father and brother again. The grandfather comforts them by way of a legend about the Roma living in their original fatherland, and encourages them with the final message: „Walk with an open heart, engage in good deeds – and learn. Believe that you will find your place and happiness“ (99). Immediately after the grandfather’s message follows a scene where the Germans wrestle the children away from their mothers and murder them. In the conclusion of the story, Šamko, just as Lacková, links the individual fate of the narrator’s family with that of the murdered Roma as a whole: „Only after the war I learned that almost all of our Roma were shot by the Germans. And those who were still alive were dragged to Auschwitz... I live quite well, but, nevertheless, I cannot forget“ (100).

The stories of Andrej Giňa and Tera Fabiánová

The fiction of some authors, while not dealing with the theme of the holocaust, describes the life of the Roma in pre-war Slovakia and portrays the break in this which occurred at the beginning of the war. The short stories of Andrej Giňa, collected in Bijav. Svatba (Wedding), imply that firm order existed in the relationship of the Roma with
the Slovak peasants: "My father was a blacksmith and musician. The peasants liked him because he shoed their horses, made hoes, nails, chains and also was playing with his band at their weddings...Then the war broke out. Once in the afternoon – I was five or six years old, but I remember it quite well – gendarmes and two Hlinka guardists came to the village and called my father who was the chief of the village and told him: 'By tomorrow you have to move to the forest far from the village. Either you will tear down your huts yourselves and then you can take the material with you, if not, we will destroy them...' Living below the forest was horrible. Therefore, right after the war, we moved to Bohemia" (Giňa 1991:59).

A darker image of the pre-war Slovak village is painted by Tera Fabiánová in her autobiographical Jak jsem chodila do školy (How I was Going to School). She grew up in a family with five children. "We were very poor and all the time hungry". She had only one dress and no shoes, and went to school "without a satchel, without books, pencil or notebook. I never had anything of that" (Fabiánová 1992:3). Fortunately, there was a teacher in the school who cared about the Roma children. But even this bright side of life was destroyed by the war: "I did not go to school for too long. The war came and we, gypsies, were not allowed to enter the village. And, of course, I could not go to school. So I finished my schooling in the third class" (1992: 23).

The war and the persecution of the Roma had a fateful consequence – the disintegration of their traditional society. This has been emphasized by the editors of the anthology Čalo vod’i (Sated Soul). They chose the title from a passage by Andrej Giňa: "The Roma...even if they went hungry, knew how to respect each other, they held together, they were able to forgive and see a human being in the other. Although our stomach was empty, our soul was sated" (Giňa 1991:61). So, for Giňa, the idea of a "sated soul" means living in poverty, but in the certainty of a firm emotional environment of communities holding together...This certainty began to disintegrate after the Second World War and the process continues..." (Sadílková 2007: 15).

Let me add a more cheerful note. The famous Czech writer Bohumil Hrabal, who in a number of his texts writes with sympathy about the Roma, reminds us in Cikánská rapsodie (The Gypsy Rhapsody) (Hrabal 1996: 322–325) how the Roma enriched Prague with their distinctive culture: "In the 1950s I moved to Libeň and with me also hundreds of gypsies...entire families from Romania and Slovakia, and these nomads brought with them an unknown melodic language, colourful dress and a love for music...and so these guests brought to my Libeň suburb the same as the blacks to the American cities".

**Conclusion**

In fictional representations of the holocaust we find that, ultimately, the experience of this drastic persecution has paradoxically led to some positive consequences for Roma existence. It turned them towards self-reflection, self-awareness, and the search for ways to escape their social isolation and inferior status. The fictional representations
of the holocaust thus became one of the most important factors in the transformation of the Roma social consciousness and, last but not least, engendered a new view of the fate and social aims of the Roma on the part of their „gadjí“ fellow citizens (see Hübschmannová 2005).
References


Nothing concerns Norwegian voters more than welfare. The political party that is considered able to create the best welfare wins the election. The Norwegian welfare state was developed in the 1950s and 1960s under Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet) management, and the party has since systematically used historical narratives of the welfare state to build credibility as the surest guarantor of continued prosperity. In the battle for voters, the two major parties on the Right, the Conservative Party (Høyre) and the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet), have also adopted ownership of welfare narratives in their communication. Labour has interpreted this as an attempt to ‘steal’ the party’s soul, and there have been frequent accusations that the right-wing parties, in stark contrast, have intentions of destroying the welfare state.

This article addresses how narratives of the welfare state have entered into the power struggles between the Right and Left sides of Norwegian politics. But first I will present core aspects of the foundation for the very existence of welfare narratives, the emergence of the welfare state in Norway, and how the political instrumentalization of these narratives can be understood. I focus on the three main agents in the struggle for welfare narratives: Labour, the Conservatives and the Progress Party. They are primarily represented by the Labour leader and current Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg, the Conservative leader, Erna Solberg, and the leader of the Progress Party, Siv Jensen.

Welfare narratives in political communication

The idea of the welfare state is deeply rooted in Norway. Central to it is that the state guarantees citizens support in difficult life circumstances, such as loss of work or old age. The welfare state, which originated in Europe, has its roots in the Enlightenment’s faith in human ability to create better living conditions by means of knowledge. Efforts to develop the welfare state began in the interwar period, gained momentum after the Second World War, and evolved in the 1960s into what we today refer to as ‘the welfare
state’ or ‘welfare society’. The foundation of the welfare state was a strong control of the economy in order to ensure investments for the restoration of the country after the war, and a fair distribution of its goods (Åmark 2005: 11–43, 129–282).

This past event, ‘the emergence of the welfare state’, has made an impact on Norwegians. It has created historical narratives of old-age benefits, social security, child benefits, school and health development, economic growth and increased purchasing power. Those who were born later, or were very young in the 1950s and 1960s, have been exposed to these narratives told by relatives, textbooks, and the media. As most of the structures still remain in force, it would be hard for them to disappear from people’s consciousness.

For most, the welfare state was an improvement of material conditions, and the narratives from that time are associated by many with values such as equality, compassion, justice, social mobility, and prosperity. Welfare narratives are especially positive in view of the war and the occupation that had characterized Norway before the development of the welfare state gained ground. The emergence of the welfare state showed that Norwegians were able to stand together and build a prosperous society. These narratives have been important for the way Norwegians have determined their values, but also in their identity formation. Former Labour Prime Minister Brundtland’s statement that ‘It’s typically Norwegian to be good’ is an expression of this mentality (Brundtland’s New Year’s speech, 1992).

When contemporary politicians associate their policies with these historical narratives, they create strong images that can mobilize. The politicians select and interpret the narratives of the development of the welfare state so that these narratives concur with the political projects they want to convince people about. This means that the narratives become an instrument for the politicians, in the sense that the history of the welfare state loses its inherent value and instead becomes a tool for something outside itself. The goal is not to uncover the truth about the past or discuss it, but to win support through its establishment. However, narratives symbolically reflect the struggle for power. Politicians represent different interests and ambitions, and employ welfare narratives in shaping society according to their value priorities.

‘This is the Norwegian model’

Labour was the largest political party and governed alone during much of the 1950s and 1960s. The interwar period, in contrast, was one of dominance for the bourgeois parties. This period, however, was characterized by business cycles of fluctuations and political bickering, and in the 1930s a financial crisis occurred that sent many into unemployment. Out of this background, Labour emerged as an option. The party initiated welfare reform and led Norway into a time of economic stability and prosperity through cooperation with the labour movement (Bergh 1987: 9 ff.).

