REFRAMING AND RESOLVING CONFLICT

Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations 1988-1998

Karin Aggestam

Lund Political Studies 108
The cover displays the word of peace in Arabic (salaam) and in Hebrew (shalom).
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA   Central Intelligence Agency
DOP   Declaration of Principles
DFLP  Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
EC    European Community
ECF   Economic Cooperation Foundation
EPC   European Political Cooperation
EU    European Union
FAFO  Forskningsstiftelsen for studier av Arbeidsliv, Fagbevegelse og Offentlig Politikk
GAR   General Assembly Resolution
GCC   Gulf Cooperation Council
IDF   Israeli Defence Forces
IGO   Inter-Governmental Organisation
ISGA  Interim Self-Government Authority
NGO   Non-Governmental Organisation
NUG   National Unity Government
OPEC  Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PA    Palestinian Authority
PCP   Palestine Communist Party
PISGA Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority
PFLP  Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO   Palestine Liberation Organisation
PNC   Palestine National Council
PPP   Palestine People’s Party
UN    United Nations
UNL   Unified National Leadership
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
US    United States
Part I

Introduction
Chapter I

UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT

The symbolic handshake in 1993 between two former arch-enemies, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat, signalled a major shift in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A spontaneous question raised by many, including myself, was how it was possible for this shift to occur after many decades of conflict. This doctoral thesis originates in a basic puzzle concerning the continuity and change in meaning and behaviour, and in strategies for resolving an intractable conflict. In the past ten years, we have seen both an upsurge of violent conflicts, for example, in the Balkans, Rwanda and Somalia, and a transition from conflict to cooperation in several disputes in the Middle East, South Africa and Northern Ireland.

The aim of this study is to elucidate the problematique of how adversaries in a seemingly intractable conflict, such as the Israeli-Palestinian case, reach a point where they seek to resolve the conflict through negotiations. Examination of the processes that lead to the acceptance of negotiation is particularly interesting when considering that most conflicts today tend to defy negotiated and mediated settlement (see, for instance, Wallensteen 1994; Zartman 1995). Only fifteen per cent of internal, civil conflicts, for example, end through negotiated settlements (Stedman 1996: 343). Moreover, only one-third of those negotiated agreements hold for more than five years, which points to the immense challenge of implementing negotiated agreements in order to consolidate peace (Licklider 1995: 686). The oscillation between cooperation and conflict in post-agreement phases reveals the non-linear nature of resolving conflict and calls into question many widely held understandings of how conflicts may be brought to an end.

The construction of theories about these multifaceted, complex characteristics of conflict has long posed a challenge to conflict researchers. In this study, I seek to develop a theoretical framework based on an agent-structure approach to the analysis of the intricate, dynamic and contradictory processes of reframing and resolving conflict. I will begin by examining how continuity and change in conflict have been conceptualised in conflict theory. How are such
key concepts as conflict settlement, resolution and transformation interpreted and understood? Much of the research on conflict theory has focused on interstate war, crisis management, and the implications of the superpower rivalry for the international system and international conflict (Brecher 1996; Lebow 1981; Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Spiegel 1992; Vasquez 1993). During the Cold War, for instance, much research interest was given to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which generated theories about patron-client relations and conflict management and settlement (Bar-Siman-Tov 1987; Ben-Zvi 1986; Shoemaker and Spanier 1984; Touval 1982). Some of these theoretical perspectives, such as game theory and cognitive theories, proceed from actor-oriented approaches, while other perspectives use structural approaches, such as neo-realism. Most conflict theories, however, implicitly assume an interdependence between agent and structure, but few studies have attempted to theorise about and analyse the interplay between them. An analytical framework which highlights an agent-structure approach and situated actors may thus contribute to an enhanced understanding of the interplay between intention, motivation, restraints and possibilities for resolving conflict. Hence, with such an analytical framework we will be able to improve knowledge of the intricate and dynamic processes of resolving conflict and contribute to the advancement of conflict theory.

Why the Israeli-Palestinian Case?

What we are doing today is more than signing an agreement, it is a revolution. Yesterday a dream, today a commitment. The Israeli and Palestinian people who fought each other for almost a century have agreed to move decisively on the path of dialogue, understanding, and cooperation (Shimon Peres, Israeli Foreign Minister, on signing the DOP in Washington 1993, Institute for Palestine Studies 1994: 132):

We know quite well that this is merely the beginning of a journey that is surrounded by numerous dangers and difficulties. And yet, our mutual determination to overcome everything that stands in the way of the cause of peace— our common belief that peace is the only means to security and stability, and our mutual aspiration for a secure peace characterized by cooperation (Mahmoud Abbas, Head of the PLO's Department of National and International Relations, on signing the DOP in Washington, 1993, Institute for Palestine Studies 1994: 134).
In September 1993, Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements. This event marked a dramatic shift from conflictual to cooperative interaction. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century and for much of this time it has been characterised as a zero-sum conflict. Both parties have made exclusive claims on the same territory and interpreted the intention of the ‘other’ as posing an existential threat to its own national survival. It was not until 1993 that the Israeli government and the PLO leadership broke the pattern of intractability by explicitly recognising each other’s national existence, which signalled a change in both the meaning of the conflict and the intention to resolve the conflict through a joint process of negotiation.

Since one objective of this study is to advance theory, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is viewed as a critical case because extensive empirical information is publicly available about the processes of which a conflict may move from intractability to tractability. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has several unique characteristics but shares with other conflicts such features as, for example, the persistence of enemy images, divided societies, and difficult implementation of and adherence to negotiated agreements. The conflict provides rich empirically based insights into the intricate, complex and at times contradictory processes of conflict and cooperation. This conflict may also be viewed as a ‘microcosm’ of international relations because of the high degree to which it is internationalised. This case therefore provides ample opportunity to advance theory since it contains several significant features of conflict. Even though it might be problematic to define the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an internal conflict, it nevertheless shares several characteristics with internal, civil conflicts, such as immense asymmetry between a state and a non-state actor as well as resistance to a negotiated settlement because of the zero-sum character of the conflict.\(^1\) Moreover, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is, as mentioned above, identified as an international conflict. The conflict constitutes the core of the wider Arab-Israeli conflict, and various actors outside the region are involved in the conflict, such as the European Union, the United Nations, Soviet Union/Russia and the United States. Finally, for several decades the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

\(^1\) Brown (1996: 4) categories the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an internal conflict, whereas Licklider does not (1995: 682). It seems to me that this problem of categorisation triggers a question regarding the usefulness of such a distinction between inter- and intra-state conflict, particularly today, when most conflicts are civil (Sollenberg, Wallensteen and Jato 1999).
conflict has been the object of extensive research interest and is one of the most well documented conflicts. Thus it is particularly well suited for the objective of this study, namely, to advance some contributions to conflict theory.

The case study covers a period of eleven years of Israeli-Palestinian relations, 1988-98, for which various processes of change and continuity are analysed. The time period is based on two considerations. First, the Palestinian uprising, the intifada, is used as a political event to situate the political actors. The period from 1988 to 1991 may be viewed as a pre-negotiation phase and is analysed in order to discern reframing, that is, perceptual, normative and behavioural processes of change in the conflict and to understand how the parties came to attend the Madrid Conference in October 1991—the first official negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Second, since the parties commenced negotiations in 1991, the analysis gives special attention to how they endeavoured to resolve conflict. The empirical analysis ends with 1998 and includes most of the negotiations that took place during the entire interim period. Officially, the interim period terminated on 4 May 1999, but the negotiation process has been deadlocked since January 1999.

In short, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict provides a current empirical illustration of the challenges involved in reframing and resolving conflict, which ultimately may generate an improved theoretical understanding of conflict.

The Research Problem

This doctoral thesis attempts to address, both theoretically and empirically, the basic question of how the meaning of conflict may change and how conflict may be resolved. The broad aims are: first, to empirically analyse and improve knowledge of the transitional process from conflicting interaction to cooperation in the Israeli-Palestinian case; and second, to develop conflict research by advancing theoretical ideas concerning these processes. Three analytical concepts constitute the core of the research problem: (i) meaning, (ii) reframing and, (iii) resolving conflict.

2 The notion of pre-negotiation refers to the time before the commencement of the official negotiations and focuses on how to start and prepare for such a process (see further Saunders 1985, 1996; Stein 1989).
Understanding Conflict

(i) Meaning of conflict
At the centre of the problematique of reframing and resolving conflict is the meaning of conflict. The key question here is how to advance an operationalisation of meaning at the level of both agent and structure. How is conflict interpreted and defined in theory? In what ways is conflict constructed in the interplay between agent and structure, on the one hand, and in the interaction between adversaries, on the other hand? In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the central issues concern the predominant frames of the conflict among Israeli and Palestinian political elites as well as the domestic and international structural parameters of the conflict.

(ii) Reframing conflict
Since the transition from conflict to cooperation constitutes the core focus of this thesis, an important question is how continuity and change in conflict are understood in both theory and the empirical case. How do adversaries in a conflict come to change the meaning of conflict? How are meaning and negotiation linked? How did the Israeli and the Palestinian political elites come to favour negotiations in 1991? What processes in the domestic and international arenas preceded, facilitated, and resulted in the commencement of a negotiation process?

(iii) Resolving conflict
The processes of resolving conflict include strategies and interaction. The main theoretical problem here concerns the interplay between actor, strategy, structure and transformation of conflict. How are strategies constructed and formed? What is the interplay between agent and structure during a negotiation process? How are the outcomes of negotiation linked to the transformation of conflict? In the empirical case, the analysis centres on both the Israeli and the Palestinian frames of negotiation as well as on how the political actors are placed in a structural strategic context that may facilitate or restrain negotiations. How did the negotiation process and its outcomes alter the frames, strategies and structural parameters of the conflict?
Introduction

From Epistemological Queries to Methodological Strategies

This study aims to reconstruct and analyse the meaning attached to conflict and the transformation of the conflicting interaction between adversaries. It highlights how political actors are placed within a strategic structural context and how they act on their understandings of conflict. It is therefore assumed that context does matter, that facts are theory-laden, and that international relations are social constructions (compare Adler 1997; Hollis 1996; Lichbach 1997). Since I use an agent-structure approach, the interest is focused on what motivate political actors to act at a specific time, as well as how rules and norms in the domestic and international arenas guide interaction. The study therefore provides an ‘explanatory understanding’ since it attempts to situate interaction within the ‘right complex of meaning’ (Hollis and Smith 1990: 78-79, 200).

In international relations theory, the concepts of explaining and understanding are frequently used simultaneously and interchangeably. According to Hollis and Smith (1990), however, these concepts provide two distinct accounts of international relations. Explaining is firmly based on ontological assumptions similar to those of natural science where the purpose of research is to provide causal explanations and predictions of international behaviour. International relations are defined as an objective and external reality ‘out there’ to be studied with scientific theories and methods. To use Popper’s terminology, causal factors and hypotheses that elaborate on a theoretical problem are tested to be ‘corroborated’ (Hollis 1994: 40-65; Nicholson 1996: 30-53; Woods 1996: 11).

Understanding, on the other hand, is based on an interpretive and hermeneutic tradition, in which the analysis of international relations aims at understanding the meanings and rules of action. To understand international action, one needs to analyse the rules, conventions and contexts that govern the meaning of action. This approach emphasises that the social world should be studied with different theories and methods from those used in the natural sciences (Guneriussen 1996: 15; Hollis 1994: 143-162; Hollis and Smith 1990: 68-91; Lundquist 1993: 42).

Hence there is a dual approach to the study of international relations (Nicholson 1996; Woods 1996). However, I do not think that it is helpful to frame the two approaches as incommensurable since this may create more confusion than clarity. Wendt, who disagrees with Hollis’ and Smith’s dualism of explanation and under-
standing, argues that we should instead broaden the conceptualisation of explanation to include both causal and non-causal (constitutive) explanations (1998: 117). This study may be seen as using the understanding approach, but is guided by an ‘epistemological openness’ (Layder 1998: 41). The approach favoured here is therefore eclectic in that parts of various theories will be examined and used to advance conflict research in general and the construction of a theoretical framework in particular. Still, it is important to note that an eclectic approach requires an awareness of and reflection on various epistemologies and ontologies, as I will elaborate on in great detail in chapter two (see also Lundquist 1993: 79).

Single case study as a research strategy

Many studies of international relations and international conflicts are concerned with theory-testing, which may, according to McKeown (1999), be traced to a ‘statistical worldview’. This type of research strategy emphasises hypotheses and deductive theory-testing using relevant empirical data, aimed at confirming or falsifying general theoretical assumptions. On the basis of causality and plausible explanatory variables, the objective is to be able to make theoretical generalisations and produce probabilistic explanations. This study, in contrast, does not seek to test, refute or confirm hypotheses, but rather to generate theory and advance arguments for and against some theoretical ideas (Alvesson and Sköldberg 1994: 356).

Thus, the methodological approach favoured here is single-case study, which puts particular emphasis on adaptive theory and sensitising concepts. In theory, a distinction between inductive and deductive approaches may be identified, although in practice such a distinction is difficult to uphold. Research more often includes a mixture of both, and this is why I have found adaptive theory, as outlined by Layder (1993; 1998), particularly useful, as it recognises the interplay between theory and empirical data.³ ‘[T]he theory both adapts to, or is shaped by, incoming evidence at the same time as the data themselves are filtered through (and adapted to) the extant theoretical materials that are relevant and at hand’ (Layder 1998: 38). In this study, the approach is deductive insofar as existing theory and sensitising concepts guide the empirical analysis. Sensitising concepts,

³ In a similar vein, albeit with different labels, Ragin (1994: 47) argues for ‘retroduction’ and Alvesson and Sköldberg (1994: 72) for ‘abduction’.
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which in this study concern meaning, reframing and resolving, are not definite but rather analytical and organisational concepts derived from prior theory. By the use of sensitising concepts, flexibility is allowed during the processes of theorising. This provides opportunities to formulate and elaborate on new theoretical ideas which may evolve in the course of the empirical analysis (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 1994: 41-42, 63-70; Andersen 1997: 77; Layder 1998: 35-36; Ragin, 1994: 85-89). ‘As opposed to many quantitative studies, qualitative case studies seldom begin by specifying the major variables. In a qualitative case study, relevant dimensions will gradually appear’ (Stenelo, 1984: 25). This study is also inductive in the sense that new concepts and arguments are generated from the empirical case. As Ragin (1994: 46) states, ‘[r]eview that advances theory ... is usually described as having an inductive quality. On the basis of new evidence, the researcher develops a new theoretical concept or new relationship or advances understanding of existing ones.’

Yin (1984: 23) points out that the case method is frequently favoured in empirical studies that involve context-dependent contemporary phenomena which require multiple sources. In the methodological literature, several different types of case studies can be identified: atheoretical, particular, interpretive, thick descriptive, explorative, explanatory, theory-testing, theory-generating and heuristic (Andersen 1997: 127; Merriam 1994: 26-27; Stenelo 1984: 27; Yin 1984: 15-16). These classifications are related to specific research problems raised in various studies. The case method is, however, frequently criticised for not allowing generalisations to be made. Such a criticism mirrors our different epistemological and ontological assumptions and objectives in science. My own understanding of the single-case method is based on a recognition that context does matter and thus stipulates that it is only possible to make contingent generalisations. The single-case method is therefore seen as containing the ‘power of the good example,’ to use Flyvbjerg’s notion (1991: 149). A single case is selected and favoured not so much on the basis of how representative it is but rather on the basis of how critical the case is for the research problem. The case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may therefore be viewed as not only an interpretive case, considering its use of ‘thick’ empirical description, but also analytical and explorative since the objective is to advance theory. Moreover, the theoretical model which is constructed for the empirical analysis of reframing and resolving conflict is useful for other single cases as well as for comparative research on conflict.
A single-case study may also provide empirical insights that are of interest not only to academics but also to practitioners. This study may, for instance, be seen as an attempt to 'bridge the gap' (George 1993) between theory and practice in that it involves an analysis of a current event, that is, the ongoing Middle East peace process. However, it is recognised that analysis of a current event has its limitations regarding archival material, which would not be encountered in studying a historical case. Nonetheless, the ambition of this doctoral thesis is to provide improved knowledge and understanding of a contemporary conflict in transition through a theoretically guided analysis.

**Empirical Material**

Extensive academic research has been conducted on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, although it has been overshadowed by the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet, with the outbreak of the intifada and the end of the Cold War, the focus has shifted somewhat, to a greater emphasis on the identity and inter-communal dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Finkelstein 1995; Lesch and Tesler 1989a; Peretz 1990; Sela and Ma’oz 1997a; Schiff and Ya’ari 1989). Since the start of the official peace process in 1991, both scholars and journalists have published several books which analyse the negotiations from a variety of perspectives (Aruri 1995; Bowker 1996; Corbin 1994; Flamhaft 1996; Freedman 1998; Heikal 1996; Karsh 1997; King 1994; Lochery 1999; Massalha 1994; Peleg 1998a; Perry 1994; Rubin, Ginat, Ma’oz 1994; Shehadah 1997; Zitrain Eisenberg and Caplan 1998). However, this thesis is one of the first studies to cover the entire interim period and to analyse the major negotiated agreements concluded during this period. In addition to books and edited volumes, academic articles analysing the conflict and the negotiation process have been utilised as secondary sources (e.g., Journal of Palestine Studies, Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture, and Occasional Papers of the Leonard Davis Institute).

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4 It is frequently assumed that academics and practitioners are placed in two distinct cultures where problems and interests diverge. Christopher Hill (1994) mentions three issue areas in which practitioners and academics tend to hold contrary views: history, ideology and professionalism. For an interesting debate on the question of policy-relevance in academia, see Wallace (1996), Smith (1997), and Booth (1997).
There is certainly no lack of documentation of public statements on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such official documents as speeches, statements, negotiated agreements, protocols, position papers and memoranda are widely published (e.g., Medzini 1981, 1982, 1984, 1989, 1992, 1993; Institute for Palestine Studies 1994). Both the Israeli Foreign Ministry and the Palestinian Authority maintain several Internet web-sites on the conflict in general and the peace process in particular. Furthermore, several relevant local periodicals (The Jerusalem Report, New Outlook, The Palestine Report) and newspapers (The Jerusalem Post, Ha-aretz and The Jerusalem Times) are published in English.

In addition to official documents, periodicals and newspapers, other primary sources that have been consulted are interviews and memoirs, particularly on the negotiation process. The first phase of the peace process was characterised by extensive publicity, providing documentation on the negotiations. This phase can be contrasted to the secret and secluded negotiations that took place in Norway in 1993. It was not until the parties concluded an agreement in late August 1993 that the negotiations became public. In late 1993, when I commenced work on this thesis, there was hardly any published material on these secret negotiations. I therefore began to interview Israeli, Norwegian and Palestinian negotiators who had participated in the Oslo channel and concluded my first research report in 1995 (Aggestam 1996). Since then, the memoirs of several of the negotiators have been published, and I have used them to complement my interviews (Abbas 1995; Arens 1995; Ashrawi 1994; Baker 1994).

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5 See, for example, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH000c0; and http://www.pnaweb/peace/.
6 One of the several reasons why I interviewed the negotiators in the Oslo channel was the distorted picture given at the time in the media of what had actually taken place. As the Oslo channel became a successful case of negotiations, a competition evolved over who to credit for its success. For instance, in a first press conference held by Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jørgen Holst, the impression was that it was his wife, his son and himself who had been the 'ice-breakers' between Israelis and Palestinians. However, it should be noted that neither his wife nor his son ever attended any of the negotiation sessions. In a similar vein, Peres failed to mention in his first book, published in 1993, the private Israeli diplomats who established the Oslo channel, namely, Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik. However, directly after the conclusion of the DOP, British reporter Jane Corbin produced a video film, 'The Norway Channel' (Panorama, the BBC, 1993) in which she provides a fascinating account of the negotiations through exclusive interviews with Abu Ala, Mona Juul, Terje Larsen and Uri Savir. On the basis of that video film, Corbin shortly thereafter wrote Gaza First (1994), the first book published on the secret negotiations in Oslo.
The advantage in this particular case of using memoirs is that they were written almost immediately after a political event; they therefore avoid the criticism often posed when, for instance, a politician tries to reconstruct an event many years later. Although memoirs provide personal accounts of political events, they are a useful source since this study is primarily focused on the interpretation of political actors.

A note on interviews

Approximately thirty interviews were conducted, most of them with members of political elites and negotiators who participated in the peace process. The in-depth interviews, which frequently lasted from forty-five minutes to an hour, were particularly important because one phase of the negotiation process was conducted in complete secrecy. Upon formally requesting interviews, I realised that persistence and patience were required virtues when attempting to arrange elite interviews.7

The interviews may be described as open-ended discussions of an explorative nature. They provided new information not only about the 1993 secret negotiations in Oslo but also on where to locate accessible research material (compare Stenelo 1984: 31). The interviews were semi-structured in that I had prepared a set of general questions which the respondents were asked to elaborate upon. However, in most cases the respondents began to express their reflections, often enthusiastically, after I had briefly presented my research. I agree with Patton, who states '[t]he fundamental principle of qualitative interviewing is to provide a framework within which respondents can express their own understandings in their own terms' (quoted in Stenelo 1984: 29; see also Trost 1997: 47).

All the interviews with Palestinians and Israelis were conducted in English, whereas the interviews with Norwegians were made in Swedish and Norwegian. However, since the negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians were conducted entirely in English, the Norwegians frequently came to illustrate and recall situations using English expressions. Every interview was recorded, and none of the respondents expressed any objections or misgivings about this proce-

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7 Letters and facsimiles had to be followed up by telephone contacts and personal meetings with secretaries before I could receive a positive response for an interview.
Introduction

On the contrary, some respondents expressed their satisfaction since recordings minimise the risk of being misquoted. Furthermore, over time I came to appreciate the advantages of recorded interviews since I could listen to them several times.

In short, as this empirical study analyses a recent and ongoing process, interviews have been particularly useful since the time between the peace process and the interviews was short.

Outline of the Thesis

The structure of this thesis is based first, on an interplay between theory and empirical analysis; and second, on a process-oriented chronology, which covers the Israeli-Palestinian conflict between 1988 and 1998. The thesis includes eleven chapters, which are divided into five parts: (I) introduction, (II) conflict, (III) reframing, (IV) resolving, and (V) conclusion.

(I) The introduction consists of two chapters. The first chapter outlines the research problem and the epistemological and methodological underpinnings of the thesis. The second chapter elaborates upon how an innovative framework for the analysis of conflict may be constructed. A meta-theoretical model is outlined which includes an agent-structure approach and constructivist assumptions of conflict.

(II) The second part, on conflict, contains two chapters. The third chapter outlines theoretically the frames of the political actors. The conceptualisation of structures highlights the domestic and international ‘games,’ which contain norms, rules and patterns of behaviour. The fourth chapter serves as an introduction to the various meanings attached to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The dominant Israeli and Palestinian frames and structural parameters of conflict are examined.

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I am well aware that there are both advantages and disadvantages in recording interviews. The disadvantages may be that the respondent avoids providing vital information because he or she is not an anonymous person and therefore risks being quoted. Yet, since I have conducted interviews primarily with political elites, it would probably be relatively easy to identify the source, particularly on the Oslo negotiations, where there were only a limited number of negotiators. Moreover, I have considered it important to provide documentation on this secret process (see also Trost 1997: 50-52).
(III) The third part, on reframing, includes two chapters. In chapter five the concept of reframing is advanced. Motivation, opportunity and focal point are discussed as a link between reframing and negotiation. The theoretical discussion guides the empirical analysis of the intifada, the Palestinian uprising, in chapter six. The analysis centres on the implications of the intifada for the level of agent and structure, and the behavioural turning point, which the 1991 Madrid Conference constituted.

(IV) The fourth, and most extensive part of the thesis, is on resolving. It contains four chapters, a theoretical chapter and three empirical chapters which analyse the Middle East negotiation process from 1991 to 1998. Chapter seven elaborates theoretically on agents' frames, structural characteristics, situated strategies, and the process of negotiation. With a transformative and constructivist approach to negotiation theory, the overall negotiation process is analysed. Chapter eight examines the first phase of the process, which was characterised by 'public diplomacy,' competitive frames and domestic restraints. This process resulted in intractable positions, several deadlocks and no substantial change in the conflict. Chapter nine analyses the second phase of the negotiation process, which led to several agreements and most importantly a mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO. Still, the process was characterised by a mixture of competitive and problem-solving frames, hostile domestic opposition, and 'two-track diplomacy,' which is a combination of secret, official and unofficial tracks of negotiation. Chapter ten covers the conclusion of the interim period, from 1996 to 1998, which reveals the cyclical nature to resolve conflict. This period was characterised by a high degree of mistrust, strong enemy images and competitive negotiations punctuated by deadlocks. Only with the full participation of the United States, which turned the process into 'trilateral diplomacy,' did the parties conclude two agreements on implementation.

(V) The final concluding part of the thesis consists of chapter eleven. The adaptive interplay between theoretical concepts and empirical analysis throughout this study has resulted in a theoretical model for the empirical analysis of reframing and resolving conflict. From that model, the three core concepts—meaning, reframing, and resolving—are discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications for conflict research and the transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Chapter 2

**CONFLICT RESEARCH AND CONSTRUCTIVISM: AN AGENT-STRUCTURE APPROACH**

In this chapter, the overall objective is to outline an innovative framework for the analysis of processes to reframe and resolve conflict. Departing from a critical discussion of conflict research, in which several lacunae are identified, the basic argument is that it is vital to analyse the interplay of agent and structure in order to understand change in the interaction between adversaries. The notion of situated actors is highlighted as the nexus of agent-structure. On the basis of a constructivist approach to the study of conflict, a meta-theoretical model is outlined at the end of the chapter.

**(Un)Ending Conflict**

In the first section, an overview of conflict research will be presented, with a particular emphasis on how conflict are defined and understood. The next section will critically discuss and compare how various approaches theorise and conceptualise change and the dynamics of conflict.

The study of conflict

Despite the extensive work done on conflict resolution and conflict theory, there has been surprisingly little analysis of the concept of conflict itself. (Vásquez 1995: 138)

In the study of conflict, a whole range of theoretical perspectives can be identified, although many of the perspectives share similar ontological and epistemological assumptions about conflict that originate from dominant paradigms in international relations theory.
Each paradigm presents a particular world-view and understanding of conflict, actor, strategy, change and how to resolve conflict (for an overview of strategic studies, conflict research and peace research, see in particular Groom 1988; see also Bloomsfield 1997; Hoffmann 1986; Sandole 1993; Vasquez 1995; on mediation theory, see Kleiboer and t’Hart 1995).

This section aims to present an overview of conflict research in order to critically discuss how various perspectives theorise about political actors, structures, change and continuity of conflict. I have made a theoretical categorisation in order to discuss the present state of conflict research and to direct attention to areas where theory might be advanced. I have identified three broad approaches in the study of conflict: (1) conflict management (CM), (2) conflict resolution (CR), and (3) conflict transformation (CT). These three approaches provide us with divergent and contrasting analytical frameworks and highlight distinct understandings of the origin and processes of conflict. As Sandole (1993: 3) states, “different mappings of the “same thing,” mean different “realities.”” It should, however, be emphasised that this is purely a theoretical, simplified categorisation, without claiming to cover the whole field of conflict research. Moreover, there is a conceptual and semantic confusion within conflict research itself regarding the interchangeable use of some of these concepts, such as resolution and settlement. Finally, some theoretical perspectives may overlap all three approaches.

The perspectives of conflict management are mostly based on the paradigm of realism owing to their ‘Hobbesian’ world-view of international politics. The interaction of states, as the primary actors of international politics, is characterised by power struggles which originate from objective laws with roots in the continual aggressive nature of human beings. ‘The drives to live, to propagate and to dominate are common to all men ... The tendency to dominate, in particular, is an element of all human associations’ (Morgenthau, quoted in Groom 1988: 98). For neo-realism, the lack of any international overarching authority above that of the state produces anarchy, insecurity and constant threats to the survival of the state (Waltz 1959). As a result, the national interests of states concern primarily the maximisation of power; thus, ‘if you want peace, prepare for war’. An assumption of that kind leads to a decrease in security for other states, which produces a security dilemma. Every state strives to increase its autonomy and promote its national interests, which inevitably will lead to zero-sum disputes, particularly between status quo and revisionist states (Buzan 1991: 298-303).
In the 1950s, realism was the predominant paradigm in international relations theory, partly as a reaction to inter-war political idealism and to the horrors of the Second World War. From a realist perspective, international politics should be analysed 'as they were, rather than as they might be' (Hollis and Smith 1990: 21); thus theorising was to be based on objective laws of international politics (Morgenthau 1993: 4). In a post-war context and with an emerging Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the field of strategic and conflict studies was firmly established. With the looming risk of nuclear war, many of these studies focused, often with game-theory approaches, on how to cope with international crisis, coercion, the arms race, threat perceptions, escalation ladders, etc. (see, for instance, Schelling 1960; Snyder and Diesing 1977).

Just as realism was a reaction to political idealism, the approach of conflict resolution emerged during the 1970s in response and as an alternative to the dominant power-political framework (Burton 1969; Kelman 1979). Perspectives of conflict resolution emphasise the generic character of conflict which exists on all levels, from interpersonal, societal, to international, and include states as well as non-state actors. Moreover, a decisive distinction is made between disputes and conflict since "[d]isputes" involve negotiable interests, while "conflicts" are concerned with issues that are not negotiable, issues that relate to ontological human needs that cannot be compromised" (Burton 1993: 55). Conflict, according to this school of thought, does not originate in the intention and instinct of human beings to dominate. Instead, conflict is viewed as dysfunctional behaviour between parties, which emanates from unfulfilled human needs, such as identity, security, autonomy, dignity and bonding. These human needs are universal and, if not satisfied, may create frustration, dissonance and ultimately violence and conflict (Sandole 1993: 14-15; Tidwell 1998: 77-81). Human-need theory derives from Maslow's theory of motivation and need hierarchy and was further developed and integrated within conflict theory by Burton (1969; 1990). Thus, conflict is defined from the actors' subjective perceptions of their environment, and conflict resolution is primarily concerned with how to help the parties reassess more accurately conflict and perceptions (Burton 1995: 122).

The last approach, conflict transformation, shares some epistemological assumptions with the second approach but diverges ontologically because of its emphasis on structures as causes of conflict. Structural violence, equality and justice are key concepts since the approach stresses the importance of positive peace (Galtung 1995). Similar to the second approach, conflict transformation highlights frustration but
views violence as an outcome of a structural discrepancy between actual and potential states of being, called ‘rank disequilibrium’ or ‘relative deprivation’ (Gurr 1996: 63; Sandole 1993: 11-12).

This type of research views the formation of conflict as caused by deep-rooted objective structures, for example, economic, patriarchal and religious. These structures express societal contradictions which yield a ‘real clash of real interests rather than a perceived clash of interest’ (Groom 1988: 112). Such a holistic perspective defines the dynamics and duration of conflict as cyclical and dialectical. Conflict needs to be manifest and polarised in order to achieve structural change, that is, conflict transformation (Groom 1988: 112).

Continuity and change

We cannot really date the end of a war if we cannot date its beginning. To do both, we must first have to know what the war was about. The account we give depends very much on the story we want to tell. (Coker 1997: 617)

What do we mean by change, variation, conflict life-cycles, resolving, ending, or settling conflict? The dynamics of conflict may be defined in many ways, with different conceptual frameworks providing distinct analyses and answers to this question. Moreover, an understanding of change relates to a temporal dimension of conflict. Galtung (1995: 51-52; 1996: 80-87), for instance, points to the differences among cultures and civilisations with regard to the conceptualisation of time. The Judeo/Christian/Islamic culture sees time as bounded, linear and finite with a clear beginning and an end. In contrast, the Daoist/Buddhist view of time is infinite and dialectical, without any obvious beginning or end, which renders transformation unknown. This second section will narrow the horizon somewhat and critically discuss how the three approaches to the study of conflict conceptualise change and continuity.

As the notion of conflict management indicates, the first approach has more limited ambitions than, for instance, conflict resolution towards changing conflict interaction. This approach is based on the ontological assumption that power politics are inherent in ‘man’ and that conflict cannot therefore be ended. Thus, conflict management attempts to stop direct violence by agreements that provide the basis for some kind of order and stability (Doran 1995).
The process of conflict management is characterised by competitive negotiations in which the conflicting parties attempt to influence each other by using issue-based leverage and manipulative strategies, such as coercion, threats, ‘sticks and carrots,’ offers of concessions and compromises. ‘Ripe moments,’ depicted as ‘mutually hurting stalemates’ (Zartman 1986: 219-220), are considered particularly appropriate for pursuing conflict settlement. In a stalemate, the parties have reached a complete deadlock and a stage in the conflict in which there are great risks of further escalation with high costs for both parties. Thus, a mutually hurting stalemate may convince the disputants that only a political solution may settle the conflict. According to Zartman, a ‘cost-benefit notion of conflict is not only one that leads to a clearer understanding of the conditions of management and resolution, and of the relation between the two, but also one that reflects the ways of thinking of decision makers’ (Zartman 1990: 309).

Conflict settlement is understood as containing conflict, but without addressing the underlying causes of conflict. As a consequence, conflict settlement, such as an agreement to end violence, can be imposed on adversaries by an outside actor, frequently a great power or superpower. Conflict settlement is therefore not based on subjective attitudes per se but on objective issues and the behaviour of the adversaries (Zartman 1993: 156). ‘Through negotiation and bargaining, settlement can be achieved, and if it involves coercion, manipulation, power-bargaining and compromise, then that is an acceptable fact of reality on the path to success’ (Bloomfield 1997: 75).

One major weakness of conflict management is that most of the perspectives focus on interstate conflicts. Most conflicts today are intra-state conflicts, and one of the characteristics of these conflicts is the immense asymmetry of power between the parties. Moreover, as internal conflicts frequently concern strongly held enemy images and fundamental disputes about identity and ethnicity, they are particularly resistant to negotiated and mediated settlements. This highlights the importance of the implementation of agreements, a phase mostly ignored by conflict management. A cost-benefit calculation, assuming interests as given and states as unitary actors, is based on a rational discourse that considers states as the major players in world politics. Other significant aspects, such as culture, identity and non-state actors, tend to be ignored in this approach.

In contrast to conflict management, the second approach, conflict resolution, does attempt to address the underlying causes of conflict.
As stated above, conflict resolution is a response to the power-political framework and diverges in the ontological understanding of human beings and conflict. Ending conflict is indeed possible, according to this school of thought, if one is only directing attention to the basic needs of the conflicting parties, such as security, identity, etc. These fundamental needs cannot be compromised on or bargained over in a competitive process. Rather, they should be addressed within an analytical, supportive framework using problem-solving approaches, possibly with the help of a neutral third party acting as a facilitator (Burton 1995; Hoffman 1995; Kelman 1992; Väyrynen 1995). For example, with track two diplomacy, an informal, unofficial form of interaction, and analytical problem-solving workshops, the conflicting parties may through a joint analysis and a non-confrontational process come to redefine their perceptions and relationship by a mutual recognition of each side's basic needs. Mutual recognition and change of perceptions promote mutual trust and enhance the chances of locating integrative solutions to conflict (Fisher 1997; McDonald and Bendahmane 1987). In short, this school of thought sees conflict resolution as an end to conflict since the underlying and deep-rooted causes of conflict are addressed. By promoting conditions for cooperative relationships, the approach acts as conflict 'provention' since 'satisfaction of human needs that are universal must be the ultimate goal of survivable societies' (Burton 1993: 60).

The perspectives of conflict resolution have also been criticised. Criticism has been levelled specifically at the theory of human needs and the 'ending picture' of conflict (Lederach 1995a). The question is how, if at all, to generalise to such an extent as to define these needs as universal. By stressing universalism, these perspectives tend to ignore the cultural diversity among individuals and groups and therefore lean towards socio-biology (Scimecca 1993: 213).

Azar has attempted to refine Burton's theory of human needs. 'Developmental needs,' as he prefers to call them, are viewed as identical in that all human beings share these psychological needs. Although cultural diversities play a role in the definitions of, for instance, identity, security, and which methods to use in order to satisfy these needs (Azar 1990; Bloomfield 1997: 71-73), the problem of universalism still remains since conflict resolution is based on the improvement of 'accurate' perceptions of conflict, which contradicts cultural diversity and rationale (Tidwell 1998: 73). Human-needs theory also ignores and lacks any real understanding of power asymmetry and structural inequalities between conflicting parties.
Thus, conflict resolution may be conducted at the expense of justice (Jabri 1996: 155; Lederach 1995a: 16). Power asymmetry, as discussed above, is an important dimension of the understanding of the dynamics of internal conflicts. Another point raised about internal conflicts is the significance of implementation. Many perspectives of conflict resolution neglect thorough analysis of institutions and peace-building, since they adopt rational assumptions about how conflictual attitudes and environment will change after successful analytical problem-solving (Rupesinghe 1995: 75). By excluding power relations and institutions from the analysis, conflict resolution is described by some scholars as ahistorical, linear and non-structural, which belies social reality (Väyrynen 1991: 23).

Moving to a more structural analysis, conflict transformation is the last approach of conflict research to be discussed in this section. The dynamics of and changes in conflict are primarily understood from a holistic perspective that emphasises deep-rooted structures, such as patriarchy, racism and capitalism, as causes of human behaviour (Sandole 1993: 3-6). Processes of conflict transformation concern normative elements of the nature of social order and are analysed in a long-term relational perspective. At times, these processes are highly competitive and conflictual, since they involve clashes of incompatible interests between dominant and underprivileged groups. During these processes conflicts may become manifest and underprivileged groups will gain empowerment, creating change in power relationships and ultimately a breakdown of the system. Conflict may therefore have a function by which collective violence may be used as a way to protect or enlarge the interests of a political group (Groom 1988: 112; Lederach 1995b: 201-205; Väyrynen 1991: 1-4).

Since this school of thought is concerned with normative research, an important distinction is made between positive and negative peace (Galtung 1996: 3). According to Galtung (1996: 9) ‘peace is the absence/reduction of violence of all kinds. Peace is nonviolent and creative conflict transformation,’ which requires not only an end to violence and conflict behaviour, that is, negative peace, but also the complete elimination of structural violence and transformation of the international system, that is, positive peace. The emphasis of conflict transformation lies in the process, which is viewed as comprehensive and open-ended. Väyrynen (1991: 23) writes:
Violence and conflicts may be managed by instrumental action, but they can be eliminated only by identifying their root causes. Those causes and their functions are, however, ever changing with the economic and social transformation of societies. That is why any argument that a conflict has been solved for good, that history has ended, is based on an ahistorical illusion. The only historically viable approach is to aim to eliminate the violence in present conflicts and to trace the new socioeconomic transformations which create new sources of violence.

In recent years, there has been an increasing number of studies that use the notion of conflict transformation (Lederach 1995a; Rupesinghe 1995; Väyrynen 1991), but with a less abstract and more pragmatic understanding. ‘[T]he idea of transformation does not suggest we simply eliminate or control conflict, but rather points descriptively toward its inherent dialectical nature. Social conflict is a phenomenon of human creation, lodged naturally in relationships’ (Lederach 1995a: 17). Holism is stressed and attention is directed towards how conflicts may transform into, rather than end in, something non-destructive. Such an approach therefore focuses on the post-agreement phases, for example, peace- and institution-building, and long-term processes of reconciliation and forgiveness (Lederach 1995a; Rupesinghe 1995; M ontville 1993). ‘Because successful implementation depends entirely upon (re-)establishment and maintenance of enduring functional relationships and institutional capabilities, it is during this phase that postconflict reconciliation and reconstruction must occur’ (Rasmussen 1997: 40).

One weakness of conflict transformation is the inclination to over-emphasise structures. Structures are considered to determine human behaviour. Thus, the consciousness and reasoning of individuals and the strategic interaction receive less attention in some of these analyses. For instance, structural violence is a much appreciated concept for understanding indirect violence but it is an abstract notion. It tends to reduce individuals to the role of victims without revealing or attempting to analyse the more complex and contradictory understanding of the interplay between individuals and structures. Moreover, how can we interpret the notion of justice while avoiding an objective and essentialist definition (Groom 1988: 111)? Several of the perspectives have been criticised as illusory and pretentious, focusing more on social engineering than on social science (Nicholson 1992: 22).