Since then, the Labour Party has made welfare narratives into a permanent ingredient of its political communication. Welfare narratives appear in speeches, debates and interviews to convince voters about the party and its policies. The Labour Party leader
and Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg, said the following in his National Convention speech in 2009:

A clear line runs through our history: a distinct value anchoring. A strong will to change and a willingness to cooperate and compromise in order to get things done. That’s how hundreds of thousands were lifted out of injustice and poverty. That’s how the modern welfare state was created. That’s how the Norwegian model was created. And in the same way we’re going to meet the huge challenges we face in our time\textsuperscript{116} (Stoltenberg’s National Convention speech, 2009).

Stoltenberg legitimizes Labour’s policies today by referring to the party’s successes of the past. ‘We have succeeded before, so we will succeed again’, is the underlying message. The past becomes a guarantor for the future. Stoltenberg also draws on the background of the rise of the welfare state – poverty and ‘the hard 1930s. In so doing, he strengthens Labour’s ownership of the ‘golden’ welfare narratives that become even more valuable and important to fight for.

In particular, the ‘Nordic’, or ‘the Norwegian welfare model’, has been central to Labour’s narratives. The term suggests that other welfare models also exist, but that there is something special about the Norwegian or Nordic one. The reasoning behind this is that Norway is not the only welfare country in the world. Other European countries have welfare models based on needs assessment and rights related to factors such as profession and status. The United States has a welfare model which ensures people a minimum survival level. The Nordic model, however, is characterized by one of universality – that everyone, regardless of gender, age, income, and so on, has the right to support. This model has therefore been considered the most extensively developed welfare model (Kuhnle 2001: 1 ff.). The emergence of the welfare state as a particularly valuable heritage is underlined by the political link between the terms ‘welfare’ and ‘Norwegian’. Being ‘Norwegian’ as a community – what gives Norwegians glory and pride – is by definition something positive. Thus, if welfare is Norwegian, this implies that it is typically Norwegian ‘to be good’.

As new political affairs and ambitions have entered the political scene, welfare narratives have been formed in accordance with the new reality. As far back as the Labour Convention in 1961, the Labour leader and then-Prime Minister, Einar Gerhardsen, pointed out that:

Norwegian society has undergone significant changes since the Labour Party gained a majority in Parliament in 1945. … If we consider major areas of politics, such as the distribution of wealth, housing, social security, the 9-year compulsory school, new industries, power development, support to economically struggling districts – then our political opponents really must have had a loss of history or been misled by wishful thinking if they can now stand forward and proclaim that they have been the standard-bearers and leaders of men (Gerhardsen’s National Convention speech, 1961).

\textsuperscript{116} All the political statements quoted in this article were originally in Norwegian, but have been translated by me into English.
A later leader of the Labour Party, Gro Harlem Brundtland, referred to the narratives of welfare in a speech in 1986 to build Labour’s credibility as a champion of freedom:

The Labour movement has been fighting for a fairer distribution of community resources. This is how we have created more freedom and more equal opportunities. Therefore, we have plenty of evidence in our history to support the claim that the Labour movement is a freedom movement and socialism a freedom idea (Brundtland’s National Convention speech, 1986).

Stoltenberg showed in his speech to Labour’s National Executive Committee in 2009 that welfare narratives also can be used to legitimize a certain type of tax policy:

The money the right wing wants to use on tax cuts, we will use on the community… Of course, I realize that many people don’t like paying taxes. But the Norwegian welfare state—schools, care for the elderly, libraries, roads and everything else— is all about taking public responsibility. As social democrats, we would like everyone to pay for this security together. We accomplish this through our common tax system. People pay their share. This is the Norwegian model (Stoltenberg’s National Executive Committee speech, 2009).

Labour constitutes a narrative of Labour’s transformation of Norway from a poor country to a welfare state. Norwegians used to live under poor conditions with little welfare. Labour solved the problems and developed the welfare state. The heroes in this story are Labour’s own leaders, or in Stoltenberg’s own words: ‘Like Einar Gerhardsen, we are building social services, industry and power plants. Like Trygve Bratteli, we are building infrastructure. Like Gro, we are building prosperity for the future and creating a sustainable society.’ (Stoltenberg’s National Executive Committee speech, 2010). According to Labour, the right wing has stood still and represents fundamentally different politics. Today’s Labour is thus the rightful heir, or ‘builders’.

The emergence of the welfare state as a construction project is a frequently used metaphor in Labour’s narratives. For example, ‘We build the country’ was the title of Stoltenberg’s speech to Labour’s National Executive Committee in 2010. In this way, Labour creates an image of itself as a constructor of a house or a home. Well-being is not something that is complete, but rather something that constantly needs to be further developed. Labour’s narratives thus become a perpetual myth of liberation and prosperity about a people who stood up and continue to fight the battle to constantly develop the welfare state under Labour’s leadership.

‘We’re a welfare party’

The Conservatives have been more characterized by national and Christian narratives than by welfare ones. An example is the Conservative leader Alv Kjøs in the final Party Leader Debate before the parliamentary elections of 1957. According to Kjøs, ‘we’ (the Norwegian people) are best able to meet the challenges of the future ‘when we have established a solid foundation in the Christian and moral values of our national and cul-
tural traditions in free democratic institutions’. Further, Kjøs reminded the Norwegian people that ‘we are people of an ancient culture and with a strong democratic tradition’ (Kjøs, Party Leader Debate, 1957). A later leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister, Kåre Willoch, talked about guarding ‘inherited values’ (Willoch, Party Leader Debate, 1981). In the Conservative Party’s narrative, Labour’s success story was turned into a small episode within a greater national, cultural and Christian success story which the Conservatives, just as much as Labour, were representatives of.

The Conservative Party also argued that they would invest in welfare, but essentially with a contemporary focus; through arguing, for example, that tax cuts are a prerequisite for welfare because lower taxes help increase the creation of wealth on whose funding welfare depends. When the Conservatives have used welfare narratives in their political persuasion, they have done so to trivialize, criticize, point out their own achievements in key welfare issues, or to verify that the Right contributed to building Norway. In recent years, however, the Conservatives seem to have exercised a more active ownership to the narratives of the welfare state. That being said, while Labour’s ideological use of welfare narratives communicates solidarity and communal mentality, the Conservatives’ ideological use of welfare narratives communicates liberalism and conservatism. In her National Convention speech of 2010, the Conservative leader Erna Solberg stated:

The rise of the Norwegian welfare society did not start with the state. On the contrary, it started off with all those who contributed on their own initiative. The first hospitals were established by the Church. It was the Red Cross that created the forerunner to the Help Asset Centre [Hjepemiddelsentralen]. In recent times, it is Franciscan Aid that has led the way in the effort to develop a relieving treatment for the seriously ill and dying. For more than 114 years, women in the health sector have played a crucial role in combating tuberculosis, establishing health stations and creating facilities for those suffering from rheumatism, the old and sick and others. As elected officials, we are in great debt to the non-governmental organizations and individuals that established our first welfare schemes. It is still the case that women in the health sector and other organizations take precedence over and establish new facilities that have not yet been covered by the state. Individuals still make a big difference. … (Solberg’s National Convention speech, 2010).