Each of the three approaches of conflict research presents a particular understanding of time and change, as shown in the figure below. However, despite divergent theoretical frameworks, there are
still some points of convergence in their epistemological assumptions. First, both \( \text{CM} \) and \( \text{CR} \) assume that perceptions and images can be changed, either by manipulation or by analytical problem-solving; thus, ‘conflict behaviour has alterable component’ (Groom 1988: 110). Second, \( \text{CM} \) and \( \text{CR} \) lack a greater understanding of the implementation and post-agreement/resolution phase, assuming either that sustainable peace is not feasible or that resolution simply ‘ends’ conflict. Third, both \( \text{CM} \) and \( \text{CT} \) assume that conflict may be defined objectively, albeit with divergent understandings of conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRAMEWORK</th>
<th>UNDERSTANDING OF CONFLICT</th>
<th>ACTOR AND STRUCTURE</th>
<th>CHANGE</th>
<th>PROCESS AND STRATEGY</th>
<th>(UN)ENDING CONFLICT</th>
<th>LACUNAE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (CM)</td>
<td>realism</td>
<td>power politics inherent in man</td>
<td>emphasis on actor from an objective perspective</td>
<td>static</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>conflict settlement: unending conflict, balance of power, stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONFLICT RESOLUTION (CR)</td>
<td>idealism</td>
<td>unsatisfied human needs</td>
<td>emphasis on actor from an inter-subjective-perspective</td>
<td>linear</td>
<td>problem-solving</td>
<td>conflict resolution: ending conflict, satisfying human needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION (CT)</td>
<td>radicalism</td>
<td>structural inequalities</td>
<td>emphasis on structure from a holistic perspective</td>
<td>dialectical</td>
<td>empowering</td>
<td>conflict transformation: open-ended, institutional/systemic change</td>
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**Table One: Three approaches to conflict research**

Within conflict research there is an increasing awareness of the complexity of conflict and the need for integrative and trans-
formational approaches (Hampson 1996; Stedman 1996). The empirical analysis which will be pursued in this study centres on the kind of conflict which Burton (1987) calls ‘deep-rooted’ or in Kriesberg’s (1989) vocabulary ‘intractable,’ that is, a conflict that tends to resist any change towards a negotiated and cooperative agreement over time.9

In the rest of this chapter, I will outline an analytical framework for this particular study, which highlights process-oriented and agent-structure approaches. Emphasis is placed on the dynamic contexts of transition from conflict to cooperation, which gives less attention to the ‘ending picture’ of conflict. It is understood as a ‘multi-dimensional process— one that has neither neat and distinct beginning or end points’ (Rasmussen 1997: 42). A greater understanding of the interplay between agent and structure than the one shown in conflict research is therefore essential. As we have come to witness, for instance, in Cambodia and Bosnia, processes of resolving conflict entail dynamic, long-term processes which may oscillate between cooperation and conflict. Actors, political agendas, rules and norms do change over time. This particular understanding of conflict shares several assumptions with the approach of conflict transformation. However, in comparison to conflict transformation I place the strategic interaction at the centre of the analysis. I also prefer the more impartial notion of ‘resolving,’ since it enables me to draw insights from all three theoretical approaches of conflict. Finally, constructivism provides the underlying assumptions of the analytical framework that will be outlined below, since conflict formation is viewed as a social construction, and a historically contingent outcome of the interplay between agent and structure.

The Problem of Agent and Structure

In this section, the long-standing problem of agent and structure within social science will be raised. I will elaborate further on the ontological and epistemological assumptions of understanding conflict and how agent and structure may be linked.

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9 According to Kriesberg, a conflict is intractable when the parties do not recognise each other and the perceptions of conflict and de-escalation are too diverse (Kriesberg 1989: 110).
On ontology: the dilemma defined

The dilemma of agent-structure has been widely contested within the philosophy of social science. However, political science and international relations theory in particular have only recently approached and debated the problem more directly (see, for example, Friedman and Starr 1997; Hollis and Smith 1990; Jabri 1996; Wendt 1987). With the end of the Cold War a transformation took place which several political scientists had failed to foresee. A debate was triggered on the issue of ‘explaining’ and ‘understanding’ international relations.

The problem of agent-structure focuses specifically on how international relations theory can explain or contribute to an understanding of the relationship between agent and structure. One way to understand international interaction is to focus primarily on individual intention and motivation, which gives agent ontological primacy over structure. Actor-oriented theoretical perspectives, such as rational choice, social and political psychology, emphasise cognitive frames, preferences, intentions, beliefs and the reasoning of actors.

Another way of understanding interaction between political actors is to view international behaviour as conditioned by structural parameters and social systems, thereby giving structure ontological primacy. According to some theories, such as neo-realism and world system theory, the explanation lies in the way structures determine action. These theories strive to explain observable international interaction in terms of unobservable structures that constrain the behaviour of political actors.10

According to Hollis and Smith (1990) these different understandings of agent and structure provide two distinct approaches to international politics: an inside, interpretive account that focuses on the intentions of actors and their understanding of and reasoning about the situation; and an outside, scientific account modelled on the natural sciences, which emphasises the structural and causal conditioning of world politics. For Hollis and Smith, these two approaches cannot be bridged or fused because of their differences in methodology, epistemology and ontology. There is therefore no neutral or external position from which to evaluate when agent or structure may play the decisive role. Hence, the two accounts are

10 See Wendt (1987: 337-349), for a critical assessment of the inability of these theories to explain their units of analysis, thereby making either state or system structure ‘ontologically primitive units.’
'incommensurable' and there will always be 'two stories to tell' about international politics (Hollis and Smith 1990: 1-7; Smith 1994: 17-19).

Before entering this intricate debate, it is important to stress that the level-of-analysis problem is related to, but still distinct from, the dilemma of agent-structure. The level-of-analysis problem concerns a methodological debate about what is the most appropriate level at which to explain international behaviour, that is, whether to proceed top-down or bottom-up. However, the debate does not explicitly focus on ontology, that is, 'how the world really is' and the inter-relationship between agent and structure (Buzan 1995: 212-214; Carlsnaes 1994: 277; Hollis and Smith 1990: 8-9, 203).

The conclusion of the state of international relations theory as 'two stories' has spurred an intensive debate (see Carlsnaes 1992, 1994; Friedman and Starr 1997; Jabri and Khan 1996; Wendt 1991). According to Wendt, the argument of two stories is stretched too far by seeing them as incommensurable. He considers that such a view originates in a positivist distinction and conception of science. Wendt argues that such a differentiation does not necessarily have to be made and that both accounts are indeed important in social science. 'Sometimes one type of account makes more sense; sometimes another.' (1991: 391).

Similarly, Carlsnaes (1994: 278-283) describes the conclusion of Hollis and Smith as ontologically zero-sum. Instead of continuing to stress the distinction between the two accounts we should, according to him, redirect our efforts to define a single integrative conceptual framework. Such a framework should combine both interpretive understanding and causal explanation and incorporate the dynamic empirical interplay between agent and structure since '[o]ur stories—of whatever kind—are always about something' (Carlsnaes 1994: 280). Finally, Friedman and Starr (1997) have responded with a similar argument—that it is indeed possible to combine interpretive and positivist approaches in empirical enquiries.

The polarised 'two stories' metaphor may have created more confusion than clarity in the debate. The problem of agent-structure consists first of the ontological question whether we should proceed from a structural (holism) or an actor-oriented (individual) perspective. Second, the epistemological question is whether we are to

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11 However, one major weakness in their argument is that they blend rational choice theory with an interpretive and hermeneutic approach. Rational choice is an individual but an explanatory account, and consequently it becomes self-evident that such an approach may be fused with a positivist scientific approach.
view structure or agent from an inside (subjective, interpretive) or an outside (objective, causal) perspective. What is missing in this meta-theoretical debate is a more concise and precise discussion of the dividing line between objectivist/subjectivist accounts, on the one hand, and individualism/holism, on the other. In my view, there are at least ‘four distinct stories’ about international relations, which Hollis and Smith (1990: 5, 215) also indicate in their figures, although without making the conclusion explicit.\textsuperscript{12}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inside</th>
<th>Outside</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individualism</strong></td>
<td>(1) reasoned choice</td>
<td>(2) rational choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Holism</strong></td>
<td>(3) collective norms</td>
<td>(4) external structures</td>
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Table Two: ‘Four stories’ of international relations

Individualism, as illustrated in the above figure, can be viewed from an inside or an outside perspective. (1) An inside account would focus on the subjective and interpretive characteristics of agent, by attempting to understand the actor’s way of reasoning and seeking meaning. It is a Weberian understanding of reconstructing the actor’s subjective reasoning about a situation. (2) An outside account of individualism has a more ‘mechanical’ and ‘instrumental’ view of agent, which highlights actors’ objective pursuits of interests. Calculated risks, uncertainties, and expectations about choice concern the pursuit of maximising utility, which resembles Popper’s understanding of ‘situational logic’ where action is understood as a response to an objective situation. Holism has a similar distinction of an inside and an outside account. (3) An inside account of holism emphasises that actors are norm-conforming by their collective understandings and shared intersubjective values. Social actions are imbued with normative expectations, symbols and signs, which constitute ‘social reality.’ (4) Finally, an outside account of holism views structure and system as external with functional and conditional effects on actors. Social action is understood as determined and as an outcome of underlying structures, forces and mechanisms (Gunerius sen 1996: 150-151, 285-322; Hollis 1994: 94-182).

\textsuperscript{12} Hollis is much more precise on this point in his later book from 1994.
Returning to conflict research, several perspectives of conflict management are firmly based on an outside account, although there are both individualist (rational choice) and holistic approaches (neo-realism\textsuperscript{13}). The second school of thought, conflict resolution, leans towards individualism and intersubjectivity because of its emphasis on shared understandings of conflict resolution in general and 'universal human needs' in particular. Conflict transformation tends to stress holism and several of the perspectives within this approach view structures as externally causing action.

Thus, in conflict research there is a scarcity of approaches which focus explicitly on the interplay between agent and structure. As this study is concerned with change and continuity of conflictual interaction, it is vital to consider the actors' reasoning and intentions, as well as the understanding of the structural parameters of action. I will therefore return to and elaborate on these problems in depth in the remaining section. However, I will first briefly discuss the utility of structuration theory, since it claims to have succeeded in transcending the dilemma of agent-structure.

Structuration theory: bridging the gap?

Despite the discouraging conclusion of Hollis and Smith (1990) several endeavours have been made to bridge the ontological gap between agent and structure. This section will concentrate on Giddens's work on structuration theory, which has inspired several scholars in international relations theory (Dessler 1989; Jabri 1996; Wendt 1987), but also raised several critical issues about its utility.

Giddens rejects dualism and delineates, in theory, a 'duality of structure' in which agent and structure are not conceived as ontologically primitive but mutually constitutive and dependent. Action is situated in time and space, and in his stratification model Giddens defines actors as knowledgeable and reflective human beings with a consciousness about the rules of social life. The reflexive monitoring of action is expressed by agents' rationalisation and motivation of action which emanates from the continuities of social life (Giddens 1979: 56-59).

\textsuperscript{13} It could also be argued that neo-realism is an actor-oriented theory, due to the strong emphasis on states and the micro-economic assumptions of Waltz (Wendt 1987: 340-344).
Structures are defined as social relationships and practices that constitute the rules and resources used in the interaction between actors. These rules are produced and reproduced, intentionally or unintentionally, by actors, and the pattern of these social practices over time makes up the system. The structuration consists of the enabling or constraining conditions, which govern over time the production and reproduction of the system (Giddens 1979: 60-63). Hence, 'structuration theory attempts to preserve the generative and relational aspects of structuralism while taking explicit conceptual and methodological steps to prevent the analytical separation of generative structures from the self-understandings and practices of human agents to prevent structural reification' (Wendt 1987: 355).

Despite the effort by Giddens and others to overcome the problem of agent-structure, some scholars have expressed uncertainty about the endeavour. They have criticised Giddens for redefining structure to mean something quite different from what is generally understood by the term (Hay 1995: 198; Layder 1998: 148; Sztompka 1993: 196). Hay (1995: 198), for instance, describes the structuration theory of Giddens as 'sophisticated intentionalism' and Layder (1994: 141) states that '[i]f structure no longer means what it usually means, then the notion of a “duality of structure” is confusing and misleading.' Criticism has also been levelled at the conceptualisation of interests and identities of agents, which is seen as generated from internal relationships between entities. Friedman and Starr (1997: 42) stress, for instance, that such a conceptualisation risks equating social roles with social relations; thus, agents become 'passive bearers of social facts'. These authors also criticise structuration theory for excluding subjectivity.

In a similar vein, others have raised objections concerning the advantages of analytically transcending the dilemma. They argue that such an analysis loses the temporal dimension, that is, it fails to understand change and alteration over time (see, for example, Carlsnaes 1992: 258; Friedman and Starr 1997: 63; Stubbergaard 1996: 40). As Taylor (1989: 149) clearly states about structuration theory: ‘as an approach to explaining social change it is useless. To confute structure and action is to rule out from the start the possibility of explaining change in terms of their interaction over time.’ A final and important critical point is that structuration theory is considered vague as a theory in empirical research because it has failed to link

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14 Resources may be either allocative (access to material facilities) or authoritative (access to control of the activities of actors).

Notwithstanding these critical remarks, structuration theory still offers several important insights for an understanding of the interplay between agent and structure, particularly the facilitating and restraining nature of structure. Jabri (1996: 54-86), for instance, has in an interesting way used structuration theory to analyse the ontological nature of war as a social phenomenon. From a structuration perspective, conflict is viewed as situated and reproduced in discursive, intersubjective and institutional continuities. Thus, shared understandings and social institutions provide power and legitimacy, which enable and reproduce conflict and violence.

Structuration theory may therefore be useful when we analyse the persistence and practices of conflict and offers meta-theoretical assumptions about how structure may provide agent with power and legitimacy to act. The eradication of the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity by an exclusive emphasis on intersubjectivity is an attempt by structuration theory to transcend the dilemma of agent-structure. However, in this study it is considered relevant to distinguish between subjectivity and intersubjectivity, since the aim is to analyse change rather than continuity and reproduction of conflict. Hence, in contrast to structuration theory, an analytical dualism will be made between agent and structure in order to more precisely analyse empirical change over time. I will therefore outline a meta-theoretical model based on an agent-structure approach in the remaining part of this chapter.

**Framework for the Analysis of Reframing and Resolving Conflict**

In this section, an analytical framework that explicitly and theoretically strives to combine agent and structure will be presented. A meta-theoretical model will be outlined as a guiding framework for the analysis of reframing and resolving conflict. This analytical framework is based on constructivism and an interpretive conceptualisation of the interplay between agent and structure, which also shares several assumptions with structuration theory. In the first section, the contents and the utility of a constructivist approach to the study of conflict will be discussed. On the basis of constructivism, the next section will elaborate on how to define and conceptualise
agent and structure. In the end of this part, I conclude with a presentation of a meta-theoretical model.

Constructivism: a bridge-builder in a divided discipline?

The content of constructivism and its utility as a theory have been widely discussed (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Checkel 1998; Finnemore 1996; Katzenstein 1996; Searle 1995; Østerud 1997). Many scholars view constructivism as a 'bridge builder' in a divided discipline by virtue of its being a pragmatic, diverse and inclusive approach—a 'bridge between those who treat international relations as a set of facts and those who argue that social and political life in the international arena is entirely constructed' (Woods 1996: 27). However, this may also be its major weakness, since it creates confusion as to the exact contents of constructivism. For the purpose of this study, the advantages and disadvantages of constructivism will therefore be clarified.

First, constructivism seeks to understand the social construction of reality, thereby focusing on ontological and epistemological questions. International politics are seen as consisting primarily of social facts, which are based on human agreements and intersubjective knowledge. In contrast to post-modernists, however, constructivists do not criticise mainstream international relation theory per se and embrace ontological realism by acknowledging the existence of a material world, which facilitates and restrains social action. Thus, constructivism attempts to bridge idealism and materialism, as well as rationalist and reflectivist epistemologies (Adler 1997: 330-337). Constructivism seizes the middle ground because it is interested in understanding how the material, subjective and intersubjective worlds interact in the social construction of reality, and because, rather than focusing exclusively on how structures constitute agents' identities and interests, it also seeks to explain how individual agents socially construct these structures in the first place. (Adler 1997: 330)

Second, constructivism draws on social theory and provides a conceptual framework of social life and change. International politics consists of rules and norms, 'international games,' which means that 'norms do not cause a state to act in a particular way, but rather provide reasons for a state to do so.' (Woods 1996: 27). Thus, 'constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on the dynamic

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normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world’ (Adler 1997: 322).

Third, constructivism analyses the collective understandings and how political actors attach meanings to and frame the material and social world. The frames originate in collective understandings, which form the identities, interests and behaviour of political actors. This type of ‘cognitive evolution’ assumes that actors have a potential and capacity for self-reflection and learning. Thus, the task for constructivists is to analyse why a certain set of norms and ideas comes to constitute ‘the international game,’ that is, the social reality. Constructivism depicts, in a way similar to that of structuration theory, that these practices and institutions for understanding realities are continuously produced and reproduced through the interplay between agents and cognitive intersubjective structures. Constructivists thereby seek to address not only which interpretation becomes the predominant but also why political actors choose to embrace new interpretations of reality (Adler 1997: 324-339).

Fourth, there is a whole range of constructivist approaches that give priority to divergent aspects of actors, discourses and the material world. From this disparity of perspectives, Adler (1997: 335-336) identifies four constructivist strands, which focus either on: (a) states as the primary actors, (b) international law and rule-guiding action, (c) narratives of knowing, or (d) deconstruction.

There are both advantages and drawbacks associated with a constructivist approach to the study of conflict. For the objectives of this study, there are at least two identified lacunae. First, constructivism is not a theory of politics by itself, but a social theory which provides a basis for other theories on various international political phenomena. Thus, constructivism, like structuration theory, lacks the precision and clarity of a theory of politics for use in empirical analysis (Adler 1997: 323). This is partly the reason why confusion and disputes have arisen as to what exactly constructivism is all about. It offers scope for a variety of interpretations of constructivism, as noted in Adler’s categorisation. As a result, ‘the relationships among principles, norms, institutions, identities, roles, and rules are not well defined so that one analyst’s norm might be another’s institution and a third scholar’s identity.’ (Finnemore 1996: 16).

Second, since most constructivists, like the adherents of structuration theory, emphasise and analyse intersubjectivity there is relatively little research on the problematique of agent (for a structural orientation, see, for example, Katzenstein, et al., 1996; Finnemore 1996). As
Checkel (1998: 325) writes, 'constructivism lacks a theory of agency. As a result, it overemphasizes the role of social structures and norms at the expense of the agents who help to create and change them in the first place.' So even if Adler sees constructivism as 'seizing the middle ground' between materialism and idealism, and individualism and holism, I would still argue that the theory is located in holism. This is a weakness for the purpose of this study, since I am interested in both how political elites frame and understand conflict and how such processes take place in a strategic environment characterised by a competition of contending norms. To resolve conflict often questions collective understandings that previously have facilitated and legitimated violence. An agreement between political leaders to de-escalate conflict may, for instance, result in a domestic breakdown in previously held collective understandings of conflict. Consequently, '[w]ithout more sustained attention to agency, these scholars [constructivists] will find themselves unable to explain where their powerful social structures (norms) come from in the first place and, equally important, why and how they change over time' (Checkel, 1998: 339).

Notwithstanding these limitations, there are several advantages in embracing some of the meta-theoretical assumptions of constructivism. Constructivism provides insights into the dynamics and formation of collective understandings about conflict. For instance, it facilitates an understanding of the reasoning and the construction of new knowledge structures, which may elucidate why political elites change and adopt new policies and strategies of conflict or cooperation. Hence, constructivism is used, on the one hand, to clarify the ontological underpinnings of this study, while, on the other hand, providing a framework for the study of the epistemology of agent and structure.

Moreover, utilising a constructivist perspective in the analysis of conflict gives particular attention to communication processes and highlights the problematic nature of meaning and how understandings of tacit and explicit messages between conflicting parties are constructed. During the communication process, political actors strive to understand and rationalise their own actions as well as the content of interaction with others. Hence, the reasoning and construction of meaning are highly contested processes, since political actors hold different beliefs and have different frames. At the same time, the intentions and motivations of political actors are influenced and mediated by intersubjectivity. Norms and rules, constituting so-called games in the domestic and international arenas, guide and direct agents towards appropriate action. Thus, constructivism points to the
importance of understanding situated actors and strategic games, which includes material objectives and intersubjective understandings (Adler 1997: 329-346; Jönsson 1990: 13-14).

In short, constructivism provides an overall dynamic framework for understanding change and is particularly well suited for an analysis of processes, which comprise fluctuating change in behaviour from conflict to cooperation. The basic assumption is that the nature and meaning of international politics are highly contested and constructed, which is a relevant consideration when analysing processes of reframing and resolving conflict. Like structuration theory, constructivism also seeks to capture the interplay between agent and structure by defining them as mutually constitutive. However, as stated above, one major weakness of constructivism is that it lacks a more explicit conceptualisation of agent, which therefore will be elaborated on in the section below.

The interplay between agent and structure

War is a practice that has been learned within history and is changed by how it is practised. In this way, it becomes a human institution with rules, customs, and norms that tell people for what purpose they can fight wars and, to a certain extent, how they should fight them. (Vasquez 1997: 668-669)

In this section, I will outline how this study will use an agent-structure approach in order to capture the dynamics of reframing and resolving conflict. What is the linkage between agent and structure, and how may we conceptualise this interplay? Constructivism will be the guiding meta-theoretical framework since conflict is viewed as a social construction. Most constructivist approaches tend to focus on how structures construct meaning; however, in this study I will give equal attention to agent and, more importantly, to the strategic interaction which frequently remains ‘unattended’ by constructivists (Jepperson, et al, 1996: 70).

Conflict is a multifaceted phenomenon and resolving conflict includes many contradictory processes. For instance, previously shared understandings of conflict may be shattered and challenged when political leaders opt for an alternative interpretation of conflict which may lead to domestic instability. This particular understanding of the interplay between agent and structure resembles the notion of ‘double-edged diplomacy’ in which the role of political leaders is seen
as a touching point between agent and structure. The objective here is therefore to strike a balance between norm-conforming and intersubjective structures of action, and agent's intentional reasoning and subjective meaning of conflict, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of methodological individualism and social determinism. Structures contain both material and social elements. However, following a constructivist framework, social structures will take precedence over material structures 'on the grounds that actors act on the basis of the meanings that objects have for them, and meanings are socially constructed' (Wendt 1996: 50). This section will clarify and define what is meant by structure and agent and elucidate the interplay between them.

Structure may be defined in a variety of ways. In this study, structure basically refers to patterns of social relationships, practices and shared perceptions of reality, which generate norms, rules, and behaviour (Lundquist 1987: 40). Norms may also be analysed from a wide range of theoretical perspectives, both rationalist and reflectivist approaches. Consequently, the understandings of these concepts are quite disparate and include contested definitions (see, for example, Adler 1997; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Hollis 1994). In this study, norms will be understood as social knowledge structures that define collective expectations of appropriate action. 'Unlike ideas which may be held privately, norms are shared and social; they are not just subjective but intersubjective' (Finnemore 1996: 22). Thus, social structures are based on shared understandings and meaning systems, which create patterns of behaviour. Norm and behaviour are therefore linked in that norm generates expectation of behaviour and guides political actors in their strategic interaction. March and Olsen (1998: 8-11) offer a useful distinction regarding the logic of action by pointing to the difference in the 'logic of anticipated consequences' and the 'logic of appropriateness.' The former assumes environmental constraints, rational calculation, and a choice among various alternatives, whereas the latter underlines norms and identities as the basis for action. In this study I will focus more on the latter, since I will elaborate on 'self,' 'other,' and how action is affected by norms. Action evokes identity and gives meaning to the situation. Consequently, '[c]hange and stability are linked to definitions and redefinitions of the self and the situation' (March and Olsen 1998: 21). The analysis, however, will give less attention to specific rule-based behaviour with clear

15 However, in contrast to that theory, which treats interests and preferences as given, this study will problematise and analyse the construction and changing nature of preferences in social interaction (Woods 1996: 12).
prescription of action since I am primarily concerned with change in conflict and how adversaries attempt to reframe, resolve and ultimately construct new political ‘realities’ and ‘rules of the game.’

Studying conflict in such a way assumes that there is a tension between competing norms, not only between adversaries but domestically as well. It is therefore important to highlight why certain norms, rather than others, guide action; but it is also important to identify emerging norms that may challenge the established ones. Hence, new norms that compete with established ones in a political contested process between international and domestic arenas may, for instance, facilitate change in policies and strategies from escalation to de-escalation (Finnemore 1996: 135; Jepperson, et al., 1996: 56).

However, it is significant to bear in mind the distinction between ‘domestic games’ in societal-political arenas and ‘international games’ in regional-international arenas. Societal norms are often more broadly held than norms in the international arena, which are rarely universal. As Cohen (1980a: 130-131) points out, the contingent nature of norms and their influence of interaction ‘exist at a dyadic (bilateral) or, less frequently, a regional level ... norms are more frequently partnership-specific than actor-universal.’

Since this study does not use discourse or cultural analysis per se, other than in a broader understanding since both approaches tend to give structure primacy over agent, the focus is on how norms and patterns of behaviour influence strategic interaction. Norms may, for instance, guide political leaders in their reasoning about what is socially considered valuable, desired and ultimately legitimate strategies of conflict. Agents, on the other hand, are here assumed to be knowledgeable and self-reflective political actors, which are guided not only by the ‘rules of the game,’ but also by desires, beliefs, and intentions. The question is then how to achieve a balance between agents’ autonomy and capacity to select a preferable choice and structural restraints on action. Reconstructing the motivation of agent may focus on ‘in order to’ reasoning, which expresses purposive behaviour, for example, how a political actor selects a particular strategy in order to achieve a specific goal. Another way of reconstructing the reasoning of agent is to highlight ‘because of’ reasons, which then leads to an account that argues that owing to some specific circumstances a particular strategy was favoured. Action, may, for instance, be justified and rationalised by reference to intersubjective norms (Friedman and Starr 1997: 71; Hollis and Smith: 1990: 144-145).
Lundquist (1987: 43) usefully suggests how these accounts may be combined. He emphasises three attributes of agent that affect choice of action: will (preferences), can (capacity and influence), and understand (perception). The effects of structure on these properties may be depicted by the flows of socialisation and information emanating from social structures. Willingness and understanding are largely influenced by socialisation, which provides agents with a frame for interpreting self, action, and social reality. Information about structure, on the other hand, facilitates agents’ improvement of their understanding of which actions may be possible or not. More immediate effects are how structure may facilitate or restrain action. Agents may draw and utilise structural properties in purposive behaviour in order to reach specific outcomes, while at the same time being placed and restrained by structures (Lundquist 1987: 48-49).

According to structuration theory, structures contain signification, domination and legitimation, and in action they may either facilitate or restrain the action of agents. Signification, which includes symbols and shared structures of meaning, may provide agents with interpretive schemes for communicating with other actors. Domination, on the other hand, highlights how the interplay between agent and structure ultimately concerns power, that is, an asymmetric capacity among political actors to mobilise for action. Finally, legitimation comprises norms and rules, and action may be either approved or inhibited by normative expectations of appropriate behaviour. For example, political leaders may draw on some specific norms in order to legitimise a policy in consonance with collective expectations (Giddens 1979: 82-83; Jabri 1996: 67, 82-83).

On the basis of these assumptions, I will conclude this section by outlining a meta-theoretical model for the analysis of the processes to reframe and resolve conflict.17

A meta-theoretical model of reframing and resolving conflict

The model presented below constitutes the guiding and overarching analytical framework for this study, and this section will merely offer an overview of the model, since the following chapters will ope-

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16 I will be using the terms willingness, capacity and understanding.
17 The model is inspired by Giddens (1979), Hay (1995), and Lundquist (1987).
rationalise concepts and discuss at greater length various parts of the model.

Figure One: A meta-theoretical model of reframing and resolving conflict

Conflict research lacks dynamic theoretical perspectives that attempt to combine agent and structure; thus, the aim is to design a process-oriented framework for the analysis of conflict. My approach to conflict is informed by various schools of thought ranging from international relations theory to sociology and social and political psychology. Second, in the empirical analysis the framework strives to combine the interplay between agent and structure in order to understand how change occurs. Third, the model is constructed with the objective of ‘explanatory understanding.’ The understanding of the cyclical and transformative nature of strategic interaction is viewed as contingent on historical and sociological processes. Hence, highlighting transformative processes of resolving conflict gives less
attention to any precise or exact ‘ending picture’ of conflict. Still, I basically agree with Rupesinghe (1995: 77) that ‘[u]ltimately, transformation can be meaningful only if it is not merely a transfer of power, but if sustainable structural and attitudinal changes are also achieved within the society and new institutions emerge to address outstanding issues.’

In the previous part of the chapter, I discussed the interplay between agent and structure. The notion of situated actor is introduced to highlight how political actors are situated in a structured strategic context (Hay 1995: 190). Hence, the notion is receptive to a particular time and situation in which political actors may be located and positioned. By using the notion of situated actors, we may enhance knowledge of how normative expectations may facilitate and restrain action. At the same time, a situated actor is mediated by the perceptions and preferences of agents which may, for instance, opt for alternative strategies to conflict. Hence, appropriate strategies may change over time.

The strategic interaction is depicted as a bargaining and communication process where political actors interpret the intentions and behaviour of others. Bargaining includes conflict behaviour and various types of communication processes, ranging from tacit signalling and informal bargaining, to explicit negotiation (Jönsson 1990: 2-3). The effects of the strategic interaction highlight cyclical and non-linear patterns of reframing and resolving conflict. It is assumed that agents are knowledgeable and self-reflective political actors who reason, rationalise and attempt to make sense of both their own action and the strategic interaction with other parties (Giddens 1979: 57-59). Thus, it is presumed that the strategic interaction, which may have both intended and unintended outcomes, facilitates some type of ‘political learning’ and effects on perceptions held by political actors (Hay 1995: 201; Jönsson 1990: 11; Wallensteen 1991: 129). For instance, political leaders may revise their perception of an adversary or become more informed of restraining structures, which may limit the range of strategic options. Similarly, structures are affected by the outcomes of the strategic interaction. Strategic interaction may generate new norms and patterns of behaviour, leading to (re)constructed realities, which facilitate or restrain the future course of action.

Since agent and structure are viewed in this study as mutually constitutive, that is, ‘the construction of social structures by agents as well as the way in which those structures, in turn, influence and reconstruct agency’ (Finnemore 1996: 24), some methodological
considerations need to be given to the temporal dimension of empirical change over time. Agent and structure are both affected by the strategic interaction, although not simultaneously. Structures, for instance, 'logically both predate and postdate any action affecting them' (Carlsnaes 1992: 260; see also Lundquist 1987: 50). As mentioned above, an analytical dualism is therefore made by 'bracketing' structure and examining the agent's intentional behaviour and reasoning. The brackets will then be reversed to agent in order to analyse the facilitating and restraining effects of structures (Carlsnaes 1992: 259-260; Finnemore 1996: 25; Friedman and Starr 1997: 24).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have attempted to elucidate the fundamental theoretical underpinnings of this thesis. On the basis of a critical assessment of conflict research, the overall objective is to advance conflict research by furthering knowledge of change and continuity in conflict from a process-oriented perspective. By the use of key sensitising concepts, such as 'meaning,' 'reframing' and 'resolving' conflict, actor, structure and strategy are situated in time and space. These notions entail complex processes of change and continuity, and the endeavour has been to outline a meta-theoretical model for the analysis of these processes. The model strives to serve as a dynamic analytical framework for the study of conflict, which includes an agent-structure approach. Hence, the model depicts the overarching structure of this thesis, which also guides the operationalisation of key concepts pursued in subsequent chapters.

The ontological problem of agent and structure is long-standing in the social sciences. The immediate concern here has been how to conceptualise and analyse the interplay between agent and structure; and how to balance between autonomy of agent, on the one hand, and the structural restraints imposed on action, on the other hand. In this regard, I have found both constructivism and structuration theory useful in that both theories provide meta-theoretical assumptions concerning the problem of agent and structure. Constructivism clarifies the ontological assumptions of this study while at the same time focusing on the epistemology of agent and structure. Structuration theory highlights how knowledgeable and self-reflective actors are restrained and facilitated in their action by structural rules and resources. However, in contrast to structuration theory, I argue
that it is important to make an analytical dualism between agent and structure if we want to analyse and understand how change occurs. Similarly, constructivism tends to oversocialise agent and lacks an explicit conceptualisation of agent (see also Barnett 1999: 7). The meta-theoretical model therefore outlines an agent-structure approach to be used for the analyses of reframing and resolving conflict.
Part II

Conflict
Chapter 3

FRAMES AND STRUCTURES OF CONFLICT

The objective of this second part of the thesis is to present a theoretical and empirical overview of the various understandings attached to the origin and evolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This chapter elaborates first theoretically on the frames of agent, that is, ‘underlying structures of belief, perception, and appreciation’ (Schön and Rein 1994: 22). The second section presents a conceptualisation of the structural parameters of conflict which emanate from domestic and international arenas. It is argued that in order to understand collective reasoning, norms and behaviours in the domestic arenas, an analysis of political culture is required. In international arenas, patterns of behaviour and norms are more frequently partnership-specific. The analysis will therefore focus on relations with informal and formal allies and third parties, which generate normative expectations of action. The overall aim is to provide an understanding of the political setting in which the strategic interaction of conflict takes place.

Adversarial Perceptions and Self-Images

If one’s primary concern ... is to understand the dynamics of conflict and the strategies most likely to be effective in transforming destructive into constructive processes, then it is also crucial to focus upon the differences in perceptions of parties to conflict. Then one needs to analyze the differences with which parties perceive the same issues, events, policies, and peoples. (Kaplowitz 1990: 56)

Adversarial perceptions of conflict bring forward questions about identity politics in general and the image of ‘self’ and ‘other’ in particular. Most often, political leaders in conflict hold rival views and images of what constitutes ‘reality,’ and ‘decision-makers act in accordance with their perception of reality’ (Brecher 1972: 12). Thus, in order to gain an in-depth understanding of the strategic interaction in conflict, one must pay particular attention to the dominant images
and beliefs held by political elites. In this study, a political elite will be understood as a ‘single group,’ a few individuals who are part of a single body (Friedman and Starr, 1997: 88), in this case, a political leadership, which constitutes the inner core of a decision-making body. These dominant frames of political elites are assumed to be influenced both by individual attributes, such as cognitions, values and attitudes, and by political culture and ideology.

This section utilises various perspectives from social and political psychology which focus on the different ways individuals reason and construct meanings of their political environment. Understanding dominant frames involves an ‘empathetic reconstruction’ of how political elites construct reasons for their strategic interaction. As scholars are interpreting an already interpreted political environment, empathetic reconstruction thus involves a double hermeneutic (Hollis 1994: 146; Jönsson 1990: 30).

The approach advocated in this study partly deviates from the prevalent assumption held in cognition theory according to which researchers study and compare two ‘realities,’ that is, one subjective and one objective. If such an assumption is made, subjective perceptions may be evaluated and compared with an ‘objective reality’ and then ‘misperceptions’ in international politics may be identified (see, for example, Jervis 1976; Vertzberger 1990: 37). The purpose here, however, is not to assess why individuals perceive, accurately or not, a political event but to operationalise the agent’s attributes—willingness, capacity, and understanding—discussed in chapter two. Such an understanding facilitates knowledge about how political elites make sense of their social realities and highlights various conflicting perceptions and intentions (see also, Smith 1988: 12; Schön and Rein 1994: 30-34).

Enemy images and perceptions of conflict are generally known for their perseverance, since political actors tend to interpret and understand their political environment from ‘theory-driven’ perceptions, which are derived from pre-existing knowledge structures (Jönsson 1990: 52). ‘Perception simply refers to the way in which an individual interprets the world. As social actors we constantly “decode” messages from the world around us. The codes we break, however, are not written in stone; we decode messages according to our internal standards.’ (Tidwell 1998: 91).

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18 Several studies analyse the belief system of political leaders from various perspectives, such as operational codes, images, belief systems, cognitive maps and attitudinal prisms. For an overview of the approaches to the study of belief system, see Smith (1988: 17-27).
This section will devote special attention to cognitive and ideological beliefs. Cognition theory highlights how individuals, during information processing, frequently act as ‘cognitive misers.’ Individuals acting as cognitive misers tend to reject new information if it contradicts pre-existing beliefs in order to avoid dissonance (Larson 1985: 29-34). Cognitive beliefs are understood as beliefs based on history and personal experiences, that is, empirical events that political elites use to frame and reason about conflict. These types of belief are often constructed by ‘lesson-drawing’ from the past, and political actors are therefore inclined to act as ‘practical-intuitive historian’ (Vertzberger 1990: 298). The frequent use of historical analogies is one way for political actors to compare and categorise contemporary political events (Jönsson 1990: 52-57). An illustrative example of analogical reasoning is the way American President George Bush framed the Persian Gulf Crisis in 1990-91 and the behaviour of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. A historical analogy was made by comparing and categorising the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait with the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1938. This way of reasoning provided a suitable frame to castigate Saddam Hussein as a leader with characteristics similar to those of Adolf Hitler—a dictator who could only be deterred by power, not through appeasement.

According to schema theory, memories and experiences are stored and categorised and serve as guidelines for political actors in their interpretations of world politics. Actors may seek reassurances in familiar experiences by analogical reasoning, which may help them to diagnose and make sense of a complex political situation (Jönsson 1990: 51-62; Larson 1985: 50-56). ‘History is more than a mere description of the past; it provides insight into the deeper layers of meaning’ (Tidwell 1998: 119). These kinds of belief not only guide political actors in their strategic interaction but also (re)construct images of self, enemy and conflict in general.

A historical perspective influences the judgement of parties to conflict, limiting, curtailing and creating options for behaviour. It is also a window into motivation, and the rationale behind choices made ... History is defined as a perceived version of the past; it is an explanation of how things were, and why things today are as they are. (Tidwell 1998: 108-109)

19 The distinction between cognitive and ideological beliefs is analytical and they should not be seen as mutually exclusive. Both beliefs are used to further knowledge of how adversaries reason about conflict, in this case by the use of history or ideology.
Hence, cognitive beliefs descriptively point to the perceived ‘realities’ of political actors. In comparison, ideological beliefs are more abstract, while at the same time more articulated and explicit, than cognitive beliefs. Ideological beliefs constitute a comprehensive framework for purposeful and intentional behaviour with prescription and legitimation for political action. Founded on value systems, ideological beliefs provide an intellectual framework for interpreting and evaluating conflict. According to Larson (1985: 21) ideology is ‘defined as a belief system, held by a group, that “explains and justifies a preferred political order for society, either existing or proposed, and offers strategy (processes, institutions, programs) for its attainment.”’ Hence, ideology prescribes long-range goals, and these beliefs are frequently used to diagnose problems, evaluate alternative strategies, and justify and rationalise various actions taken in conflict (Holsti 1983: 324-325; Maclean 1988). In a similar way, Aronoff and Aronoff (1996: 4) argue that ideological beliefs are specific, rationalised interpretations of political culture. However, it is important to make an analytical distinction between ideological and sociological beliefs. ‘Ideological beliefs represent an interpretation from within a particular thought which remains trapped within that thought, while sociological beliefs represent an interpretation from without, which seeks to refer knowledge claims and beliefs to the social context which can offer the meaning necessary to understanding and assessing.’ (Maclean 1988: 65).

An analysis of cognitive and ideological beliefs accordingly facilitates an understanding of the images of self and enemy. Holsti (1962), in his seminal work on national and enemy images, differentiates between open and closed belief systems in which new information either produces change (open system) or is adjusted to a pre-existing belief system (closed system) with obvious implications for change and continuity of beliefs. Self-images are particularly resistant to change as they ‘draw upon myths and embellished memories of past achievements as palpable examples of the national purpose’ (Lebow 1981: 197). Moreover, political elites are inclined to be locked in their own national self-image, which may induce them to believe that others see

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20 Carlsnaes (1981: 183-188) argues that perceptions and ideology should be distinguished from each other in the analysis, since cognition theory, in his view, is based on causality, whereas ideology is seen as a doctrinal element, which must be explicated as purposeful and intentional action. The analytical dualism upheld in this study between cognitive and ideological beliefs should be viewed as an attempt to analyse both the ‘because of’ and the ‘in order to’ reasoning of political actors.
them in a similarly idealised way as they understand themselves, that is, ‘images of others’ images of oneself’ (Lebow 1981: 202-203).

Kaplowitz (1990) stresses the importance of studying self-images, a research area which he claims is neglected in the study of conflict. He sees a clear link between how political elites frame their own national purpose and aspiration to that of the enemy’s legitimacy and authenticity (Kaplowitz 1990: 57). In a similar vein, Vezzberger (1990: 126) refers to the ‘judgmental heuristic’ and the conjunction of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ Hence, part of the process of constructing national self-esteem and self-image is to distinguish ‘self’ from the ‘other.’ This is frequently done by distinguishing ‘us’ and ‘them,’ ‘friends’ and ‘enemies,’ which tends to lead to national stereotyping and simplistic beliefs about the ‘other’ (Vezzberger 1990: 125; Jabri 1996: 133-141). ‘An enemy is, in some way, an opponent, but also much more. An enemy is a value-laden, emotionally charged entity, one that is the recipient of specific negative value connotations and meanings.’ (Tidwell 1998: 127).

Attribution theory is helpful in that the theory problematises how political actors actively attempt to interpret and understand their own behaviour as well as that of other actors, and how intertwined this knowledge is with images of self and other. Heradstveit (1979), in his excellent study on the psychological obstacles to peace, claims that beliefs of self and ‘other’ are based on a ‘mutual contingency interaction’. The interaction and behaviour of the enemy have direct consequences for the frames of self, the enemy and conflict in general (Heradstveit 1979: 23-24). In the quest for meaning and interpretation of conflictual interaction, political actors are disposed to act as ‘intuitive scientists,’ utilising a kind of ‘naive epistemology’ (Heradstveit 1979: 22). The driving force is not consistency, as stipulated in the theory of cognitive dissonance, but rather a search for validity in order to understand and provide reasons for the strategic action of others as well as that of oneself (Larson 1985: 34-41).