Solberg does exactly the same as Labour politicians have done since the emergence of the welfare state – she legitimizes the politics of today by referring to the past. But in Solberg’s narrative, it is not the state or the community that has built the welfare state, but rather non-governmental and private bodies. The Conservatives’ ideological activation of welfare narratives, like that of Labour, is expressed in a number of issues. For example, while Stoltenberg talks about higher taxes, Solberg talks about the opposite – lower taxes:

Millions of people are on their way out of poverty and about to climb the same welfare ladder that we in Norway climbed in the last century. We are the welfare party … and we pursue policies that are good for the business world. And it helps to create values and the “benefits” that create new jobs, better goods and services and greater tax revenues that can pay for public facilities. We are a business party – because we are a welfare party! (Solberg’s National Convention speech, 2006).
In another speech, Solberg emphasizes that ‘the soul of the Conservatives is located in welfare policy’, and ‘If I were to give Jens Stoltenberg a good piece of advice, it would be that he doesn’t have to pretend that Labour has built the society and the welfare state alone.’ She stressed that changing governments have developed the welfare state, and that it was a bourgeois government that stood behind the introduction of social security (Klassekampen 2010).

In Solberg’s account, the state, the public and the community are not enemies, but rather co-owners of a single project in which the private sector has played at least an active role. The Conservative Party is just as entitled as Labour to claim ownership of the welfare state.

The fact that the welfare state in itself has been internalized, and is experienced as self-evident by many Norwegians, may have contributed to the need of the Conservatives to employ these narratives in their persuasive efforts. A growing body of research into the development of the welfare state (Seip 1994; Kuhnle 1990), the gradually increasing coverage given to it in textbooks, the mass media’s references to the future of the welfare state and, last but not least, Labour’s constant references to these narratives, have created a positive history circle. New positive narratives have reinforced the old. This, combined with surveys showing that welfare issues score highly in what politics interest people, has made it difficult for the Conservatives to allow Labour to continue to have the ‘copyright’ on welfare narratives (Saglie 2009: 95–97).

Furthermore, changes in the political power constellations have made it possible for the Right to take welfare narratives into use. Since the 1960s, the Conservatives have also been in government, and the result has not been a systematic destruction of the welfare state and poverty, as one might infer from Labour’s point of view, but rather a further development of the welfare state. At the same time, all the political parties, including Labour, are struggling to solve the new welfare challenges related to policy areas such as health, the elderly, and student housing (Furre 2000/2006: 188–361). Labour has also moved to the political Right over the past 35 years, and become quite a different party from the one it was during Gerhardsen’s planned economy (Børhaug 2007: 25–105). Thus, new political factors have diminished Labour’s credibility as the sole carrier of the welfare narratives.

The Conservative Party’s new application of welfare narratives can also be understood as a defence against the electoral criticism that the Conservatives are a ‘Calculator Party’, with reference to the party’s major emphasis on economic issues. This criticism was established in the media and in the collective consciousness in the early 2000s, and created the impression that the Conservatives were more concerned with structures, processes and the wealthy than ordinary people’s lives (Aftenposten 2006). According to the Norwegian Conservative MP Thorbjorn Røe Isaksen, the result has been an increased awareness: ‘I think many in the party were struck by the criticism the Right got in 2005 for being “a calculator”. There has been an increased awareness among Conservatives that the leftwing cannot simply dominate the welfare debate alone.’ (Klassekampen 2010). The Conservative Party’s new application of welfare narratives can be understood as an attempt to prevent Labour from solely defining the policy debate.
The Conservatives experienced that they focused on welfare, but that Labour took their voters by associating themselves with “golden” narratives of the emergence of the welfare state, and that they thus implicitly frightened voters with an image of the Conservatives as associated with the opposite of what “true” welfare narratives are about. The cure for the Conservative Party has not been to revolt against welfare narratives, but rather to make attempts to take ownership of them. They have consequently positioned themselves on the Labour side of the playing field, competing for Labour’s arguably most important symbolic arena.

‘We are the new Labour Party’

The Progress Party has also tried to take ownership of welfare narratives. The Progress Party is relatively new in Norwegian politics. It was founded in 1973 as Anders Lange’s Party, and re-named ‘Fremskrittspartiet’ in 1977, with Carl I. Hagen as the leader, on a liberalist platform. The party has especially distinguished itself in promoting lower taxes and reduced bureaucracy. Today, it is also the party with the most restrictive immigration policies. The party has been a competitor to the Conservatives in particular, but has also taken many voters from Labour (Eriksen et al. 2003: 349–357).

Like the Conservatives, the Progress Party also uses narratives ideologically by referring to how individuals, private enterprises and sacrifices have built the welfare state. However, in the Progress Party’s communicative landscape, the elite–popular axis is more dominant than the ideological. According to Hagen, Labour has become an elite party which, together with some trade union careerists, has in many ways become the Conservatives of our time… The Progress Party is in many ways today what Labour was in the last century.’ (Marsdal 2007/2008: 61).

Togetherness is now the defining characteristic. Organizational construction continues. We have a great secretariat at Youngstorget, which is not simply by chance situated between LO [The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions] and the Labour Party. We are the new Labour Party! We adapt to the times. The Progress Party can unite workers and employers in the fight against the greed of the state (NTB 2003).

The current leader of the Progress Party, Siv Jensen, continues where Hagen left off. According to her, it is not the main interest organization for employees in Norway, “Landsorganisasjonen” (LO), or Labour that has built Norway, but individuals and workers. ‘This is the workers’ day. It’s not LO’s day. It’s not Labour’s day. It’s a day for ordinary workers, which is basically what we all are.’ And she went on to emphasize that LO and Labour have forgotten why we can all go to work every day: because the private sector creates jobs (Jensen’s speech, 1 May 2010).

The Liberals’ narratives can be understood against the background that Labour has recruited more people over the years from other spheres than the traditional working class. Many new Labour members and supporters have perceived themselves as middle
class and upper middle class; many of them have also been stigmatized in the political debate as ‘blå russ’\textsuperscript{117} (Dagsavisen 2005). In the Labour of today, labourers in the traditional sense seem to be in the minority: as Labour has accumulated increasing political power in Norway, it has concurrently become associated with the establishment, the elite (Bull 2007: 33–40).

In contrast, the Progress Party has for many years been actively working at the grass-root level and has recruited heavily from the traditional blue-collar environments, as representatives of the party and its elected bodies. This is precisely what the party flags explicitly. Many blue-collar workers and elderly (‘those who built the country’) feel ignored by the middle classes, and the Progress Party claims to offer them the new ‘People’s Party’ (Bull 2007: 33–40). The message that the Progress Party often both implies and states explicitly is that one has to distinguish between the Labour of Gerhardsen’s time and the Labour of today. The bottom line is that the Progress Party, not Labour, is the rightful heir to the welfare state and the Gerhardsen epoch.

No examples are more illustrative than the strategy Siv Jensen and her deputy Per Sandberg employed at a press conference in 2010 (Strand 2010). With Labour’s election posters displaying pictures of Gerhardsen behind them, they proclaimed, in familiar Labour style, that they would ‘build the country’. Using Labour’s old election posters and Labour terms such as ‘labourers’ and ‘build the country’, the Progress Party has taken over Labour’s own language. The message being communicated was that the Progress Party is the new Welfare Party, and Siv Jensen the new national mother figure (‘landsmoder’). As such, the Progress Party manifested itself as the heir to Labour’s proud tradition of fighting on behalf of ordinary working people.

The Progress Party claims that the ownership of welfare narratives should not be based on having participated in the construction of the welfare state, but rather on who currently best represents the values of that time. The Progress Party acknowledges that Labour built the welfare state, but that Labour has betrayed the ideals from that time, in the sense that it has become more elite orientated than a ‘welfare for all’ party. The Progress Party, with its focus on ordinary people, is thus the rightful heir to the history of the rise of the welfare state.