Attribution theory emphasises the distinction between dispositional and situational factors. Dispositional factors are understood as enduring and internal characteristics of an actor, whereas situational features are external, contextual and transient. Political actors have a tendency to overemphasise dispositional factor when explaining the behaviour of enemies, whereas situational factors are accentuated when interpreting their own behaviour. As a consequence, there is a tendency in conflict to have negative anticipations about the behaviour of the enemy and positive expectations about the action of
oneself. In theory, this is called the ‘fundamental attribution error’ (Heradstveit 1979: 23-26).

In the next chapter, the empirical analysis will centre on various understandings of self and enemy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These frames are based on historical interpretations, ideological beliefs and situational and dispositional rationalisations made by political elites in the conflict. Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, the theoretical framework will be expanded and linked to societal-political as well as to international structures of conflict.

**Domestic and International Structures**

The domestic and international environments of states have effects; they are the arenas in which actors contest norms and through political and social processes construct and reconstruct identities. (Katzenstein 1996: 25)

There are several studies of conflict that focus on political leaders and adopt perspectives in which adversaries are viewed as rational and purposive political actors. However, according to Farnham (1990: 84), there is a need, particularly within decision-making theories, to focus to a greater extent on the political environment where action takes place. This section aims to problematise the political contexts of conflict and discuss how normative and behavioural structures may facilitate and restrain strategic interaction. In conflict research and foreign policy analysis there are studies that have attempted to combine structural and individualist accounts, the external/operational and the internal/psychological environments, to use a different terminology (Brecher 1972; Hopmann 1991). However, in comparison to these studies, the understanding here of structure will not relate to the material world per se, but rather to how various political groups interpret and give reason and meaning to these ‘realities.’ This study assumes that political actors are affected by structures of shared knowledge and intersubjective understandings. Socially constructed rules, principles, norms of behavior, and shared beliefs may provide states, individuals, and other actors with understandings of what is important or valuable and what are effective.

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21 This is an attempt to combine subjective and intersubjective understandings and thus diverges from several constructivists; see, for instance, Katzenstein (1996), where most of the authors are ‘thoroughgoing structuralists’ (Jepperson, et al., 1996: 66).
and/or legitimate means of obtaining those valued goods’ (Finnemore 1996: 15). One of the aims is therefore to identify the collective as well as rival meanings of conflict in the societal-political and international arenas, which in this study constitute the structural parameters of conflict.

Any new or emergent norm must compete with existing, perhaps countervailing, ones. This is a political process that implicates the relative power of international or domestic coalitions. But norms make new types of action possible, while neither guaranteeing action nor determining its results. (Jepperson, et al., 1996: 56).

The focus lies on practices, patterns of relations, and normative expectations about action which generate rules, norms, and behaviour. These structures contain information about what is prescribed as appropriate and legitimate strategies in specific political situations (Cohen 1980b: 8; Katzenstein 1996: 5). Hence, the manifold and frequently rivalling expectations and understandings of conflict in the domestic and international arenas are for the adversaries part of the structures in the strategic interaction. The focus of the analysis will therefore be, as discussed in chapter two, on the ‘logic of appropriateness’ rather than the ‘logic of consequences,’ when analysing the strategic interaction.

Societal-political structures

In the domestic arena, public opinion expresses normative expectations and sets boundaries for what is or is not acceptable action in conflict (see, for instance, Putnam 1993a). According to some researchers, public opinion is simply reactive to international political events, whereas other scholars interpret public opinion as prescriptive; thus it becomes a facilitating or a restraining structural feature of the strategic interaction (see, for example, Craig and George 1990: 60). In conflict, there usually exists a kind of overarching meaning, a ‘meta-frame’ for what generally constitutes conflict and the legitimate grounds for dispute which have evolved over time through practice and behaviour. However, if we assume that there are also contested understandings and ‘struggles’ for meaning of conflict, it is important to elaborate on the political setting—which domestic interest groups may articulate these opinions (Wolfsfeld 1997). To facilitate such an analysis we need to clarify the so-called ‘game of politics’ in which political opposition is able to act and express itself (see Hagan 1995).
What type of rules and norms does the domestic political system and organisation contain? Are norms and organisational structures for politics authoritarian or democratic? Moreover, in what ways are public opinion and political opposition integrated within the wider setting of political culture? One of the aims of the empirical analysis is therefore to crystallise and identify political culture and analyse how various interpretations of conflict are expressed by domestic groups.

Political culture is a problematic and elusive notion. According to Verba, political culture 'consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place.' (1965: 513; compare with Diamond 1994: 7). Aronoff and Aronoff define political culture as 'collective meanings and understandings that social groups create, share, and symbolically express' (1996: 3). Political culture may thus be understood as a dominant discourse of symbols and myths constructed from political practices, which depicts a shared identity and perception of its destiny (Aronoff and Aronoff 1996: 4; Jabri 1996). Collective political attitudes are formed by learning experiences of history and practices emanating from the political system. Consequently, political culture provides various domestic interest groups with a meta-frame to interpret social and political actions. Political culture thus highlights preferences and distinct 'orientation to action' (Diamond 1994: 8; Peleg 1998b).

Conflict is cultural behavior, since culture shapes what people fight about, how they fight, with whom they fight, and how the conflict ends ... Both group goals and group actions are linked to cultural notions of appropriate behavior in the development and pursuit of goals. As a result, culturally shared rules can guide behavior even in the absence of strong institutions to enforce them. Conflict involves both the pursuit of culturally defined competing interests and the parties' divergent interpretations and threats to identity. (Ross 1997: 74)

According to Peleg, political culture may be depicted either as 'consensual,' characterised by an overall societal unanimity, or 'differentiating,' reflecting only one particular societal segment which affects the orientation to action (Peleg 1997: 14). As stated above, it is assumed that domestic constituencies may diverge in their interpretations of conflict, and consequently an important question to raise is the extent to which these meta-frames are shared or contended. Which interpretation is considered more appropriate; which acts in accordance with dominant social norms; and which rivals the dominant meta-frame of conflict?
International structures

In comparison to the domestic arena, the international arena has received greater attention because of the dominance of the realist paradigm. Several studies of international relations have centred on the consequences of anarchy, material capabilities, and the influence of order and stability in the interaction of major powers. The use of a constructivist approach, however, shifts attention from consequences to meaning and appropriateness, which focus on norms, rules and patterns of behaviour. Constructivist approaches frequently devote greater attention to global and universal norms. This study will confine the analysis to norms, rules, and behaviour generated specifically from relations in informal and formal alliances and between disputants and third parties in conflict. It is assumed that expectations regarding the appropriateness of behaviour in conflict originate from these relationships. Hence, the aim is to delineate various interpretations of conflict and thereby identify the various expectations for strategic interaction.

As mentioned, alliance relations have traditionally been analysed and understood as a response to threats and anarchy, which are determined by power politics. However, following a constructivist line, the focus will rather be on the extent of shared perceptions of ‘realities’ and patterns of behaviour over time in international relations. Barnett (1996: 401) argues that the relational and ideational aspects are the decisive factors in alliance formation, that is, ‘politics of identity rather than the logic of anarchy.’ Hence, the choice of alliance partners is frequently based on a shared definition of threats and a similar identification of friends and foes in international politics. Moreover, ‘identity concerns not only the state’s external “self” but also its internal one; thus, changes, for example, in state identity, may impair alliance formation (Barnett 1996: 408, for the quotation, p. 412).

Third parties are also part of international structures in their direct or indirect interventions in conflict. Intervention will here be used in a more restricted manner by the exclusion of military intervention. The emphasis lies on benign intervention by external actors who strive primarily to promote specific norms and influence the behaviour of the conflicting parties towards some kind of de-escalation of conflict.

22 Several of these approaches assume implicitly that some specific norms, usually ‘good ones’ such as democracy and human rights, will be adopted by most international actors (Checkel 1998: 338).
Third parties may involve a whole range of political actors, such as small states, great powers, and intergovernmental (IGO) and nongovernmental (NGO) organisations. Benign intervention may take the form of mediation and facilitation of de-escalation processes in which third parties express their understandings of conflict and present various ‘formulae,’ which include norms and assumptions about appropriate strategic actions. Finnemore (1996: 11, 147) describes this type of third parties as ‘active teachers’ by virtue of their promotion of certain norms and political agendas. These assertions by third parties may either converge with or contest the disputants’ understandings of how conflict should be managed and resolved. Consequently, relations with third parties constitute yet another dimension of the structural parameters that define opportunities and restraints in the strategic interaction.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have advanced a number of theoretical arguments for how agent and structure are operationalised, as presented in the meta-theoretical model in chapter two. First, in order to delineate the attributes of agent—willingness, capacity, and understanding—we need to elaborate upon adversarial perceptions and self-images. Second, to identify images of self and enemy, an analytical dualism between cognitive and ideological beliefs is presented. Cognitive beliefs depict how the frames of agent are formed by historical lesson-drawing and experience, whereas ideological beliefs constitute more abstract reasoning, which may serve as an evaluative framework to prescribe action. Third, structures are here understood as domestic and international ‘games’ which contain norms, rules and patterns of behaviour. To highlight structural features, which political actors may draw upon in action in the societal-political arena, such as signification, power, and legitimation, the notion of political culture is particularly useful. Political culture illuminates meta-frames and interpretive schemes, which enable people to construct meaning of conflict. Furthermore, the notion highlights particular norms, structure, and organisation of politics, which may legitimate or censor action in conflict. Finally, in the international arena the focus is on

23 An expanded typology of third-party intervention may include conciliation, mediation, consultation, arbitration and peacekeeping.
alliance and third-party relations, which generate norms and patterns of behaviour. Again, these norms and behaviour may provide meaning, capabilities and sanction action in conflict.
Chapter 4

UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

The terrible fact is that in relation to this country, two peoples are in existence—each of them with the deepest sincere belief that this country is their home. This fact cannot be eliminated by any theory or by any ideology. (Interview, Leibowitz 1993)

There are numerous studies of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which provide different insights into the complex nature of the conflict. The analysis of this study is confined to agent and structure, that is, the frames of the Israeli and Palestinian elites and the domestic and international structures of the conflict.

Israeli and Palestinian Elite Perceptions of the Conflict

The study of the dominant elite perceptions of conflict directs attention to images of self and enemy. In what ways has history influenced cognitive beliefs of conflict? What are the predominant ideological frames for the interpretation of conflict? How are cognitive and ideological frames used to rationalise conflicting interaction?

Dominant Israeli frames

Before and immediately after the establishment of Israel, the Labour Party was the predominant party in Israeli politics; not until 1977 was Labour defeated by the Likud Party. Yet, despite different world-views and interpretations of Zionism, these Israeli political elites have shared several beliefs about the conflict, such as viewing the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as a terrorist organisation and rejecting
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This section attempts to reflect both the shared and contrasting frames of these two dominant Israeli elites. Jewish history, anti-Semitism, Arab hostilities and wars constitute a large part of the Israeli cognitive beliefs. Lesson-drawing from historical experience and analogical reasoning have thus frequently been used when Israeli elites rationalise and interpret the conflict. Zionism constitutes a major part of the ideological beliefs from which the conflict is evaluated, and legitimation and prescription of action are generated.

Self-images

The cognitive frames of self have to a great extent been shaped by the legacy of Shoa—the Holocaust—and by the establishment of the state of Israel. Until the twentieth century the vast majority of Jewish people lived in diaspora, dispersed throughout the world, although predominantly in Europe. Jewish history constitutes a rich heritage of culture, religion and civilisation. Yet, a recurrent element in Jewish history has been anti-Semitism, which culminated in the Holocaust, in which one-third of the Jewish people was murdered. The Holocaust left a tremendous and yet an ambivalent consciousness in the minds of the Israeli political elite. For the ‘founding fathers’, the Jewish life in diaspora was viewed as vulnerable and passive and negated the life in Palestine where the ‘new Jew’, the ‘Sabra’, was characterised by strength and self-reliance. The Holocaust therefore became ‘the most salient and deplorable symbol of the Jewish plight in the diaspora’ (Weitz 1995: 143; see also Bar-On 1993: 26-28; Flamhaft 1996: 138; Kimmerling 1997: 228). The basic understanding and lesson-drawing of the Holocaust among many Israelis has been that such an evil act, directed against the Jewish people, should never be allowed to happen again. The best insurance that it would never happen again, it was argued, was the existence of a militarily strong Jewish state. A Jewish state and the ‘right of return’ would guarantee a home for

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24 These shared understandings were part of the common platform for two national unity governments in 1984 and 1988 (Basic Policy Guidelines [1984]1992: 2).
25 For instance, Israel did not have a memorial day for the Holocaust until the end of the 1950s.
26 Every person with a Jewish grandmother/father is allowed to settle in Israel, although this contradicts the halachic (ultra-orthodox) interpretation of who is a Jew.
persecuted Jews from the diaspora. To ensure the physical survival of the Jewish state, it had to be strong militarily (Bar-Tal 1990).

There are several examples of attribution errors in which Israeli actions most often have been interpreted according to situational factors and strengthened by analogical reasoning. Israel was declared a state in May 1948 and has since experienced several wars. According to Israeli elite perceptions, the Jewish state was, from its first day of existence, physically threatened by Arab states. Particularly the war of independence of 1948-49, the Six Day war of 1967, and the Yom Kippur war of 1973, to use Israeli parlance, have been interpreted as evidence of Arab aggression and their wish to annihilate the state of Israel. Israel has therefore been forced to build a strong military institution in order to deter enemies and ensure the physical survival of the Jewish state (Peres 1998: 112). Israel, in contrast to the Arab states, declared on several occasions its longing for and willingness to negotiate peace with its Arab neighbours (Meir [1962]1984: 165). However, the response from the Arab world was interpreted as complete rejection of any recognition of Israel. A frequently cited example of aggressive Arab intentions is the Arab summit held in Khartoum in 1967, when the Arab states announced that there was to be 'no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country' (The Khartoum Resolutions [1967]1997). As a consequence, it was argued that Israel did not, for a long period of time, have any partner with which to negotiate peace (Eban [1967]1984: 207-229). Not until the late 1970s, with the Camp David agreement, were the first concrete steps towards peace taken. For some part of the political elite, this peace treaty was still viewed as an isolated event owing to the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat, the subsequent isolation of Egypt in the region, and the unfolding of a 'cold' peace between Egypt and Israel (Interview, Shamir 1993).

The predominant Israeli frame of self has therefore been that of 'David vs. Goliath', the small state of Israel surrounded by twenty-two Arab states with a desire to annihilate the Jewish state (Interview, Shamir 1993). For instance, Ben-Gurion ([1961]1998) described the war of independence in 1948 thus as 'a small nation of 700,000 persons ... stood up against six nations numbering 30 million.'

For many political leaders 'the memory of the Holocaust makes it possible to believe the reiterated Arab threat of annihilation,' and anti-Zionism becomes almost equivalent to anti-Semitism (Bar-Tal

H alaha stipulates only a person born of a Jewish mother or a convert to Judaism is a Jew.
1990: 15). In short, the cognitive Israeli frame among the political elite is characterised by a strong emphasis on security, survival, deterrence and military strength around which there has been solid consensus (see also Lidén 1979).

The ideological beliefs of self are related to cognitive beliefs, as Zionism is very much a product of history. However, the emphasis is more on intentions, where ideology may be used to evaluate the conflict and prescribe action. Zionism, as a Jewish national ideology, was partly a response to the increasing European nationalism and anti-Semitism. The overall objectives, shared by all Zionists, were the longing for and objective to establish a Jewish state and the creation of a modern Jewish society (Bar-O n 1993; Laquer 1972). Still, Zionists differ in their views of the character and purpose of a Jewish state. Two streams of Zionism, labour Zionism and revisionist Zionism, deviate in their self-images, which are also reflected in current Israeli politics. Labour Zionism emphasised from the outset the importance of the internal dimensions of statehood, that is, the qualitative characteristics of a Jewish state. Inspired by socialist ideology and liberal democracy, labour Zionists at the time put a strong emphasis on working the land, building Jewish settlements and a dedication to agriculture. A ‘new Jew,’ the Sabra, which negated the diaspora Jew as the ‘other,’ was characterised by strength and self-reliance (Weitz 1995: 143). Revisionist Zionism, in contrast, emphasised the external dimensions of the state, that is, defence of the land where Jews could live in dignity and self-respect. Inspired by conservative ideals of military might, a pessimistic world-view, and scepticism of liberal democracy, revisionist Zionists measured the importance of a Jewish state according to territorial size and military strength. Hence, they explicitly made claims not only on Palestinian territory, but also on that of Transjordan, later to become Jordan (Harkabi 1988: 70-83; Sprinzak 1993: 118-121).27

Enemy images

Ideological beliefs not only prescribe but also provide legitimation of action. Israeli ideological beliefs have had a direct impact on the construction of the rejection and denial of the ‘other,’ the enemy. Zionism had, as one unifying and motivating theme, ‘a land without

27 This is one of the reasons why the Likud claims to have already made a territorial compromise.
a people to a people without a land’ (for a critical analysis, see Finkelstein 1995: 7-20). As the theme reveals, the Arab inhabitants in Palestine, who in the beginning of this century constituted almost ninety percent of the population, were largely ignored (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 78). As former Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol stated: ‘What are Palestinians? When I came here [to Palestine] there were 250,000 non-Jews, mainly Arabs and Bedouins. It was desert, more than underdeveloped. Nothing.’ (quoted in Farsoun and Zacharias 1997: 10; see also Meir’s statement in 1969 about the non-existence of a Palestinian people, quoted in Cobban 1984: 246). The denial of the existence of another nation in Palestine was also made possible by treating Palestinians as Arabs, that is, no explicit distinction was made between Arabs and Palestinians (Ben-Gurion [1961]1998). Instead it was argued that the Palestinian people had vast territories of belonging in comparison to the Jewish people, who only had one country (Interview, Shamir 1993). Thus, the problem of Palestinian refugees in 1949, after the war, was entirely framed as an issue to be dealt with by the Arab states. The idea of repatriation to Israel was seen as both absurd and an ‘unnatural event’ (Eban [1958]1984: 155). ‘The Arab refugees are to be uprooted from the soil of nations to which they are akin and loyal—and placed in a State to which they are alien and hostile.’ (Eban [1958]1984: 162).

The enemy image is also based on cognitive beliefs which affect how a conflicting situation may be diagnosed. According to Israeli cognitive beliefs, the Arab refugee problem was interpreted without any association to the national rights of the Palestinians to the land.28 The Palestinian refugee problem was a consequence of Arab aggression and their joint declaration of war in 1948 against the newly declared Jewish state (Meir [1961]1999; Tekoah [1972]1999). Consequently, the Israeli political elite put the entire blame on the Arab states because ‘[i]f there had been no war against Israel, with its consequent harvest of bloodshed, misery, panic and flight, there would be no problem of Arab refugees today. Once you determine the responsibility for that war, you have determined the responsibility for the refugee problem’ (Eban [1958]1984: 151). Ben-Gurion ([1961]1998) stated:

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28 The Israeli government also stressed that the state had settled around 450,000 Jewish refugees from the Arab world (Eban [1958]1984: 158).
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We have clear documentary evidence of the fact that they [the Palestinians] left the country at the orders of the Arab leaders, headed by the Mufti, on the assumption that the invasion of the Arab armies after the departure of the Mandatory Government's forces would destroy the Jewish State, and throw all the Jews, alive or dead, into the sea.

In the 1970s the Palestine question came to the fore internationally, partly because of the intensification of Palestinian terrorism. Concurrently the PLO augmented its role as the representative of the Palestinian people and received increasing recognition, for instance, in the UN, where the organisation gained the status of a permanent observer. The focus of the enemy shifted somewhat from Arab aggression in general towards the PLO specifically. After a terrorist attack in July 1975, Prime Minister Rabin ([1975]1982: 248) described the PLO in the following way:

The terrorist organizations, headed by Yasser Arafat, were quick to claim responsibility for this bloodshed. This is the face of the man who led the U.N. General Assembly astray — so easily — with the olive branch in his hand and the pistol strapped to his waist. This is the act of those whose principles are designed to liquidate Israel and deny sovereign Jewish national existence.

Notwithstanding the split among the Israeli political elite over the future of the occupied territories, there was until recently an almost complete consensus that the PLO was to be seen as a terrorist organisation.

The real problem is not whether to deal with the PLO or not, but whether it would serve any useful purpose whatsoever ... the PLO's very raison d'être is the denial of Israel's right to exist, thinly veiled behind the cover of an ostensibly legitimate call for Palestinian statehood. (Shamir [1982]1984: 642)

To sum up, the belief systems of the Israeli political elites may be characterised as relatively closed and driven by strongly held enemy images. The PLO was for a long period of time described as evil and with dispositional characteristics, an enemy image which was seen to be validated by the contents of the Palestinian National Charter, and evidenced in the wave of terrorist acts against Israeli and Jewish civilians. Israeli actions, in contrast, were understood as situational reactions to a hostile environment (Allon [1974]1982: 135; Rabin [1974]1982: 115-121).
Dominant Palestinian frames

There have been, for several reasons, fewer studies and research on Palestinian than on Israeli elite frames. First, the analysis of political elites is frequently made in comparative studies, and one general criterion for this kind of research has been that the political elite is part of a state. Moreover, this particular conflict has, for a long period of time, been defined as primarily an interstate conflict, that is, the Arab-Israeli rather than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Consequently, the Palestinian political elite has been the subject of less thorough analysis. Second, the distinction between political elites and people has been less clear because of the fact that the majority of the Palestinians since 1948 live in exile. For an extended period of time the Palestinians lacked any type of cohesive and unified political leadership. Instead, they experienced a competition among Arab leaders in their attempt to represent and lead the Palestinian cause (Brynen 1995; Farsoun and Zacharia 1997; Khalidi 1997).

Palestinian elite perceptions are to a large extent constructed on cognitive beliefs based on historical lesson-drawing, particularly from the events in 1948 and 1949. These perceptions have been strengthened by ideological beliefs, which evaluate and legitimise conflicting interaction.

Self-images

The cognitive beliefs are primarily shaped by the experience of the al-Naqba—the catastrophe—in 1948 when 726,000 Palestinians were either being expelled from or fled the country in which they previously constituted a majority (Persson 1994: 64).30

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29 On comparative studies of the Arab-Israeli conflict see, for example, Heradstveit 1979; Lenczowski 1975; on the scientific study of political elites in the Middle East, see Zartman 1980.

30 The general Israeli account of the events in 1948-49 is that the Palestinians were encouraged by their leaders to leave. This account, however, has recently been challenged by post-Zionist historians (see, for instance, Benny Morris 1988) who argue that orders were informally given, which encouraged the expulsion of segments of the Palestinian population.
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What the Palestinians now shared was far greater than what separated them; all had been dispossessed; none were masters of their own fate, all were at the mercy of cold, distant, and hostile new authorities. If the Arab population of Palestine had not been sure of their identity before 1948, the experience of defeat, dispossession, and exile guaranteed that they knew what their identity was very soon afterwards: they were Palestinians. (Khalidi 1997: 194)

After the armistice agreements were reached in 1949, mandatory Palestine was split into a Jewish state; the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, was occupied and later annexed by Jordan; and the Gaza Strip was put under Egyptian military rule. The expulsion of the Palestinians and the decision to partition Palestine have been framed by the Palestinian political elite as a tremendous ‘historical injustice’ since it deprived the people of the land and the right to national self-determination. They consider themselves the indigenous people of Palestine who have inalienable national rights. Pre-1948 Palestinians constitute al-Sha’ab al-Filastini (the Palestinian people), part of the greater Arab umma whose watan (homeland) is Filastin’ (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 12).

The historical lesson-drawing of the al-Naqba has been strengthened by ideological beliefs of Palestinian nationalism, pan-Arabism and ‘an amalgam of Third World-style ideas of social, economic, and political-military revolution’ (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 183). The content of Palestinian nationalism has shifted in emphasis from an identification with a greater Arab nation to a distinct territorial Palestinian identity. During the first part of the twentieth century Palestinian nationalism was prevalent mainly among notable elites and families in a mainly agrarian Palestinian society. A joint national leadership, the Arab Higher Committee, was formed during the Arab revolt of 1936-39, but was soon shattered owing to differences in tactics. After the al-Naqba in 1948-1949, and with the emerging regional leadership of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, pan-Arabism was gaining ground among Palestinians.

31 After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Palestine was under a UN mandate, under British authority, from 1918 to 1948.
32 Jordan is the only country in the Middle East that has offered citizenship to the Palestinians.
33 In 1947, the UN suggested a division of Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state, with Jerusalem as an international city.
34 In the first half of this century, the Palestinian political leadership was split into several national orientations, such as pro-Syrian, pro-Jordan, and pan-Arab (see further, Khalidi 1997).
The Palestinians were deeply attracted by the pan-Arabism of ‘Abd-al-Nasir. Beyond the obvious fact that Arabism had been an important element of the Palestinian self-view for many decades, in its potent new pan-Arab form it promised, as had the other regional or transnational ideologies the Palestinians had identified with in the past—whether Ottomanism, Arabism or pan-Syrianism—to multiply their limited forces and give them support from outside Palestine against the Israeli foe they knew from bitter experience to be far stronger than they were. (Khalidi 1997: 182)

As a result, it was difficult to clearly distinguish a Palestinian leadership and instead, both Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan claimed to represent the Palestinian people and their cause. For instance, it was Nasser who took the initiative to create the PLO in 1964, with the ambition to control various Palestinian guerrilla groups. Thus, ‘for many years it could plausibly be argued that there did not appear to be a Palestinian identity, just as there was no Palestinian entity that could be pointed to on the map’ (Khalidi 1997: 181). However, only three years later Israel conquered the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights in six days of war against Jordan, Syria and Egypt. Against the background of this devastating and humiliating war, and with Palestinian disappointment in the performance of Arab regimes and their commitment to the Palestine cause, many Palestinian organisations and guerrilla groups drew the lesson that only Palestinians could liberate the homeland. This lesson-drawing was to be reflected in the revision of the Palestinian National Charter in 1968 (The Palestinian National Charter [1968]1984: 366-372). Hence, shortly after al-Fatah took control over the PLO a distinct leadership, based on Palestinian particularism, was evolving.

Ideological beliefs also provide a framework which prescribes and legitimates action. The Palestinian ideological beliefs were, as stated, influenced by a combination of Third World liberation theology, pan-Arabism, socialism and anti-imperialism, which suggested appropriate strategies towards a Palestinian revolution and liberation of the land. According to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat ([1969]1984: 378), the Palestinian ‘struggle is part and parcel of every struggle against imperialism, injustice and oppression in the world. It is part of the world revolution which aims at establishing social justice and liberating mankind.’ The origin and evolution were also understood and interpreted from these ideological beliefs. The UN partition of Palestine and the subsequent support of the state of Israel by the Western world were framed as a colonial and imperialist project (Arafat 1973: 167). Thus, Palestinians were seen as victims of Western imperialism and aggression, and according to Arafat ([1969]1984: 378), the Palestinian ‘struggle is part and parcel of every struggle against imperialism, injustice and oppression in the world. It is part of the world revolution which aims at establishing social justice and liberating mankind.’
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374), 'the immediate objective of Al Fatah is the total liberation of Palestine from Zionism and the destruction of any racial or sectarian notion which might exist among the Arabs.'

Enemy images

As attribution theory states, self- and enemy images are intimately linked in a ‘mutual contingency interaction. The Palestinian ideological beliefs are, as mentioned, partly based on Third World liberation ideology. The enemy image was therefore constructed on a negation of Israel as a legal entity, since the state was an ‘expression of colonisation based on a theocratic, racist and expansionist system and of Zionism and colonialism’ (Al-Fatah [1969]1984: 372). It was not only the foundation of imperialism and neo-colonialism that were refuted as illegal, but also the claim that Jews constitute a nation.

Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history and the true conception of what constitutes statehood. Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own; they are citizens of the states to which they belong. (The Palestinian National Charter [1968]1984: 369)

Zionism was for a long time interpreted as a political movement, associated with international imperialism and racism, working against the liberation of other people. As a consequence, Israel was never mentioned by name but referred to only as the ‘Zionist entity’ (see, for instance, Arafat’s speech in the UN in 1974b). Consequently, the rejection of the existence of Israel and the preoccupation with the armed struggle took precedence over a political settlement. There was a ‘symbiotic, relationship between armed struggle and nation-building in Fatah thinking’ where ‘[m]ilitary action confirmed that the Palestinians, to themselves above all, were active participants in shaping their own destiny, rather than passive victims’ (Sayigh 1997a: 26-27).

The enemy image was also strengthened by cognitive beliefs according to which Israeli actions were described with dispositional characteristics, which seemed to validate the Palestinian perception of Israel as the aggressor. Palestinian perceptions stipulate that, through its practices and attitudes as a state, Israel exhibits racism and expansionism (Interview, Zayeed 1998). ‘The memories of the massacres of Palestinian civilians at Dir Yasin, Sabra, Shatilla, and Tal
al-Za’tar are also at the core of the Palestinians’ collective agony’ (Sahliyeh 1997: 9). The refusal of Israeli political leaders to recognise the Palestinian people is taken to reflect a racist attitude towards the Palestinian people (Arafat [1969]1984: 377). Furthermore, Israel was viewed as expansionist by virtue of the enlargement of its borders in every war and the occupation and settlement of Arab land. Since the occupation in 1967, Israel has expropriated fifty-two per cent of the West Bank and forty per cent of the Gaza Strip (Sahliyeh 1997: 10), and these actions were taken as valid arguments for the dispositional characteristics of the Jewish state (Bar-Tal 1990: 17-19). By comparison, Palestinian actions were rationalised as situational reactions to and in self-defence against Israeli aggression.

However, after the war of 1973 there were indications that the Palestinian belief system was becoming more open. There were certain signals emanating from the PLO leadership that the armed struggle may be combined with a political approach. ‘We say that there are two options: either war—and if that is the case we shall fight it until we reach the sea—or else a settlement—in which case it shall not be at the expense of the Palestinian people.’ (Arafat 1974a: 198). Moreover, the new and ambiguous concept of the establishment of a ‘Palestinian authority’ in any liberated land was introduced, which may be interpreted as a first step towards an acceptance of a two-state solution (Abu Amr 1996: 7; Muslih 1997: 38-40). Moreover, the war in Lebanon and the subsequent expulsion of the PLO to Tunis in 1982 strengthened the political and diplomatic approach of the PLO leadership. Not only did the armed struggle fail to liberate Palestine, but it also became practically much more difficult to pursue an armed conflict, since the PLO, for the first time, would have its headquarters in a country that did not border on Israel. Consequently, the political struggle was transferred back to the occupied territories in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Hassassian 1997: 80-81). It is also important to note that during this period, Egypt had as the first Arab state to do so, signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, which included Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories. So, even if the Camp David accord was officially rejected, a viable political strategy based on a two-state solution was under consideration (Muslih 1997: 44).
Embedded Conflict: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in the Domestic and International Arenas

Moving from agent to structure, the analysis centres on normative and behavioural structures over time in the domestic and international arenas. The focus will be placed on the identification of shared understandings of the conflict and on various patterns of relations and behaviour from which normative expectations of action emanate.

Political culture and orientation to action

In the ensuing analysis, I will focus on political culture, in particular on meta-frames and interpretive schemes that are collectively shared in the domestic arena. What are the rules and norms of domestic politics? In what kind of political setting are collectively shared understandings of the conflict expressed? Can we identify any overarching and consensual understanding of the conflict in the Israeli and Palestinian domestic arenas, and are there any rivaling interpretive schemes which challenge these meta-frames of the conflict?

Palestinian domestic politics

In the discussion on dominant Palestinian elite frames, the problems involved in an analysis of elite perceptions were mentioned. Similarly, it is difficult to discern precisely what is meant by Palestinian domestic public and society. Palestine does not exist as an established state; there is no unified political system; and the Palestinian people are dispersed in several countries, living under various, frequently repressive, political systems. As a consequence, it is problematic to study Palestinian domestic public, political opposition, and organisation. Yet, with these reservations in mind, it is argued that the PLO as an umbrella organisation had an ambition to function as a state in exile and in the making, with quasi-state and institutional structures. As this study focuses primarily on the period from 1988 to 1998, the analysis of domestic politics and Palestinian society will be confined primarily to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The PLO was created as mentioned above on an Egyptian initiative, but al-Fatah, the largest Palestinian guerrilla group, with Yasar Arafat as its leader, took control of the organisation in 1968-69. The take-
over can be interpreted as a breakaway from pan-Arabism to Palestinian self-reliance, which strengthened a distinct Palestinian identity. The formal and explicit rules, setting and structure of Palestinian politics have been organised within the framework of the PLO, which functions as an umbrella for a number of Palestinian associations, such as guerrilla organisations, trade unions, women’s organisations and health associations. These various branches aim to facilitate fulfillment of the political and existential needs of the dispossessed Palestinian people. The basic objective is to rehabilitate and reconstruct a shattered Palestinian society. For instance, before the war of 1982 and with the subsequent expulsion of the PLO, the development of a distinct Palestinian civilian-institutional infrastructure had proceeded quite far in Lebanon in that there was a state within a state.

The institutional structure of the PLO is divided into a number of bodies. The most important are the Palestine National Council (PNC), which functions as a Palestinian legislative body in exile. The other important body is the executive committee, consisting of fifteen members who are elected by the PNC. The composition of the executive committee reflects the political weight of various factions within the PLO. Finally, in 1973 a Central Council was created, which functions primarily as a consultative body to the PNC (Sahliyeh 1997: 16; Cobban 1984: 269).

The overall guiding meta-frame for Palestinian politics has been the resistance to Israeli occupation, a dedication to the Palestine of the past, and a hope of return, which has developed into a ‘mystique of redemption of their homes and homeland.’ (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 199) ‘The Palestinians lived nostalgically for a return to their pre-1948 Palestine, to their houses (whose keys they still kept), to their towns, villages and fields, as if nothing had changed’ (Massalha 1994: 164).

The unifying common denominator of various political factions within the PLO has been the amended Palestinian Charter of 1968, which calls for the liberation and independence of Palestine. At the same time, the PLO is characterised by political pluralism, and various political factions differ in ideology and interpretations of the means

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35 The PNC has 430 members which represent the main guerrilla organisations/political parties (nineteen per cent), trade unions (twenty-six per cent), Palestinian communities and refugees in diaspora (forty-four per cent), and army personnel (ten per cent) (Cattan 1988: 116).

36 The Council has sixty members, elected by the PNC.
Understandings of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and strategies to achieve national objectives. Even though a simple majority is sufficient for decision-making within the PLO, consensus has most often been prioritised as an expression of the unity of the Palestinian people. As a consequence, major decisions and declarations, particularly those emanating from the PNC, have frequently been characterised by ‘constructive ambiguity’, which leaves them open to a variety of interpretations (Bowker 1996: 24; Hassassian 1997: 77; Massalha 1994: 166). ‘Maintaining unity took precedence over risky innovations. ... For many years Arafat and the PLO obsessively sought to have as close as possible to 100 percent support from Palestinians. Unable to impose unanimity, Arafat often bowed to preserve it, adopting the lowest common denominator as his strategy’ (Rubin 1994: 148). The overall meta-frame still allows for various interpretations of and reasoning for how to pursue the Palestinian struggle and what the fundamental objectives are.

Three major political streams can be identified as providing different and partly rivalling interpretations and understandings of the conflict. (1) The mainstream and overall Palestinian majority is comprised basically of al-Fatah and the much smaller party, the Palestine People’s Party (PPP).37 Al-Fatah has mainly been preoccupied with nurturing a distinct Palestinian identity and mobilising the Palestinian people in the struggle to liberate Palestine as well as international opinion towards a favourable position on the Palestine conflict. As previously discussed, al-Fatah is primarily a populist organisation which has emphasised the liberation of Palestine, with revolutionary means in combination with political-military strategies, and a negation of Zionism (Abu Amr 1996: 31; Cobban 1984: 28-35; Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 191; Sahliyeh 1997: 15).

(2) The 'loyal' opposition of the left, that is, loyal to the framework of the PLO but in opposition to al-Fatah, consists primarily of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). PFLP, the second largest party within the PLO after al-Fatah, was created in 1967 and has since been led by George Habash (Hassassian 1994: 19). Within the PLO, there are also other minor parties and splinter groups from the PFLP which have pro-Syrian or pro-Iraqi profiles.

37 Founded in 1951, the PPP was a relatively moderate party that reflected Soviet positions on the conflict. As a former communist party it abandoned Marxism-Leninism in the 1980s and changed its name from the PCP (Palestine Communist Party) to the PPP.
The political platform of the PFLP is based on pan-Arabism, Marxist-Leninism, and Third World activist ideology. The Palestine conflict is primarily defined in terms of class struggle, and thus the PFLP strives to create a socialist Palestine, which is to be achieved through a revolution, not only in Palestine but also in the rest of the Arab world. Yet, despite the militant and extreme positions, including the use of world-wide terrorist operations, the PFLP endorsed the Fez plan in 1982, which calls for a two-state solution (Cobban 1984: 140-152; Farhoun and Zacharia 1997: 193-194).

The DFLP was created in 1969 as a splinter group of the PFLP; its aim was to become a ‘revolutionary proletarian party.’ Headed by Nayif Hawatmeh, this party, in comparison to the PFLP, was more moderate and willing to support diplomacy as a strategy. Based on orthodox Marxism, the DFLP was attuned during the Cold War to Soviet Middle East policy. The DFLP, more than any of the Palestinian parties, stressed the non-sectarian dimension of a future democratic Palestine for Arabs and Jews alike. This conceptualisation of a future Palestinian state included a recognition of the rights of all Jews presently in Palestine as citizens equal to the Muslims and Christians (Cobban 1984: 155-156; Farhoun and Zacharia 1997: 193-194).

(3) The Islamist opposition emerged during the 1980s as the primary challenge to al-Fatah and the PLO in general. The Islamist opposition consists largely of the Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement) and the Islamic Jihad and it aims to change the Palestinian nationalist discourse to an Islamic reference, that is, re-Islamization of Palestinian society. Both movements emanate from the Muslim Brotherhood but broke ranks because of their emphasis on the violent tactics of jihad in the struggle to liberate Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood, in contrast, refrained from anti-Israeli activities and stressed that the initial step of the struggle concerns social and individual transformation; that is, the Palestinian people should first embrace and return to true Islam. According to the Muslim Brotherhood, Palestine was lost as a punishment by God because the Palestinians had turned away from Islam (Abu-Amr 1994: 19). Jihad, a violent and political struggle against Israel, was deemed necessary, however, only as a second step in the struggle. Hence the principal struggle was focused on reversing modernisation and secularisation, and was not

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38 The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan al-Bana with the aim of building an Islamic society based on the Sharia, the Islamic law. The Muslim Brotherhood has since been established in many other countries in the Middle East (see further Abu-Amr 1994: 1-22).
specifically directed against the Israeli occupation (Massalha 1994: 169; Robinson 1997: 143-144).

During the 1980s, a growing influence of Islam could be identified in Palestinian society, for instance, at the universities, by the increasing number of mosques in the occupied territories and by the expansion of non-profit Islamic associations and charities, so-called Zakat, for Palestinians in need of social services. The Islamic Jihad was founded in the early 1980s by Shaykh 'Abd-al-Aziz' Awda and Fathi al-Shaqaqi. The primary goal was to resist and confront Israeli occupation with violence. Based on a small number of members and organised in highly secretive structures, the Islamic Jihad directed several terrorist attacks primarily against the Israeli occupation forces (Robinson 1997: 145-146).

The Muslim Brotherhood transformed, after radical changes under the leadership of Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, and changed its name to the Hamas, which explicitly aims to reconcile religion and nationalism. The Hamas covenant states: ‘Nationalism, from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement, is part of our religion. Nothing in nationalism is more significant or important than waging jihad when an enemy treads on Muslim land.’ (quoted in Robinson 1997: 151). None of the Islamic parties make any distinction between the Israeli occupations of 1948 and 1967. Palestine is viewed as a ‘larger God-given Islamic endowment, or waqf; thus no human had the right to cede control of any part of such lands to non-Muslims’ (Robinson 1997: 143).

Israeli domestic politics

Israel is a multi-faceted, heterogeneous society, consisting of Jews originating from continents like Africa, Asia, Europe, and America, and with a twenty per cent non-Jewish minority, primarily Muslims but also Christians, Bedouins and Druzes.

The setting, structure and orientation of Israeli domestic politics are based on norms and rules of liberal democracy within the pre-1967 borders, with characteristics of a multi-party system and proportional representation. The original idea of a multi-party system was to reflect the diversity of society; thus, a party requires only 1.5 per cent
of the votes to receive a mandate in parliament. However, the implication of such a system is that it is difficult to form a majority government. Small parties have gained advantageous positions in coalition bargaining and exercise more power than their parliamentary mandates stipulate. As a consequence, Israeli politics have, particularly since the 1970s, been characterised by weak governments, which have compelled the Likud and Labour twice to form a national unity government (see further Lochery 1997).