The narrative of the Progress Party differs from that of both Labour and the Conservatives. While the latter two point to continuity – how they themselves built the welfare state and thus implicitly guarantee its further development – the Progress Party points to an analogy. The Progress Party represents a repetition of the narrative in the sense of returning to the golden era. In other words, an employment of nostalgia. All parties idealize the narratives of building the welfare state, but none idealizes the past as much as the Progress Party.

\textsuperscript{117} “Blå russ” refers to elite members educated to a professional life within traditionally market/trade-orientated environments.
‘The legacy of Gerhardsen is threatened’

The Conservatives’ and the Progress Party’s attempts to take over welfare narratives has created a new situation for the Labour Party. The party has changed over time according to new social conditions, but for many its focus on welfare is what makes Labour. One could argue that the party has a form of ownership to the welfare concept (Aardal 2004: 23–24). If they were to lose this association, they could also risk losing themselves or their core values, and thus also voters. They could also come across as unreliable, or at best unable to adjust to changes in time.

Labour’s response to the Conservatives’ and the Progress Party’s interest in welfare narratives has been to try rewriting the Conservatives’ narrative, so that it becomes about extreme market liberalism, which will in fact destroy the welfare state – a sort of modern version of Gerhardsen’s narrative in which the Conservatives represented poverty in the interwar period. An example is Stoltenberg’s historical reference to a 30-year war between the state and the Conservatives and Progress Party, starting with Reagan and Thatcher:

The market is not self-regulating. It has to be adjusted. For many years have we heard the opposite message. Minimize regulations and minimize the state has been the chorus. Twenty-eight years ago, Ronald Reagan said in his inauguration speech that ‘the government is not the solution to our problem, the government is the problem.’ Margaret Thatcher went as far as to say that ‘... There is no such thing as a society.’ This was the start of three decades of uncritical promotion of the unregulated market, with deregulation of credit markets and a cultivation of greed. The right wing’s 30-year war against the state (Stoltenberg’s National Convention speech, 2009).

At the same time Stoltenberg consolidated Labour’s relationship with the welfare state, emphasizing that it is Labour that has changed Norway:

The Labour Party’s National Convention has made the decisions that changed Norway. The Convention in 1933 created the emergency programme for all people at work. The Convention in 1949 voted to entrust Norway’s security in NATO. The Convention in 1969 voted for women’s right to choose abortion. The Convention in 1989 voted for 6-year-olds to start school. And the Convention in 2007 adopted the world’s most ambitious climate policy (Stoltenberg’s National Convention speech, 2009).

Labour makes it clear in this way that the Conservatives and the Progress Party are not the heirs to the welfare history by rewriting their history; Labour underlines its sole ownership of the narratives by referring to its own political decisions throughout history. The Right uses similar strategies against Labour. For example, the Progress Party since Hagen’s days as party leader have connected Labour with narratives of extreme socialism and its regimes:
No, the truth is that this is the area with the greatest deficiencies, precisely because it is organized according to the same socialist principles as the Soviet Union. And in the USSR and other socialist planned economies, there are queues for all goods and services… Look to the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and other socialist countries. They have used a system of public regulations on all goods and services. The consequences? Queues, waiting lists and a shortage of products (Hagen, 1988).

Welfare narratives as political ‘framing’

The historical narratives of Labour, the Conservatives and the Progress Party can be discussed in relation to the term ‘framing’. According to the American linguist George Lakoff, ‘framing’ is about the ability politicians have to provide positive associations to their own policies, and negative associations to those of their opponent (Lakoff 2004: 3–4). The employment of narratives is ‘framing’ when politicians represent their policies in a particular way in order to associate them with the emergence of the welfare state. For many Norwegians, welfare narratives elicit associations to fundamental values, pride, and identity. Not everyone would agree with the political positions of Labour, the Conservatives or the Progress Party on different matters, but most people would agree that welfare and ‘the Norwegian model’ is something positive, based on its fundamental position in the history of Norwegian identity. This makes it potently persuasive.

In this kind of narratives, one does not appeal to the knowledge of the voters and their capacity to reflect, but rather to their perceptions of the welfare state, where emotions are at least as important as rationality. Over time, Labour has highlighted that their former leader Einar Gerhardsen almost built Norway with his own hands, while the Conservatives and the Progress Party symbolize a dark story of market failure. In principle, this is not so different from the Conservatives’ attempts to write Labour out of the national history of the early 20th century.

But the welfare state did not primarily develop through the conflict between the Right and Labour, but rather through consensus as a result of negotiations, compromises and common decisions (Åmark 2005: 34–35). Thus, even though Labour was the dominant political force in the growth of the welfare state, one cannot give them all the credit for its development. One can argue that even the Progress Party, which was founded after the emergence of the welfare state, represents some of this heritage. Just like Labour during the interwar period, the Progress Party was built up as a grass- root movement; just like Labour, it claims to be a community-building party. However, in its narratives the Progress Party keeps silent about the differences between Labour and themselves; for example, that their liberalistic American values clash with Gerhardsen’s views regarding a planned economy.

Common for the Conservatives, the Progress Party and Labour is the growth of the welfare state as a story of something ‘good’. But this story also represents a truth with certain reservations. Modernization, mass culture, prosperity and welfare development
created post-Second World War conformity, including rigid role expectations in relation to gender, for example. At the same time the Norwegianization of minorities continued (although officially ended). Minorities such as the Sami felt pressured to rid themselves of their ethnic belonging and take part in the new society. Overall, there was little acceptance for those who didn’t conform. Norwegian and Swedish so-called vagabonds, and Roma, were condemned as well as abused to the extent of sterilization authorized by the government (Helle 1996/2005: 311).

In his studies of populist communication, Ernesto Laclau argues: ‘The problem begins when the condemnation replaces the explanation, which is what happens when some phenomena are seen as aberrations dispossessed of any rational graspable cause.’ (Laclau 2005/2007: 250). The same applies to the narratives. ‘We are the new Labour’, ‘This is the Norwegian model’, and ‘We are also a welfare party’ do not provide lessons for the future. In the long run such narratives risk becoming empty rituals if they are not connected to the historical context, specific and critical discussions of what it means to be a new Labour, and what a welfare party is today.

On the other hand, the historical references in politics are in accordance with how the brain organizes knowledge. The brain does not do this by assimilating the welfare state’s complexity in time and space, but rather by organizing knowledge in simple categories, using terms of ‘contradictions’ that either destroy or build the welfare state: ‘analogies’ that ‘We are the new Labour Party’, or “development optimism’, such as the construction of the welfare state as a series of very brave efforts from the community or from private initiatives (Zerubavel 2003: 1 ff.).

The voters do not necessarily take sides in the political debate by rationally weighing up various aspects of an issue in order to arrive at a conclusion. Social psychological research has shown that people also make decisions based on values and emotions (Westen 2007: 3–88). Long ago, Aristotle pointed out that someone who attempts to convince others by the use of ‘logos’ (sense), and ‘ethos’ (personality), must also demonstrate emotion (‘pathos’) (Aristotle 2006: 27–28). This means that welfare narratives can be at least as persuasive as rational argumentation. At the same time, most people do not have the opportunity to immerse themselves in politics during a busy day. With this in mind, one can argue that narratives essentially enable people to understand and get involved in welfare policy, and as such are indispensable for democracy.

In conclusion

The political struggle for the power to shape the further development of the welfare state is a battle for ownership of the right selection and the right interpretation of welfare narratives. However, while the Conservatives form their story as a continuation of how also private initiatives built the welfare state, the Progress Party also forms its story as an analogy about Labour’s treason against the welfare state and their claim that they are now the rightful heirs to welfare narratives. Labour, on the other hand, is afraid
to lose its ideological foundation and voters, and emphasizes its historic ownership of narratives with an idealized story – one continuing into the present – of how this party was in the driver’s seat during the construction of the welfare state. At the same time, Labour rewrites the history of the political Right as one of extreme market liberalism. However, Labour has not yet found a new frame that can trump the political Right’s threats to take over the claim to the welfare history. Common to both the Right and Labour is that they use welfare narratives as framing, and thus create the impression that their political positions are about fundamental values and a sense of identity to which many Norwegians can relate.

However, the welfare debate in general is dominated by rational contemporary arguments. Labour tries to get the voters to choose between welfare and tax cuts, while the Right attempts to convince people that tax cuts are a prerequisite for welfare. But in an age where the welfare state faces challenges in the form of a growing elderly population, a financial crisis, and uncertainty about how social benefits will be financed, the narratives about the emergence of the welfare state can assume more power as the promise of a new golden age where everything is good and safe.

In Sweden, this seems to have been the case. The Swedes also developed a welfare state after the Second World War that was not so different from the Norwegian one. Most recently, the Swedish Conservative Party, Moderaterna, won many voters by crossing over to the Social Democratic field and taking ownership of welfare narratives by arguing that, ‘We will be the party that preserves our society’ and ‘We are the only Labour’ (Smith 2010; Aftenposten 2010). In Norway, the Conservatives and the Progress Party seem to have attempted to win the 2011 municipal and county elections in the same way.

Welfare narratives seem to have been what nationalist narratives were like before the war, and what the war narratives were in the post-war period. In the interwar period, Labour fought hard against the political Right to create an image of itself as a party that was just as concerned as the Right with building up the nation. After the Second World War, the war narratives became a new ‘myth of origin’ for the new Norway, which both the Right and Left used to win the political debate. Nowadays, welfare narratives seem to be Norway’s new ‘myth of origin’ in the political debate, over which both the Right and Labour struggle for ownership.
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Preserving the past and intervening in the future through memorials and gravestones

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In this article we will discuss and describe the ideological statements and design of memorials and gravestones. In other publications we have discussed the importance of memorials and gravestones in nation-building in Norway (Dessingué et al. 2009; Smith-Solbakken & Weihe 2011b). In this article we will include other memorials and tombstones. Thus, the discussion will relate not only to the Second World War but also to other events.

We will make an attempt to discuss the importance of the memorials and gravestones at the time they were erected, their use and the possible change of use in the later public discourse. Finally, we will question their importance today. The latter obviously also points to the possible importance in the future. We realize, of course, that we will merely be able to question and give preliminary discussions related to a field of great complexity. Still, we do think that the questioning and discussions are of importance for later discussions and research.

The use of memorials and tombstones both in public ceremonies and by individuals give proof of their importance. Well-maintained graves tell another story than overgrown and unmaintained graves. Fresh flowers and frequent visitors illustrate the importance. The manifestations of the past in interaction with the present provide us with material for a number of discussions about the importance of the gravestones and memorials. Thus the discussion and reflection is not only related to the importance of the historical context of the past, but also to a community or society in change (Frykman & Ehn 2007). A discussion of this kind can obviously be related to a number of interpretations and analyses of historical processes (Foucault 1979; Geremek 1994; Weihe 2004).

This article focuses upon providing the contours of a large field of research. Thus, details are only given in order to present the larger picture and illuminate the importance and use of gravestones and memorials. In a way we are addressing ideology and values, and we anticipate discussions as a result.
Memorials and gravestones

Memorials and gravestones tell us about a complexity of values, feelings, as well as political and religious convictions. They often display highly emotional statements of grief, honour the dead and, in a way, give the deceased a presence in the future. Memorials serve as reminders of the importance of what the future will have to build upon, as well as of individuals who should have a sort of eternal presence in the community, for the nation or a particular group of people. The selection process of whom or what to remember is an obvious part of this, even to the extent of being regulated by law. Some memorials and gravestones will disappear, while others are thought of as worthy of maintaining and preserving.

In our research we not only investigate the physical evidence, such as inscriptions and design, maintenance, flowers and candles, but have also interviewed visitors, read articles about use, and been present at ceremonies. There are obvious ethical and political dimensions of conducting such research (Weihe 2008). On one occasion, our pointing out the lack of memorials for Jews who died during the Holocaust of the Second World War led to a heated local discussion about the importance of erecting such a memorial (Dessingué et al., in Syvertsen & Weihe 2009; Weihe et al. 2010a/b). Much of the discussion locally is about, on the one hand, shaming the local community and those who co-operated with the enemy and, on the other hand, shaming the local community for not remembering the local Jews of the past.

Our research into memorials and gravestones has also involved us in discussions of traumatic events of the present. After the terrorist attacks of 22 July, we have been involved in a number of discussions about how to remember those who lost their lives, honouring the dead, showing respect for those grieving, and showing collective unity and values (Boyesen et al. 2011; Fones et al. 2011; Hosar et al. 2011; Smith-Solbakken & Weihe 2011a; Weihe & Solbakken 2011a/b).

The terrorist attacks of 22 July 2011

In modern Norwegian history, no events have been as traumatic to the nation as the terrorist attacks of 22 July. Even if more people were killed when the Alexander Kiel-land oil platform collapsed on 27 March 1980 (Ryggvik & Smith-Solbakken 1997), the terrorist attacks represented an entirely different and far more traumatic event, as they were deliberate and attacked the very values of society. In Oslo, important central government buildings were destroyed, and on the island of Utøya young people from the largest political party in the country massacred. These young people were from the whole country; representatives of local Social Democratic youth organizations.

After the attack and the arrest of the perpetrator, there were large remembrance gatherings; some of them planned, others spontaneous. In Oslo the largest gathering since the Second World War was organized. All over the country there were memorial services
and memorial gatherings. Enormous amounts of flowers, memorial letters, candles and memorial items were deposited by people. In many places old memorial structures were used as sites of gathering and memory (Smith-Solbakken & Weihe 2011a; Weihe & Solbakken 2011a; Weihe 2011).

For us as researchers, it was natural to participate in the gatherings. Just as other Norwegians, we were greatly shocked and affected. In addition, being academics who had worked with questions of grief and trauma we became professionally involved, and suddenly found ourselves in the middle of important discussions and decisions that had to be made. The immediate discussions were about how to take care of memorial letters and the documentation of the events (Fones et al. 2011; Hosar et al. 2011) and the long-term decisions about how to relate not only to the memory, but also how to show respect for those in grief and show collective unity and values. The latter pointed to the future and the discussions are in no way concluded, but rather ongoing and relate to the nation as a collective, the fundamental values of humanity, and at the same time the trauma of individuals.

Revising this article, after editorial comments, came in the midst of those discussions. Thus we were faced with including the completely unanticipated trauma in the article. In a way we felt that we had no other choice. The day of 22 July will forever be part of Norwegian history, in the same way as 9 April, when Norway was invaded during the Second World War, 8 May, when that war ended, and 17 May, the Norwegian Constitution Day. Still, we do not know how those in the future will interpret the trauma of our present time. What we know is the trauma of today, and we also know that an assemblage of representatives of all political parties, all religious creeds, and across cultural differences, want to acknowledge the importance of the trauma and show collective unity. Moreover, we know that that unity and the memorials to be erected, and gravestones already in place, point to the future.