The dominant political discourse is guided to a great extent by Zionism as a collective reference and meta-frame. The aspiration of Zionism to create a Jewish state and society in Palestine is ingrained within the collective consciousness. Against the background of the Holocaust, self-reliance and a strong Jewish state are two notions emphasised as a way to thwart the possibility of the Holocaust ever happening again (Aronoff and Atlas 1998; Aronoff and Aronoff 1998; Bar-Tal 1990). Less clear and intersubjectively shared is what exactly is to be understood and interpreted as a Jewish state. Is the reference interpreted in a religious way? If so, should, for instance, Jewish religious laws and practices (Halacha) be reflected in the judicial system and politics in general? Alternatively, is a Jewish state simply understood as a demographic reflection of the majority of its citizens? If so, how are relations defined between an overall Jewish majority and a minority of non-Jewish citizens? More fundamentally, how can a Jewish state and democracy be reconciled? There is no overall consensus or understanding in Israel on these questions, which is one of several reasons why Israel still does not have a written constitution. In a constitution, several disputed issues would have to be addressed, such as relations between religion and state, the status and rights of minorities, and generally how a Jewish state can be democratic and a state for all its citizens.

Three issues in particular may be identified that spur conflict and expose rivaling interpretive schemes: the defining features of a Jewish and democratic state; religion and secularism; and the future of the occupied territories. Below I will give an overview of the various contending understandings of the conflict, with particular emphasis on the question of the future of the occupied territories. I have constructed four categories to highlight some fundamental differences in the understanding of the conflict among the Israeli domestic public.  

40 Other parties not included in this categorisation, but which are still influential in Israeli politics, are Shas, a rapidly expanding party which focuses on domestic and religious concerns and less on territorial and foreign policy issues; Agudat Yisrael,
Understandings of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

(1) Biblical Israel: Within this category two parties—Tsomet (crossroads), led by Rafael Eitan, and Moledet 41 (homeland), led by Rechavem Zeev—are included since they both aspire to a Jewish state with borders similar to those of biblical Israel. Both parties share a fatalistic and pessimistic worldview based on a particular reading of history, that is, suspicion of the intentions of others, particularly Arabs. Hence, peace is a highly elusive and abstract notion. Instead, the emphasis is placed on the historical rights and claims of Jews to the land of Israel while rejecting any recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination. As a result, both parties are outspoken in their determination and desire to annex the occupied territories despite the obvious consequences this would have for Israeli democracy and the demographic character of the state (Flamhaft 1996: 126). Moledet, in comparison to Tsomet, has addressed the dilemma of demography by concluding that ‘voluntary transfer’ 42 of the Palestinian population is favoured. Where the two parties diverge is on the religious dimension. Moledet has a more distinct religious and messianic profile, whereas Tsomet is a staunch defender of secularism (Deegan 1993: 89).

(2) Greater Israel: This category consists of the Likud Party (former Herut and Liberal Party) and the smaller party Mafdal (the nationalist religious party), which share a similar reasoning and pessimistic worldview to that of Moledet and Tsomet. For the Likud, the claim to a ‘greater Israel’ is based primarily on the assumption that the territories are vital for the security of Israel. The threat perception is based on an interpretation of the wars Israel has experienced since statehood, which provide evidence that Israel needs the occupied territories for its security and as a buffer area against other Arab states (Interviews, Begin 1993, Shamir 1993). In 1977, the Likud, headed by Menachem Begin, gained power and initiated an intense settlement programme. Yet, despite rhetoric on the importance attached to the territorial integrity of Israel, it was a Likud government that negotiated peace with Egypt and made a territorial compromise by withdrawing fully and completely from the Sinai Peninsula.

Mafdal, originally a relatively small centrist party in Israeli politics, has since the occupation of 1967 become more right-wing and an ultra-orthodox party which is mostly concerned with religious issues; and Yisrael B’Aliya, a party mainly concerned with domestic issues and immigration.

41 The party Tehiya (Renaissance) can also be included in this category, although it lost its place in parliament in 1992.
42 The notion assumes that the Palestinians would leave if financially encouraged to do so.
extreme with its active support of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, such as the support of the Gush Emunim movement. Thus, today its politics are much more attuned to the extreme right on territorial and national issues. Yet it tries to achieve a balance between the ultra-orthodox and the secular parties in the religious sphere, since the party views itself as the protector of the religious status quo in Israel.

(3) The State (Medinat) of Israel: This group, which includes the Labour Party, is more concerned with the consequences of occupation, in contrast to the group discussed above. The negative democratic implications and the ‘demographic time-bomb’ are seen as important arguments for territorial withdrawal, while acknowledging the necessity to make territorial adjustment to enhance security (Dayan 1994). Moreover, Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem is not considered reversible and, until the 1990s, Labour shared with right-wing parties a rejection of a Palestinian state and non-recognition of the PLO. Consequently, a territorial compromise and solution were to be sought with the Hashemite kingdom in Jordan (Interview, Lass 1993).

(4) A civic Israel: This category consists of Meretz, an alliance of three parties—the Shinui (Liberal Party), Ratz (Citizens Right Movement) and Mapam (Social Democratic Party). These parties strive for an inclusive state for all its citizens and are greatly concerned with the moral consequences of occupying and ruling over another people. In their reasoning, Israel has to recognise the national rights of the Palestinian people, which include recognition of the PLO, the need for an almost complete withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the establishment of a Palestinian state (Interview, Aloni 1993).

Relations with allies and third parties

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been greatly influenced by international structures. Many of the problems of the Middle East in general may be traced to the heritage of colonialism, the division and

43 The Palestinian birth-rate is much higher than the Israeli; thus, it is assumed that within fifty years, the Palestinians will constitute the majority (Peres and Littell 1998: 104).

44 Most of the Israeli-Arab citizens vote in the national elections overwhelmingly for Zionist parties. Yet, there are minor Arab and other non-Zionist parties (see further Al-Haj 1993).
borders of states, and the effects of the rivalry between the superpowers, such as arms races and the establishment of patron-client relations during the Cold War. The analysis here, however, is confined to the identification of normative and behavioural structures which emanate over time from relations with allies and third parties.

Alliance formation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Since its establishment, Israel has been isolated and seen by the Arab states as an ‘alien’ element in the region. In the first decade of statehood, Israel received armaments primarily from the Soviet Union and France. During Israel’s 1948-49 war of independence, vital military supplies came from the Soviet Union via Czechoslovakia, as the Soviet Union hoped that the creation of a Jewish state might result in a socialised country, which might undermine the British presence in the region. Israel soon, however, made clear that the state identified and aspired to closer relations with the West. Thus, from the 1950s until the war in 1967, Israel’s main military ally was France, which assisted Israel in developing an efficient airforce and nuclear deterrent (Peres 1995: 117-142).

It was not until the 1960s and after the war of 1967, when France broke the alliance with Israel, that closer relations between Israel and the United States developed and deepened. With increasing rivalry between the superpowers, and the expanding influence in the Middle East of the Soviet Union, which at the time had become the main patron for Egypt and Syria, Israel was valued as an important ally within the overall American Middle East policy. On the basis of an increasingly shared threat perception and appreciation of the ‘special relationship’ between Israel and the United States, the alliance was in the 1970s deepened and strengthened, for instance, by the Israeli action taken during the Jordanian crisis. In this crisis, it was argued that Israel, the only democracy in the Middle East, proved itself as a buffer against further Soviet expansion (Blitzer 1985: 74; Reich 1984: 17; for a critical view see Chomsky 1983: 20). Moreover, the October War of 1973 clearly exposed how entrenched the Middle East had become in the superpower rivalry. Syria and Egypt received extensive military supplies from the Soviet Union during the fighting, as did Israel from the United States (Quandt 1977: 196-197).

45 When the Syrian forces were mobilised close to the Jordanian borders, Israel was seen as deterring Syria from crossing the Jordanian border.
Thus, particularly during the Cold War, Israel and the United States shared an identification of friends and foes in international politics and a mutual threat perception of Arab and Soviet aggressive intentions in the Middle East. The alliance was further cemented by the ‘special’ relationship,’ which is based on cultural affinity and shared values (Barnett 1996: 437). Yet, disagreements exist, particularly regarding expectations of resolving the conflict. The United States has seen the Arab-Israeli conflict as a destabilising factor in the region, and therefore stressed the need to settle the conflict through negotiations and territorial compromise. The American approach to conflict has been based on UN SCR 242 and 338 (see appendix one), which stipulate recognition of and security for Israel and withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories. The two states have, however, shared a common perception of the PLO as a terrorist organisation and rejected the idea of a Palestinian state.

In comparison to the isolation Israel experienced in the region, the PLO had, at least at the official level, received military, political and financial support owing to the overall normative framework of pan-Arabism, which provides an identification with one Arab nation (see further Faksh 1993). Nonetheless, ‘PLO’s relationship with the Arab states, from its establishment to the Oslo accords, was marked by mutual suspicion and antagonism.’ (Sela and Ma’oz 1997b: 103). The Palestine question was for many decades used as a unifying theme among Arab states, while they concurrently attempted to control the Palestine agenda and Palestinian organisations. Egypt is one example already mentioned and Jordan yet another Arab state that claimed, in competition with the PLO, to represent Palestinian interests. Syria has supported radical Palestinian groups, frequently in opposition to the PLO leadership and al-Fatah.

In 1974, at the Arab summit, the PLO was recognised as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and consequently financial support from OPEC (Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) countries increased. However, parallel to the decline of the overall normative reference to pan-Arabism among several Arab states, there was a general shift inwards, with a focus on more narrow national self-interests. Egypt’s peace initiative and subsequent peace agreement with Israel may partly be seen as an expression of that trend (Faksh 1993). At the same time, there was a general regional trend away from radicalism towards moderation of attitudes towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which can be identified from 1982 onwards. At the 1982 Arab summit in Fez, King Fahd presented a plan, the first of its kind, which stipulated a two-state solution and
Understandings of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The PLO also received support from the Soviet Union, which to some extent was based on a shared ideological identification and threat perception. Hence, the PLO became an additional client, receiving military support in the form of training and education as part of the general Soviet support to various socialist liberation movements in the Third World. Soviet support of the PLO was, however, 'highly tactical in nature' and, according to Golan, the Soviet Union used the Palestine issue, which was viewed as the 'Achilles heel of American policy in the Middle East,' as part of the superpower competition in the region (Golan 1992: 33; see also Cobban 1984: 222; Golan 1990: 110-23). Despite the fact that the Soviet Union supported the PLO and Arab regimes, which officially were calling for the elimination of the state of Israel, the Soviet Union let it be known that this type of rhetoric was considered 'unsound' (Kaplan 1981: 433; see also Golan 1992: 132). Even though the Russians were highly critical of Israeli behaviour, they recognised Israel's right to exist and UN SCR 242. Hence the Soviet Union had to perform a balancing act of supporting the client states while trying to avoid war in the region. '[T]he Soviets would not risk being dragged into a global confrontation for the Palestinians' or the other Arabs' sake.' (Cobban 1984: 222). One illustrative example is the actions taken by the Russians prior to the October War of 1973. When they received information about an impending war, the Soviets tried to signal, in an ambiguous way, this message to the Americans by evacuating Soviet military personnel from Egypt (see further Golan 1974; Jönsson 1984).

As Barnett (1996) notes, change in state identity may have implications for alliance relations. Hence, with the new thinking of Gorbachev, a de-ideologisation of Soviet foreign policy could be noticed in which support for national liberation movements such as the PLO was reduced. In addition, relations between the Soviet Union and the PLO became increasingly strained as the PLO leadership started to turn towards the United States for assistance (Golan 1992: 33).

Third parties to the conflict

On the basis of their interpretations of conflict, third parties explicitly act to promote specific norms and express expectations of appropriate
action to resolve conflict in various 'formulae.' In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a whole range of third parties have been engaged in the conflict, trying to act as 'teachers' of some specific norms and formulae. This brief overview will put special emphasis on those parties which over time have exercised a decisive influence on the conflict: the US, the UN, and to a lesser extent the ECEU.

Even though the US has failed to be impartial because of its 'special relationship' with Israel, the United States has aspired to play a role as a third party, which the conflicting parties also have advocated. There are several instances of American involvement. Kissinger was well known for his shuttle diplomacy in 1973-74, concluding cease-fires between the fighting parties and laying the ground for the Camp David accord. President Carter was known for his active intervention in the bilateral negotiations between Israel and Egypt, which led to the first peace treaty between an Arab state and Israel. Moreover, several American formulae and proposals for resolving conflict have been suggested (Quandt 1993).

The basic American understanding of resolving the conflict has primarily focused on bilateral interstate solutions, for example, the Roger plan, stipulating an Israeli-Egyptian rapprochement, and the Reagan plan, favouring an Israeli-Jordanian settlement, both based on UNSC 242 and 338. One may, however, also notice the differences between various American administrations concerning their interpretations of the conflict. The Nixon administration, with Kissinger basically outlining the American Middle East policy, advocated a realist practice and a step-by-step approach. It was assumed that the region would become more stable if the two major regional powers, Israel and Egypt, were to reach a settlement (Ben-Zvi 1986). Jimmy Carter, who assumed office in 1976, delineated a somewhat different American Middle East policy based on two tracks: (1) rapprochement and cooperation with the Soviet Union on a peace settlement; and (2) a need to find a just solution to the Palestinian problem, which included a Palestinian 'homeland' and Palestinian right to self-determination (Carter 1985: 56). Yet, with growing tension between the superpowers, particularly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and with the advent of the Reagan administration, this policy was reversed and attempts were instead made to find a solution between Jordan and Israel (Ben-Zvi 1986; Quandt 1993).

Israel’s position towards American involvement has been characterised by ambiguity and ambivalence. Israel has feared any external involvement which attempts to impose a solution. For
instance, the Carter administration’s initial proposals for an international conference addressing Palestinian national rights were rejected, and Israel insisted instead on bilateral interstate negotiations and only American facilitation (Quandt 1993: 255-283).

The PLO has long viewed American involvement in the Middle East as a form of Western imperialism, and various peace proposals have been regarded as ‘American-Zionist-Hashemite schemes’ (Cobban 1984: 236). It was only when the PLO began to reverse its policy towards a political solution in the 1980s that American involvement was viewed as more positive and desirable. Yet, the United States has since 1975 viewed the PLO as a terrorist organisation and thereby disqualified it as a party in a peace process. Moreover, the American policy towards the PLO has been based on a 1975 US-Israeli memorandum of which stipulates that the Americans will refrain from any dialogue with the PLO until it recognises Israel and UN SCR 242 and 338, and renounces terrorism (Rubin 1997: 143).

The UN has had a great influence, both negative and positive, on the development of the conflict. For instance, it was the UN that took the crucial decision to divide Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state. Several UN mediators have since then been sent to the region, such as Folke Bernadotte and Ralf Bunche during the war of 1948-49, and Gunnar Jarring after the war of 1967. UN peacekeeping troops have been dispatched to the Sinai Peninsula in 1956-1967, to the Golan Heights in 1974, and to Lebanon in 1982. Many resolutions have also been passed during the course of the conflict and they have been used as a normative reference and as interpretive schemes with regard to the meaning of the conflict and how it should be resolved. The most important resolutions are the following: General Assembly Resolution GAR 181 (1947) on partition of Palestine; GAR 194 (1948) on the rights of the Palestinian refugees to return to their homes or receive compensation for those opting not to return; UN SCR 242 (1967) (see appendix one) on Israeli withdrawal and the rights for all states to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries (see the Institute for Palestine Studies 1994).

GAR 181 was officially rejected by the PLO until 1988, whereas in 1947 Israel had endorsed the idea of partition.46 However, GAR 194 was, as discussed in the section on Israeli frames, completely rejected.

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46 Today, paradoxically, it is the PLO which is using the resolution to strengthen its claim to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Israeli government under Netanyahu’s leadership, viewed in contrast, the resolution as null and void because of the war of 1948.
and the refugee problem was viewed as a problem for the Arab states to solve. **UN SCR** 242, stipulating Israeli withdrawal, has been interpreted by Israel as not requiring a complete withdrawal from all occupied territories. Again, until 1988 the **PLO** rejected this resolution as well since it does not mention Palestinian rights to self-determination, but only states the need to solve the refugee problem.

Since the 1970s, several General Assembly resolutions have been passed. **GAR** 3236 (1974) stipulates the 'inalienable rights' of the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty. Moreover, the resolution concludes with a recommendation that the **UN Secretary-General** establish contacts with the **PLO**, which later resulted in permanent observer status for the **PLO** at the **UN** (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 330-331). In 1975, a highly criticised and controversial resolution was passed in the General Assembly which equated Zionism with racism. However, this resolution was renounced in 1991.

In the Security Council, the Americans have vetoed most of the anti-Israel resolutions, but in the General Assembly resolutions may pass if a two-thirds majority can be reached. For Israel, the **UN** has been viewed primarily as a pro-Arab and anti-Israel forum, and by its repeated condemnation of Israel the **UN** has disqualified itself as a third party (Yaacobi 1996: 40-41). The **PLO**, in contrast, has increased its status within the **UN** and on the basis of several **UN General Assembly** resolutions mobilised international opinion and put the Palestine problem on the international agenda.

The **EC/EU** has also put forward its understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and expectation of how to resolve it. Being a major political and economic actor, the **EC** has nevertheless confined most of its actions to statements on the Middle East. Since the inception of the European Political Cooperation (**EPC**) in 1969, the **EC** has approached the Middle East as a test case for political cooperation. In 1974, a Euro-Arab dialogue was launched, and in this forum the Arab states insisted on a linkage between trade and political issues. However, a European role as a third party in the Middle

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47 For instance, the **EC** is Israel's largest export market, and two-thirds of its agriculture is directed towards the **EC** (Greillsammer and Weiler 1988). Since 1975, Israel has had a free trade agreement with the **EC** and from 1995 an association agreement.

48 In 1991, the name of the **EPC** was changed to the **CFSP**, the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
East is problematic, considering the colonial past of some of the member states and the legacy of the Holocaust (Avineri 1988).

As part of an ambition to influence events in the Middle East, the EC issued several declarations based on UN SCR 242 and explicitly addressed the Palestinians’ right to repatriation; Palestinian ‘legitimate’ rights; the need for Israel to end occupation, and to recognise Palestinian expression of national identity and a homeland. The culmination came with the Venice Declaration of 1980, which created diplomatic turmoil in both Israel and the United States. This was an attempt by the EC to push the Palestinian issue into a post-Camp David era. In the declaration, the EC recognised the PLO as a party to the peace process and clearly spelled out the desire of Europe to play a ‘special role’ in the Middle East. Yet, later in the 1980s, the EC down-played this role, partly because of Margaret Thatcher, who was concerned about the implications of the EC for trans-Atlantic relations, and François Mitterrand, who feared negative effects on relations with Israel (Cobban 1984: 232; Greilsammer and Weiler 1987: 30-38).

The Israeli reaction to the EC was, as stated, highly critical: EC declarations were viewed as dictates and conditions which were completely unacceptable to Israel. Menachem Begin, Israeli Prime Minister at the time of the Venice Declaration, harshly remarked: ‘The decision calls upon us and other nations to be involved in the peace process, to bring in the Arab SS - called the Palestinian Liberation Organisation’ (Greilsammer and Weiler 1987: 49).

Despite the reference to the PLO in the Venice Declaration, the PLO was reluctant in its response. The PLO encouraged and welcomed an augmented role of Europe in the conflict, but was disappointed that the Venice Declaration stopped short of stating that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people (Greilsammer and Weiler 1987: 50).

Conclusion

In this chapter, the objective has been to utilise the operationalisation of agent and structure, as outlined in chapter three, on the empirical case to explicate the diversity of understandings of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The analysis of Israeli and Palestinian frames points to several shared characteristics, such as a strong cognitive emphasis on
historical experience and ideological rationalisation for the non-recognition of the 'other.' These cognitive and ideological beliefs have been crucial for the construction of self and enemy images, which constitute vital parts of the agents' attributes—willingness, capacity and understanding.

The Israeli understanding of the conflict has been constructed by the experiences of anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism, and Arab and Palestinian hostility. For a long time, the Israeli enemy image was mostly centred on the Arab states, while the Palestinians were reduced to a refugee problem. Yet, in the 1970s that enemy image shifted to a greater focus on the PLO, which was now perceived as a terrorist organisation aiming at the annihilation of Israel. The Palestinian understanding of the conflict is largely based on the experience of the expulsion and flight in 1948 and on hostile Israeli practices. These actions, such as Israeli expansion of the borders during the wars of 1948 and 1967, and the building of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, were taken as evidence of such a categorisation of Israel. The ideological beliefs have also strengthened the denial and non-recognition of the 'other.' Zionism recognised only one people's claim to the country, that is, the Jewish people. In contrast, Third World liberation ideology and pan-Arabism framed Israel as an imperialist and racist Western project to be denied any legitimacy.

The willingness and preferences of the Israeli and Palestinian political elites are partly formed by these ideological beliefs. Zionism depicted a strong and secure Jewish state whereas Palestinian nationalism expressed the total liberation of Palestine. On the basis of these considerations, the agents' capacity to act and influence interaction is formed. Both Israeli and Palestinian frames are characterised by attribution errors where the action of the 'other' is described with dispositional and negative characteristics whereas the action of oneself is interpreted in situational and favourable terms. For instance, Israeli political elites viewed themselves as peace-seekers but, because of the inherent Arab and Palestinian antipathy towards the existence of a Jewish state, it was not possible to resolve the conflict. Palestinian political elites, on the other hand, argued that since Israel was a racist and illegal entity one cannot negotiate peace.

Moving to the structural parameters of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we can identify signification, domination, and legitimation in the domestic and international arenas. Signification includes shared meta-frames and interpretive schemes, and in Israeli domestic politics the meta-frames have been guided by Zionism, which accentuates Jewish self-reliance and Israeli security. In the Palestinian domestic
arena, nationalism in combination with pan-Arabism for a long period of time emphasised the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of a secular state. However, from the late 1970s, a rival Islamic discourse can be discerned which has come to challenge the civic and secular nature of Palestinian nationalism. Similarly, alliance relations contain signification by shared threat perceptions and identification of friends and foes in international politics. Israel has, together with the United States, a mutual threat perception of Soviet and Arab expansion and aggression. By comparison, during the Cold War the PLO shared ideologically, with several Arab states and the Soviet Union, a threat perception of Israel and the United States as aggressive and imperialist states.

Dominance concerns asymmetric capabilities and in this case Israel is a sovereign state whereas the Palestinian people are stateless, revealing an asymmetry between the adversaries. Thus, for the Palestinians it has been important to identify and form alliances with external actors. To consolidate support from Arab states within a unifying framework of pan-Arabism has been one such attempt, whereas the UN, since the 1970s, provided a forum for Palestinian mobilisation of action. Israel has also, despite its military strength, felt threatened existentially since it achieved statehood and viewed alliance with the West, in particular with the United States, as vital for its security and survival.

Finally, legitimation comprises rules and norms. Palestinian politics as expressed within the PLO framework has been governed on the norm of consensus and an overall emphasis on unity as expressed in the Palestinian National Charter. Hence, the opposition has been depicted as 'loyal' to the overall framework of the PLO. Israeli politics, in contrast, are based on a liberal democratic system which encourages different political orientations. For instance, in regard to the conflict, the Israeli right stresses power, territory and security, and the left emphasises territorial compromise and the contradiction between democracy and occupation.

In international arenas, normative expectations are expressed particularly by third parties who may be viewed as active promoters of norms and political agendas to resolve conflict. All third parties in this study emphasise UN SCR 242 and 338 (territorial withdrawal, security and recognition of state sovereignty) as the basis for a settlement. However, they differ regarding their understandings of the conflict. The United States has focused on the Arab-Israeli conflict and on an Israeli-Jordanian rapprochement. By comparison, the UN and the EC have stressed Palestinian national self-determination and thus favoured a two-state solution.
To sum up, in this chapter I have attempted to elucidate the agents and structures and the diversity of understandings of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This chapter also provides a background for the next chapter, which discusses reframing, that is, change and continuity of agent and structure, as well as processes leading to an acceptance of negotiations.
Part III

Reframing
Chapter 5

FRAMING AND REFRAming CONFLICT

Resolving conflict involves a transition from predominantly conflicting interaction to cooperation. The basic puzzle is how, for instance, Israelis and Palestinians, after several decades of conflict interaction and non-recognition of each other, came to accept negotiations in 1991. The key questions guiding this third part of the thesis on reframing are: In what ways have the conflict changed? Were there any changes in the frames of agent? In what ways did domestic and international structures facilitate or restrain such a shift in policy?

To enhance an understanding of transition, we need to define such concepts as time and change. Thus, the aim of this chapter is three-fold: first, to investigate how conflict research has addressed the problematique of time and change towards cooperation; second, to elaborate on a conceptualisation of reframing that seeks to enhance knowledge of the processes of change at the level of both agent and structure; and third, to link the notion of reframing to policy change, that is, the parties' acceptance to embark on negotiations.

Time and Change

Time is a concept with a multitude of meanings. For instance, is 'time' to be understood as social or natural? Can time be objectively measured, or is it only subjectively experienced? Is time cyclical or linear? What are the relations between past, present and future (Baraka 1990: 4; Lundquist 1987: 51)?

Change is a frequently used concept in IR theory, but it is seldom precisely defined. Despite ambitious research agendas, the question still remains what exactly is to be understood by change. According to Hermann (1995: 246) many theoretical approaches 'lack adequate treatment of dynamics and change. There is a general lack of attention to dynamic processes and to the conditions that precipitate significant change as opposed to stability.'
In a similar vein, Holsti (1998: 1-3) states in a paper on change in international relations that there is no consensus on what constitutes change, and even less agreement on how to recognise and identify it. For instance, what should be the markers of change? How do we distinguish minor changes from fundamental ones? Is such a distinction pursued in the analysis of international relations?

Divergent conceptualisations of change and continuity in conflict research were also identified in chapter two. Conflict management tends to view change from a static and timeless frame, owing to the assumption that international politics is fundamentally determined by some basic, unalterable, objective laws. Thus, continuity takes precedence over change, and if change in some form is recognised, it is usually categorised as an adjustment primarily at the interaction level. Conflict resolution, by comparison, proceeds from a notion of change—how to move from conflict to cooperation. Change includes the recognition among individuals of universal human needs. Yet, the time perspective tends to be linear as it assumes that altered perceptions of conflict lead to resolution. Conflict transformation, in contrast, focuses primarily on dialectical and systemic change over time from a holistic perspective. Conflict is viewed as an ever-present, transformative event. Change therefore concerns transforming destructive conflict to constructive conflict over time by addressing such key notions as justice and positive peace.

As may be noted, a distinction is frequently made between minor and major change in the usage of change. Sztompka (1993: 6) refers to the distinction as ‘change of’ and ‘change in.’ ‘Change of’ relates to structural transformation in that the entire system is affected and transformed at the macro level. ‘Change in’ refers to adaptive change at the individual and interaction level, which points to a more functional dimension of change. The system modifies and adjusts to partial changes, whereas the overall system remains intact.

In this study, the understanding of change will centre on processes of transition from conflict to cooperation. However, recognising the cyclical nature of conflict, we may still come to witness periods of oscillation between conflict and cooperation. Transition will therefore basically be understood as a ‘change in’ rather than ‘change of’, with an emphasis on learning and adaptation. It should be noted, however, that there is a fine line between ‘change in’ and ‘change of’. According to a transformative approach to conflict, ‘change in’ might eventually accumulate over time to ‘change of’ (Sztompka 1993: 6). In the end, what is viewed as stable and constant over time
relates to the pace of change and ultimately corresponds to the time frame of the observer (Giddens 1979: 199).

**Ripeness and Timing De-escalation: A Critique**

In conflict research, sequential time frames are frequently used when elaborating on de-escalation and efforts to resolve conflict. Specific strategies are linked to appropriate times and phases to initiate de-escalation. Yet, the meanings and implications of these sequences vary depending on the purpose of the de-escalation. In the search for an appropriate metaphor of change in conflict, the organic notion of ripeness has become increasingly popular, among both practitioners and academics.

**Ripe conflict**

Ripeness theory was initially introduced and developed by Zartman (1986, 1989). The ambition of the theory is to identify a general description of what is the most favourable and ripe moment to initiate de-escalation strategies. Zartman depicts such a right moment as a ‘mutually hurting stalemate,’ characterised by a deadlock. The parties are locked into a situation because of an impending catastrophe and an intolerable situation. In this situation, the disputing parties come to perceive the limits of unilateral strategies and the need for a negotiated settlement as the only way out of further escalation (Zartman 1986: 218).

Ripeness theory attempts to depict a particular situation—a plateau, a crisis—which causes conflict to ‘mature.’ Based on a cost-benefit calculation, two descriptions of a ripe moment can be seen in the literature. (1) Zartman’s model of a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ stipulates, as mentioned above, that the conflicting parties come to realise the advantages of a political settlement because of the sharp change in the cost of pursuing escalation (Zartman 1986: 219). (2)

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49 Contingency theory provides an understanding of de-escalation, including appropriate strategies (Keashly and Fisher, 1996). The contingency approach, however, has been criticised for its oversimplification of conflict as divided into a few stages, but also for defining conflict as one-dimensional and linear, thereby ignoring the dynamics and complexity of each phase (Bloomfield 1997: 79-95; Webb with Koutrakou and Walters 1996: 171-173).
Mitchell’s model of an ‘enticing opportunity,’ in comparison, emphasises the prospect of future gains. At a ripe moment, the parties tend towards de-escalation because they anticipate the possibility of achieving certain aims with alternative strategies to conflict (1995: 44-45). The difference between these two models is based on different assumptions of what motivates the parties to engage in de-escalation. Is it negative experiences, such as a mutually hurting stalemate, or positive expectations of future gains? Both perspectives, however, fail to understand the dynamics of intractable conflicts. For instance, they cannot provide an account of why adversaries frequently maintain costly strategies of escalation. This problem has been addressed by two other theories, namely, prospect theory and entrapment theory. Prospect theory emphasises the importance of loss aversion: individuals tend to be risk-averse concerning gains and risk-acceptant of losses (Levy 1996; Stein 1993). In a similar vein, entrapment theory argues that costs often transform into ‘investments’ for the parties, which prevents them from engaging in de-escalation despite the ‘unbearable’ costs of pursuing conflict (Mitchell 1995: 42-43). Hence, these two theories deviate from a rational cost-benefit calculation and provide a greater understanding of the framing and continuity of conflict. However, these theories elaborate less on the processes of reframing conflict, which is the main concern of this study.

Several scholars have been inspired by Zartman's notion of ripeness and have attempted to refine the theory by highlighting favouring conditions for conflict settlement. These attempts at refinement have put greater emphasis on domestic politics, with particular focus on the characteristics of political leaders, such as their readiness to engage in mutual concession-making during negotiations (Haass 1988; 1990); internal changes of leadership, such as emerging new leaders and increasing cohesiveness of leadership (Stedman 1991); and a complete willingness of political leaders to negotiate (Kleiboer 1994).

A relevant question to pose here is whether successful negotiation indicates the existence of ripeness or if a ripe moment may be distinguished from the outcome of the negotiation. One basic problem with these endeavours to refine ripeness theory is precisely that they tend to focus more on the identification of favouring conditions at times of successful negotiation. Zartman, in comparison, originally intended with the theory to highlight a common situation prior to negotiation, a mutually hurting stalemate, which may motivate the parties to begin negotiation but not completely determine its success (Zartman 1999).
Hence, despite the number of studies conducted on ripeness, the theory tends to remain obscure and continues to be associated with several conceptual problems, such as the difficulty of generalising across diverse conflicts.

These characteristics [of ripeness] may appear to have a reality independent of the adversaries. However, in a fundamental sense, they do not. What is the natural sequence and what is or is not reversible depend on subjective beliefs of adversaries and intermediaries. These beliefs change over time, reflecting changes in experience and in external circumstances. (Kriesberg 1991: 4)

The basic question is whether ripeness theory should serve as a predictive tool, providing practitioners with knowledge about when to initiate de-escalation strategies, or if it is supposed to provide scholars with a theory that can explain the success and failure of de-escalation strategies. The answers to these queries reveal different purposes of research and differences in what ultimately is defined as a right moment and good timing. This is also one reason why there exist disparate efforts to refine the notion of ripeness.

The basic understanding of the theory is that conflict has moved from an unripe to a ripe situation that favours negotiation and conflict settlement. Implicitly, the temporal dimension of ripeness points to a sequential time frame and to an organic understanding of conflict. For instance, a fruit matures and is picked in a specific season, sequence, otherwise it will become overripe. Translated into theory, a ripe moment should be seized before the season is over (Lewitt 1994; Zartman 1999: 2). Less clear, however, is the understanding of the particular transition from unripe to ripe conflict. How is a ripe moment linked to efforts to resolve conflict? In other words, how is ripeness sustained and enhanced (see further Aggestam, forthcoming-b)?

The theory of ripeness leaves these questions largely unanswered since the theory is situation-specific rather than process-oriented. Ripeness theory seeks to ‘diagnose’ a situation as ripe but does not strive to explain the processes leading to a ripe conflict. Moreover, for the purpose of this study, one weakness of the theory is that it lacks an in-depth elaboration of the motivation of agent. In this regard, however, I have found Pruitt’s adaptation of ripeness theory particularly useful. In his critique of ripeness theory, Pruitt highlights how the theory implicitly assumes that a mutually hurting stalemate affects all the parties to a conflict simultaneously. He therefore suggests an adaptation of the theory by highlighting ‘motivational ripeness,’
which includes a separate analysis of the motivation and readiness of political actors to negotiate (Pruitt 1997: 239). Still, there remains an elaboration of the interplay between agent and structure in order to more precisely understand what constitutes change from conflict to cooperation and how negotiations come to be favoured. The next section will therefore attempt to move beyond a situation-specific to a process-oriented understanding of ripeness by utilising an agent-structure approach and emphasising the concept of reframing.

**Reframing Conflict**

A change in the definition of the relationship between adversaries and of their conflict may enable de-escalation to occur. This often means that the conflict is reframed; the interpretative schema that partisans use to organize and understand their conflict changes ... Redefinitions or reconceptualizations of the conflict may come about when it is viewed in a new context, as when a new superordinate shared goal is found. (Kriesberg 1991: 15)

In contrast to the theoretical notion of ripeness, the concept of reframing is used as a sensitising analytical concept. The endeavour is to enhance knowledge of how the meaning of conflict, in this case the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, may change and how interaction, characterised by hostility, violence and denial of the enemy, may move towards cooperation and an acceptance of negotiation. Thus, the focus is process-oriented on reconstructing the reasoning before, around, and after a political event, in this case the intifada, and to analyse how the meaning of conflict may be altered. The analysis strives to provide a type of 'explanatory narrative' that situates actor and structure in a historically contingent context, to use Somer's terminology (1996: 79). The markers used for the analysis of reframing are the perceptions of agents and normative and behavioural structures. To elucidate the linkage between reframing and resolving conflict, the concepts of 'motivation,' 'opportunity' and the identification of so-called 'focal point' will be emphasised.

**Change in perceptions**

Change in perceptions can be analysed by focusing on internal processes, that is, change in the information processing or in the external environment, such as analysing how shifting political contexts
affect the frames of political actors. Since this study emphasises the interplay between agent and structure, both internal and external processes will be taken into account. To elucidate change in perceptions, four theories will be discussed, since I assume that political actors may respond differently to various events. Together, these theories provide a comprehensive understanding of learning and image change.

(W)here the theory of cognitive consistency assumes the existence of a belief system with a high degree of coherence and interdependence between beliefs that are extremely resistant to change, a social cognition perspective depicts individual belief systems as much more fragmented internally, with different beliefs or schema being invoked under different situations for making sense of the environment. This suggests a greater likelihood that some beliefs may change over time. (Rosati 1995: 54)

Stein, who has conducted several studies on image change and conflict resolution, stresses the importance of including in the analysis the political context of political action and criticises cognition theory for failing to do so. ‘Theories of social cognition do not explicitly model the processes that link changes in the environment to cognitive constructs or explain how images change’ (Stein 1996: 99). According to Stein (1996: 100), image change, is an incremental process of trial-and-error in which political leaders learn and change images through experimentation. In her in-depth studies of Gorbachev and Sadat she concludes that this type of re-interpretation of the political environment is triggered primarily when there is a need for domestic reforms and when previous unilateral strategies have failed. Consequently, these factors encourage political leaders to engage in political learning, to be more adaptive and receptive to new information (Stein 1996: 102-105). According to attribution theory, as discussed in chapter three, political actors are guided by their quest for meaning and validity. The theory therefore stipulates that actors form attitudes on the basis of their own ‘diagnosis’ of an event. Hence, change may appear as a result of a learning experience, which may lead to cognitive adjustment, and/or by the construction of new beliefs (Heradstveit 1979: 27). In a similar vein, the ‘Hovland approach’50 assumes that the beliefs of actors may change and actors may learn if they are exposed to persuasive communication, that is, new

50 After Carl Hovland, who initiated the research programme on attitude change at Yale University.
arguments and reasons put forward by a credible and trusted source (Larson 1985: 25-29). Finally, cognitive dissonance theory stipulates change in beliefs owing to the dissonance that actions and events may create in pre-existing beliefs and self-images. The argument is that change in perceptions appears after an alteration in behaviour. In other words, conflict is reframed following a shift in policy or strategy as actors frequently try to rationalise their actions (Larson 1985: 29-34; see also Auerbach 1986: 541-542).

Change in normative and behavioural structures

Change in the domestic and international arenas includes shifts in the intersubjective understandings of conflict, the pattern of behaviour, and specifically what is considered appropriate strategic interaction. At the domestic level, norms are embedded in ‘cultural rationales’ that invoke symbols and rules and provide meaning to conflict (Ripley 1995: 90). Time is embedded in these understandings as it stipulates what is considered the appropriate ordering of events, for example, if, when, and how to de-escalate conflict. Social time is part of society and functions to co-ordinate social action (Sztompka 1993: 54). Thus, identification of a dominant or a rival time perspective, past or future-oriented, is vital for an understanding of the transition from conflict to cooperation. A time perspective is part of the values in a society and guides groups in their present and future social actions. ‘Some societies or groups look back-ward: they cherish traditions, focus on past achievements, live in history; others look forward, break with traditions, ignore the past, look towards the future.’ (Sztompka 1993: 48). Normative change can be identified by the deviation from established meta-frames and by the existence of new competitive understandings of conflict. Additional political demands may be mobilised which strive to replace or modify parts of the established meta-frames, leading in due time to a shift in the patterns of behaviour.

In the international arena it is, as discussed in chapter two, more difficult to identify widely shared intersubjective understandings than it is at the domestic level. Hence, the analysis will be limited to patterns of relations that the adversaries have with allies and third parties. Is there any change in threat perception among allies, and what are the implications? Have third parties shifted normative expectations for how conflict is to be resolved?
According to Finnemore (1996: 11), structural change at the international level is often interpreted as something ‘self-taught’ or caused by pressures originating in the domestic context. She contrasts such a self-learning process by introducing the concept of teaching, which presumes a more active learning process or ‘socialisation’ with the assistance of so-called teachers. In her case, the notion of teacher is applied to international organisations, which may set agendas internationally and define and shape new understandings and interpretations of international politics. Thus, change is generated by the international context and, Finnemore argues, political actors are particularly receptive to teaching at times when it is less clear what is an appropriate and useful action to take in a specific situation (1996: 11-13). Thus, the notion of teacher will be used and applied in this study, particularly in the analysis of third parties.

To begin negotiating— a turning point?

For conflict to be resolved there must be the opportunity to do so; for example, there must be time to try to resolve conflict ... A final requirement for resolution is volition, or will. Without some desire to engage in resolution conflicts will persist. (Tidwell 1998: 4-5)

The basic problem is how reframing and efforts to resolve conflict are linked. The concept of ‘turning point’ is often understood as a decision that deviates and breaks from the previous pattern of conflict (Auerbach 1986: 534-535; see also Druckman 1997: 92). I will use the concept somewhat differently, as the emphasis lies on processes of change rather than a decision per se. I therefore suggest that we need to analyse (i) the motivation of political actors to initiate negotiations; (ii) the opportunity at the domestic and international arenas to negotiate; and (iii) the identification and/or construction of focal points to coordinate the parties’ positions on negotiations. These three concepts comprise psychological (motivation), strategic (opportunity), and functional (focal point) processes that may result in an acceptance of negotiations.

The motivation refers to the willingness of the political actors to search for a mutually satisfying conflict settlement (see also Pruitt 1997: 239; Schön and Rein 1994: 171-174). The time frame determines how continuity and change are perceived, which is particularly important to highlight when elaborating on the various attempts to resolve conflict. For instance, a political actor with a
Reframing retrospective time frame tends to have a conservative outlook and to emphasise the antecedence and recurrence of events within a given order. Hence, with a retrospective time frame the near future and change are understood in a more passive and fatalistic manner, in which the need for adaptation and anticipation is stressed. In comparison, a person with a prospective time frame tends to encounter the future with a voluntaristic orientation, actively constructing and shaping change (Sztompka 1993: 47-49). These examples reveal not only how the future might be perceived but also plausible implications of various time frames for resolving conflict. For example, the understanding of the appropriate pace of a peace process may differ, based on the time frame of the political actors.