We further know that there are political differences and conflicts not visible in the seemingly uniform collective grief and remembrance gatherings. One can anticipate that the events will be discussed and re-interpreted in time to come. Obviously, one can also expect forthcoming research and numerous publications on the subject, as well as new ceremonies and, of course, memorials (Weihe & Smith-Solbakken 2011b).

The emotions of memorials

A striking number of memorials have been erected just after highly emotional events. Many of the war memorials and those for other traumas are examples. However, there are also a number of memorials erected a long time after the events happened. An example of the latter are the many memorials erected in memory of the Jews killed during the war. Gravestones are an entirely different matter and are put up shortly after a burial. Those responsible, mostly the family, might take some time to arrange for a permanent stone, but most will be decided upon and in place within a fairly short time (Weihe & Smith-Solbakken 2011c).
The emotional aspects of the memorials and gravestones are hard to penetrate, but easy to acknowledge and sometimes very much present. The terrorist attacks made us acutely aware of just how important that impact is and, moreover, the need for people deeply affected to have places to gather and sites of grief. In many cases earlier events and identifiable places of memory acquire new meaning and are charged with new emotions when new traumas occur. The evidence comprises interviews with people gathering in times of memory at old places of memory, and their stories of that importance, as well as how they signify their reactions through memorial letters, flowers, etc.

In most cases people do not talk about the nation, religion or the greater meaning of life, but rather the emotional aspect. A surprisingly number also mention how they relate to those who must have been in grief and those who have erected memorials a long time ago. After one of our articles about grief was published in a local newspaper, one of us was contacted by a mother who had lost her son in a traffic accident (Weihe 2011). She told of how she felt like being in a community with other mothers who had lost their sons, by relating to other gravestones and events that in some way resembled her own situation. One of those gravestones was from the 1890s, another from the war; but still, the epitaphs and the similar ages of the deceased meant that the mothers and fathers were part of the same emotional community of grieving parents.

Reactions such as those she described can be related to certain events affecting an individual or the community (Stern 2007; Weihe 2008). Analyzing from a psychological perspective gives insights into the emotions given to the symbols and ceremonies that will be part of the experience of both the single gravestones and memorials and their context. The latter might be a cemetery, a place of memory and even the wider surroundings.

**Today’s practice and the bureaucracy of civilian graves**

Twenty years after a person is laid to rest in a Norwegian cemetery, the gravestone can be removed unless the lease of the grave is renewed (Lov om kirker og kirkegaarde, 1897:§37; Aagedal 1994). After a hundred years the grave will be protected by state regulations and cannot be removed. Such are the rules, and that is why a great many visitors looking for signs of their old family will find no gravestones of their relatives in local cemeteries. Usually the family will be pre-warned by a small notice on the gravestone. As addresses tend to change and relatives die, many will not be contacted by letter, but some will be if they are known to the local authorities. New regulations even give instructions as to the size of gravestones. The old large ones of the past can be maintained, but new stones of a similar size cannot be erected.

Over the years, cemeteries will change. Those with well-off families and those with a good economy and routines will mostly ensure that graves are maintained. Thus, it often seems like the world of the past consists of businessmen, lawyers, the well-educated and wealthy. Farmers are mostly tied to the land, and thus the proportion of farmers increases in cemeteries while farm workers and smallholders tend to disappear.
The cemeteries turn into resting places for those of importance not only in the past, but also in the present.

Even if poverty is an acknowledged fact of history, the dead bodies of the poor are hidden away and best forgotten (Geremek 1994). The practices of those in charge of cemeteries and the law maintain social differences and ensure that memory is reserved for the select few chosen by society or by economy.

The private world of memorials and politics

Memorials in Norway are mostly erected by private organizations and sometimes local public administrations. Looking at memorials, typical initiators would be youth organizations, historical societies, and even in some cases scouting associations and teetotal organizations.

Even the gravestones of certain important people, for example those who died during the war, will be erected by or at least supported by such organizations. State agencies rarely initiate memorials, but with a few exceptions, such as the large war memorial at Akershus Fortress in Oslo, memorials for celebrated people of national importance, like Ibsen and Bjørnson, and in commemoration of certain important events.

Gravestones are mostly a matter for the family. Thus, gravestones of the past reflect the wealth and importance of the deceased. Today, uniform standards for the size of gravestones apply, and therefore differences are no longer as visible as earlier. Still, those belonging to families with large gravestones of the past can add new names and thus maintain their traditional family position in society.

Events like those of 22 July create a need for state memorials and even individual graves symbolized as being part of the heritage and identity of the nation. Leading politicians, like the Norwegian Prime Minister, have publicly acknowledged the importance of this, yet we still do not know how it will be manifested.

The memory of what did not exist

At Tretten in Gudbrandsdal there are three large and tall memorial stones. One of the memorials was erected by the Tretten Youth Organization (Tretten Ungdomslag) on 17 May 1914 to commemorate those who participated in guarding the border towards Sweden in the years 1807–1814. This memorial stone is situated close to Tretten Church, just outside the churchyard. Another stone, situated close to Tretten railway station, commemorates those from Tretten who died fighting the German occupation forces during the Second World War. Both of the memorial stones commemorate events that took place and people that existed.
The third memorial stone is rather different; not by its design, but rather because it commemorates a person who most probably never lived in nor had any connection to the local community. It is situated in Musdalen, a small valley close to Tretten. The memorial stone commemorates Eirik Bjodaskalle, the father of the Viking-age King Olav Trygvasson. It is a highly disputed object, and that Eirik Bjodaskalle ever lived is most likely a total fabrication (Stranger 2010: 23–27). Bjodaskalle is known from the old sagas; however, he most probably lived in a totally different place: Hå, in Jæren, just south of Stavanger. The memorial stone was erected in 1926 by the Youth Organization and The Local Language Association (Tretten Mållag). During the planning of the memorial the initiators were in contact with the leading scholars of the Viking Age. They all contradicted the idea of Eirik Bjodaskalle ever having lived at Tretten and in Musdalen. Interestingly, the stone was still erected, and locally it became established as a fact that Bjodaskalle had lived there. Even if scholars disputed that he had ever lived locally, the memorial illustrated the national pride of the local people (Stranger 2010:67). The local community felt great pride in the memorial, and it has been actively used by the community.

At Harkmark Church close to Mandal, a circle of erected tall stones is situated just outside the gate to the churchyard. A small sign states that the circle was erected about 500 B.C., and unlike all other such stone circles it has a particularly small diameter. While visiting the site, a man passing by told us that his father had been the churchwarden and had erected the circle. According to him, his father had erected the circle in order to make it look historical. The stones had been collected from local farms where they had been used as gate stones. His father had always thought that after one generation it would be interpreted as genuinely of great age. The size of the circle was small because he had to construct it in a way that made it possible for cars to pass around it (Field work notes, 8 August 2010).

In both cases the active construction of an historical past was important for certain members of the community. The facts of history were in a way of minor importance compared with the active use and construction of a past. This was not only important for members of the local community, but also for the understanding of the local community by outsiders.

Ignored in life and made invisible after death

On Helgøya, an island in Lake Mjøsa, there were a number of institutions. One of them was an old people’s home for Russian and Eastern European refugees from the Russian Revolution, another for young boys with behaviour problems, and a third for the mentally retarded (in the parlance of the time). The Russian and Eastern European refugees have a protected place in the cemetery by the chapel centrally located on the island. Many of the refugees came as children and have their place of birth listed as the Soviet Union, others in Russia. The question of nationality and nation of birth was a significant political issue at the time of the Cold War and the Soviet Union as a superpower.
Many of the mentally retarded died on the island, and for a long time their burial plots were situated in another corner of the cemetery. A few years ago there were several rows of gravestones, but today just a few remain. Many of the mentally retarded had been ignored by their families in life, and no one saw any reason to pay for the renewal of the lease for the graves. Thus those who were ignored in life and hidden away on the island are also ignored after death. All traces of the institutional history of the mentally retarded are disappearing at the cemetery. The story will remain in archives and local history accounts, but there are no longer any visual reminders on the island of a past that perhaps many thought best forgotten. After all, the large isolated institutions for the mentally retarded and the insane are today acknowledged as constituting a past we no longer can identify with; representing both methods and ideologies no longer accepted (Horndalen 1991).

Lately, a number of groups, like New Age travellers or the Roma people, have given high priority to erecting memorials for their past and their dead (Hazell 2002; Schlüter 1993; Viborg & Weihe, in Syvertsen et al. 2009). Their initiatives illustrate the importance given to being visible and having a memory by groups of people historically excluded and rejected by society.

The unwanted and destroyed

During the Second World War the Nazi authorities erected a large number of memorials. In Norway the first of these was erected after the so-called Altmark incident 1940, when a German ship with British prisoners on board was attacked in Norwegian territorial waters by a British force. These prisoners were rescued and seven German soldiers were killed. Norwegian naval inspectors had inspected the ship (Grimnes 1984:38–42). Nazi Germany argued that the episode illustrated that Norway was not able to defend its own territory and prevent a savage British attack on a civilian German ship in neutral waters. The British point of view was that the Norwegians were accepting German misuse of their territory, carried out no proper inspections of naval ships disguised as civilian ships, and had neither the will nor power to protect their neutrality.

The erected memorial “For the Heroes from Altmark” was frequently used in the propaganda war. A large number of other German memorials were erected in Norway during the Second World War, but none of them remain. Neither do the memorials erected by the Norwegian National Socialist movement.

Another aspect of avoiding memorials for the enemy was the distasteful case relating to some of the dead being innocent victims of the Allied forces. Analyzing the deaths of imprisoned German soldiers after the end of the war provides evidence of a number of injustices (Kallelid et al. 2011).
Memorials and graves in the service of nationalism

Travelling in the areas around the border between southern Hedmark and Østfold in Norway and Bohuslän and Värmland in Sweden, one sees landscapes with very much the same characteristics. Often it is even difficult for a traveller to tell on which side of the border he or she is; however, traffic signs, just as house styles, make national differences visible. There are also clear differences in cemeteries, memorials and public buildings like churches. On the Norwegian side of the border there are many memorials, and in many cemeteries there are memorials for those who died during the Second World War. A number of memorials also exist from the war of 1807 – 1814, and nearly all of them are situated on the Norwegian side of the border. The memorials testify to brave deeds and the heroic defence of the nation. Most of the memorials were erected just before 1900 or in the years up to the end of the First World War.

However, there are some Swedish memorials. One of the memorials is at Eda Skans (or, in English, the Eda Fortification). The monument was erected in 1954, at a time when Norwegians were still busily erecting memorials for the heroes of the war of 1940 – 1945. The memorial at Eda is in memory of the Norwegian and Swedish men who fought and were killed in war (Field work notes, 15 August 2010). Unlike the Norwegian memorials, there are no national statements, and Norwegians and Swedes are remembered equally.

Those in the service of the enemy

The war graves and memorials erected by the local Norwegian National Socialist movement and the Nazi German authorities during the war were thought of as symbols of the aggressor and therefore unwanted. In addition, the Nazi symbolism used on the memorials and even individual gravestones was perceived as a provocation. Such symbolism was unwanted by Germany and other nations and had to be removed. One of the reasons for German war cemeteries, graves and memorials being highly controversial was the tradition of “hero worship” and political use of the memorial places. In a way, the German War Graves Commission was challenged with turning the memorial sites into individual places of memory and grief, and national symbols into symbols of peace and a futile war that never should have been fought.

In many cases even individual graves and gravestones were removed if they had belonged to someone who could be identified with the Nazi movement. Sometimes this practice even included family members not in the Nazi movement and family gravestones from before the Second World War. We have a number of oral sources for this, but it seems that no official policy was involved, only individual and local initiatives (Smith-Solbakken & Weihe 2011d). From recent publications and from interviews, we know about a number of graves of those who had been in the service of
Cold War and hot memorials

In Norway there were numerous memorials and graves for Yugoslavian and Soviet prisoners of war. After the war these memorials became a matter of great political concern. Many of them were situated close to military installations, and Norwegian authorities did not want Soviet military representatives visiting the graves. In addition, the graves were important from a political point of view for those who supported the Soviet Union.

Thus, many graves were removed, in the so-called Operation Asfalt, to a few selected spots by the Norwegian authorities. The removal took place despite often very vocal local protests. In the industrial town of Mo i Rana in northern Norway, protests were vehement and local resistance to the removal of the graves threatened to turn violent. An armed naval ship, KNM Andenæs, was commanded to escort the transportation of the disinterred, and if necessary use force against the protesters. In the case of Rana, during the so-called “Churchyard War” (Kirkegårdskrigen), tensions ran high and a large number of the locals tried to prevent the removal of the dead. The town had one of the strongest Communist movements in Norway and, in addition, the planned removal offended the Church, which objected to disturbing the peace of the dead (Titlestad 1997, 2010).

In the end the protesters were successful and a Soviet memorial, erected by Soviet prisoners of war, remains in the churchyard (Titlestad 1997: 53–60). The unsuccessful removal was attempted during the very tense situation of the Korean War. Tensions between East and West were extreme, and the Swedish magazine Se wrote: “Mo i Rana will hardly go into history as the Sarajevo of Norway, but the background is serious enough” (Quoted in Titlestad 1997:57 and Jacobsen 1988).

Comparing the situation to the one in Sarajevo which ignited the First World War illustrates that tension was so severe that some thought a grave removal in a small town in northern Norway might start the Third World War. In retrospect, the tension was so great that it could very well have resulted in armed resistance and the loss of life. The Soviet Union delivered diplomatic protests to the Norwegian government, and the situation could very well have been used as an excuse for escalating tensions between the Western and Eastern powers.
The honoured, celebrated and acknowledged

In the town of Lillehammer there is a tall “bauta”-like memorial; a granite stone with the names of local Norwegian people who lost their lives during the Second World War. The acknowledged victims exclude those Norwegians who died fighting as part of the National Socialist war effort, as well as those from other communities who lost their lives locally and others not defined as locals. The Allied and Soviet war dead have their own memorials and graves, and all the German war dead have been removed to a German war cemetery in Oslo.

North of Lillehammer in Kvam, in the middle of the valley of Gudbrandsdal, a large memorial stone has been erected for all those Norwegians from Gudbrandsdal who died fighting the Germans. Civilians are not mentioned on the memorial stone.