Opportunity concerns the identification of alternative understandings of resolving conflict in the domestic and the international arenas and how these understandings may facilitate negotiations. As demonstrated in several empirical cases, major shifts of policies from conflict to cooperation require sufficient domestic consensus and legitimacy (Farnham 1990: 97-100; see also Bar-Siman-Tov 1994). Moreover, opportunity to resolve conflict may be facilitated by activities of third parties, who may offer formulae and assistance during negotiations.

To resolve conflict relates ultimately to the coordination of expectations, and therefore ‘time’ becomes an important organising principle for de-escalation strategies. Yet, dissimilar temporal perspectives may reach different conclusions on, for instance, the timing and the tempo of negotiation. As Cohen (1996: 119) points out, time ‘shapes two subjective features of negotiating behavior: timing, the judgment of the right moment for the performance of a given action; and tempo, the sense of the appropriate rate of progress or transition from one move to the next.’ Thus, in contrast to ripeness theory, which assumes that a mutually hurting stalemate is affecting both parties simultaneously (Pruitt 1997: 238), I will discuss the notion of time and the co-ordinating efforts to resolve conflict. Schelling’s concept of ‘focal point’ will be used since it highlights the notion of coordination and how it may serve as a ‘road map’ in a highly uncertain situation (see also Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 16-17).

51 Sztompka emphasises societal orientations whereas I also use the terms with reference to the actors’ time frames.
52 Schön and Rehn (1994: 51) emphasize the importance of understanding the other party’s frame and how that may facilitate a peaceful solution to conflict.
People can often concert their intentions or expectations with others if each knows that the other is trying to do the same ... provide some clue for coordinating behavior, some focal point for each person’s expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do. Finding the key, or rather finding a key — any key that is mutually recognized as the key becomes the key — may depend on imagination more than on logic ... A prime characteristic of most of these ‘solutions’ to the problems, that is, of the clues or coordinators or focal points, is some kind of prominence or conspicuousness. But it is a prominence that depends on time and place and who the people are. (Schelling, 1960: 57-58)

**Conclusion**

Ripeness is a thought-provoking notion. Several scholars have attempted to theorize about how a ripe moment in conflict may be linked to negotiations. This study, however, seeks to go beyond the ‘diagnosis’ of a specific ripe situation in order to advance knowledge about processes that may result in negotiations. The concept of reframing is therefore suggested since it directs attention to processes of change in perceptions and normative and behavioural structures.

If we return to the meta-theoretical model presented in chapter two, the focus is primarily placed on effects of the strategic interaction on agent and structure. For instance, in what ways have agents’ understanding, preferences, and capacity of action in conflict changed? How have norms, patterns of relations, and shared meanings of conflict been altered?

Reframing may enhance the motivation of political actors to negotiate, provide opportunity which facilitates negotiation, and identify focal points between adversaries that coordinate expectations of a negotiation process. An analysis of these three concepts provides deeper insights into the processes that may lead to negotiations. Moreover, such an analysis may improve knowledge about the negotiations and how they will proceed and evolve. One fundamental query, which I will attempt to address empirically, is therefore to what extent adversaries reframe conflict before embarking on negotiations. In what way does an acceptance to negotiate constitute a ‘turning point’ in the pattern of conflict, and how is conflict transformed? On the basis of the theoretical discussion on reframing, I proceed in the next chapter with an empirical analysis of the processes that led to the onset of the Middle East peace process in 1991.
Chapter 6

THE ROAD TO MADRID - A TURNING POINT?

In this chapter, the overall objective is to elucidate how Israelis and Palestinians came to accept negotiations in 1991. In what ways were the conflict reframed, and how did positions on negotiations change? In what ways did domestic and international structures facilitate and restrain the process? Finally, in what ways did the initiation of a negotiation process constitute a turning point in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

Based on the theoretical assumptions outlined in the previous chapter on reframing and its linkage to negotiations, the empirical analysis below is structured in three sections. In the first section, an analysis is made of the situated Israeli and Palestinian actors prior to the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising. The second section centres on the effects of the intifada on agent and structure, while the third section focuses on the road to Madrid and the parties' readiness to negotiate.

The Intifada

Many suggestions have been made about what constitutes the decisive turning points in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As for the PLO, several researchers identify the turning point from an armed to a political struggle as 1974, when the 12th PNC meeting issued a declaration that stipulated PLO’s desire to establish a Palestinian national authority on any liberated land. This declaration has been interpreted as an implicit acceptance of a two-state solution, although without giving up the armed struggle (Hassassian 1994: 145). Other researchers (Sayigh 1997b: 543) stress the implications of the forced evacuation in 1982 of the PLO from Lebanon to Tunis, which strengthened the political and diplomatic option in the light of the failures of the armed struggle. On the Israeli side, it is less obvious what may be regarded as specific turning points. The October/Yom Kippur war of 1973 has been
described as an important event, as Israel came to realise the limitations of its military power (Rubin, Ginat and M'aoz 1994).

Without negating the importance of these events, there is an overwhelming consensus among scholars that the intifada was an important event in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, although many dispute its implications (Aronoff and Aronoff 1998: 12; Abu-Amr 1996: 24; Schiff and Ya'ari 1989; Massalha 1994: 198-200; Muslih 1997: 46). The intifada exposed the internal dimensions of the conflict, whereas previously the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had been viewed primarily as an interstate conflict, that is, the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moreover, the Palestinian nationalist struggle came to shift the focus from the 1948 Palestinian diaspora to the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Situated Israeli and Palestinian actors

The analysis below will focus on the period preceding the Palestinian uprising in order to situate the actors in time and place and to provide a background to the analysis of continuity and change in agent and structure. In the mid-1980s, what were the predominant frames of Palestinian and Israeli actors and the facilitating and restraining structural parameters of the conflict?

Palestinian elite frames: ambiguity and consensus

The 1980s was a turbulent decade for the PLO leadership, which had several implications for both the cognitive and ideological beliefs of the conflict. Forced to leave Lebanon in 1982 and establish new headquarters in Tunis, the PLO leadership had to reconsider the military option, which consequently strengthened the moderates who advocated a political and diplomatic solution to the conflict. While the PLO totally rejected the Reagan plan\(^5\) in 1982 because it did not provide a 'sound basis for a just and permanent solution to the

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\(^5\) The Reagan plan stipulates a settlement based on U N S C R 242 and the Camp David agreements; the exchange of territories for peace; Palestinian autonomy and elections; immediate freeze by Israel on building settlements; rejection of a Palestinian state and Israeli annexation of any territories; and a united Jerusalem (Flamhaft 1996: 227).
Palestine issue and the Arab-Zionist conflict', the Fez plan\(^{54}\) was endorsed and ratified at the 16th meeting of the PNC (PLO Statement Outlining its Position 1983: 218; Farsoun and Zacharias 1997: 203). Hence, even though the enemy image of Israel as a colonial and illegitimate entity prevailed, the PLO leadership took several steps in order to consolidate a diplomatic strategy and position on how to resolve the conflict.

These attempts also had repercussions for Palestinian self-images and the objectives of the Palestinian struggle. For instance, the PLO leadership began to revise its long-held perception of the Jordanian monarch as a rival representative of the Palestinian people. From 1983, Arafat and King Hussein held talks to co-ordinate and form a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, which culminated in the Amman Accord in February 1985. The accord not only stipulated the formation of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, aimed at taking part in an international conference (including all the parties to the conflict and the permanent members of the Security Council), but also gave expression to the shared desire of the PLO and Jordan to establish a confederal affiliation between a future Palestinian entity and the Hashemite Kingdom. However, the attempt at policy change was surrounded by ambiguity. Shortly after the accord was concluded, cooperation between Jordan and the PLO was terminated. The breakdown was partly due to internal criticism within the PLO leadership of the Amman Accord, especially on the concept of a confederation, and of the close Jordanian alliance. Moreover, the PLO leadership continued to express reservations about UN SCR 242 and equivocate in condemning terrorism. Consequently, national unity within the PLO took precedence over what had originally been agreed upon in the Amman Accord (Cairo Declaration on the PLO terrorism [1985]1986: 214-216; King Hussein 1986: 206-232; Sela and Ma'oz 1997b: 99; Rubin 1994: 68-69).

\(^{54}\) The Fez plan, presented at the Twelfth Arab Summit in 1982, stipulates Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories occupied in 1967, including Jerusalem; removal of Jewish settlements; Palestinian self-determination to be exercised under the leadership of the PLO; UN supervision of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during a transitional period; creation of Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital; and guarantees of the UN Security Council on peace for all the states in the region (Twelfth Arab Summit Conference [1982]1984: 663-665).
In the Palestinian domestic arena: unification and mobilisation against occupation

In the 1980s, there were several signs of alteration in the Palestinian meta-frames of the conflict. There was, for instance, a shift in the political orientation as large sectors of Palestinian society became mobilised to resist Israeli occupation. Since the 1970s, there had been an increasing political awareness at all levels of Palestinian society. The younger generation, in contrast to the older, had benefited from higher education and was now demanding social change and resistance to Israeli occupation. For a long time, the overall strategy of Palestinians in the occupied territories had been characterised by ‘steadfastness,’ which was interpreted as simply remaining on the land as an act of resistance. In the 1980s, however, growing dissatisfaction, particularly among the intellectuals and students, was noted. It was directed towards the failure to translate the idea of steadfastness into a more active notion of gaining control in as many areas as possible of Palestinian life. As a consequence, popular movements, such as trade unions, student unions, agricultural, medical, and women’s committees, were formed with the objective of building an independent Palestinian infrastructure, capable of meeting the needs of the population and thereby lessening the dependence on Israel (McDowall 1989: 110; Robinson 1997: 19-37).

The mobilisation was combined with explicit demands from several Palestinian organisations and parties from the occupied territories, calling for a moderation of the PLO and a decisive statement on a two-state solution to the conflict in order to end the Israeli occupation (Abu-Amr 1996; Muslih 1997: 46). Palestinians on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip had become increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress in diplomacy and concrete steps on part of the PLO leadership, while Israeli occupation continued with intensified settlement activities, expropriation of land, and deportations. Still, there existed an overall national discourse which advocated support of the PLO leadership as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; rejection of UN SCR 242 since it did not recognise the Palestinian right to self-determination; acceptance of the use of force, while opposing force against civilian targets; and support of a two-state solution (The al-Fajr Public Opinion Survey [1986]1987: 196-207).

The so-called ‘inside’ or ‘interior’ leadership, primarily West Bank nationalist leaders, made several attempts to establish a direct dialogue with Israel, particularly Faisal Husseini and Sari Nuseibeh, two well-
known, prominent political figures associated with al-Fatah. The dialogue between Nuseibeh and Moshe Amirav, a Likud member, was path-breaking. Along with the dialogue, they constructed an outline for the advancement of negotiation between the Likud and the PLO which stipulated an interim arrangement for three to five years (Amirav [1987]1988: 184-186; Steinberg 1994: 123). The plan, however, was never officially endorsed, and Amirav would later be expelled from the Likud Party. Moreover, there was growing suspicion within the PLO leadership that the ‘inside’ leadership might compromise on the long-term national goals of the Palestinians (Litvak 1997: 172).

In short, Palestinian domestic public expressed overall support for a peace process which would provide the PLO leadership with legitimation and facilitation of negotiations. Yet, there was also opposition expressed by Palestinian students and intellectuals associated with the PFLP, the DFLP, and other minor leftist parties against an alteration of strategy and policy. These groups opposed the Jordanian option, and a two-state solution was viewed merely as a tactical step towards the creation of a democratic and socialist Palestine (Lesch and Tessler 1989b: 258-259; see also Moughrabi, Zureik, Hassassian and Hader 1991).

Israeli elite frames: unity and difference

During most of the 1980s, the Israeli leadership consisted primarily of national unity governments (NUG). From 1984 to 1988, and from the elections of 1988 until 1990, Labour and the Likud cooperated in governing Israel. Despite their political differences in general, the NUG was united in its view of Israeli sovereignty over a united Jerusalem, rejection of negotiations with the PLO and a Palestinian state (Basic policy guidelines [1984]1992: 1-7). For instance, the attempt to include the PLO in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was rejected unanimously by the NUG. Another result of the shared enemy image occurred in 1986, when the NUG amended a law on the prevention of terrorism. The law now stated that unauthorised meetings between members of the PLO and Israeli citizens, in most

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55 The arrangement resulted in a rotation between Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Shamir in the positions of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Yitzhak Rabin was Defence Minister for the entire period of NUG.
forms and for most purposes, were to be punished as an offence with risk of several years' imprisonment (Rolef 1997: 264).

However, the intensification of peace efforts, such as the Schultz initiative, exposed a gap between the positions of the Likud and Labour regarding their different interpretations of a future peace process. For instance, when Peres, rotating with Shamir, became Foreign Minister in 1987, he promoted the idea of cooperation with Jordan at an international conference. Several secret talks were held with King Hussein, resulting in the 'London Document.' The document called for an international conference based on UN SCR 242 and direct negotiations between the conflicting parties, which included a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that should address the 'legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.' (Peres 1995: 361-362). The initial idea was that the document should be officially presented as an American proposal. However, the plan did not receive the approval of Shamir, as he feared that an international conference would impose a solution on Israel (Peres 1995: 310; Flamhaft 1996: 56-57).

In the Israeli domestic arena: rivalling meta-frames

Israeli domestic politics have since 1967 been roughly divided into two camps as regards expectations about the future of the occupied territories. These meta-frames are strongly related to Israeli self-images and the future character of the state. One group argued for withdrawal, and until recently that was interpreted by a majority as a Jordanian option, that is, an unspecified territorial withdrawal from the occupied territories in exchange for a peace treaty with Jordan. A minority within this group promoted the idea of a Palestinian state and talks with the PLO. An overall peace organisation, Shalom Achshav (Peace Now), including most of the left, was formed in the late 1970s as a response to the peace negotiations with Egypt and to the war in Lebanon. Advocating territorial withdrawal, the organisation still emphasised that it did not favour peace at any price, only peace with a secure Israel. Consequently, there was no consensus within the organisation on the issues of a Palestinian state or

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56 The initiative was based on UN SCR 242 and 338 and a denouncement of violence and terrorism. The initiative was focused on an international conference, although stipulating bilateral negotiations between the delegations. Palestinians were to be part of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and Palestinian issues should focus on autonomy, for a three-year transitional period, but initiating final status talks before the transitional period began (Quandt 1993: 486-487).

The other camp wanted to hold on to the territories, which included Palestinian autonomy, as stipulated in the Camp David accord, or ‘voluntary transfer’ of the Palestinian people, as argued by a minority (Peretz 1991: 31-35). In the 1970s, religious and radical right-wing groups gained in appeal among the Israeli public. The Likud, led by Menachem Begin, came to power in 1977 and broke the long tradition of Labour governance. ‘[U]ntil 1967 a secular-socialist brand of nationalism dominated culture and politics. This was replaced almost overnight by messianic nationalism that permitted, or better yet, encouraged the rise of a radical Right and Jewish fundamentalism’ (Flamhaft 1996: 137). Jewish settlements were viewed as ‘creating facts’ in the occupied territories and Gush Emunim, one of the settler movements, found political, economic and ideological support in this new government (Flamhaft 1996: 144-148; Harkabi 1988: 90).

The increasing attraction of the radical right could also be seen in the elections of 1984, when the extreme right-wing party Tehiya became the third largest party. Tehiya was created in 1979 in reaction to the ‘moderation’ of the Likud after the Camp David Accord because of the complete withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and its acceptance of Palestinian autonomy. Also the racist party Kach, led by Rabbi Meir Kahane, received a seat in parliament. However, that party was banned in the next elections, in 1988, on grounds of racism (Flamhaft 1996: 135-152; Sprinzak 1993: 126).

To sum up, the Israeli domestic scene of the 1980s exhibited a continuation of polarisation with regard to the future occupied territories. The enemy image projected of the PLO was however relatively shared and based on the norm that an Israeli government should not negotiate with a terrorist organisation.

**International relations: shifting alliances and third-party intervention**

In the early 1980s, both continuity and change in the pattern of alliance formation may be identified. On the one hand, Israeli-US alliance relations were solidified by an increasingly shared threat perception, owing to the Iranian revolution and the intensification of the Cold War with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. On
the other hand, Israel broke its long isolation in the region through the peace treaty with Egypt.

Even though Egypt was regionally isolated for several years as a consequence of the Camp David Accord, the peace treaty with Israel may still be interpreted as a first step by the Arab states towards greater attention to domestic and state interests and a disintegration of a regional Arab system (Andoni 1991: 55-56; Muslih 1997: 47; Sela and Ma'oz 1997b: 105). Pan-Arabism, which previously had been the shared interpretive scheme for a regional Arab system, was obviously in a decline, with implications for the engagement of the Palestine question. Hence, there was growing concern within the PLO about the shift in the focus of many Arab states away from the Palestine conflict towards interstate affairs, such as the Iran-Iraq war and the normalisation of relations with Egypt. For instance, the 1987 Arab summit in Amman was referred to by Arab governments as the ‘conference of reconciliation and accord’ but was dubbed by several Palestinians as the ‘conference of hypocrisy and spending’ because little attention was given to the Palestine question (Muslih 1997: 47; Antoni 1991: 55-56; McDowall 1989: 103).

Moreover, in 1985 Gorbachev came into power in the Soviet Union and based his ‘new thinking’ on several practical considerations, such as restricting the economic costs of the Soviet Union’s competition with the West; a reorientation of focus towards resolving domestic and economic problems; and in 1987 the public announcement of the intention to normalise relations with Israel and grant visas for Soviet Jewish emigrants. Consequently, the de-ideologisation of Soviet foreign policy had repercussions for relations with the PLO, since the mutual threat perception was shattered (New Outlook May/June 1990; Golan 1992: 3, 17, 32-34).

In the 1980s, third parties presented and promoted several formulae which contained normative expectations for how to resolve the conflict. The Reagan plan presented by the United States in 1982 stipulated, on the one hand, the expectation that Israel would stop building Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. On the other hand, the American formula rejected a Palestinian state and did not mention Palestinian national self-determination. The Reagan plan was rejected by both parties (Flamhaft 1996: 35-41).

The Schultz initiative was launched in 1987 against the background of improved relations between the superpowers; the Arafat-Hussein (Amman) accord of 1985; and the Hussein-Peres (London) declaration of 1987. The Schultz plan focused primarily on convening an international conference, since it was assumed that some kind of
shared understanding of this notion existed. Moreover, the plan called for negotiations on an interim period, to be called a transitional period, rather than on autonomy. Israel neither rejected nor accepted the plan, whereas the PLO explicitly rejected it since it did not mention the PLO (Flamhaft 1996: 51-54).

After the Venice Declaration of 1980, the EC issued no more grand declarations on peace in the Middle East. Moreover, the EC member states found it difficult to ‘speak with one voice’ on several international issues (Lindemann 1988:303-312). Self-criticism regarding the role as a third party also arose, and critical opinions were voiced on recognition of the PLO without concurrently providing Israel with some kind of security assistance during the transitional arrangements (Greilsammer and Weiler 1987: 57). The UN did play a more indirect role as a third party by expressing, in various declarations and resolutions, its interpretation and expectation of appropriate actions to resolve the conflict. Several UN General Assembly Resolutions (see, for instance, GAR 41/23, 41/63, 41/48, 41/162, 41/93 in Medzini 1992) were passed, condemning Israeli practices in the occupied territories while promoting the idea of an international conference under the auspices of the UN. In these resolutions, the General Assembly called for an unconditional withdrawal by Israel from all the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, while allowing Palestinians, under the leadership of the PLO, to exercise their inalienable rights, which included the right to return, national independence, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. However, the UN was categorically rejected by Israel as a third party, since Israel viewed the General Assembly as a propaganda forum for the PLO and the Arab states (Shamir [1985] 1992: 315-318).

The outbreak of the Palestinian uprising

In early December 1987, an Israeli truck rammed a Palestinian car in the Gaza Strip, causing the death of four and injuring nine Palestinians. According to the Israeli version, the incident was an accident, but many Palestinians interpreted the crash as an act of intentional Israeli aggression (Massalha 1994: 195). Clashes between Palestinians and the Israeli army soon broke out, and the uprising spread within a few days to the West Bank. The Palestinian uprising started as a spontaneous reaction; resistance was promptly organised and mass activities coordinated by a Unified National Leadership (UNL) of the
The intifada, which consisted of al-Fatah, the PFLP, the PFLP, and the PGP. The UNL issued guidance for actions in leaflets and public appeals, so-called bayans and nida. The Islamic Jihad and the Hamas were not part of the joint leadership, but synchronised initially with the UNL (Litvak 1997: 180; Sayigh 1997b: 615).

The intifada was a collective Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation which included all sectors of Palestinian society and a variety of resistance strategies. The direct confrontation with the IDF, the Israeli Defence Forces, consisted mostly of throwing stones and burning tires and was pursued by young Palestinians. The uprising also included widespread collective civil disobedience, demonstrations, and economic resistance, such as refusing to pay taxes, boycotting Israeli products, strikes against Israeli employers, and mass resignation of Palestinian employees of the Israeli civil administration in the occupied territories. Many voluntary and non-governmental organisations and local committees participated in this endeavour, as the aim was to alter conventional methods of political action. These actions deviated from previous static approaches of the PLO, which had excluded social mobilisation (Sayigh 1997b: 612).

The overall objectives and strategies of the intifada and the UNL were: (1) to persuade and force Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and (2) to convince not only Israel but world opinion of the need to negotiate a two-state solution at an international conference where the PLO alone should represent the Palestinian people (McDowell 1989: 6; Rubin 1994: 87). As the local Palestinian leader Faisal Husseini stated: 'We struggle for the liberation of our people, not to dominate any other people; we struggle in order to establish our own state, not to destroy any other state; we struggle in order to guarantee and secure a safe future for our coming generations and not to threaten the coming generations of any other people in the area' (quoted in New Outlook November/December 1989).

The Israeli response to the outbreak of the intifada was to use military power in order to 'crush the uprising by all possible means' (Rabin, quoted in Massalha 1994: 197). However, the Israeli

57 It is important to recall that the majority of the Palestinians in the occupied territories were born after the Israeli occupation of 1967. Half of the population is under the age of fifteen and seventy per cent under the age of thirty (Sayigh 1997b: 608).

58 The intifada is also interpreted as 'shaking off', that is, shaking off the Israeli occupation.
government initially defined the Palestinian uprising as only disturbances in the territories and thereby denied that a popular rebellion had begun (Sayigh 1997b: 607). The uprising was met with a harsh policy of expulsion, demolition of houses, long curfews, beatings, and widespread use of tear gas and plastic bullets as a way to restore order and break up demonstrations. The television pictures of Israeli troops firing at demonstrators, or beating Palestinian civilians, exposed the brutal character of the Israeli occupation and the asymmetry between Israel and the Palestinians. As Schiff and Ya'ari state (1989: 115): 'By the end of the first month of the uprising, it was impossible to deny that Israel's policy in the territories was utterly bankrupt. The system that had enabled the occupation to continue for over two decades simply collapsed in the face of the violence and, much to the consternation of the Israelis, none of the old rules applied any more.' By the end of September 257 Palestinians had been killed, over 30,000 injured and 40,000 arrested (McDowall 1989: 2, 15; Sayigh 1997b: 619; see also Massalha 1994: 197; Rubin 1994: 113; Schiff and Ya'ari 1989: 144-149).

In 1989-90, the Palestinian uprising started to lose momentum, particularly during and after the Gulf Crisis, when many Palestinians in desperation and frustration turned to Saddam Hussein for assistance. There was also a drastic increase in murders of Palestinians by other Palestinians who were accused of collaborating with Israel (Sayigh 1997b: 636). As previously stated, the Hamas and Islamic Jihad never took part in the intifada, although they coordinated their activities with it. The Hamas therefore issued its own leaflets, which expressed a more confrontational and hard-line position vis-à-vis Israel, striving to "'cleanse' Palestinian society of both secular and Zionist influences "toward raising the banner of Allah on every inch of Palestine"' (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 237).

**Reframing the Conflict?**

Identifying what constitutes change in perceptions and normative and behavioural structures is both difficult and disputable, as there is a combination of continuity and change in all political events. The Israeli-Palestinian case is no exception. By analysing the period before, during, and after the intifada, the aim is to trace patterns of change and continuity in the actors' frames and in the structural parameters of the conflict. The intifada had several effects on the frames of the
political actors and the normative and behavioural structures of the conflict, leading in some cases to a change of reasoning and in others to a reinforcement of pre-existing meanings of the conflict. An additional dramatic event during the course of the intifada was the Gulf crisis and the subsequent war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation by an American-led coalition, which included several Arab states.

Change and continuity in perceptions

In this section, the analysis is centred on how the Palestinian uprising was perceived by Israeli and Palestinian political elites. In what ways was the meaning of the conflict in general, and self- and enemy images specifically, affected by the Palestinian uprising? Is it possible to identify any change in the perceptions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

The Palestinian political elite: learning by trial-and-error

The most obvious change in Palestinian enemy images was the official recognition of Israel and the acceptance of a two-state solution. The change, however, may be depicted as incremental and characterised by a trial-and-error process of political learning over time. The PLO leadership was as surprised as Israel at the outbreak of the intifada. It was a spontaneous uprising based on massive public participation at all levels of Palestinian society, which deviated from the traditional static approach of steadfastness. Moreover, the uprising moved the national struggle to the occupied territories, whereas before the power base had always been the 1948 Palestinian diaspora. The apparent message from the Palestinians in the occupied territories was an urgent appeal to the PLO leadership for a new and decisive policy that would end the Israeli occupation. The PLO leadership was therefore faced with two choices: to accept Israel and a partition of Palestine, or to continue past ambiguous policies. The disengagement of Jordan from the West Bank in July 1988 became an extra triggering event as it left a political vacuum in the occupied territories. The PLO opted for the first alternative by declaring a Palestinian state based on the UN partition plan 181 and adopting a new political program in Algiers in November 1988. By this declaration, the PLO leadership expected
to gain diplomatic momentum\textsuperscript{59} (Litvak 1997: 172; Musli 1997: 47; Rubin 1994: 100-107; Sayigh 1997b: 616-624).

However, the persistence of these changes in Palestinian perceptions may be questioned by several events that took place at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s. In May 1990, former al-Fatah members attempted a terrorist attack in Tel Aviv. The PLO leadership refused to publicly criticise and punish these Palestinians for their acts and the Americans therefore broke the newly established dialogue on 20 June (Rubin 1994: 122). Second, and more important, the Gulf crisis had severe ramifications for the PLO because of the stance taken during the Gulf crisis by its leadership. Earlier diplomatic efforts to become an acceptable negotiation partner were thwarted by the support of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. The support, which was greatly influenced by popular pressures in the occupied territories, corresponded to Saddam Hussein's reasoning, in which he linked the occupation of Kuwait to the Israeli occupation. 'If Iraq was being told to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait or face the consequences, the same conditions should apply to Israel's occupation of Arab territories in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon' (al-Dajani 1994: 194; PLO Statement on the Gulf Crisis 1990: 165-168). Iraq and the PLO therefore accused the West of hypocrisy with reference to its determination to liberate Kuwait while remaining reluctant to intervene in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, according to Faisal Husseini, the PLO leadership did not condone Iraqi occupation but took a neutral position in the crisis:

\begin{quote}
The PLO has been wrongly read over the Gulf crisis and the war. With the outbreak of the crisis, the PLO was the first to take an initiative based on an immediate withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. When the American intervention started, we came out against it and instead suggested an Arab solution - the replacement of American forces by Arab troops and the opening of peaceful negotiations. When this failed, we supported an international solution - an international conference to tackle all the problems of the Middle East, including the Gulf crisis and the Palestinian problem. (quoted in New Outlook February/March 1991)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{59} Bassam Abu Sharif, as Arafat's advisor, had prepared the ground with a document called 'Prospect of a Palestinian-Israeli Settlement' (Sharif 1988; see also Abu-Sharif and Mahnami 1995: 252-255).
The Israeli political elite: continuity and dissonance in perceptions

Any change in Israeli elite perceptions concerned only one part of the NUG, namely, the Labour Party, while the perceptions of the Likud were characterised mainly by continuity. For several Labour ministers, the Palestinian uprising and the Israeli response created dissonance in their self and enemy images. The Israeli government was taken by surprise by the strength, organisation, and inclusion of most sectors of Palestinian society in the intifada. The Israeli government was at first determined to quell the intifada by military means, but there was increasing awareness among several ministers, primarily from the Labour Party, of the need to address the Palestinian uprising with a political approach.\(^60\) Rabin, in particular, despite his initial ‘iron fist policy’ towards the Palestinians, realised that military strategies to end the intifada would not lead to any results.

For the first time since 15 May 1948 we witnessed a struggle waged by the Palestinian inhabitants ... this is a clash between two national entities waged through violence by civilians wishing to attain the same goals they could not achieve through terrorism and war ... What is taking place in the territories is not terrorism because no one is shooting at us, but a civil war waged by women and children. (Rabin, quoted in Ben-Yehuda 1997: 209)

Hence, there was a change, to some extent, in enemy images in that there was an acceptance of Palestinians as a partner in a peace process. This acceptance did not, however, include recognition of Palestinian national rights or the PLO. Several Labour ministers concluded that the Palestinian uprising could only end with a political solution, which was interpreted as a need to negotiate with ‘moderate’ Palestinians, that is, Palestinian representatives from the occupied territories who were to be elected in local elections. The PLO, in contrast, was not viewed as a genuine representative of the Palestinian people (Ben-Yehuda 1997: 208-209). With reference to the PLO, the NUG was still united and rejected the Algiers Declaration made by the PLO in 1988, as well as the subsequent statements of Arafat in Stockholm and Geneva (Flamhaft 1996: 155-157).

\(^60\) Israel held elections in 1988, which again resulted in a NUG. This time, however, the Likud was the dominant party and the position of Prime Minister did not rotate between the Likud and Labour.
The PNC declaration is an additional attempt at disinformation, a jumble of illusions, meant to mislead world public opinion. The PLO has not changed its covenant, its policy, its path of terrorism or its character ... It is worth adding for those countries seeking to promote peace in the Middle East that the PLO was and remains the main obstacle to peace, and that therefore, it would be desirable for them to refrain from backing it and recognizing its declarations. (Cabinet Statement on the PNC Decisions [1988]1992: 1000)

Change and continuity in normative and behavioural structures

The analysis below centres both on the interpretations and effects of the intifada on the Israeli and Palestinian domestic publics and on relations with allies and third parties. For instance, did these interpretations deviate from established domestic meta-frames of the conflict? Also, in what ways did the Palestinian uprising provide reasons for third-party intervention? Was there any change in the normative expectations for how to resolve the conflict?

In the Israeli domestic arena: increasing polarisation

The Palestinian uprising primarily strengthened an already existing split and a differential normative orientation among the Israeli public regarding the conflict. The parties on the right were invigorated by the intifada in their enemy image and conviction concerning the inclination of Palestinians towards violence against Jews and the state of Israel. Some parties even called for the ‘transfer’ of Palestinians (Peretz 1991: 28-35; Tessler 1990: 49-50). The left, on the other hand, was further convinced in its understanding that occupation was detrimental to a democratic Jewish state. Several Israeli groups reacted against the brutal use of military power against Palestinian civilians and feared the moral implications. New groups were formed against a continuation of Israeli occupation, such as Women in Black (women's groups demonstrating weekly in road junctions all over Israel), Yesh Gvul (Israeli soldiers refusing to serve in the occupied territories) and Academics against Occupation (New Outlook November/December 1989).

A widespread effect on the Israeli public in general was the ‘revival’ of the green line, that is, the borders before the war of 1967. During the twenty years of occupation, the green line had begun to evapo-
rate in the minds of many Israelis. Particularly the generations of Israelis born after 1967 were inclined to view the occupied territories as an integral part of Israel. Various Israeli governments have promoted this integration by, for example, the use of official maps which only show Israel without the green line. Moreover, in 1981 the Likud government introduced ‘civil administration’ in the occupied territories and changed the official name of the West Bank to the biblical names of Judea and Samaria (Kimmerling 1997: 234-235; Tessler 1990).

The Jewish public tended to repress the Palestinian issue entirely, relating to the territories as though they were a distant land. In a sense the Israelis discovered the territories twice: at the end of the Six-Day War, when attention was riveted on their historical landscape with all its biblical landmarks; and again some twenty years later, in December 1987, when the Palestinian population made it impossible for them to cling to the blinders that had made the million and a half Arabs under Israeli military rule so conveniently invisible ... Above all, this conclusion was reached because the Palestinians simply did not exist in the political consciousness of most Israelis. (Schiff and Ya’ari 1989: 41)

The Gulf War and the missile attacks on Israel convinced many Israelis that the argument for seeing the territories as a buffer against aggressive states was less persuasive in an age of modern weapons technology. However, Palestinian support of Saddam Hussein, and their enthusiastic approval of the missile attacks on Israel, left a deep resentment and disappointment among the general Israeli public, particularly among the Israeli left. Yossi Sarid (quoted in New Outlook September/October/November 1990), a key political figure within Ratz, concluded:

At a time when Saddam Hussein is depicted through the free world as the principal enemy of its peace and prosperity, Yasser Arafat appears as his faithful servant ... If my reason for supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state had been based solely on the argument that the Palestinians, too, deserve a state — I would now withdraw my support. I continue, however, to demand their right to self-determination and an independent state because it is my right to get rid of the occupation and the harm it causes. They might deserve the occupation, but we don’t. I insist, despite everything, on maintaining my human dignity, but I don’t need Arafat, Hussein, and Darawashe [Israeli-Arab Knesset member] for this supreme effort ... if they [the PLO] want to talk, they know where to find me.
In the Palestinian domestic arena: from resistance to despair

The intifada came to symbolise a major change among the Palestinians, from passive to active resistance and social mobilisation against Israeli occupation. In many ways the uprising strengthened Palestinian institutions and civil society, which was one of the reasons why civil disobedience became so effective and adhered to by the majority of the Palestinians. Initially, the Palestinian uprising had a strong unifying effect which was articulated in the stance of demanding a two-state solution and moderation of the PLO leadership. The PLO leadership was still viewed as the sole representative of the Palestinian people; thus, the ‘inside’ leadership reacted with disapproval of any proposal from the United States or Israel to ‘create’ an alternative leadership to the PLO.

In addition to being the sole, legitimate representative of our people, the PLO is the framework of our struggle for freedom and a symbol which embodies the identity of the Palestinian people as a whole and its aspirations for return, self-determination, and an independent state. Shamir’s attempt to ignore the PLO is an attempt to ignore our political legitimacy as well as our legitimate aspirations (Text of letter signed by West Bank leaders 1989: 156).

However, the intifada began to recede in 1989-90 and many Palestinians felt disillusioned by the lack of progress towards an end to the occupation. As the West Bank Palestinians expressed in a memorandum to the US:

It is ironic that the Palestinian peace stance, which presents a unique opportunity for reconciliation and for breaking the endless cycle of violence and pain that has hitherto engulfed our region, has been met with blind intransigence and entrenchment on the part of the Israeli authorities as expressed in their escalation of a brutal and punitive policy of repression and violence. (Memorandum submitted to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly 1989: 143-144, italics added)

There was an increase in Palestinian violence, such as knife-stabbings of Israelis within the green line, and a drastic growth in murders of accused Palestinian collaborators. Also the Hamas, which by now had an extensive organisational structure, became more offensive in its efforts to present an alternative Islamic meta-frame in contrast to the established secular Palestinian cultural rationale. The Algiers Declaration of a Palestinian state in 1988, based on the concept of a two-
state solution, was completely rejected by the Hamas. ‘We condemn all the attitudes calling for ending the jihad and struggle, and for establishing peace with murderers, and the attitudes which call for acceptance of the Jewish entity on any part of our land’ (quoted in Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 244; see also Mishal 1997: 204).

Furthermore, the disillusionment over the lack of diplomatic progress made the linkage between the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and Israeli control of the territories an appealing notion for a majority of Palestinians in the occupied territories as well as in Jordan. In their reasoning, Saddam Hussein dared to challenge the double standards of the West. Saddam Hussein’s rhetoric had alluded to Arab nationalism, and the idea of ‘Arab oil is for Arabs’ had an instantaneous appeal. Thus the Palestinians rejected international, and particularly American, involvement in the Gulf crisis and instead promoted the idea that the crisis should have an ‘Arab’ solution (New Outlook September/October/November 1990: 18-19; Hallaj 1991: 41-47).

The position of the Palestinian people on the Gulf War had severe implications. There was a cessation of financial aid to the PLO from important donors like Saudi Arabia. Palestinians in the occupied territories who previously had received financial support from the PLO, for example, when their houses were demolished or when family members were arrested by Israeli authorities, were no longer able to obtain that kind of aid. Another important private source of revenue for Palestinian families had been Palestinian labour migrants in the Gulf Arab monarchies. During and after the Gulf crisis many Palestinians were expelled, particularly from Kuwait. The Palestinian community, which had been one of the economically strongest in the Palestinian diaspora, was after the war reduced from 350,000 to 15,000 (Sela and Maoz 1997b: 105). Moreover, the economic conditions in the occupied territories deteriorated further as a result of the long curfews imposed throughout the occupied territories during

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61 The economic resistance also came to be felt in Israel, particularly the reduction of the Palestinian working force, which fell to around thirty per cent in construction, agriculture, and service sectors (New Outlook November/December 1989). Israel tried to break the economic resistance by forcing owners to open shuttered shops and requiring new plastic cards and permits for Palestinians working in Israel. These cards revealed information about payment of Israeli taxes and any involvement in the intifada (Farsoun and Zacharias 1997: 241). Yet the economic effects were much more devastating to the Palestinian than the Israeli economy, due to the asymmetric dependence between Israel and the Palestinians. Many Palestinian families were severely hit economically by strikes, high rates of imprisonment, and the decrease of daily wage earning in Israel (Farsoun and Zacharias 1997: 228).
the war. For instance, Palestinians working in Israel\(^\text{62}\) were not allowed to enter, farmers were not able to harvest or market their crops, and factories came to a standstill (Peretz 1991: 17-18).

In the international arena: shifting threat perceptions and augmented third-party intervention

In the international arena, the Palestinian uprising sparked several reactions. Third-party intervention was intensified both in regard to active 'teachers' presenting various formulae and statements containing normative expectations for what they considered appropriate behaviour. Alliance relations were also affected in that the position of the PLO was improved in the first years of the intifada. The Palestinian problem was again on the agenda of the Arab states. For example, after the failures of King Hussein to establish cooperation with the PLO on a joint Jordanian-Palestinian stance in 1985 and later to reach an acceptance with Israel of an international conference in 1987, the intifada shattered Jordan's ambition to regain control of the West Bank. The Palestinian uprising was clear evidence of the Palestinians' aspiration for a separate Palestinian state. Moreover, at the Arab summit in 1988, it was decided that all the Arab financial aid would be channelled exclusively through the PLO. Consequently, in the summer of 1988, the king opted for a total disengagement of Jordanian administrative, legal, and financial ties, which were extensive throughout the West Bank. Furthermore, the disengagement had political consequences in Jordan, where the parliament was dissolved over the question of the representation of West Bank Palestinians. Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship lost most of their rights as citizens and thus could now only use their Jordanian passport as a travel document. A political vacuum was thereby created, and the PLO seized the opportunity to declare the state of Palestine in November 1988, which Jordan immediately recognised (Deegan 1993: 29; Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 244).

However, the interpretation of and stance taken by the PLO leadership during the Gulf War deviated from those of many Arab states. Thus, after the war it was not only Western countries that reappraised their relations with the PLO, but also many Arab states, as reflected in the Damascus Declaration on Arab coordination and cooperation.

\(^{62}\) Around forty per cent of the Palestinian workforce in the Gaza Strip and one-third of the West Bank had, before 1990, employment in Israel (Peretz 1991: 17).
The declaration was issued shortly after the war, by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Egypt and Syria, and the PLO was not mentioned in the document (Damascus Declaration 1991: 161). Yet, according to Andoni (1991: 55), 'The PLO's support for Iraq was used as a pretext by the Gulf and other Arab states to absolve them from their financial and political commitments to the organization.' Thus, the PLO leadership became ostracised and isolated both politically and financially in the region.

New alliances were also made possible by the shifting relations between the superpowers and an increasing moderation in the Arab world, particularly towards the United States. For instance, the American-led coalition now included the Soviet client state Syria, and Iran opted for a neutral stance in the Gulf crisis. Moreover, the UN Security Council, with the approval of China and Soviet Union, was able to provide a military mandate for the Allied forces to liberate Kuwait. The Israeli government was therefore concerned whether the Bush administration was about to re-evaluate the 'special relationship' between the United States and Israel. During the Gulf War, Israel had been perceived more as a burden than an asset. In addition, there were increasing tensions between the US and Israel on how to pursue a peace process (Barnett 1996).

If we now turn to relations with third parties, the augmented role as a 'teacher' of normative change concerned in particular the United States and Egypt. With the outbreak of the intifada, American Secretary of State George Schultz reactivated his efforts to bring the parties to the table by intensive shuttle diplomacy. The initiative was based on a recognition of legitimate Palestinian political rights, while still rejecting a Palestinian state and Israeli annexation of the occupied territories. From this position, Schultz formulated a three-stage formula: (1) to convene an international conference; (2) to facilitate negotiations with Israel and its neighbours, including a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, which should negotiate a three-year interim arrangement in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and (3) to reach a permanent and comprehensive settlement by direct negotiations (Sayigh 1997b: 623). The proposal received mixed reactions: rejection by the PLO because the formula excluded the PLO, and rejection by Israeli Prime Minister Shamir, who viewed an international conference as a 'dangerous trap'. However, Egypt and the Israeli Labour Party supported the idea (Flamhaft 1996: 54-56).