Further north, at the very northern end of Gudbrandsdal, there are two large memorial stones in a small park by the local church. Both stones commemorate military victims of the fighting in 1940. One of them commemorates the first US soldier to die in the war. He was a military attaché to the embassy in Oslo and died accidentally due to German bombing of the railway. His death was termed accidental as the USA and Germany were at the time still not at war. The other stone mentions all the Norwegian military war dead in the fighting at Dovre. The civilians killed there, even those assisting the military forces, are not mentioned on the memorial.

Further west, at Lesjaskog, there are three tall granite memorials erected by the local church. One of the memorials is dedicated to those participating in the war of 1807 – 1814, another commemorates those who migrated to America, and the third all those who died locally in the fighting during the invasion of 1940. Unlike the other memorials, both Norwegians and Allied soldiers are named.

In Oslo, one civilian who helped the Norwegian forces during the fighting at Dovre is buried in the Jewish Cemetery. His gravestone is rather large and commemorates his war effort during the invasion. Jews arrested locally in Gudbrandsdal and Lillehammer and who later died in the death camps in Europe are named, as are other Jewish victims on another memorial for all those who died during the Holocaust. None of the names are to be found on any local memorials (Weihe & Smith-Solbakken, in Dessingué et al. 2010).

The mix – grief; painful, good and distorted memories

Visiting cemeteries frequently means relating to people who sometimes want to be left alone and at other times very much want the opposite. At times it means meeting people experiencing grief, sometimes having painful memories and sometimes having good memories. Since we deliberately wanted to talk to people at cemeteries, and since many of them had a great interest in us as researchers taking notes and photographing, we had a great number of conversations with people we met at such sites.
Quite obviously we have to treat those we interview with respect and understanding. In many of the interviews we have found it helpful to be one man and one woman. The reason is simply that many people relate in slightly different ways to males and to females. In our experience this is helpful in order to relate to both the factual and the emotional aspects of life. Then, of course, being a man might make it easier to gain an understanding – or rather an atmosphere of understanding – of typical male experiences such as being part of a military unit. Such experiences mean being part of a male culture, with all its values and experiences. Emotions like grief and love, on the other hand, might be easier to share with a female. Emotions are part of the bonds between males and females in addition to being bonds between males and between females (Vetlesen 1998; Weihe 2008).

However, individual reactions should never be treated according to categorized standard procedures. Individual reactions are always personal and depend on the context and the state of the individual at the particular time of the interviews. The ability to take care of the individuals interviewed is based partly on personal skills developed through life, and partly capacities developed through professional practice. Mostly, such skills are so mixed together that we can hardly separate what is professional from what is personal. As described, people sometimes lie, sometimes remember wrong, and sometimes have grossly distorted memories of the past (Aale 2009: 21).

Obviously, the graves and memorials are used to signal certain values and are often part of a Christian understanding of death. Among those criticizing the latter use was the Norwegian politician, member of the resistance and earlier concentration camp inmate Sverre Løberg (1905 – 1976). In a heated discussion with the Norwegian bishop Dagfinn Hauge (1908 – 2007), he accused Hauge of using the war dead in religious propaganda even if the deceased had never shared that belief (Løberg 1966; Hauge 1946). The points made by Løberg and Hauge illuminate that all discussions of graves, memorials and war dead will have to relate to the political and religious dimensions of death. The dead themselves might have identified with different values than those their military units, family and nation gave them.

Concluding remarks

Recent events will sometimes infuse old memorials and even individual gravestones with new meaning and new emotions. In the present it is often difficult to imagine the importance both of the future and the past; it is only possible to relate to what we see and what is remembered, that which is possible to document, and whatever is used in ceremonies of our time.

The reality of death and sudden loss has always meant that people need community action in one way or another. In traditional Norwegian society, this was in some places organized in in such a way that several smallholders worked together in times of need. In Havråtunet, one of the few remaining village-like settlements in western Norway, this was done in the so-called seven units (Skre 1994). Seven small farms not only pooled
their work effort when harvesting, but also in relation to care and funerals. Memorials, gravestones and burial places are part of the local community effort and sometimes of national agendas. During the German occupation in the Second World War they were erected as symbols of the power of the occupier. Thus, for those occupied they were hated symbols of oppression and the rape of the nation. Then, of course, it is a question of who is to be included, who excluded, and interpreting the past in order to communicate with and influence the future (Frykman & Ehn 2007).

The historian interpreting the use of memorials needs to be aware of both the historical context of memorials and gravestones and also of who is excluded and what is deliberately avoided. The memorials to the brave fight against the foe of Sweden in 1807 – 1814 were all erected at the end of the century and even into the next, as part of the movement of Norwegian nationalism and movement for independence (Nerbøvik 1976). The interpretation of the past was then used as a tool for future political action. In Sweden it was rather the opposite: there are few memorial and those that exist seem to have been erected after Norway gained its independence. Sweden had no interest in Norwegian independence and hoped to maintain the Union.

Going back in history, being buried outside churchyards meant being excluded from salvation. Those born outside of marriage, committing suicide, those executed or simply excluded were damned by man and God. Such practices can be found in many countries and are perhaps best seen in the cases of those executed (Potter 1993; Foucault 1979). In historical terms, the poor are included for a short time and then excluded as their lease of a burial plot is terminated. All of us will “turn into dust”, however society choose who to remember and who to forget. Economic, cultural and social power is evident and reproduced in cemeteries. The poor were a resource, a nuisance and a reality (Geremek 1994). Still, they could be made invisible, at least in the long term. Looking into the past through the lens of what exists as memorials, gravestones and other sources also requires carrying out archaeology, in order to discover that which is not otherwise visible (Foucault 1984, 1997).

Thus the structures of capitalist society always ensure that landholders and the wealthy remain on top with their memorials and stable, lasting family economy (Marx 1939). Using a Marxist interpretation, the cemeteries illustrate the structures of power in society and the political economy. What is visible also tells us what is suppressed and made invisible.

Cemeteries and places of memorials are part of the public sphere using the written word, in the form of epitaphs, inscriptions and sometimes outright political statements (Habermas 1996). The latter is best of all seen on war memorials and memorials for important national heroes such as, for example, the national poet and novelist Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson (1832 – 1910) (Weihe, in Herje et al. 2010). In the latter case this atheist novelist and poet was even turned into a religious person after his death, to be used as a moral national hero for the newborn nation.

Interpretation of the structural transformation of the public sphere needs to take into consideration not only the content of publications, but also statements and interactions with the past represented by symbols, memorials and gravestones (Habermas 1996). None of us can avoid such places, and in the end we and all others will be part of them.
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(Footnotes)

1 “knowledge” here is used as an approximate translation of the Ukrainian original ‘uiavlennia’ (уявлення) that have connotations of both knowledge, imagination, perception and memory.
In order to bring research in Memory Studies conducted in the Nordic countries together, to connect existing knowledge and to promote cooperation, a group of scholars from the universities of Lund, Karlstad, Stavanger, Copenhagen, Helsinki and Tartu in 2009 initiated the Nordic Network in Memory Studies. That year the network was awarded financial support from NordForsk for three years, and a network project was launched with the title "Towards a Common Past? Conflicting Memories and Competitive Historical Narratives in Europe after 1989." The network presently includes about 45 researchers (both senior and PhD candidates).

This book includes a selection of papers given by members of the NordForsk network during two workshop meetings in 2009 and 2010. Its aim is to demonstrate the variety of subjects and empirical cases that our network members deal with, as well as the range of disciplines they represent. The contributions to the volume are united by the authors' keen research interest in the functions and dynamics of cultural memory.