In 1989, the American administration, with whom the PLO aspired to establish relations, began to exert pressure for additional clarifications of a recognition of Israel, acceptance of UN SCR 242 and
338, and an explicit denunciation of all forms of terrorism. After quiet diplomacy by Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson, who facilitated talks between American Jewish leaders and Chairman Arafat, the parties produced a joint statement in Stockholm, which attempted to clarify the PLO’s position (see further, Rabie 1992). The American administration was still not satisfied and demonstrated this by not granting Arafat a visa when he was to address the UN, on the grounds that he advocated terrorism. The UN therefore moved the session to Geneva, and in a press conference held a day after his speech in the General Assembly Arafat made the necessary clarifications: ‘the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security, and, as I have mentioned, including the state of Palestine, Israel, and other neighbours, according to Resolution 242 and 338 ... we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, including individual, group and state terrorism’ (quoted in Sayigh 1997b: 624). Arafat also stated that ‘our desire for peace is strategic and not a temporary tactic ... Our state provides salvation for the Palestinians and peace for both the Palestinians and Israelis’ (quoted in Rubin 1994: 110). The following day the PLO-US dialogue was established.63

With the new American administration of President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker, new diplomatic attempts were made. Baker pressed for what came to be known as the ‘five point plan’ on constructing a dialogue and a negotiation agenda. The Israeli Labour Party again endorsed the plan, while the Likud requested a modified version and assurances that the PLO would not participate, directly or indirectly. The United States refused to include these assurances in the document, so the Baker plan did not receive official Israeli approval. As a consequence, the Labour Party decided to leave the NUG (Lochery 1997: 153-155).

Egypt also became very much involved in the attempts to promote talks on Palestinian elections and acted as an indirect go-between between Israel and the PLO. The Cairo talks focused on elections with international supervision in the territories, a freeze on building Jewish settlements, and an international conference based on UN SCR 242 (Egypt’s Ten-Point Response 1989: 144-155; Rubin 1994: 117). The involvement of Egypt, according to Osama El-Baz, adviser to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, was based on the following understanding (quoted in New Outlook February 1988):

63 The PLO-US dialogue was held, however, by low-level American officials and, to the disappointment of the PLO leadership, did not produce any concrete results.
The peace between Egypt and Israel is an integral part of a comprehensive peace, not a separate peace... recent events in the territories have proved that it is impossible to ignore the Palestinian problem even for one moment... The Egyptian and Palestinian peoples have a common interest, a shared goal, to end the occupation and march in the direction of peace.

The intensive diplomatic efforts particularly by the United States may be contrasted with the manifold official statements emanating from the UN and the EC. The EC reacted sharply against the brutal Israeli force used to quell the Palestinian uprising. As a result, the EC decided to initiate cultural and scientific sanctions against Israel as a way of demonstrating its disapproval. In addition, the EC restated the Venice Declaration and stressed that the conflict should be resolved at an international conference under UN auspices. The conference should include the participation of the PLO and address the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and the right of all states, including Israel, to security (European Community Declaration 1989: 121-122; European Community Declaration 1990: 147-148).

Readiness to Negotiate?

Conflict is characterised by various processes of change and continuity. In this chapter the objectives are to identify and analyse the reframing processes that have occurred during and after the Palestinian uprising. The key question in this section concerns the linkage between reframing and acceptance of negotiations. How did the parties reach the stage of negotiations? Did the acceptance of negotiations constitute a turning point in the understanding of the conflict? To answer these queries, I will analyse the readiness of the parties to commence a negotiation process.

Motivation to negotiate

During the period analysed here, the Israeli political leadership consisted of national unity governments, with two parties united in a platform of rejecting a Palestinian state and negotiations with the PLO. On these two accounts there was a continuity of beliefs, but on other
political issues the two parties had distinct interpretations of the conflict.

The frame of the Likud discloses the continuity and perseverance of self- and enemy images. The Likud reasoned and categorised political events, particularly the intifada, within a retrospective time frame. This type of frame was characterised by a pessimistic and fatalistic worldview that was suspicious of peace proposals. For instance, the rejection of an international conference was based on the understanding that it was a dangerous trap which might impose solutions on Israel. Having to respond and adapt to pressures for resolving the intifada, Shamir came up with the suggestion of autonomy for the ‘Arabs in Eretz Yisrael’ in line with the Camp David accord (Shamir [1988]1993: 13). The Palestinian uprising was, in the Likud’s understanding, exposing the true character of the Palestinians and the PLO in particular. The intifada validated, it was argued, the enduring inclination of the Palestinians towards violence and terrorism. The Algiers Declaration of 1988 was explained in situational terms as based on tactics and hiding the true intentions of the PLO. Any suggestions of a two-state solution, which would entail trading territories for peace as stipulated in UN SCR 242, and a freeze on building Jewish settlements were completely rejected as contradicting the self-images of the Likud and the ideology of a Greater Israel originating from revisionist Zionism (Shamir 1989: 176-179).

By comparison, Labour had a more prospective and optimistic time frame, characterised by active attempts to shape political events. Despite international condemnation of Israel’s brutal way of handling the Palestinian uprising, the Labour Party was much less fearful and suspicious of proposals presented by third parties. Most of the proposals from the United States and Egypt were endorsed by Labour, including the idea of an international conference. The leadership also had a more diversified frame of the Arab world and recognised the changes towards moderation taking place in the region. Egypt and Jordan in particular were seen as important partners in the process. The Palestinian uprising and the subsequent critical world opinion of Israeli behaviour had a reframing effect on the Labour leadership. Less attention was given to an interstate settlement of the conflict, such as the Jordanian option, whereas a new and stronger emphasis was placed on a political solution to the Palestinian problem. For example, the Labour Party deemed it necessary to construct its own formula in response to American and Egyptian diplomatic pressures. In January 1989, Rabin presented a plan primarily focusing on Palestinian elections in order to have a partner with whom to negotiate a
transitional period of self-rule (Flamhaft 1996: 65; R olef 1997: 262 - 264). As R abin was part of the NUG, Shamir initially stated that these ideas were R abin’s private ones; however, in May 1989 the NUG presented its own formula, primarily based on R abin’s previous proposal. The document stated that negotiations should be based on the framework of the Camp David agreement and free elections among the Palestinians. These changes, however, were incremental in that there were to be no negotiations with the PLO and no change in the status of the West Bank (Judea and Samaria, as it was referred to). According to R abin, ‘the 15 May 1989 peace initiative ... was a historic turning point in viewing the Palestinians as a partner, separate from Jordan’ (quoted in Ben-Yehuda 1997: 211). The local Palestinian leaders, on the other hand, viewed the elections plan as a ‘non-starter’ and as an attempt to create an alternative Palestinian leadership to the PLO (New Outlook August 1989).

The Likud Party was apprehensive about any of the formulae presented by third parties, fearing that the Israeli government might end up negotiating with the PLO on a Palestinian state (Flamhaft 1996: 66). James Baker, the new American Secretary of State, was trying to find a bridging formula. The American proposal was, however, rejected by Shamir, who was under great pressure from the right not to make any concessions (Flamhaft 1996: 69-73). As a consequence of the Likud’s rejection, the NUG was dissolved in March 1990, just a few months before the Gulf crisis. A new Israeli government was formed with the support of small parties on the extreme right, the most right-wing government since the establishment of Israeli statehood.

Because of the formation of a new Israeli government and the upcoming Gulf crisis, the diplomatic momentum was lost. During the Gulf War, Israel was hit by forty-two Scud missiles and, to the astonishment of many analysts, Israel did not retaliate against Iraq, partly because of American pressures not to do so. After the war, several diplomats, including American Secretary of State James Baker, identified a ‘window of opportunity,’ based on the view that the PLO

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64 The document distinguished two stages: a transitional period consisting of five years to be followed by a permanent solution, in which negotiations on a permanent status were to be commenced no later than the third year of the transitional period. Additional parties invited to negotiate in the first stage were Jordan and Egypt (see further Flamhaft 1996: 228-229). Note the striking similarity with the Oslo agreement of 1993.

65 The Baker plan focused on Palestinian elections and tried to promote talks in Cairo between Israel, Egypt, and the US (see further Flamhaft 1996: 229).
was isolated and weakened while the Arab world was showing several signs of moderation. This presented an opportunity for new diplomatic initiatives. Shamir was still reluctant to accept most proposals and not until great pressures were exerted by the United States did he agree to attend the Madrid Conference. Peres (1995: 320) clarifies 'In Israel, sadly, many political leaders continued to talk as though these great changes had not taken place, and as though our stereotypical conception of the Arabs was somehow stronger than the new realities of the Arab world. We seemed unable to grasp the magnitude of the changes, both global and regional, that were occurring around us.'

The frames of the PLO leadership on negotiations were similarly mixed, owing to a combination of prospective and retrospective time frames. For instance, the Amman Accord of 1985 and the PLO's subsequent withdrawal from the agreement are illustrations of the ambiguity and ambivalence of the PLO, since it feared that the accord might cause disunity among the Palestinian people. Yet the intifada moved the time frame of the PLO leadership towards a prospective one in that decisive diplomatic steps were taken, such as officially accepting a two-state solution and recognising Israel. On the PLO Charter, with clauses calling for the elimination of the State of Israel, Arafat now stated that '[c]oncerning the Charter, there is a French expression for it: “c’est caduc” [obsolete, or lapsed]' ([1989]1990: 144).

The overriding and continual concern of the PLO leadership to maintain unity among the Palestinian people has frequently led to ambiguous, contradictory, and at times disastrous policies. An illustration is provided by the failure of the PLO to condemn the terrorist attack in Tel Aviv 1989, which led to the termination of the US-PLO dialogue.66 Another example is the stance taken by the PLO leadership during the Gulf War, which exposed its relapse to a retrospective time frame of pan-Arab nostalgia fused with frustration over the lack of diplomatic progress towards a two-state solution.

To conclude, it is difficult to identify any real motivation for efforts to resolve the conflict in 1990-91. After the fall of the NUG, the Israeli government was defensive and suspicious of every peace proposal that was put forth. The PLO, on the other hand, which before the Gulf War had expectations of becoming a partner in the peace process, now was severely weakened and preoccupied with its political and

66 The PLO viewed the suspension of the dialogue as a ‘blow to the entire peace process' but concurrently rejected the 'U.S. positions favoring and supporting Israel' (PLO Executive Committee 1990: 160-161).
economic survival. Instead, the local Palestinian leaders in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip found themselves in the awkward position of being pressured into participating in a peace process, while continually restating that the PLO is the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Opportunities to negotiate

Change in the domestic context is often generated by the rise of new political norms and shifts in cultural rationales. In the Palestinian domestic arena, there are contradictory patterns of change and continuity. On the one hand, the intifada expressed a new future-oriented and active time frame through the articulation of an end to the Israeli occupation and the promotion of a two-state solution. Hence the Palestinian uprising broke away from a more passive and past-oriented approach of ‘steadfastness.’ On the other hand, the Palestinian public turned to a passive and fatalistic approach during the Gulf crisis, viewing Saddam Hussein as the one person who could end the Israeli occupation, which neither the PLO nor the intifada had been able to do (Finkelstein 1992). Concurrently, the Hamas was gaining popularity, advocating a competing meta-frame of the conflict which was characterised by a past-oriented time frame. Both the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad reject any recognition of Israel and argue for a return to Islam.

Similarly, the Israeli domestic arena displayed a mixture of change and continuity. The intifada reinforced the green line in the minds of the Israeli public and strengthened the pre-existing divide in Israeli society regarding the future of the occupied territories. The political parties on the left, such as Mapam, Shinui and Ratz, clearly stated, particularly after the Algiers Declaration of 1988, their willingness to talk to the PLO as well as their support of a demilitarised Palestinian state (Interviews with Aloni 1993, Orron 1993). Within the Labour Party as well, several members called for some type of negotiations with the PLO. However, for the parties on the right, the Palestinian uprising only strengthened the enemy images of violent Palestinians and the PLO as a terrorist organisation.

67 For instance, the NUG went into a deep crisis when Ezer Weizman, member of Labour and Science Minister, was questioned of holding secret talks with the PLO in 1989 (Interview with Weizman 1991; Flamhaft 1996: 170).
Concurrently with the ongoing intifada, Israel was receiving thousands of Jewish immigrants each month from the Soviet Union. The Soviet immigration was generally well received in Israel but created a tremendous financial burden that affected several social sectors. For instance, there was an acute lack of housing for new immigrants and underprivileged Israelis. At the same time, the Israeli government, particularly Housing Minister Ariel Sharon, was actively promoting and encouraging Israelis and new immigrants, with financial incentives, to settle in the occupied territories. However, not many Israelis and new immigrants wanted to reside in the territories. Thus, this policy of subsidising houses in the territories, while facing a major socio-economic crisis within Israel, created a heated debate over what should be the national priorities in Israel (see, for example, New Outlook August 1990). The Shamir government requested loan guarantees from the United States to settle new immigrants, but the Bush administration required that there should be a freeze on building Jewish settlements in the territories—a precondition that was unacceptable to a government that believed in the notion of a 'greater Israel' (Baker 1995: 541-543).

In the international arena, international opinion was nearly unanimously one of dismay over Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The EC demonstrated its disapproval by applying cultural and scientific sanctions against Israel, which, however, were swiftly removed when Israel was hit by Scud missiles during the Gulf War. The UN General Assembly issued several resolutions condemning the Israeli occupation and reaffirming Palestinian legitimate rights. At the same time, there was an increasing moderation among the Arab states towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which included an acceptance of a two-state solution. If we adopt Finnemore’s concept of teaching normative change, the US, and Egypt to a lesser extent, may fit this notion. As discussed above, these third parties suggested their formulae with expectations for how to resolve the conflict and offered assistance to the parties. However, even though the American administration had established a dialogue with the PLO, it was still officially opposed to a Palestinian state.

To sum up, the intifada had several effects in that the focus shifted back to the Palestine problem and shattered what for many Israelis had been the accepted status quo of the conflict. However, the opportunities for resolving conflict were mixed and contradictory. On the one hand, there were apparent signs in the international arena that promoted and supported negotiations, but in the Palestinian and Israeli domestic arenas, the publics were split in their interpretations of
what constituted the appropriate moment to begin negotiations. The Palestinians had been relatively united in 1988-90, but with the increasing stronghold of Hamas, and with a widespread disillusionment over the lack of concrete diplomatic results from the intifada, the Palestinian public became more reluctant and suspicious of a peace process. In Israel the intifada caused an even deeper rift between the hawks and doves regarding the advantages of negotiation and how to end the Palestinian uprising. At the same time, there was growing discontent among the Israeli public concerning new Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, while Israel was facing financial difficulties settling the great influx of Soviet immigrants.

**Focal points for negotiations**

Notwithstanding the denial of any linkage of the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait to the Israeli occupation, the American administration shortly after the Gulf War revived the peace effort. James Baker (1995: 412) stated: 'It was apparent to me that the Gulf War had created an unprecedented window of opportunity to pursue the possibility of peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors ... Our leverage was now infinitely more potent. More significant, it would almost certainly never be so great again.' However, the American optimism was not immediately shared by the conflicting parties. The PLO was excluded from the process and the ‘inside’ Palestinian leadership was disinclined to participate in a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation without the official inclusion of the PLO. The Israeli government was reluctant and suspicious of the suggested structure for the negotiations, that is, the two tracks of bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and of the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation in particular.

It is difficult to identify any obvious focal point for negotiations that was shared by the conflicting parties; consequently, the Americans had great difficulties in coordinating the parties’ expectations of negotiation. Both sides tried to convince the Americans of their interpretations of fairness in the conflict, but in Baker’s point of view that was ‘fighting symbols over substance’ (1995: 496). The American mediation, in the phase leading up to the Madrid Conference, was therefore primarily concerned with procedural matters. Baker introduced a compromise formula to coordinate the parties’ expec-

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tations regarding negotiation. The 'two-track' approach that was suggested consisted of bilateral and multilateral negotiations. The multilateral track was intended to meet the Arab states' requirement for an international conference while the bilateral track was an Israeli precondition for participation (Baker 1995: 415-417).

The 'inside' leadership, however, continued to insist on a delegation of its own and PLO representation (Palestinian Nationalists 1991: 163-164; Palestinian Leaders 1991: 172-173). The Israeli government was suspicious of the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, fearing that the PLO might be represented. The invitation to an international conference was therefore not approved until the United States exerted pressures and provided the parties with letters of assurances. The Americans used 'constructive ambiguity' in order to transform politically contested issues into procedural matters. This strategy was based on the assumption that once the Palestinians and Israelis started to negotiate 'there will be no turning back' (Baker 1995: 420, 491).

In conclusion, because of the lack of any substantial focal point for negotiations, the American mediation avoided constructing an agenda for negotiation. Instead, efforts were made to solve procedural questions and to co-ordinate a shared acceptance of bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Notwithstanding the American success in convening the Madrid Conference in 1991, the problem of Palestinian representation and the distinct understandings of the purpose of negotiation reappeared immediately in the first session of the negotiations.

69 Important points in this letter were, for the Palestinians, a recognition of the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people; an opposition to Israeli occupation, including the annexation of East Jerusalem and the expansion of Jewish settlement; and a recognition of the rights of the Palestinians to select their own delegation (U.S. Letter of Assurances to the Palestinians [1991]1994: 5-8). In the letter to Israel the US underlined the special relations between the two countries, including an American commitment to Israel's security; the right of Israel to have secure and defensible borders; the opposition to an independent Palestinian state; the promise that the conference would have no mandate to impose a solution and no linkage between the various tracks of the negotiations; and representation of the Palestinians in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation (U.S. Letter of Assurances to Israel [1991]1994: 9-10).
Conclusion

Frequently, when adversaries in an intractable conflict reach the stage of negotiation, optimistic assessments are generally heard. However, these are often not precisely defined and the processes which led the parties to the negotiation table are more diffuse. Implicitly, there is an assumption that change, particularly in the meaning and understanding of conflict, has occurred. In this chapter, I endeavour to fill that void with the use of the concept of reframing, which according to the definition made here, discusses change in conflict at the level of both agent and structure. The concept of reframing is linked to efforts to resolve conflict by an emphasis on motivation, opportunity, and focal points, which elucidates the readiness of the parties to negotiate. Consistent with the meta-theoretical model, motivation concerns the agents' attributes of understanding, capacity, and willingness, whereas opportunity relates to the structural features of signification, domination, and legitimation.

In the empirical case, in 1991 there was no distinct readiness among the parties to negotiate. On the Israeli side, the willingness and preferences remained unchanged, that is, they wanted a continuation of Israeli control over the occupied territories, which was consistent with its understanding of the conflict. However, the capacity and autonomy of the Israeli political leadership were curtailed by both domestic and international expectations, which stressed the need to resolve the conflict. Since most of the Israeli pre-conditions were met (for example, no participation of the PLO nor any separate Palestinian delegation) the Israeli government was able to attend the Madrid Conference without creating dissonance in pre-existing beliefs about the conflict.

On the Palestinian side, the situation was more contradictory. On the one hand, the willingness and preferences of the PLO leadership had changed from total liberation of Palestine to an acceptance of a two-state solution. On the other hand, one may question the way in which the understanding of the conflict had changed, particularly after the stance of the PLO during the Gulf War. As a consequence of its action, the PLO was excluded and restricted in its capacity to exercise any decisive influence over the process. Yet, in a paradoxical way, "a lack of alternatives may increase an actor's motivation" (Habeeb 1988: 21), which may thus provide an explanation for the PLO's acceptance of a Palestinian delegation to Madrid without any PLO representatives.
In comparison with motivation, the opportunity to negotiate is more evident. Since the time of the Palestinian uprising, in both the domestic and international arenas, there has been a revision of the interpretive schemes of the conflict. A greater emphasis was placed on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the expectations to resolve it, which encouraged third-party intervention. This process was combined with most Arab states’ acceptance to attend the Madrid Conference, which provided further legitimation to the peace process. In the Israeli and Palestinian domestic arenas, the picture is more contradictory, but there was broad acceptance of a peace process, while expectations of the aims and contents of negotiations varied greatly. Furthermore, the Palestinians became less enthusiastic about a peace process that did not include them as a full partner. Instead, the process exposed an extensive asymmetry between the conflicting parties.

To conclude, a turning point in conflict may thus be understood as a change in both behaviour and the meaning of conflict. The initiation of a peace process in Madrid in 1991 can therefore be seen as a behavioural turning point in that Palestinians and Israelis, for the first time ever, sat together at a negotiation table. The behavioural change was not, however, accompanied by an alteration in the meaning of the conflict. This is one reason why the American mediators found it so difficult to coordinate and construct a ‘road map,’ an agenda for the negotiations, which came to have several implications for the ensuing negotiations.
Part IV

Negotiation
Chapter 7

NEGOTIATING AND INTERPRETING POLITICAL ‘REALITIES’

Negotiations constitute a critical part of the efforts to resolve conflict. However, just as there exist various understandings of conflict, there are also different interpretations of negotiation. In comparison to the previous chapters on reframing, which focused on the implications of strategic interaction, the analysis here centres more explicitly on strategy and interaction. To elucidate how strategies are situated in time and place, I will discuss agents’ frames of negotiation and the facilitating and restraining structural features circumventing negotiations, which are often neglected in the predominantly actor-oriented negotiation theory. The process and its outcome are analysed on the basis of constructivist assumptions, which highlight the communicative and transformative dimensions of negotiations. The overall objective of this chapter is to present some key theoretical arguments for how frame, structure, strategy, process and outcome of negotiation can be analysed, interpreted and described.

Understanding Negotiation in Theory and Practice

Like the proverbial blind men who confronted the elephant and brought back conflicting accounts of its salient characteristics, contemporary analysts of negotiation appear to be talking about different things under the name of the same phenomenon. Some have even called for a search for a common understanding of the subject so that analysis can proceed on the same epistemological track. (Zartman 1988: 31)

Negotiation theory\textsuperscript{70} is applicable to most areas of human interaction. There has been extensive research on negotiation, both in

\textsuperscript{70} The objective here is not to make a comprehensive overview of negotiation theory, but rather to link it to conflict research.
theory and in practice, and at the international as well as the interpersonal level. Yet, despite the number of studies, negotiation theory is still rather vague on the precise meaning of negotiation. Scholars not only have divergent academic and professional backgrounds but are also driven by different research aims. First, several studies have an explicit ambition to prescribe what is considered the most effective strategy of negotiation. This kind of knowledge may be described as 'technical' and is found in several handbooks on negotiation (see, for instance, Fisher and Ury 1981). These books emphasise how to 'diagnose' problems and prescribe how to 'cure' conflict (see, for instance, Fisher et al., 1997; and Aggestam 1999 for a review of the book).

Another ambition of negotiation theory is to predict outcomes of various bargaining situations. Game theory and abstract economic models have frequently been used to theorise on what are viewed as the most likely outcomes of competitive bargaining situations characterised by strategic interdependence (see, for instance, Axelrod 1984; Schelling 1960). In these games, there is an implicit assumption about the preferences of political actors, and the rationality of their strategic choice, which accordingly excludes from the analysis the beliefs about and facilitating and restraining effects of larger political, social, and historical contexts (Larson 1988: 282-289; Stein 1988: 221-222).

A third ambition identified in negotiation theory is to promote a specific purpose and outcome of negotiation, namely, how conflict resolution should be pursued (Burton 1987; Kelman 1979). This type of normative research makes a distinction between the endeavours to address conflict within a power-dominated framework and those of a problem-solving approach (see, for instance, Burton 1995). Hence, this kind of research clearly stipulates what are or are not viewed as appropriate strategies of negotiation. As discussed in chapter two, the distinction can be traced to different ontological and epistemological understandings of conflict, which lead to different assumptions about what may be viewed as appropriate negotiation behaviour.

A variety of analytical approaches in negotiation theory may be discerned, such as structural, strategic, process, behavioural, and integrative, although according to Zartman (1988: 31-37) there is no dominant analytical paradigm of negotiation. The question is then how we are to understand negotiation. A negotiation process may basically be viewed as containing both cooperative and competitive characteristics, as well as interdependent decision-making (Jönsson 1979: 8). However, as noted above, the analyses of negotiation are often pursued either by an emphasis on prescriptive, descriptive or
predictive accounts. One consequence of this is the problem of distinguishing between the scholars’ perspectives of negotiation, on the one hand, and the practitioners’ frames of negotiation, on the other hand.

Frames of negotiation

In the empirical analysis, the focus will primarily be placed on the political actors’ frames of negotiation, that is, how agents perceive and define their situation. Various suggestions are made in negotiation theory about different frames. Druckman (1997: 83-90) suggests four different approaches: puzzle-solving, bargaining, organisational management, and diplomatic politics. Pruitt (1990: 78) offers a similar categorisation: contending, problem-solving, and yielding. However, the ambition here is not to cover the entire field of research but rather to focus on two dominant perspectives in negotiation theory which are also recognised in conflict research, namely: (1) the competitive, and (2) the problem-solving. The two perspectives diverge since the former is task-oriented, that is, it focuses on a particular instrumental goal, whereas the latter is problem-oriented in its emphasis on relational rather than instrumental goals (Pruitt 1990: 78). These perspectives will be used as a comprehensive guiding framework for the analysis of negotiation frames and will be linked to the theoretical discussion in chapter five on change and time frames. As argued there, retrospective and prospective time frames delineate distinct understandings of the timing, the appropriate moment, and the tempo—the appropriate pace—of the negotiation process. Thus ‘expectations vary due to the participants’ differing frames of reference’ (Stenelo 1972: 55). Stein (1988: 222) poignantly states: ‘the way a problem is diagnosed and framed can have a critical impact on subsequent strategies and outcomes. For example, whether a negotiating problem is defined as competitive or integrative is critically important both to the likelihood of an agreement and to the kind of agreement that is achieved.’ In short, these perspectives illuminate how self, the other party, and the situation are perceived as well as

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71 As Elgström (1992: 13) points out, it is not always clear how these concepts are understood. Scholars use them to delineate situations, processes, solutions, attitudes, etc.
A competitive (also called contending, bargaining and distributive) perspective of negotiation emphasises individualism, autonomy, strategic choice, and self-interests in a bargaining situation, or a so-called game (Putnam 1994: 341-344). The focus is basically on the competitive nature of the negotiation process, which concerns the advancement of one party’s interests relative to those of the opposing party. For example, one party may attempt to gain as much as possible of whatever value is being divided. Consequently, in competitive negotiation the goals and interests are frequently framed as incompatible, which tends to lead to distrust and to obstruct candour and flexibility about preferences and interests (Hopmann 1995: 25; Pruitt 1990: 78). While emphasising the contending character of bargaining and negotiation, this approach nevertheless recognises the existence of ‘games’ characterised by non-zero sum, that is, mixed motives that have both competitive and cooperative characteristics (Hopmann 1995: 25). Moreover, the interlocutors are receptive to learning games; Axelrod (1984), for instance, highlights how cooperation is enhanced when the game is repeated and based on reciprocity.

The overall character of negotiation, however, centres on strategies of holding firm on negotiation positions and issuing rewards, as well as threats and counter-threats, as a way to convince the other of concession-making. By the end of a negotiation process, there may emerge a dynamic of convergence and concession-making which may eventually lead to the conclusion of an agreement (Hopmann 1995: 26).

A problem-solving (also called integrative and cooperative) perspective, in comparison, focuses not only on the readiness and flexibility to make concessions but also, and fundamentally, on a joint search for mutually advantageous alternatives to conflict. Thus, with a problem-solving perspective of negotiation, information may be exchanged in an admissible manner about oneself (needs, interests, priorities, etc.), and the conflict in general is framed as a joint problem, a puzzle, that should be solved together. In establishing trust and a working relationship that strives towards a win-win solution, a joint effort is made by the parties to identify common interests and values. Moreover, it is assumed that problem-solving negotiations may facilitate long-term exchange. The parties may be ready for compromises on matters of self-interest in order to promote mutual interests and future gains (Bartos 1995: 48; Pruitt 1990: 78-86).
The problem-solving perspective was initially outlined by the game-theorist Anatol Rapoport through his emphasis on the dimension of ‘empathetic understanding,’ that is, a joint search for mutual understandings and shared gains. Fisher and Ury’s book Getting to Yes (1981) is a classic work in the genre of problem-solving in which the authors stress the importance of focusing on interests rather than bargaining positions. A similar approach, advanced by Zartman and Berman (1982), emphasises diagnosis and formula. A joint diagnosis of the problem may help the parties to identify a formula for resolving conflict (see further Hopmann 1995: 25-27). Negotiations are thus understood as ‘a process of combining conflicting positions into a common position, under a decision rule of unanimity, a phenomenon in which the outcome is determined by the process’ (Zartman 1988: 32).

Kelman, who endeavours to apply theoretical insights from social psychology and problem-solving to the practice of negotiation, argues that a problem-solving approach is best advanced in an interactive workshop. In such a setting, the participants are able to redefine negotiation away from zero-sum to win-win thinking. These non-binding, problem-solving workshops are facilitated by social scientists who encourage the parties to share and exchange information, in a flexible and frank manner, about their interests, preferences, demands, needs, and fears (Kelman 1992: 62-66).

In short, the two perspectives diverge not only in their understandings of a bargaining situation but also in how the ‘other’ is viewed. With a competitive frame, the ‘other’ is viewed with mistrust, as a rivaling opponent, whereas in a problem-solving frame the other party is regarded as a partner in a negotiation process which strives to establish a working trust.

**Structural Parameters of Negotiation**

Turning from agent’s frame to the structural characteristics of negotiation, this is an area of research which has received less attention, since negotiation theory tends to favour actor-oriented approaches. In this section, I will highlight normative and behavioural structures of negotiation, that is, the norms of modern diplomacy and the practice of double-edged diplomacy.
Normative structures of modern diplomacy

Modern diplomacy embraces a number of norms which generate expectations and legitimation regarding how the practice of diplomacy should be pursued. Basically, it is assumed to be an open process with a requirement to keep the public informed, which can be contrasted with the characteristics of old diplomacy. The origins of old diplomacy can be traced back to ancient Greece, from which some of the traditional diplomatic vocabulary and practices emanate. Roman law and later Italian customs shaped much of diplomatic practice. The basic assumption was the acceptance of rivalry between international units, with secrecy forming a natural part of diplomatic practice. Public opinion was thus rarely taken into consideration, since diplomacy was viewed as an art based on tradition and historical precedents and practised by diplomatic elites with a ‘trained intuition’ (Berridge 1995: 4; Eban 1983: 333-344).

After the First World War and with the spread of democracy, the international and domestic setting of diplomacy underwent a transformation. American President Woodrow Wilson stated in his Fourteen Points that a new kind of diplomacy, based on moral and democratic principles, had to be developed. International negotiations should from then on be pursued openly and in public, without private or secret understandings between negotiators. Hence, President Wilson’s famous statement about ‘open covenants openly arrived at’ became the normative principle of new diplomacy (Eban 1983: 345). These new moral principles of diplomacy stemmed from the view that old diplomacy was immoral and encouraged conspiracies and war. These assumptions were strengthened by the growing influence of the media and public opinion, which demanded transparent, democratic diplomacy. Open international conferences, multilateral diplomacy, and personal involvement of politicians increased, so the role of professional diplomats became more limited (Watson 1983: 121; Sofer 1988).

However, there is an in-built tension between publicity and international negotiation, as there are times when negotiators prefer privacy. Journalists, on the other hand, require openness in order to be able to cover the various phases of negotiation. Too much media exposure during the negotiation process may consequently reduce flexibility and lead to a freeze in the parties’ positions (Arno 1984: 237; Barston 1988: 8, 75; Cohen 1986: 76, 69). Privacy may therefore be desired, for instance, in an additional track to official negotiations. The dispute about secret negotiations concerns how open and public
international negotiation should be and when secrecy is necessary. Those who aspire to expand and enhance open, public diplomacy believe in its superior rationality. It is assumed that international politics should be adjusted and become more similar to domestic politics. Secrecy is considered dangerous and immoral, liable to lead to regrettable compromises in international negotiations. Most importantly, it is perceived as counter to the principles of democracy (Klieman 1988: 15). A more frequently held view is that sometimes there is no alternative to the exchange of confidential and private views between negotiators (Watson 1983: 137-139). Thus, there is some ambivalence among diplomats about the publicity surrounding negotiations. At the same time, public diplomacy has become an integral principle for any state claiming to be a democracy, and the ‘public’s right to know,’ for instance, about new policies and official negotiation positions, cannot be disregarded.

Behavioural structures of double-edged diplomacy

International negotiation must be seen as a double-edged process in which every actor tries to take into account expected reactions on both the domestic and international levels. Deals at the international level change the character of domestic constraints, while the movement of domestic politics opens up new possibilities for international accords. Domestic goals are pursued via international moves, and domestic politicking is central to international negotiation. (Evans 1993: 397)

Domestic and international arenas may both facilitate and restrain negotiations. For instance, domestic interest groups as well as third parties express expectations of appropriate behaviour in negotiation, and what may be viewed as logical in one context may be seen as irrational in another context. Thus, the parties are, metaphorically speaking, playing different ‘games’ in which the logic of appropriateness is determined by which ‘game’ is being played. In this section, the problem is approached through a discussion of various dimensions of ‘double-edged diplomacy’ (Evans, Jacobson and Putnam 1993). Moravcsik (1993: 15) states that ‘[d]iplomacy is a process of strategic interaction in which actors simultaneously try to take account of and, if possible, influence the expected reactions of other actors, both at home and abroad.’ To resolve conflict involves a reassessment of basic attitudes and values, and for this reason political leaders need to obtain national legitimacy from a considerable part of
their domestic publics (Bar-Siman-Tov 1994: 4; Mor 1997: 199). Public opinion is therefore an important consideration when deciding to embark on and pursue negotiations. At the same time there is an inclination to view public opinion as having a negative impact on negotiation. Domestic interest groups that are active on an issue are assumed to limit the autonomy and flexibility of negotiators. For instance, concessions are often difficult to make when there are active domestic constituencies with hawkish and opposing opinions towards the negotiations. Conversely, domestic groups with dovish attitudes may undermine the credibility of their national negotiators. As Bell points out (1988: 236), '[a]lthough it may be possible to “construct” a problem in several different ways, and to choose between alternative definitions of what is at stake, the range of alternatives is limited by the political culture.'

Double-edged diplomacy assumes that political leaders are ‘Janus-faced’ in that they have to conduct several dialogues simultaneously— influencing, as they negotiate, interlocutors, domestic and international opinion72 as well as third parties (Putnam 1993b: 71). Moreover, concession-making is particularly difficult in this type of multi-level game, and it is the interaction between international and domestic normative expectations of the outcome of the negotiations that facilitates or restrains the process (Moravcsik 1993: 15-17). For example, in conflict active domestic interest groups rarely raise demands in favour of more accommodative strategies, but rather against further concessions and compromises (Kriesberg 1991: 7). With enduring enemy images characterised by suspicion and mistrust, there will always be some domestic groups that feel betrayed by an agreement. These groups typically portray themselves as ‘patriots’ and their opponents as ‘traitors’ and may attempt to undermine the government because concessions are interpreted as a deviation from the initial negotiation position. This puts an extraordinary burden of responsibility on political leaders who are advocating an agreement. Yet, under some circumstances, domestic division may even strengthen one’s bargaining position by making it possible to argue persuasively to one’s counterpart that it is impossible to make some specific concessions because public support is lacking (Moravcsik 1993: 28).

72 Domestic legitimacy is to be understood in a broad sense, that is, political leaders receive tacit or explicit domestic approval from key domestic interest groups. As Putnam points out, the necessity and the degree of that domestic approval depend, however, on the institutional, societal and political structures, and vary from time to time (Putnam 1993b: 71).
Situated Strategies of Negotiation and Mediation

In this section, the purpose is to explicitly link negotiation strategies to frames and structures of negotiation. This objective is based on the argument that, in order to improve knowledge about the preferences and appropriateness of negotiation strategies, they have to be situated in time and place.

International mediation

In this study, third parties are seen as part of the normative international structure. Mediation may be viewed as an active and accepted attempt by third parties to intervene during negotiation. Thus, international mediation is 'related to but distinct from the parties' own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider (whether an individual, an organization, a group, or a state) to change their perceptions or behavior, and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law' (Bercovitch 1997: 130). Thus, the acceptance and type of international mediation are determined by the parties' and the mediators' overall assessment of the negotiation process. In this section, I adopt a broad typology of mediation from Zartman and Touval (1985; see also Bercovitch 1992: 17-18), who identify three types: (a) manipulation, (b) formulation, and (c) communication-facilitation. These types are linked to actors' frames of negotiation where, for instance, manipulation is frequently favoured in competitive negotiations, whereas formulation and communication-facilitation tend to be emphasised in problem-solving negotiations. Thus, the focus here is primarily on the interlocutors' views of mediation and less on the mediator's frame per se.

A predominantly competitive frame of negotiation focuses on power and conceives of negotiations in confrontational terms. The distribution of power and the structural classification of negotiation as asymmetric or symmetric are important features of this frame. According to Habeeb (1988: 8), a weaker party may utilise a number of strategies during asymmetric negotiations, such as withholding an agreement, appealing to moral obligations of the stronger party, and forming a coalition in support of its position. Support of third parties may thus be particularly important for the weaker party to balance the asymmetry between the interlocutors.
Manipulation, also called principal or power mediation is a frequently favoured strategy, which is viewed as a coercive form of direct bargaining between mediators and adversaries (Princen 1992: 19-25). By the use of both coercive and rewarding strategies, the mediators strive to influence the parties towards specific instrumental goals. Mediation may be desired since competitive negotiations frequently run the risk of deadlocks because of the parties' mistrust of each other and their inclination to stand firm on original negotiation positions. The interlocutors assume that a mediator, usually a superpower or a great power, through the use of power and manipulating strategies such as 'carrots' (side-payments) and 'sticks' (threats), will affect the power distribution and thereby bring the opposing sides closer to an agreement (Zartman and Touval 1989: 125-126). Mediators may thus act forcefully to transform the bargaining process into a 'multi-cornered relationship,' especially when the parties greatly mistrust each other and exhibit a reluctance to implement an agreement (Hampson 1996: 12).

By comparison, a problem-solving frame of negotiation is more concerned with persuasion via communication and learning through negotiation. As Elgström (1992: 16) points out, the major difference concerns 'the element of free choice contained in persuasion. The attitudinal change resulting from persuasion must be voluntary. In a coercive situation, the receiver will not experience any alternative but to act according to the sender's wishes.'

Mediation concerned with persuasion may be called pure or neutral, which is understood as a non-coercive and impartial form. The parties have an expressed desire and motivation to engage in a joint search for a diagnosis of conflict and for a mutually acceptable formula that may settle the conflict. A problem-solving frame of negotiation consequently favours the second and third types of mediation strategy, that is, formulation and communication-facilitation. Formulation strategies, such as structuring negotiation agendas, suggesting various formulae, and highlighting focal points and common interests, may be viewed as appropriate when the parties are at the negotiation table and there is a need for assistance to locate and reach mutual acceptance of a formula.

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73 Haas (1988, 1990) emphasises how this type of power mediation may be counter-productive when applied to a conflict which is not ripe for a settlement.

74 The major differences between pure and power mediation concern: (a) interests and capabilities of mediators; (b) target of intervention, that is, the pay-off structure or the mode of interaction; and (c) the objectives of intervention, to further incentives or promote empathy (Princen 1992: 30).
An interactive problem-solving perspective emphasizes the importance of undistorted communication channels and a supportive negotiation framework. Mediators may be sought to play a constructive role through the use of various communication-facilitation strategies; and a whole range of political actors, such as private individuals, academics, representatives of NGOs or IGOS and heads of states, may assume the role of mediator (Bercovitch 1992: 10-14; Rubin 1992: 256-268; Väyrynen 1995). They may help the parties to establish communication, act as a go-between, supply additional information, facilitate interaction, and arrange meeting places and a constructive negotiation milieu. As Princen (1992: 8) writes, a mediator gathers necessary information and 'serves as a regime surrogate in disputes where institutionalization is impractical.' Moreover, one dimension of conflict that is viewed as vital to address during interactive problem-solving is the perseverance of enemy images and the efforts to reframe them. Psychological features of conflict are thus accentuated, and mediators may therefore assist and encourage the parties to confront self- and enemy images.

Variations in milieu and tracks of negotiation

In the analysis of negotiation, two tracks are frequently mentioned in theory: track one, or official, public negotiations between governments; and track two, or unofficial, informal negotiations between individuals and groups outside governmental structures (Botes and Mitchell 1995; McDonald and Bendahmane 1987; Rouhana 1995; Stenelo 1972: 141-142). These two tracks of negotiation are, however, often intertwined in practice. As Montville (1987: 7) states: 'Track two diplomacy is a process designed to assist official leaders to resolve or, in the first instance, to manage conflicts by exploring possible solutions out of public view and without the requirements to formally negotiate or bargain for advantage.'

Manipulation and formulation strategies are frequently used in official, public settings where the media play an influential role. The media frequently carry and interpret messages between international and domestic arenas. For instance, while the parties negotiate directly with each other, they simultaneously send messages, indirectly via the media, to domestic interest groups and public opinion. The media may also be manipulated by the negotiating parties. For instance, in competitive negotiations in which there is a low political willingness
to reach an agreement, the media are often used by the parties to publicly expose negotiation positions and to send messages to domestic interest groups that oppose negotiations that they are indeed standing firm.

Publicity during negotiations may also provide opportunities to test new ideas, so-called trial balloons, in order to see how the other party reacts, to mobilise support, to measure the likely extent of domestic support for an eventual agreement and to prepare the public (Berridge 1995: 156; Cohen 1986: 76, 81; Jönsson and Aggestam 1999: 160-162). However, as Stenelo (1972: 63) writes, 'the element of risk-taking may be increased if other actors who are not parties to the negotiation appropriate or misinterpret proposals and arguments by giving them a meaning which was not originally intended. The result of a high level of publicity may thus be an uncontrollable proliferation of rumors.'

Publicity is particularly problematic when the parties are willing to conclude an agreement that includes painful concessions. In that phase of negotiation, a more private milieu may be favoured, away from the media spotlight (Putnam 1993a: 447). Armstrong, for example, has analysed three cases75 in which conflicting parties pursued the path of rapprochement and conciliation. He found that negotiations which successfully resulted in an agreement were conducted away from the public, on a high political level, and with few participants involved (1993: 138-140).

Moreover, some maintain that secrecy avoids arousing public anxiety until there is a reasonable opportunity to gain public acceptance of an agreement. This is especially so when negotiations involve a radical departure from previous policies against which the domestic opposition is presumed to be powerful. With increasing politicisation of an international issue, domestic interest groups that oppose negotiations may become more active. Such groups are less concerned with the costs of failing to reach an agreement and may even sabotage the negotiation process by various means. This may reduce flexibility and is indeed the main reason why most negotiators emphasise the value of secrecy (Berridge 1995: 5; Eban 1983: 353-354; Iklé 1964; 132: 262; Putnam 1993a: 446).

75 The three cases are: Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik initiative, which resulted in the 1972 Basic Treaty between West Germany and East Germany; Richard Nixon's and Jimmy Carter's negotiations with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping for normalisation of relations between their countries, which was finalised in 1979; and the negotiations between Anwar Sadat, Menachem Begin, and Jimmy Carter that resulted in the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty of 1979.
Seeking a more private and unofficial setting, the parties may, for instance, attempt to establish a parallel track to the official negotiations in a so-called back channel, arrange informal meetings, or organise an interactive problem-solving workshop. In these types of more unofficial, non-threatening, and often non-binding settings, the parties may analyse and address, in a straight-forward way, conflicting perceptions as well as test new ideas. Unofficial and private individuals may also play an important role as third parties, facilitating private meetings and communication (Berman and Johnson 1977: 77; Kliemann 1988: 11).

However, the distinction between various negotiation and mediation strategies should not be exaggerated as they are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they frequently overlap and there exists an interplay between different approaches and strategies. Specific strategies are used in particular phases of negotiation, and in this study it is assumed that negotiation can only be understood when it is situated in time and place, since it is part of the ongoing, wider social and political processes (Stein 1988: 223).

**Negotiation as a Communication and Transformation Process**

The framing of the problem is, of necessity, in part a function of the language and culture of the participants. The phrasing and rephrasing of the problem by each of the participants, the meaning of the language they use, its cultural and symbolic significance, all have an important impact on the way the problem is defined. Goals are not given, as game theory assumes, but variables that are shaped by language, culture, and context. Understanding the context and the meaning of a problem definition is the crucial first step for the analyst of international negotiation. (Stein 1988: 222-223)

Since this study is concerned with continuity and change in conflict, it is critical to stress the dynamics of a negotiation process and how frames and structures of negotiation are altered. Central to the analysis is how the negotiating parties attribute meaning to the process. The interpretation and understanding of their own intentions and actions as well as those of others are viewed as important determinants of how each party reciprocates during negotiation (Larson 1988: 226). Still, to interpret the intentions of the other is a problematic task, as social psychology and cognition theory highlight,
and negotiations are therefore characterised by a high degree of uncertainty about the intended behaviour of the opposing party.

As discussed in chapter three, attribution errors are common problems during negotiations. These errors are often expressed by an overconfidence in one’s own assessment, while ignoring and simplifying the cognitions of the other; an inclination to justify and stay firm on initial negotiation positions, which may cause deadlocks; and a tendency to view the opposing party as a unitary actor, etc. (Baserman and Sondak 1988: 305-311; Deutsch 1991: 43-47; Larson 1988: 227-228). Jönsson (1990: 32-87) identifies four problems which are common in international communication and particularly relevant to consider when analysing efforts to reframe and resolve conflict. (a) ‘The problem of meaning’ is directly linked to the problem of reframing conflict in that it highlights how theory-driven perceptions and pre-existing belief systems may prevent the interlocutors from identifying and constructing a shared understanding of negotiation and conflict. (b) ‘The problem of categorisation’ highlights the challenging task to overcome enemy and stereotyped images of the ‘other.’ (c) ‘The problem of explanation’ concerns attributional errors, as discussed above, where the interlocutors are inclined to interpret one’s own action as positive whereas behaviour of the other party is viewed more critically. (d) Finally, ‘the problem of credibility’ refers to how one party expects and interprets with suspicion the actions and intentions of the other party. Particularly during negotiations that involve efforts to resolve conflict, mistrust and fear of deception are common characteristics, leading to distorted credibility judgement.

The question is then how to overcome these problems during a negotiation process. A manipulative approach outlines various strategic moves of threats and rewards, which may influence the adversary’s expectation of the outcome of negotiation. A cybernetic approach assumes that change may appear during a process of trial-and-error, which is primarily based on a search for a mutually shared formula that may resolve conflict. A cognitive approach, on the other hand, devotes attention to internal processes of information processing and concludes that core beliefs, particularly in intractable conflicts, most often are resistant to change and thus stipulates that only peripheral beliefs may be altered (Jönsson 1990: 4-5). However, we also need to include the dimension of ‘learning’ through mutual verbal persuasion, experience and the construction of shared meanings through
interaction (Jönsson 1990: 11). As Rubin (1990: 223) writes, '[l]earning entails the incorporation of new information or insights, new ways of seeing the world, and this process of necessity involves change over time.' Hence, communication is emphasised as an integral part of the negotiation process, and the objective is to analyse how conflicting parties interpret the intentions of the other party and (re)construct the meaning of conflict during a negotiation process. How are various messages interpreted and meaning constructed in the interaction between interlocutors?

The overall approach favoured in the analysis of negotiation is similar to what Putnam (1994) calls a transformative approach. 'Negotiations can produce fundamental changes in conflicts at the actor level, issue level, rules, structures, and context of dispute' (Putnam 1994: 339). A transformative approach puts less emphasis on the instrumentality of negotiation and more on how political actors conceive of the other and the conflict, the meaning of communication and interaction, and the (re)definitions of relationship. With such an approach, the analysis will centre on the identifications of alternative interpretations of issues of dispute, which may lead to new or revised definitions of conflict, and to a new negotiated order where 'future disputes could operate from a new social reality' (Putnam 1994: 338-340).

**Conclusion**

The emphasis in this chapter is specifically on strategy and interaction. On the basis of the meta-theoretical model, I have advanced some theoretical concepts for the empirical analysis of negotiation which emphasise frame, structural characteristic, strategy and process. First, to operationalise agents’ attributes (willingness, capacity, understanding) I use two dominant perspectives on negotiation, namely, competitive and problem-solving. These perspectives, when linked to cognitive and ideological beliefs, illuminate how distinct agents may frame self, the ‘other,’ and the negotiation situation in particular. Cognitive beliefs may provide an analytical frame for assessing the negotiations, whereas ideological beliefs may guide the

76 As Jönsson (1990: 14) points out, while cybernetic and cognitive approaches emphasise meaning and communication they focus primarily on the search for a formula, or on the diversity of cognitive frames.
political actors to action (Jönsson 1979: 13). Second, to highlight structural features of negotiation, normative principles of modern diplomacy, such as the public's right to know and behavioural characteristics, such as double-edged diplomacy, are emphasised; they point to the tension between domestic legitimation and negotiation. Third, to improve knowledge about the appropriateness of strategies, we need to link frames and structures of negotiation. This is done by highlighting mediation strategies, on the one hand, and the interplay between negotiation strategies and milieu, on the other hand. Fourth, in line with constructivism, the negotiation process is analysed with particular attention to how meaning of conflict is (re-)constructed by the interaction between the parties, which includes an analysis of the obstacles frequently experienced in a communication process. Finally, the outcome of negotiation is assessed from a transformative approach, which concerns the overall change in relations and 'realities' between the parties.
On 31 October 1991, an international conference was convened in Madrid, under the joint sponsorship of the United States and the Soviet Union which signalled the end of the Cold War rivalry between the superpowers in the Middle East. The negotiations were structured in two settings: (a) bilateral negotiations in Washington, in which Israel was to negotiate separately with a Syrian, a Palestinian-Jordanian and a Lebanese delegation; and (b) multilateral negotiations in which broader issues such as regional development and cooperation were to be discussed. These negotiations also included other Arab states, as well as other political actors outside the Middle East.77

This chapter seeks to analyse how the political actors interpreted the peace process in general and the timing and tempo of the negotiations in particular. The analysis also elaborates upon the interplay between the domestic and international arenas and its implications for the process. Fourteen rounds of negotiations were conducted from 1991 to 1993. How did the parties pursue the negotiation process; what strategies were utilised; and what were the effects overall on relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians?

Competitive Frames of Negotiation

In chapter six, I concluded that there was no obvious focal point for negotiations and turning point in the meaning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus, the parties lacked an agenda and diverged in

77 The multilateral negotiations included such issue areas as water resources (chaired by the United States), environment (Japan), refugees (Canada), arms control and regional security (Russia and the United States), and regional economic development (the European Union). Syria and Lebanon were the only parties which did not participate in the multilateral negotiations since they first required progress in the bilaterals (see further Peters 1996).
their expectations regarding the whole process. From the outset, the dominant Israeli frame was characterised by competitiveness, misgivings about participating, and distrust of the intention of the opposing party. The acceptance to attend the Madrid Conference was reached after extensive pressure was exerted by the Bush administration. The Likud government feared that the conference and the subsequent bilateral negotiations would result in territorial claims and forcing Israel to make concessions, which contradicted the Likud ideology and understanding of the conflict.

For the Likud, the negotiation process basically concerned a peace-for-peace exchange, which included a recognition of Israel by the Arab states (Shamir [1991]1997: 20; Arens 1995: 218-245). This understanding did not include any change in the enemy image since the Palestinians were not recognised as full partners in the peace process. On the contrary, the Israeli government tried in various ways to limit Palestinian participation and involve only to issues concerning Palestinian administrative autonomy in the occupied territories. The Israeli government was, for example, able to obtain, as a precondition for its participation, a requirement that only Palestinians from the occupied territories should be part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Moreover, as a way of ensuring that Jerusalem was not put on the agenda, no Palestinians from East Jerusalem were allowed to participate (Interview, Shamir 1993).

Since the timing of negotiations was not conceived with enthusiasm, the predominant frame of the Likud government may be described as retrospective. It was primarily concerned with standing firm on original negotiation positions rather than striving towards joint cooperative strategies. The Israeli competitive frame of negotiation stressed ideas and interests as incompatible with the other party's position and the objective was therefore, as prospect theory also stipulates, to avoid any concession-making.78

After six months of negotiations, the Likud government was replaced in June 1992 by a new Israeli government under the leadership of Yitzhak Rabin. The Labour Party rose to power on a pledge to change and transform Israeli politics by reordering national priorities and achieving peace. These ambitions were reflected in the guidelines of the government, which stipulated the goals of a freeze on the building of any new political settlements in the occupied

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78 Shamir was quoted six months later, after having lost the Israeli election in 1992: ‘I would have carried on autonomy talks for ten years and meanwhile we would have reached half a million [Jewish] people in Judea and Samaria’ (Zittrain Eisenberg and Caplan 1998: 81).
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thereby enabling them to receive American loan guarantees; and negotiation on Palestinian autonomy in order to end the Palestinian intifada (Flamhaft 1996: 101-102; The Jerusalem Report 15 July 1993). In contrast to the pessimistic and retrospective time frame of the Likud, the new government perceived that there was a right moment to initiate negotiation and therefore embraced the peace process. The frame may therefore be viewed as prospective in that the new government declared its readiness to make concessions and search for a political settlement, particularly to end the Palestinian uprising. It did not, however, include a shift in the view of the ‘other,’ since Labour continued to share with the previous government an objection to including the PLO in the process. Rabin stated: ‘I believe that if we shift the focus from the Palestinians in the territories to (PLO headquarters in) Tunis, we’d also be shifting the issue from the interim to the permanent settlement. And once we start talking about things like borders, settlements, Jerusalem, you get immediate deadlock’ (Rabin, quoted in The Jerusalem Report 15 July 1993). Hence, despite some apparent characteristics of a problem-solving approach to negotiation, the dominant frame of negotiation still remained competitive as the government endeavoured to find an alternative leadership to the PLO. The Israeli efforts to find another leadership than the PLO was against the expressed will of the Palestinian people and thus indicated an insistence on the part of the new Israeli government to advance the process unilaterally on its own terms and interests.

The dominant Palestinian frame of negotiation is more problematic to distinguish since the PLO was not officially represented in the Washington negotiations. The Palestinian delegation was headed by Dr Haidar Abdul Shafi and initially part of a Jordanian delegation. It was represented by various leaders from the occupied territories, but unofficially the Palestinian delegation had been determined by the PLO. The PLO had reluctantly given the delegation an ambiguous mandate to pursue the negotiations, because ‘the peace process was a “compulsory track” for the political survival of the PLO (Ashrawi 1995: 184; see also Abu Amr 1992: 27).

From the start, the Palestinian delegation viewed the negotiations as asymmetric and in favour of Israel since the framework did not include the ‘national, historical, and organic unity’ of the Palestinian territories. A distinction was made between politically-ideologically motivated settlements and security-based settlements, which signalled the intention to retain permanent Israeli control of some parts of the West Bank.
people (Abdul Shafi [1991]1997: 22). Thus, the Palestinian delegation prepared for competitive negotiations, advancing its own interests on contentious issues such as territorial withdrawal, Jerusalem, Jewish settlements, and a Palestinian state. However, in a problem-solving spirit, the delegation also recognised that ‘[m]utuality and reciprocity must replace domination and hostility for genuine reconciliation and coexistence under international legality.’ (Abdul Shafi [1991]1997: 22). For the delegation, it was a subtle balance to negotiate on Palestinian national interests and to respond to the highly controversial idea of interim self-rule, without any representation of the PLO in the delegation (Abu Amr 1996: 15).

Behind the scenes, however, the PLO controlled and instructed the Palestinian delegation. The negotiations clearly posed a dilemma for the PLO. If progress was made in the negotiations, the ‘inside’ leadership was to become the major player and the control of the PLO would decline. If there was no progress, there was a risk that the Hamas would take over and undermine the legitimacy of the PLO. Progress in the negotiations was therefore not promoted by the PLO leadership and thus the dominant frame of the negotiation was simply to stay firm on basic and general principles. The PLO leadership avoided specifically to define the objectives of the negotiations and the Palestinian delegation therefore lacked any real decision-making capacity (Ashrawi 1995: 58, 139, 241; Hirschfeld 1994b: 105; Inbar 1996: 183; Interviews, Pundak 1995 and Abu-Midyan 1993). However, it is important to note that these negotiations were the first time ever that Palestinians negotiated land and their political future. Sha’ath therefore describes the negotiations as an ‘educational experience’ in that the Palestinian delegation had to collect a ‘body of knowledge’ and documents on Palestinian negotiation positions (1993: 8).

To conclude, Israel wanted at most a functional solution to end the intifada, but without any major alteration of relations between Israel and the Palestinians. The PLO and the Palestinian delegation, in contrast, were striving towards substantial negotiations, which included an end to Israeli occupation and a recognition of Palestinian national self-determination. Since the parties were not able to identify any shared focal point, motivation to pursue the negotiations was lacking.
In the Domestic Arenas: Peace vs. Violence

The negotiation process from 1991 to 1993 was both facilitated and restrained by domestic politics. One such facilitating event, providing legitimacy to the negotiations, was the change of Israeli government in June 1992. After several months of negotiations and without any substantial progress, a new government came to power in Israel. The result of the election signalled a change in the meta-frame of the Israeli public. The expectation expressed was to reach a political solution and an end to the Palestinian uprising in combination with new national priorities to resolve socio-economic problems. The election was also a fatal blow both to the Israeli right in general, with its meta-frame of a ‘greater Israel,’ and to the Likud Party in particular, which consequently led to the resignation and replacement of Shamir by Benjamin Netanyahu as party leader. Also, the extreme right-wing party Tehiya lost its representation in parliament.

In the beginning of the negotiation process, it was expected that a new Israeli government would inject vitality and impetus into the official negotiations since the former Prime Minister had never made a real commitment to the negotiation process (Baker 1995: 55). However, the Rabin government did not replace Elyakim Rubinstein as head of the Israeli negotiating team and, from a Palestinian perspective, it did not ‘matter how hard [Rubinstein] tried to shed his skin and change his tone and his ideas, he would still not emphasize with the new spirit’ (Abbas 1995: 92).80 The Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat cynically remarked: ‘This new Rabin team is the same as the old Likud team. The only difference now is that they smile’ (quoted in Perry 1994: 192).

An increasingly restraining structural feature of the negotiations concerned the Palestinian domestic public. The original shared optimism, at the beginning of the intifada, concerning the possibilities for ending the Israeli occupation was replaced by growing pessimism and ambivalence about the continuation of the negotiations. Moreover, the lack of an overall consensus and meta-frame of the peace process, in combination with a ‘national schizophrenia’81 regarding

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80 Rubinstein is well known for his right-wing sympathies and he continued to work for an agreement that would keep ‘all options open’ (Interview, Hirschfeld 1994a).

81 The Palestinians are split on a number of critical issues, such as on co-existence with Israel; Israel as a negotiating partner and the United States as a sponsor of the peace process; the negotiation process and interim self-rule; and the identification of friends and enemies (Abu Amr 1996: 15).
Palestinian national interests, undermined the credibility and legitimacy of the peace process. The PLO and the PFLP opposed the negotiations primarily because of the 'humiliating' conditions the Palestinian delegation was forced to accept, whereas the Islamic groups rejected negotiations on doctrinal grounds, since negotiations assumed an acceptance of a two-state solution and recognition of Israel. Compared to the PLO leadership, the Palestinian delegation was more attentive and constrained by the Palestinian public opinion, but Arafat argued that the Palestinian people could not afford to abstain from participating in the negotiation process (Abu-Amr 1992: 28, 1996: 15; Erekat 1999; Perry 1994: 128).

Pessimism was also reinforced by the Israeli deportation of Islamic activists in December 1992. Palestinian violence by the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad was on the rise and directed towards civilians in Israel and military personnel in the occupied territories. The culmination of events was the kidnapping and murder of an Israeli border policeman in December 1992 by radical Palestinian Islamists who demanded the release of Ahmad Yasin, the Hamas leader, from an Israeli prison. Within twenty-four hours, the Israeli government ordered the expulsion of 413 Hamas activists. For the Palestinians, however, the deportation was interpreted as a secret Israeli policy designed to expel the Palestinians one at a time (Perry 1994: 201). Concurrently with the worsening economic conditions in the occupied territories, the deportation exposed the vulnerability of the Palestinian people and reminded many of the national trauma of al-Naqba in 1948 (Cobban 1995: 96; Perry 1994: 226).

The Israeli deportation resulted in international condemnation of Israel and an immediate deadlock in the negotiations. The Palestinian delegation regarded the deportation as a major breach in the spirit of negotiating in good faith. However, Arafat viewed the delegation's own decision to break off negotiations after the Israeli

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82 Ahmad Yasin was released from an Israeli prison in 1997 at the request of King Hussein, in response to a failed attempt of the Mossad to murder a Hamas leader in Amman.

83 The sealing off of the occupied territories for an indefinite period of time had severe economic consequences for the Palestinians. The closures were preventive measures against Palestinian violence but also efforts at an Israeli-Palestinian separation. Rabin’s view of separation differed from that of Peres in that Rabin wanted an immediate separation in most spheres, whereas Peres desired a political separation but an ‘economic marriage’ (Perry 1994: 242-243).

84 In February 1993, the United States and Israel reached agreement on the phased return of the deportees who were stranded in the hilltops, because Lebanon refused to let them cross the border (see further Massalha 1994: 83).
deportation as a threat to the authority of the PLO, and he raised the critical question whether there existed two different Palestinian leaderships (Abbas 1995: 66; Ashrawi 1995: 240-41; Steinberg 1994: 125).

The Negotiation Process: In Search of Focal Points

From the outset, the negotiation process was plagued by obstacles. One major problem concerned the meaning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general. There was a tremendous gap in the understanding of why the parties were at the negotiation table in the first place. Hence the lack of an agreed agenda for negotiations, which was discussed in chapter six. Shamir stated in his opening speech that the objective was to negotiate Palestinian interim self-government, whereas Abdul Shafi emphasised an end to occupation and a two-state solution to the conflict. As Sari Nuseibeh (1993: 86), head of the Palestinian negotiation committees, asked, 'Is this process going to lead to an end of the occupation? Do we begin from the point that you [Israelis] recognize that we are under occupation or not?'

Consequently, at the first round of negotiation, the parties revealed their mistrust for each other: the Palestinians accused Israel of refusing to negotiate on the basis of UN SCG 242, while the Israelis countered by claiming that the Palestinians were too occupied with principles and not interested in engaging in any substantive discussions (Perry 1994: 135).

The 'problem of meaning' and how to reframe the conflict was clearly visible also from round three to seven, until the deportation crisis of December 1992. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations exchanged ideas, information, and outlines of interim self-government arrangements, which came to be known as the ISGA 85 (Interim Self-Government Authority) and the PISGA (Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority). The Israeli and Palestinian interpretations of the notion of self-governance revealed a wide gap in their understandings of that concept. The Israeli delegation stressed that 'Israelis will continue, as of right, to live and settle in the territories' and therefore focused only on interim and administrative arrangements,

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85 The extreme right-wing parties, Moledet and Tehiya, rejected this proposal and opted to resign from the Shamir government, thereby depriving the government of its majority in parliament (Flamhaft 1996: 84).
whereas the Palestinian delegation insisted that such issues as Jerusalem and Jewish settlements were indeed on the negotiation table (for the quotation, Israeli Delegation [1992b]1997: 65; Perry 1994: 122-123).

The different definitions of a self-governing body revealed the parties' conflicting understandings of the negotiation process. The Palestinian delegation clearly demanded that the body should have legislative, executive and judicial powers, similar to those of a state, and with full territorial control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Israeli proposal, in contrast, emphasised that authority should be delegated, not transferred, to a Palestinian administrative body, thereby attempting to obstruct an embryonic form of Palestinian statehood (Interview, Abu-Midyan 1993; Palestinian Delegation [1992b]1994: 39-40; Israeli Delegation [1992d]1997: 67; Israeli Delegation [1992a]1994: 41-44). Hence both delegations rejected the proposal of the other: the Israelis on the grounds that they did not want there to be a Palestinian state, and the Palestinians because they did not want to legitimise Israeli annexation and become ‘civil servants of their own occupation’ (for the quote, Massalha 1994: 70; Ashrawi [1992]1997: 68).

Another problem was that of ‘categorisation,’ that is, the perseverance of enemy images. The Israeli delegation refused to recognise a separate Palestinian delegation, and the Palestinians refused to negotiate Palestinian issues in a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. As a result, a situation called ‘corridor diplomacy’ arose in which the Palestinians preferred to stay outside the negotiation room, in the corridors of the State Department. In response to Israel’s insistence on meeting with Palestinians only in a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, Ashrawi ([1991]1997: 51) stated that ‘it is perfectly respectable these days to talk to Palestinians. It’s quite kosher. We are no longer the pariahs of the world and we are perfectly harmless people ... All we want is direct bilateral negotiations to discuss issues in order to achieve a genuine peace.’ So, in January 1992, at the third round of negotiations, Israel agreed to separate negotiations. Israel insisted, however, that two Jordanians would participate in the Palestinian delegation, signalling that Israel still did not view the Palestinians as a full partner in the peace process (Procedural Ground Rules [1992]1997: 58-59).

With the change of Israeli government in June 1992, the Rabin government emphasised that its approach to the peace process differed from that of the previous government. A cybernetic perspective on negotiation highlights processes of trial-and-error and the search for a formula. The new Israeli negotiation strategy was characterised by a
step-by-step approach in search of a formula which could transfer the responsibility for Palestinians to a governing council, and by the proposal to negotiate, after three years of interim rule, permanent status for the occupied territories (Israeli Delegation [1992c]1994: 68-75). Moreover, the Rabin government tried to instil new momentum in the negotiation process by several confidence-building measures, such as freezing the building of new political settlements in the occupied territories, reopening the Arab Studies Centre in Jerusalem, releasing Palestinian prisoners and, at a later stage, allowing Faisal Husseini to officially lead the Palestinian delegation, a move which was interpreted by the Palestinians as a gradual recognition of the PLO (Massalha 1994: 74, 86). However, the Palestinian delegation rejected Rabin’s distinction between political and security settlements, while still recognising ‘the emergence of a new tone in Israel’ (Interview, Nuseibeh 1993; for the quotation, Palestinian Delegation [1992c]1994: 52). The Palestinians also rejected the Israeli understanding of autonomy and stated that the Israeli definition rested on ‘a misconception, as though the West Bank and Gaza Strip were simply “disputed” and not “occupied” territories’ (Massalha 1994: 88; see also Palestinian Delegation [1992a]1994: 76-78).

With the deportation crisis in December 1992, there was also a ‘problem of credibility,’ that is, growing mistrust of the intentions of the other party. Many Palestinians expressed their hesitancy about continuing the process and 117 PNC members called for the suspension of the negotiations until the PLO was officially represented. The Palestinian delegation was therefore reduced to five delegates to protest against what was regarded as Israeli inflexibility (Massalha 1994: 70). In May 1993, however, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations resumed talks and began to elaborate on various drafts of the principles for continuing the negotiation. During this interaction of exchanging ideas, some shared understandings were identified, particularly on Palestinian elections and on interim arrangements for a five-year period. However, the parties still differed in their understandings of land, the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council, and the tempo for negotiations on a permanent status for the occupied territories. The United States made several attempts to bridge these differences but the Palestinians in particular viewed the American proposals as unfair and biased (Israeli Delegation [1993]1994: 96-97; Palestinian Delegation [1993b]1994: 98-99).

Moreover, an internal and re-emerging obstacle to progress on the Palestinian side was the mutual suspicion between the PLO leadership and the Palestinian delegation. Whenever some progress was made in
the negotiations, the PLO would instruct the Palestinian delegation not to make concessions and to 'go back to principles' (Interviews, Ashrawi 1994, Nuseibeh 1993). In such a situation, the PLO gave the Palestinian delegation hard-line instructions which were intended to block the negotiations. The PLO thereby wanted to demonstrate to Israel that only the PLO leadership could make concessions and offer flexibility (The Jerusalem Report 26 August 1993; Ashrawi 1995: 183, 256; Interview, Nuseibeh 1993; Steinberg 1994: 128). Hence the Palestinian delegation was not allowed to independently discuss American proposals and received inconsistent instructions resulting in a lack of coherent strategies. Moreover, in August 1993 the Palestinian delegation received a document from the PLO which was to be presented to American Secretary of State Warren Christopher (PLO/Palestinian Delegation [1993]1994: 110-113). The Palestinian negotiators refused to do so, however, because, according to them, the document contained an unacceptable number of concessions. Consequently, in August 1993 the members of the Palestinian delegation travelled to Tunis to offer their resignation. According to the Palestinian negotiator, Mamdouh al-Aker, they did this 'because it [the PLO] has abandoned the fixed national principles, violated national consensus, and lost its legitimacy' (quoted in Cobban 1995: 100). Around the same time, it was revealed that Israel and the PLO had secretly negotiated via a back channel in Norway and agreed upon a 'Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements.'

**Negotiation Strategies: Track One and American Mediation**

The negotiations in Washington can be categorised as track one negotiations, distinguished by an official, public milieu. However, the official dimension of the negotiation was problematic since the Palestinians were not represented by the PLO, whom they viewed as their sole and legitimate leadership. This created several problems during the negotiations since the Palestinian delegation had only received an ambiguous, inconsistent mandate from the PLO to negotiate.

From the outset, the negotiations were surrounded by a high degree of publicity. The opening ceremony in Madrid and the
subsequent negotiations in Washington were extensively covered by the media and were followed closely by various domestic interest groups. Every minute of the negotiation sessions was recorded and often published in the media. The complete lack of confidentiality between the opposing parties led to the negotiations being hampered by constant leaks as well as many press conferences in which the parties justified their positions. Each delegation sought to signal to its domestic constituency that its official negotiating position had not changed and that no concessions had been made (Ashrawi 1995: 244; Interviews, Larsen 1995, Peres 1994). The intensive communication with the media and the lack of trust between the parties are well illustrated in the crisis of the Israeli deportation of the Islamic activists. Hanan Ashrawi, a spokesperson of the Palestinian delegation, decided and announced, without beforehand informing either the PLO or Israel, on CNN program, ‘Larry King Live’, that because of the Israeli deportation the Palestinian delegation would not attend the next session of the negotiation (Ashrawi 1995: 224).

The publicity dimension and the role of the media were significant features of the negotiation milieu in Washington, especially for the Palestinian delegation. Ashrawi has described the media as ‘a partner in my battle for legitimacy’ because ‘[t]hey were after the truth and the truth was my ally’ (1995: 143, 195). The high degree of publicity included diplomatic signalling in various directions: (1) between the Israeli and Palestinian delegations, (2) to other negotiating parties in Washington (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan), (3) to domestic constituencies, and (4) to international public opinion in general. However, it prevented flexibility, and the negotiation positions became so rigid that concessions became impossible. For some observers, ‘the “klieg lights” of the media had reduced the talks to public “posturing”’ (for the quotation, Makovsky 1996: 13; Interviews, Ala 1997, Hirschfeld 1994a).

Mediation: in search for an acceptable formula

Prior to and during the negotiations in 1991-93, the United States assumed the role of mediator between the conflicting parties. However, in contrast to the pre-negotiation phase, in which James Baker used manipulation strategies, the American delegation did not, at first, actively participate in the official negotiations. The delegation assumed that, once the parties began to negotiate, they would become interested in seeing them succeed (Perry 1994: 95). Moreover,
the American delegation did not want to intervene forcefully, but rather play the role of ‘honest broker’ by trying to persuade the parties and bridging various proposals. However, '[t]he problem was that there were not yet any proposals for the United States to bridge' (for the quotation, Perry 1994: 138; Interview, Zayeed 1998).

With constant deadlocks and a new American administration headed by President Bill Clinton, the United States enlarged its role as a formulator by initiating separate negotiations with the Israeli and the Palestinian delegation. Israel had, from the outset, made it clear that it rejected any imposed solution and viewed the Americans as becoming too preoccupied with their own formulae (Peres 1993: 10). The Palestinian delegation strongly objected to the American mediation, which was described as a ‘non-starter’ deriving from a pro-Israeli stance in language and substance (Interviews, Ashrawi 1994, Pundik 1995; Sha’ath 1993: 6). As Habeeb (1988: 8) points out, a weaker party may try to balance the asymmetry by building a coalition, in this case, by gaining sympathy from a strong mediator. Hence the Palestinian delegation expected that American mediation should focus primarily on how to equalise the power asymmetry between Israel and the Palestinians. Such mediation would require the use of coercive power and a greater involvement of the United States as a partner in the negotiations. In a statement on the peace process in 1993, the Palestinian delegation concluded ([1993a]1994: 104): ‘The U.S. protestations of inability to influence the relevant parties are neither realistic nor persuasive. At this stage, it is the credibility of the U.S. that is at stake and its willingness to act in good faith to fulfill its commitments ... The promised U.S. role of full partnership in negotiations was also a source of disappointment.’ The Palestinian delegation had continuously raised the problem of negotiating with Israel while Israel was still an occupying authority. Thus, outside intervention by a party that was a full partner was preferred as a way to strengthen the Palestinian position. As Abu-Amr (1992: 29) stated: ‘Negotiating under the thumb of occupation is also a psychological handicap’.

**Conclusion**

The continuance of ‘problem of meaning’ was discussed in chapter six. The analysis of the negotiation process from 1991 to 1993 reveals how the parties attempted, without success, to reach a shared
understanding of the conflicting issues. This obstacle inhibited the formation of an agenda, a focal point for the ensuing negotiations.

In accordance with the theoretical concepts outlined in chapter seven, the agents' frames of the negotiations were first analysed. These frames were basically identified as competitive, characterised by mistrust, unilateral actions, seemingly incompatible interests, and lack of motivation to reach any substantial results. On the one hand, the preferences of the Israeli government were to retain the occupied territories, which contradicted the Palestinian understanding of the notion 'territories in exchange for peace.' While the Labour government stated its readiness to reach an agreement, it shared with its Likud predecessor a rejection of the PLO. On the other hand, the PLO was officially excluded from the peace process and therefore lacked incentives to see any agreement reached between the interlocutors.

Second, in the domestic arenas one may identify a growing struggle over the meaning of the peace process, which primarily restrained, but in some instances also facilitated, the negotiations. Islamic Palestinian groups expressed opposition through an increase of violence in Israel, which was countered by the Israeli government by a policy of deportation, leading to a deadlock in the negotiations. As a consequence, both the Israelis and the Palestinians became increasingly suspicious of the negotiations, since it contravened their expectations of a peace process. The Israelis did not see an end to the violence and Palestinians experienced an escalation of collective punishment in the occupied territories. Still, the Israeli elections were an indication of Israeli approval of a peace process that would end the intifada and conclude an agreement on Palestinian autonomy.

Third, the favoured negotiation strategy, during this particular period, was track one, which resulted, intentionally or not, in a high degree of publicity, intractable positions and several deadlocks. Since the parties did not express any willingness to change tactics and strategies, it might be argued that they lacked incentives to conclude an agreement. The American mediators, by means of various formulation strategies, attempted to persuade the parties and bridge the gaps. The American mediation did not succeed, however, since the parties did not view the mediation strategies as appropriate. The Israeli delegation did not want any greater interference, while the Palestinian delegation expected American coercion directed at the Israeli government as a way to balance the asymmetry between the parties.

Fourth, the negotiation process consisted basically of an exchange of ideas and efforts to synchronise divergent expectations in a mu-
ually acceptable agenda. However, the communication process revealed several problems of the meaning of the conflict generally and the negotiations specifically. There was also the 'problem of categorisation' in that the Israeli delegation, by refusing to negotiate with PLO officials and with a separate Palestinian delegation, revealed a continuity in the non-recognition of the enemy. Finally, there was the 'problem of explanation,' that is, attributional errors. The parties were inclined to view their own firmness on withstanding concession-making as positive, whereas the resistance of the other party to change its initial negotiation position was seen as a negative sign of not being committed to the peace process. The overall process may thus be characterised as 'public diplomacy' in that both parties became more concerned with making their case heard in the international arena, through the media, than with resolving the conflict.

In sum, the period analysed here did not end in an outcome that in any substantial way altered relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Similar to the conclusion of chapter six, we may identify a behavioural change in that Palestinians and Israelis were sitting at the negotiation table, but there was no substantial change in the meaning of the conflict.
Chapter 9

TWO-TRACK DIPLOMACY

The Israeli-PLO agreements are simultaneously compatible and contradictory to both sides' collective memories, cultures, and conventional wisdoms, as well as the interests of different strata and interest groups in each society. They are a kind of political experiment in the making. In social science such an experiment is labeled as 'social construction of reality,' giving different interpretations to the sociopolitical facts. (Kimmerling 1997: 243)

In 1993 Israel and the PLO concluded the Declaration of Principles (DOP) on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, which outlines the principles of the interim period and the timetable for the ensuing negotiations (see appendix two). The Gaza-Jericho Accord (also called the Cairo Accord), signed in 1994, concerns the implementation of Israeli territorial withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho and the transfer of civil powers to a Palestinian Authority (PA). Finally, in 1995 the Interim Agreement (known as Oslo III) on further Israeli territorial withdrawal from the West Bank and on Palestinian elections was signed.

A major question addressed in this chapter is how the parties managed to overcome the obstacles experienced in the negotiations held in Washington. In what ways did Israeli and Palestinian frames and intentions change during the negotiations? In accordance with the meta-theoretical model, the analysis below will centre on the agents' frame of the negotiation; the interaction between domestic politics and the negotiation process; the favoured negotiation strategies; the distinguishing features of the communication and negotiation process; and the implications of the outcomes of the negotiations for relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
Mixture of Problem-Solving and Competitive Frames of Negotiation

A problem-solving frame of negotiation is characterised by flexibility and a readiness to make concessions as well as a willingness to jointly search for mutually advantageous alternatives to conflict. It is possible to identify some indications in late 1992 of such a frame among the parties. After several deadlocks and fourteen rounds of negotiations in Washington, the PLO was blocking the official negotiations in order to signal to Israel its readiness to engage in direct but informal negotiations. This was an attempt by the PLO to persuade Israel that concession-making and an agreement could only be gained from the PLO leadership (Ashrawi 1995: 183; Steinberg 1994: 128). However, recognising the judicial limitation imposed on the Israeli government against officially negotiating with the organisation, the PLO leadership endeavoured to establish a secret channel, since there was a majority in the Israeli government who were supportive of direct talks with the PLO. As Arafat (quoted in the Jerusalem Report 3 December 1992) said, 'there are at least 34 members of the Knesset who accept self-determination for the Palestinian people. Twelve Meretz, 17 doves of the Labor party and five Arabs. They are the majority of this coalition.' Moreover, viewing the Israeli counterpart as less unitary, the PLO had come to appreciate the difference between a Likud-led and a Labour-led government, that is, recognising the difference between the notions 'peace-for-peace' and 'land-for-peace' (Interviews, Nuseibeh 1993, Siniora 1993). However, at the negotiation table in Washington the PLO leadership did not recognise any major alteration in the Israeli behaviour and thus concluded that there was a need to advance the idea of an informal channel (Abbas 1995: 92). Previous attempts had been made to establish secret back-channel negotiations, but the official Palestinian delegation rejected such an idea because of the common perception among the Palestinian public that talking privately with Israeli officials constituted a departure from the norm for handling Palestinian affairs (Abbas 1995: 111; Ashrawi 1995: 238).

In short, the PLO attempted to persuade the Israeli government that negotiations with the PLO leadership, in contrast to the official

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86 A law that makes it illegal for Israeli citizens to meet with PLO officials.
87 Private talks with Israelis were usually associated with Palestinian collaborators and viewed as normalising the occupation (Ashrawi 1995: 238).
Palestinian delegation in Washington, would be characterised by a readiness to make concessions and turn the negotiations into a win-win situation. A prospective and problem-solving frame of negotiation continued to be the predominant Palestinian understanding of the process. It is important to note, however, that the PLO leadership recognised their subordinate position vis-à-vis Israel. As Habeeb (1988: 22, 144) states, a commitment, in this case to a negotiation process that will lead to a Palestinian state, can be a strategy for a weaker party. Commitment is, however, double-edged in that it is both an aspiration, which can be a strength because of the motivation behind it, but also an expressed need that reveals a dependence. Hence, being the weaker party, a competitive frame of negotiation was hardly an option since the Palestinian aim was to gain territories, presently under Israeli control, in several stages as outlined in the DOP (see also Muslih 1998: 88).

In contrast, since Israel was the stronger party, its frame of negotiation was more characterised by self-reliance, which did not include a complete recognition of the interdependence between the parties in their efforts to resolve the conflict. However, in 1992 the new Israeli government, politically homogeneous but with a narrow parliamentary majority,88 revealed a prospective time frame and declared its ambition to negotiate and achieve peace. As Rabin (quoted in Peleg 1997: 14) stated in 1992: 'It is time to set aside the notion that Israel stands alone, that the whole world is against us ... This is the hour for change—to open outwards, to look around us, to dialogue, to fit in, to be forthcoming, to make peace'. However, the initial optimism of the new government was tempered by the obstacles experienced in the Washington negotiations. Moreover, the increase in Palestinian terrorism and the subsequent closures of the occupied territories spurred the idea of a separation between Israelis and Palestinians, particularly for Rabin but also among the Israeli public (Ben-Yehuda 1997: 212; Makovsky 1996: 89).

Terrorism of the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad also triggered a process of reappraisal among segments of the Israeli political elite regarding the traditional Israeli enemy perception of the PLO. As Peres (1993: 19) writes 'Would a PLO collapse benefit Israel? If the great enemy against whom we had been fighting these many years suddenly disappeared, who would take its place? Was Hamas a preferable

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88 After the withdrawal of the Sephardic religious party Shas from the coalition, the government had, with the support of Arab parties, only a narrow majority of sixty-one votes of the total of 120 Knesset members.
alternative? However, even though Peres and several other ministers recognised the necessity to negotiate with the PLO, Rabin continued to express misgivings about the inclusion of the PLO in the peace process. It was not until unofficial Israeli diplomats in the Oslo channel, laying the groundwork for problem-solving negotiations with the PLO, presented the preliminary results of their informal talks that Rabin endorsed secret negotiations in Oslo (Interviews, Beilin 1994, Peres 1994; Makovsky 1996: 42).

After concluding the DOP, Israeli frames of negotiation came to oscillate, throughout the process, between competitive and problem-solving. The preoccupation with security was reinforced by Islamic terrorism, and the strong sense of self-reliance led to a more competitive frame of negotiation. However, problem-solving was still the predominant frame at times when the parties endeavoured to outline fundamental principles for future Israeli-Palestinian relations. As Peres said: ‘I am a great believer in fairness. My approach to negotiation is not feeling you have gone to the bazaar. I don’t judge myself on whether I’ve bought a bargain’ (quoted in the Jerusalem Post, int. ed., 26 August 1995).

In the Domestic Arenas: Negotiating During Antagonistic Opposition

Some analysts of modern diplomacy emphasise the principle of the public’s right to know; that is, negotiated agreements should be publicly and openly arrived at. Others argue that, as long as agreements are made public, more ‘discrete’ negotiations are acceptable since some kind of secrecy is deemed essential during a negotiation process. These assumptions are based on different assessments of how negotiations may be restrained or facilitated by domestic politics. Ultimately, this concerns domestic legitimation and the need for political leaders to gain approval for a shift in policy, in this case, to resolve the conflict through negotiations. Since the DOP was negotiated in secrecy and in a relatively short period of time, the influence of domestic politics during the negotiation process was

89 Initially, Peres had no direct influence over the bilateral negotiations and was instead entrusted with leading the multilateral negotiations. This was an outcome of the long political rivalry between Peres and Rabin over leadership of the Labour Party.
limited. As Beilin (1999: 63) states, ‘in a secret negotiation process life is not influenced by what is going on outside.’ However, domestic politics came to have several restraining effects on the subsequent negotiations, owing to an increasingly hostile domestic opposition on both sides.

The immediate response to the DOP in 1993 among the Israeli and Palestinian publics was mixed, although a narrow majority on both sides supported the agreement. In the Israeli domestic arena, the left framed it as a first step towards peace in the Middle East and argued that Israel would be recognised by several other countries in the region. This would lead to enhanced security, economic prosperity, and regional cooperation. Moreover, the PLO was portrayed as having become a moderate and pragmatic partner for peace (Wolfsfeld 1997: 94). The right-wing parties and organisations, in contrast, claimed that the agreement was a national disaster for Israel, since it recognised the PLO and accepted territorial withdrawal. The Israeli right continued to view the PLO as a terrorist organisation and a territorial withdrawal from the West Bank as posing a fundamental threat to the security of Israel (Interviews, Begin 1993, Shamir 1993). For instance, Netanyahu accused the Rabin government of ‘treason’ and said that his party would use ‘all available legitimate means that exist in a democratic country’ to oppose the agreement (quoted in Flamhaft 1996: 107).

In the Palestinian domestic arena, support for the agreement was similar to that of the Israeli side, around sixty per cent, which signalled an acceptance of the notion of ‘self-governance’ during an interim period (Political Analysis Unit Studies 1994: 47). For many Palestinians, the DOP was interpreted as a logical step-by-step approach, which started already in 1974 and culminated in the acceptance of a two-state solution and the declaration of a Palestinian state in 1988 (Hassassian 1994: 137-149). However, a Palestinian opposition was soon formed. The secular nationalist camp (the FLP and the DFLP) voiced criticism mainly on tactical grounds and

90 A vivid example of the difference between public and secret negotiations was how the secret negotiations in Oslo continued, without any interruption, during the deportation crisis, whereas the official negotiations in Washington were deadlocked for many months.

91 The degree of support among Israeli Jews was split: thirty-three per cent were supportive and twenty-five per cent ‘so-so,’ while thirty-eight per cent objected to the agreement. This may be compared with the Israeli Arabs, of whom sixty-eight per cent were supportive and only eighteen per cent ‘so-so’ (Hermann and Yuchtman-Yaar 1998: 66).
denounced the PLO for making too many concessions. The PLO was blamed for excluding the Palestinian diaspora and accepting a partial solution and a step-by-step approach, which meant giving up Palestinian national interests without the consent of the majority of the Palestinian people (Interviews, Ashrawi 1994, Siniora 1993; Hassassian 1994: 137-149; Lindholm Schultz 1996: 274-275). The Islamic groups accused Arafat of being a traitor who abandoned Palestinian national interests and rejected the agreement outright on doctrinal grounds, since it included an acceptance of Israel (Milton-Edwards 1996).

In short, the DOP opened up an opportunity for a variety of expectations and conflicting interpretive schemes, as the agreement lacked the precision of a peace agreement which more precisely depicts the ‘road map’ and the aspiration of the negotiations.92

In Israel, the accord was often referred to as a peace agreement, rather than simply as an agreement on a process that might ultimately culminate in peace. Among Palestinians, there was a widespread perception, which the leadership did not try very vigorously to dispel, that this was an agreement on Palestinian independence, rather than simply an agreement on a peace process that might fulfil that aspiration. (Mark Heller, quoted in Zittrain Eisenberg and Caplan 1998: 117)

The most restraining feature came from the opposition of Israeli and Palestinian extremists. Even though these groups constitute a minority, they were able, in a paradoxically coordinated manner, to undermine the process. The implications of these actions for the Israeli and Palestinian publics were that they did not recognise any positive signs along the advancing peace process, such as enhanced security and peace.

Opposition by Islamic terrorism

The violent opposition to the peace process was expressed by Islamic groups with suicide attacks in Israel. These terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians clearly undermined the credibility and trust of Rabin as

92 Abu Ala argued to his Israeli counterpart that the vagueness of the DOP might be positive in that the agreement could be framed in a suitable way to fit their own domestic needs (Belin 1999: 98). The back-side of constructive ambiguity is that in implementation, when an agreement has to be clarified, incompatible interpretations may arise, making the ‘zone of agreement’ unattainable (Lebow 1996: 183).
Mr Security,’ since a majority of Israelis felt that their personal security had deteriorated after the DOP in 1993 (Hermann and Yuchtman-Yaar 1998: 69; Pundak 1995: 8). Hence, ‘[t]he transformation of Arafat from terrorist to peace partner was an uphill battle for the Rabin government’; only one year after the signing of the accord, merely twenty-five per cent of Israelis believed that the PLO would adhere to the agreement (Wolfsfeld 1997: 95, for the quotation p. 108). The Islamic terrorist attacks also had severe consequences for the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Immediately after an attack, the Israeli government would seal off the territories, resulting in rapidly deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, an important factor which was detrimental to Palestinian expectations for the peace process.

The Israeli government placed responsibility for quelling the Hamas and combating terrorism with greater determination on the Palestinian Authority, and Arafat in particular. Arafat expressed ambivalence and argued that as long as there were no Palestinian elections he could not act forcefully against the Hamas and Islamic Jihad (Heikal 1996: 544). However, the Israeli leadership told its Palestinian counterpart that, despite the timetable agreed upon in the DOP, there were no ‘sacred dates’ and that Israel was not going to move forward in the peace process unless the Palestinian leadership gave credible assurances that it would curb terrorism. Rabin repeatedly stated that ‘implementation is dependent on [PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat] fulfilling his commitments in a much more effective way’ (The Jerusalem Post, int. ed., 4 February, 11 March 1995; for the quotation 22 April 1995).

Nevertheless, both Israeli and Palestinian leaders continued publicly to state after each terrorist attack that the peace process had to move on and that ‘to halt the autonomy process altogether would be to capitulate to extremism’ (The Jerusalem Report 17 November 1994: 20). As Rabin (The Jerusalem Post 25 July 1995) stated: ‘There are enemies—murderers on the Palestinian side: Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the rejectionist fronts. But we also have Palestinian partners to reach a solution, something that we never had in the past.’ However, this message lost credibility among the Israeli and Palestinian publics and

93 While negotiating with Israel on Palestinian elections, the PLO concurrently held informal talks with the Hamas on its participation in these elections. This was an illustrative example of how the PLO leadership was trying to balance and unite various Palestinian factions, a continuation of the traditional pattern of Palestinian politics in diaspora.
instead a 'unique coalition' between Palestinian and Israeli opposition groups was formed, since both had an interest in obstructing and terminating the negotiations (Zayyad 1995: 20; see also Kass and O’Neill 1997).

Opposition of Israeli extremists by extra-parliamentary actions and violence

The Israeli right was stunned by the secretly negotiated DOP and troubled that a majority of Israelis had accepted the agreement. While the parliamentary right joined in mass demonstrations against the Oslo process, the radical right attempted to mobilise public opinion through acts of major civil disobedience, such as blocking highways and setting up new illegal settlements. Sprinzak, however, points out that 'the Israeli right lacked the energy and conviction to stop the Oslo Agreements, and the implementation of the autonomy. What changed everything ... was not the extreme right’s commitment to the Land of Israel and not the refusal to trust the PLO, but [Islamic] terrorism. Terrorism played a critical role in energizing the extreme right' (1997: 36).

Various attempts were made by the Israeli radical right to undermine the legitimacy of the peace process. During the negotiations on the Interim Agreement in 1995 there was an escalation of verbal assaults, particularly between the government and the extreme right, in which both sides accused the other of collaborating with terrorists: the extreme right blamed the government for negotiating with a terrorist organisation, namely, the PLO, while the government charged the radical right with forming a 'partnership' with the Hamas by their opposition to the DOP (The Jerusalem Post int. ed., 16 July 1995; The Jerusalem Post 3 May 1995). The tense situation deteriorated further when several Rabbis made a religious (Halakhic) ruling that forbade Israeli soldiers to evacuate any Jewish settlements and levelled the grave accusation against the Israeli government of betraying and risking innocent Jewish lives94 (Sprinzak 1998: 13-17).

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94 The ruling was based on the view that Eretz Yisra’el (the land of Israel) is sacred property. If a Jew is willing to trade the land, the person is found guilty of ‘din moser’, which brings the penalty of the execution of that guilty person. Moreover, ‘din rodef’ permits the killing of a Jew without trial in order to save Jewish life, if that person is about to commit murder (Sprinzak 1998: 17).
Moreover, outside the site of the negotiations, there was frequently a presence of Israeli right-wing groups, and the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators therefore had to move to various places in order to avoid the tense and harassing atmosphere created by these demonstrations. Israeli chief negotiator Savir (1998: 195) cynically remarked that 'never once were we privileged to encounter a demonstration by the supporters of peace.' This was also an additional reason why the chief negotiators came to value and actively seek secrecy during some parts of the negotiation process (Interview, Ala 1997; Savir 1998).

Already in 1994, however, there was an increase in the use of violence. On 25 February 1994, a Jewish settler from a nearby settlement, Kiryat Arba, entered the Ibrahim Mosque and massacred twenty-nine and wounded over one hundred Palestinian Muslims who were praying. At the time, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators were negotiating the Gaza-Jericho Accord, a process which was highly competitive and encountered several obstacles. After the Hebron massacre, there were clashes between Israeli troops and Palestinians, and the negotiations stranded completely the day after.

The PLO insisted that, before any negotiations were to be resumed, the Jewish settlers had to be evacuated from the centre of Hebron and maintained that there was a need for an international presence in the city. Israel retorted by rejecting the idea of an international presence and of any evacuation of Jewish settlers. However, the Israeli government became increasingly aware of the implications of the Hebron massacre among the Palestinian public. A growing support of the Hamas in general could be noticed, along with a decreasing support of the peace process and the PLO leadership in particular (Heikal 1996: 495-496). Arafat emphasised this dilemma to the Israeli negotiators: 'I am definitely interested in moving forward, but I need the trust of my people. You have an elected government, a parliament, clear laws. Trust is not the only bond between Israelis and their leaders. But it's all there is between my people and me' (quoted in Savir 1998: 127). Consequently, in order to resume the negotiations, Israel did agree to a temporary international presence of Swedish, Italian, and Norwegian observers who were to monitor the situation in the city of Hebron. After UN SCR 904 was passed, which condemned the Hebron massacre and called for a temporary international presence, negotiations were resumed (UN Security Council 1998).

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Council Resolution 904, [1994]1997: 160-161). Moreover, the Hebron crisis paradoxically strengthened the determination on both sides to reach an agreement. For instance, it was concluded that implementation of issues already agreed upon would begin before a comprehensive accord was reached. The Israeli government was also to start releasing Palestinian prisoners\textsuperscript{96} and allowing Palestinian deportees\textsuperscript{97} from 1967 to return as a way of reinforcing the legitimacy and political status of the PLO leadership among the Palestinian domestic public (Palestinian-Israeli Agreement on Security Arrangements in Hebron [1994]1997: 161-162; The Economist 5 March 1994).

Notwithstanding the fierce domestic opposition, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators, after long and strenuous negotiations, accomplished the conclusion of the Interim Agreement in September 1995. This agreement was interpreted by the Israeli right, possibly more than by the left, as historic, but in the sense of leading to a catastrophe, since the agreement stipulates substantial territorial withdrawal from the West Bank. In a united effort by the Israeli right on 5 October 1995, prior to the ratification\textsuperscript{98} of the Interim Agreement, a mass demonstration was held in Jerusalem, drawing some twenty thousand Israelis. The discontent was framed as a question of who is a patriot or a traitor, and posters of Rabin portrayed as a Nazi could be seen among the demonstrators. Several speakers, among them Netanyahu, accused the Rabin government of appeasing the PLO and for failing to gain the consent of a qualified Jewish majority in Israel (The Jerusalem Post, int. ed., 14 October 1995). Another mass demonstration was held shortly afterwards, but this time on the theme of peace, in Tel Aviv, in November 1995. This manifestation was, however, to be overshadowed by the assassination of Yitshak Rabin. Just minutes after Rabin delivered his message of peace, a young Israeli religious extremist shot the Israeli Prime Minister.

\textsuperscript{96} The release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails is a very important and symbolic act for the majority of Palestinians. Since the Israeli government and the PLO have signed agreements, the Palestinian expectation is that most of the political prisoners should be released (Interview, Abu-Midyan 1993).

\textsuperscript{97} For instance, two Palestinians, Jibril Rajoub and Mohammed Dahlan who were to become the chiefs of security in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, returned during this time.

\textsuperscript{98} The agreement was approved in the Israeli Knesset by a margin of only two votes, 61-59.
The Negotiation Process: Constructing New Political Relations

This agreement [the DOP] is fraught with dangers. It is like a newborn—it is like a baby and anything can go wrong with it. However, I think that if you look after it, if you care for it, then it can grow into a healthy human being. (Interview, Nuseibeh 1993)

An agreement is a compass that points to a new reality. (Savir 1998: 40)

The negotiation process in Oslo stood in stark contrast to the Washington negotiations. The key question here is how the parties were able to overcome obstacles experienced in Washington, such as problems of meaning, mistrust and enemy images. The change in the negotiation process emanated basically from a learning process through verbal persuasion and identification of shared understandings about the negotiations. This learning process evolved into a working trust and a belief that the other party was motivated to achieve an agreement as well as prepared to make concessions (see further Pruitt 1997: 242).

Already at the first meeting, held in Oslo in January 1993, two unofficial Israeli diplomats, Professor Yair Hirschfeld and Dr Ron Pundik, and PLO representatives99 Abu Ala, Maher Al-Kurd and Hassan Asfour, recognised mutual ground and began to explore what would be the basic principles for negotiations. The Palestinian chief negotiator, Abu Ala, presented the idea of ‘Gaza First’—an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as a first step, which was an idea that had been extensively discussed within the Israeli Labour Party (see further Peres 1993: 20)—and stressed the importance of economic cooperation in the region. The Israelis brought forward the principle of gradualism, based on a Declaration of Principles. By this they referred to a step-by-step approach, implying a transition from occupation to self-rule which should be accompanied by an ongoing process of negotiation (Abbas 1995: 115-126; Interviews, Hirshfeld 1994a, Pundik 1995).

99 Initially, there were three PLO representatives: Abu Ala, also known as Ahmad Qrei (at the time the PLO’s Finance Minister and presently the speaker of the Palestinian Parliament); Maher Al-Kurd, a former economic advisor to Abu Ala; and Hassan Asfour, the secretary of the negotiation committee in Washington and a member of the Communist People’s Party.
A preliminary outline of a Declaration of Principles was soon drafted and the Israeli government decided to send Uri Savir and later the legal adviser Joel Singer, one of Rabin’s close associates, to evaluate and judge whether the concessions offered by the PLO were indeed sincere and credible. After their meetings with the Palestinian negotiators, they recommended to Rabin and Peres that the process should proceed. The inclusion of Israeli officials made the negotiations more competitive, and Singer presented a revised draft of the DOP which was interpreted by the Palestinian negotiators as reversing the process to the initial stages of the negotiations. Moreover, Singer’s legalistic approach to negotiation was viewed as offensive, and the Palestinian negotiators responded by drafting their own revised version of a DOP, which put Jerusalem back on the agenda (Abbas 1995: 152; Beilin 1999: 97; Interviews, Hirshfeld 1994a, Savir 1994).100

In July 1993, the negotiations went into a deep crisis since both parties wanted to make several amendments to the preliminary draft of the Declaration of Principles. With persistent efforts by the Norwegian mediators, the interlocutors met again and decided to confront the issues of contention. In a joint effort, the parties went through the text, but sixteen issues remained in dispute. A decision was then made to divide the issues into two parts, and each delegation would return to its respective leadership and persuade them to compromise on eight of the remaining issues (Interview, Savir 1994).

Both parties have recognised in retrospect that crises may be ‘productive’ in that they reveal the ‘true red-lines’ which were beyond concession-making. Moreover, the negotiators came to learn and understand what was the basic concern of the other side. For instance, Abu Ala explained that the Palestinian negotiators initially had difficulties in grasping the Israeli obsession with details. However, later on in the process they came to interpret and accept it as a sign of seriousness on the part of the Israeli delegation and as an expressed Israeli anxiety about security. ‘The Israeli concern from the first date until the concluding of the agreement was security’ (Interview, Abu Ala 1997). However, both delegations emphasised that trust and the belief in the good intentions of the other were the crucial factors for overcoming crises. Trust enabled the parties to return to problem-

100 It had been agreed already in the third meeting that Jerusalem, which was recognised by both parties as a major obstacle, should be excluded from the current negotiations.
Two-Track Diplomacy

solving and to emphasise mutual interests in order to conclude the agreement (Interview, Abu Ala 1997; Savir 1998: 41).

According to Habeeb (1988: 142), the stronger party in asymmetric negotiations often tries to appease the weaker one by conceding on symbolic principles but staying firm on details. One illustrative example was when the Israeli negotiators decided, as an extra incentive for concession-making, to propose mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, which would enable the PLO to become Israel’s official and public negotiating partner (Interviews, Beilin 1994, Savir 1994). With the time pressure of an impending mutual recognition, and a nearly finalised draft of a DOP, the parties resolved the last issues by means of formulation strategies, with the assistance of the Norwegians and via telephone conversations between Arafat in Tunis and Peres in Stockholm in August 1993 (Interview, Singer 1994).

The negotiations on the DOP were based on prospective time frames, which constructed some mutually shared principles: agreeing that the focus should be placed on the future and avoid delving into history; ‘reconciling two rights, not readdressing ancient wrongs’; entering a historic partnership between Israel and the PLO; accepting autonomy in the Gaza Strip and Jericho as a first step; and reconciliation as the basis for permanent relations (Interview, Abu Ala 1997; Savir 1998: 40, for the quotation p. 15). Moreover, despite the fact that the DOP was not a peace agreement, it still constituted a transformative outcome in that a new negotiated order was presented. The DOP stipulates the principles for the establishment of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, which will exist during a five-year period, and includes Palestinian elections, an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho and later from additional areas of the West Bank. Negotiations on permanent status should start as soon as possible, but no later than three years into the interim period.

101 The Israeli conditions for recognising the PLO were the following: recognition of Israel’s right to exist in peace and security; recognition of UN SCR 242 and 338; statement of the PLO that negotiations were about the interim period and permanent status and an emphasis that the conflict could only be resolved through negotiations; renunciation of terrorism; cessation of all forms of violence; invalidation of articles in the Palestinian Charter that deny Israel’s right to exist; and a preparedness of Arafat to meet any Israeli official (Abbas 1995: 207-208).

102 The Palestinians were aware of the deep mistrust that Israelis felt towards Palestinians. Thus, it was clear from the beginning that the talks should centre on an interim period since Israel, to quote Abu Ala (Interview 1997), ‘never, never, never’ would accept negotiations on a final settlement at such an early stage of the peace process.
and include such issues as Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, security arrangements, and permanent borders (see appendix two). However, it was the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO that was viewed as the major breakthrough in the relationship between the Israelis and Palestinians since it implied a Palestinian recognition of Israel’s right to exist within secure borders as well as a recognition of the PLO and Palestinian legitimate political rights (Interviews Abu Ala 1997; Abu Midyan 1993; Savir 1994; Zayed 1998). The parties were now ‘to build new Israeli-Palestinian relations’ (Interview, Abu Ala 1997), and the purpose of the interim period should serve as ‘a new road map to lead us [Israelis and Palestinians] to a state of trust’ (Savir 1998: 15).

Negotiating the implementation of the DOP

Even though the negotiators in the Oslo channel were able to overcome several obstacles, such as problems of meaning and enemy images, these were to reappear in subsequent negotiations. Almost immediately after the signing ceremony in Washington in September 1993, the parties resumed negotiations on the Gaza-Jericho Accord. These negotiations encountered several obstacles. First, the power asymmetry between the Israeli and Palestinian delegations became apparent since Israeli military personnel were now leading the Israeli delegation. For instance, the Israeli chief negotiator, Savir (1998: 215), describes how ‘[t]he transition from Palestinian dependence on us to mutual dependence was difficult for the Israeli establishment. I was learning that the struggle to free Israel from the occupation was one thing, while the struggle to free Israelis of an occupier’s mind-set was another.’ Second, the disparate interpretations of how to transform the general principles in the DOP into practical implementation created ‘problem of meaning,’ that is, problem to accept a mutual redefinition of the conflict. The Israeli delegation adopted a minimalist approach that stressed civil and administrative transfer of power, which meant granting only limited powers to the PLO. The Palestinian delegation, in contrast, had a maximalist approach and wanted a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip; a large area surrounding Jericho; exclusive control of the border-crossings for Palestinians; and civil powers over the entire West Bank (The Israeli Position [1993]1997: 155-156; Heikal 1996: 473; Interviews, Ashrawi 1994, Husseini 1994). The border crossing in particular touched on an important dimension of Palestinian dignity
and sense of statehood. The continuation of Israeli border control was perceived as humiliating and a sign of the continuation of Israeli occupation. Hence, the Palestinians stayed firm in their insistence that they wanted to control the Palestinian crossings. The parties were able to resolve the issue by agreeing on detailed arrangements of cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian authorities on two vital crossing points: the Allenby bridge, between the West Bank and Jordan; and Rafah, between Egypt and the Gaza Strip (Heikal 1996: 479, 511-513; Savir 1998: 119).

After overcoming the deadlock caused by the Hebron massacre in February 1994, the negotiations were intensified and concluded on 4 May 1994, relatively successfully. Even though the Gaza-Jericho Accord stipulates retained Israeli control over Palestinian affairs, such as borders, approval of Palestinian legislation, and the size of the Palestinian police, the Accord still contained a transformative momentum (see the Cairo Agreement 1994: 161-169). Already in the summer of 1994 a Palestinian Authority was installed in the Gaza Strip, for the first time ever, which signalled a significant change in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Savir (1998: 138) remarked: ‘What remained to be seen—or built—were the terms of that new relationship.’

Thus, the accord was still only one part of the overall ‘step-by-step’ approach designed in the DOP, and Rabin emphasised that ‘[w]hoever presents this agreement as a peace agreement is mistaken. This is an agreement on the way to peace’ (quoted in the Jerusalem Post, int. ed., 10 December 1994). Thus, the two major issues to be addressed and negotiated were the deconstruction of the Israeli civil administration in the West Bank and Israeli military redeployment before the Palestinian elections. Already in the summer of 1994, the parties reached an understanding on the additional transfer of five areas of civil powers: education and culture, social welfare, tourism, health, and taxation, while the major issues of Israeli redeployment and Palestinian elections continued to be negotiated towards the set deadline of 1 July 1995 (Early Empowerment Agreement [1994] 1997: 212-223).

The negotiation process continued, however, to be plagued by problems of meaning and interpretation. On the negotiations on the Interim Agreement of 1994-95, the negotiators were struggling with one major dilemma, namely, the inherent contradiction in the DOP.

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Note that the Palestinians frequently use the term ‘withdrawal’ while the official and Israeli term is ‘redeployment.’ The varied understanding of the term signal the different intentions of the parties concerning the future of the occupied territories.
that stipulated Israeli military redeployment while keeping Jewish settlements in the occupied territories intact.\footnote{Already in 1994, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin, who was one of the initiators of the Oslo channel, reversed his opinion regarding the appropriateness of an interim period as stipulated in the DOP. Instead, he stressed the necessity to begin, as soon as possible, negotiations on permanent status. Thus secret talks were held in Stockholm in 1994-96 (see further Beilin 1999: 141-189). In 1998, he admitted that two mistakes were made at the beginning of the peace process: (a) not negotiating final status agreement, and (b) not working harder on public relations (Beilin 1998; \textit{The Jerusalem Post}, int. ed., 10 December 1994).} It will be recalled that these settlements were established in order to prevent any return of the territories (\textit{The Jerusalem Report} 2 November 1995). Moreover, the parties lacked any shared understanding of the legal status and size of the Palestinian Council, a dispute that may be traced back to the Washington talks on the proposals of the \textsc{Is} and the \textsc{Ps} (see chapter eight). Basically, the Palestinians wanted a national parliament, with all its characteristics. The Israeli government, on the other hand, continued to express its ambivalence towards a Palestinian state, while indicating an acceptance of some kind of 'Palestinian entity in most areas of the West Bank' (Rabin, quoted in \textit{The Jerusalem Post}, int. ed., 22 April 1995).

In an effort to overcome these obstacles, the negotiation teams decided to distribute the divisive issues among several committees, which focused on land, security, Hebron, and Palestinian elections. Moreover, as a way of confronting the problems of Jewish settlements and Israeli redeployment, the West Bank was divided into three areas: area A, where the \textsc{Pa} would have full control and responsibility; area B, where internal security would be managed by the \textsc{Pa}, whereas Israel would retain control for external security; and area C, where Israel would continue to exercise full control. The organising concept, which was accepted by both parties, was meant to facilitate Israeli redeployment, despite the fact that Jewish settlements were scattered throughout the West Bank (Joint Statement Israel-\textsc{Pa} on redeployment [1995]1999).

As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, the traditional Israeli position of self-reliance concerning security turned some parts of the process into competitive negotiations. The Israeli negotiators became preoccupied in some stages with advancing self-interests, particularly after the intensification of terrorist attacks, rather than with promoting any joint problem-solving. In these parts of the negotiations, the Israeli delegation was making use of the asymmetry of power and control between Israel and the \textsc{Plo} by refusing to
disclose to their Palestinian counterparts maps showing the intended Israeli redeployment. Hence it became impossible for the Palestinian delegation to assess the consequences of such structural division of zones of responsibility and control without knowing the extent of the Palestinian autonomy. It was not until September 1995, shortly before concluding the Interim Agreement, when most of the outstanding issues on, for example, Palestinian elections were resolved, that the Israeli government decided to reveal the map of the planned Israeli redeployment. For the Palestinians, the size of the Israeli redeployment was a great disappointment, as they had expected a more comprehensive redeployment. Israel would redeploy from twenty-seven per cent of the West Bank, which meant that Israel continued to exercise sole control over seventy-three per cent. Moreover, the areas of Palestinian autonomy were scattered throughout the West Bank without any territorial continuity, which was seen by the Palestinian negotiators as an Israeli attempt to cantonize the West Bank. Yet, the Interim Agreement was signed a month later since it stipulated three additional Israeli military redeployments, which were to be implemented within eighteen months from the signing of the agreement (Savir 1998: 234). Also on other highly contentious issues, such as negotiating the holy places in Hebron and Bethlehem, the Israeli negotiators abandoned problem-solving with their Palestinian counterparts. On such occasions, the Israeli negotiators bypassed the Palestinian delegation, to the discontent of the Palestinian negotiators, and preferred to negotiate directly with Arafat, assuming that the Palestinian leader would be more forthcoming and ready to yield (Interview, Abu Ala 1997; Savir 1998: 34).

The negotiation process also contained several 'problems of explanation.' Despite a growing sense of understanding and partnership on an elite level, both parties admitted to attribution errors, particularly seeing each other as unitary political actors. For instance, the PLO leadership never fully came to grasp the sense of personal insecurity felt among ordinary Israelis after each terrorist attack and their need for the PLO leadership to signal to the Israeli domestic public a determination and dissociation from the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. Similarly, the Israeli government was inattentive to the situated and controversial position of the PLO leadership to negotiate with Israel while it still occupied the West Bank and parts of the
Gaza Strip and continued, at least in public, to reject the idea of a Palestinian state.\footnote{In the 1996 elections, the Labour Party abolished the clause which rejects a Palestinian state.}

The Interim Agreement was concluded in September 1995 and includes five major parts: on the Palestinian Council; Israeli redeployment and security arrangements; legal affairs; cooperation; and miscellaneous provisions. Moreover, the agreement is based on a timetable which is divided into five phases: in phase one, Israel will withdraw from areas A and B;\footnote{Israel will withdraw from area A, which includes six Palestinian cities (excluding Hebron, where security arrangements will first have to be in place, such as by-pass roads); from area B, that is, 465 Palestinian villages; but Israel will retain seventy-three per cent of the West Bank, primarily unpopulated areas. Israel also has the overall responsibility for external security, entrance, and exit of goods and people.} in phase two, free and democratic Palestinian elections will be held for the presidency and the Council, which is to amend the Palestinian Charter and nullify all clauses that call for the destruction of Israel, while Israel in return withdraws from Hebron; in phase three, permanent status negotiations will start; and in phase four Israel will redeploy three times, at six-month intervals, from unpopulated areas in the West Bank (Palestinian-Israeli Interim Agreement \[1995\]1997: 246-255). Both parties interpreted the agreement as a ‘test-case’ for future Israeli-Palestinian relations, which required full cooperation and commitments from both sides on such issues as security and political coordination (Interview, Abu Ala 1997; Savir 1998: 242-243) However, even though the DOP was to function as a road map for the parties, the end of that road was still highly obscure and surrounded by uncertainty, which domestic opposition made use of by constructing a variety of worst-case scenarios.

**Negotiation Strategies: Two Tracks and Pure Mediation**

Up to now I can not imagine that any negotiations with Israel will succeed if it is in front of the media... When anybody speaks to the media, he speaks to the masses, to the people. (Interview, Abu Ala 1997)

There were times when diplomacy was always conducted secretly. This was the principle. Today everything is transparent-- so you must find some alternatives (Interview, Singer 1994)
The negotiation process from 1993 to 1995 used a variety of official and unofficial tracks of negotiation and pure mediation, to use Princen's (1992: 25-26) term, that is, mediation primarily focused on the mode of interaction, such as communication, perceptions, and the relationship between the interlocutors.

Track-two diplomacy is described as unofficial and informal negotiations outside governmental structures. The strategies used when establishing direct negotiations between Israel and the PLO towards the end of 1992 may thus be identified as sharing similar features with track two diplomacy. The Israeli side was represented by private Israeli citizens, Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik, who had, however, close links to the Labour Party. For three months, these two private diplomats explored ideas and negotiated a first draft of a Declaration of Principles with three PLO representatives, Abu Ala, Maher Al-Kurd, and Hassan Asfour. At that time, the purpose of the negotiations was to elaborate new concepts, in a flexible manner, without protocols or set agendas, and to explore whether an understanding could be reached between the parties. The ideas and proposals agreed upon in this back channel would later be presented in the official negotiations in Washington (Abbas 1995: 115-126; Interview, Hirshfeld 1994a). Yet, with the prospect of accomplishing a Declaration of Principles, the Palestinian delegation became increasingly concerned with the political relevance of the talks and asked repeatedly in what way Hirshfeld and Pundik represented the Israeli government and if ideas agreed upon in Norway would be promoted in Israel. Thus, after the Israeli law on banning contacts with the PLO was annulled, the negotiations became official by the inclusion of Director General Uri Savir, of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. He was sent to Oslo under two preconditions: (1) that the back channel was to remain totally secret, and (2) that the PLO would agree that it could not participate in the official negotiations (Interview, Savir 1994). Thus, confidentiality and secrecy were viewed as indispensable and enabled the parties to elaborate on new ideas.

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107 Hirschfeld and Pundik were asked by then Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin to explore talks with the PLO’s Finance Minister, Abu Ala, in London, where the multilaterals were being held. In their first meeting, mutual ground was recognised by both parties and they decided to convene a new meeting in Norway (Interviews, Beilin 1994; Hirshfeld 1994; Pundik 1994).
make tentative concessions, and ‘think aloud’ (Interview, Aas 1994). Secrecy, in some part of the negotiation process, is often valued by negotiators, particularly when it involves a radical departure from previous policies where domestic opposition is presumed to be powerful. The Oslo channel was first established with the intention of creating a secret back channel to the negotiations in Washington which would avoid media attention. Hence, confidentiality and secrecy were viewed as indispensable in the Oslo channel, enabling the parties to elaborate new ideas and make tentative concessions. The importance of secrecy also reflected an Israeli uncertainty about the PLO’s credibility and willingness to conclude an agreement. The PLO leadership was well aware of this situation and tried to make the back channel specially safe (Abbas 1995: 58). During the negotiations on mutual recognition in 1993, an additional secret channel was operating between Ahmad Tibi, an Israeli Arab and currently adviser to Arafat, and Haim Ramon, Health and Interior Minister in the Rabin government. This was a way for the political leaders to ‘double-check’ each other by posing questions and carrying messages (Abbas 1995: 74-78; Inbar 1996: 212-215).

The negotiations in 1993-94 on the Gaza-Jericho Accord stood in stark contrast to the informal and private milieu of the Oslo channel. These formal, official negotiations concerned the implementation of an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho and the transfer of civil power to a Palestinian Authority. The Israeli delegation, headed by the Israeli General Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, consisted primarily of military personnel since it concerned withdrawal from parts of the occupied territories. This shift in negotiation milieu was

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108 Singer (Interview 1994) emphasises that ‘all the important, all the significant breakthroughs in the relationship between Israel and its neighbours took place as the results of secret negotiations.’

109 However, the setbacks and problems in conducting secret negotiations were soon to be discovered by both sides. For instance, because of the fear of leaks, never in the entire process of negotiation did the Palestinians review the documents with legal consultants (except on August 20, 1993, with the PLO’s legal consultant Taher Shash). Hence, when the agreement was made public, the Palestinian negotiators were criticized for not having consulted experts on various issues. Opposition was voiced particularly by the official Palestinian delegation in Washington and the Executive Committee in Tunis, who had been excluded and kept in the dark (Abbas 1995: 206-209; Interview, Ashrawi 1994). Rabin and Peres did not receive the same criticism from its coalition partner Meretz, as they had been arguing for years for the need to talk with the PLO. The Israelis also avoided the involvement of experts, including military ones, and Rabin ‘ended up vetting every line of the DOP himself’ (Makovsky 1996: 51).
particularly shocking for the Palestinian negotiation team, which was then led by Nabil Sha’ath (replacing Abu Ala), as the asymmetry between the interlocutors in terms of power and control became evident during these negotiations (Heikal 1996: 483, 510; Interview, Husseini 1994).

After the conclusion of the Gaza-Jericho Accord in 1994, and during preparations for the ensuing negotiations on an Interim Agreement, there was some critical ‘lesson-drawing’ from the previous rounds of negotiation, and ‘the very effort to address these mistakes together eventually brought back the “Oslo spirit” of a problem-solving partnership’ (Savir 1998: 166). Thus, it was agreed that public, official negotiations were to be complemented with secret talks between the chief negotiators, particularly on security. For instance, in order to avoid deadlocks on contending issues, such as defining the extent of Israeli redeployment, and the dismantling of the Israeli civil administration in the occupied territories, several meetings were held in Norway, Italy, and Washington between the chief negotiators. The basic assumption in these talks was that the parties could explore the issues in a more flexible and informal manner, which would enhance integrative negotiations at a later stage since the parties had already agreed on the overarching principles (Interview, Abu Ala 1997; Savir 1998: 163, 195). Moreover, high-level meetings were frequently held between Arafat and Peres in order to overcome major issues of contention. A secret envoy was again operating as a go-between between Arafat and Rabin. Yossi Genosar, a former senior Shabak official (Israeli security agent), carried messages regarding security, warnings, demands, and proposals of cooperation between the two leaders (Savir 1998: 171).

\[110\] Currently the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation in the PA. The shift of negotiators also expressed a rift in the Palestinian delegation which was, however, resolved in January 1994 when Abu Mazen, one of the initiators of the Oslo negotiations, returned to the negotiation team.

\[111\] As one important dimension of the DOP was economic development, Abu Ala and Savir focused on negotiating and restructuring economic relations, and promoting economic aid to the Palestinian Authority, which resulted in a ‘Protocol on Economic Relations between Israel and the PLO’ in Paris, 29 April 1994 ([1994]1997: 163-174).
Mediation as facilitation and communication

From day one in Oslo, we had been firmly against any third-party intervention in the substantive side of the negotiations. We welcomed outside involvement in creating a conducive atmosphere, persuading the sides to be flexible, and tempering their highs and lows. But the two parties had to arrive at the actual formulas of the agreements on their own. (Savir 1998: 129)

Mediation may be desired and pursued either by an emphasis on coercion, such as manipulating strategies, or by persuasion, for instance, communication-facilitation and formulation strategies. During the entire negotiation process from 1993 to 1995, both parties stressed the importance of direct bilateral negotiations; thus, power mediation was not considered appropriate. Third-party intervention was nevertheless important, particularly in the first phase, in 1992, of establishing contact between Israel and the PLO. Jan Egeland, the Norwegian Director General of the Foreign Ministry, and Terje Larsen, the Norwegian sociologist, had already in early 1992 offered to facilitate a secret channel between Israel and the PLO. Considering that the Israelis and Palestinians were both seeking a negotiation context characterised by secrecy and confidentiality, Norway was considered ideal (Interviews, Beilin 1994, Pundik 1995, Stoltenberg 1996). As Rubin (1992: 267) points out, ‘small states may be particularly well suited for intervention in disputes between states of unequal power ... trustworthy by the weaker state, while being considered non-threatening by the powerful’.

During the ensuing negotiations, the Norwegians assumed various roles of mediation which helped the parties to overcome the ‘problem of credibility,’ that is, mistrust, and the ‘problem of categorisation,’ such as revising enemy images, which facilitated the identification of shared meaning (see further Aggestam, forthcoming-a). First, Norway acted as a facilitator by providing a secret context and a cover for back-channel negotiations. If there were any leaks, the parties could always refer to the ‘academic activities’ pursued by non-governmental organisations, which included the Norwegian FAFO (Institute for Applied Social Sciences, headed by Larsen) and the Israeli ECF (Economic Cooperation Foundation, founded by Hirschfeld and Beilin). The facilitation included arranging when and where subsequent meetings would take place; and in times of crisis, Larsen, together with Mona Juul, a Norwegian diplomat, and Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jørgen Holst, were able to persuade the parties to return to the negotiations by suggesting ‘non-meetings’ to
discuss the issues of disagreement (Interviews, Egeland 1994; Juul 1994; Larsen 1995, Pedersen 1994; Pundak 1995). Second, Larsen and in particular Holst played an essential role as communicators and go-betweens during the negotiation sessions, since there were no direct telephone links between Israel and Tunis. In times of crisis, Holst enlarged that role by travelling to Tunis and Israel in order to reassure, communicate and convince each party that the other side was indeed negotiating in good faith (Abbas 1995: 107-109; Corbin 1994: 122-125; Interview, Larsen 1995; Peres 1995: 341-343). Third, the role of formulator was assumed when concluding the DOP during the decisive seven hours of negotiations via telephone between Peres in Stockholm and Arafat in Tunis in August 1993, and later during the intensive exchange of letters of mutual recognition. Holst helped the parties to reformulate sentences and presented his own views and assessments of what issues may pose an obstacle and what may be feasible (Abbas 1995: 104-108; Corbin 1994: 157; Interview, Savir 1994). Finally, one role that Larsen (Interview 1995) himself has named and acted upon was that of a ‘psycho-analyst.’ In this role, the Norwegians tried to help the parties to redefine conflict by confronting old enemy images in a non-threatening and supportive framework. Similar to an interactive problem-solving approach, Larsen insisted on a small setting where the Norwegians were ‘monitoring from a distance, trying to look on the psychological balance’ (Interview, Savir 1994); managing tensions and suspicion and acting as a ‘shock-absorber for both sides’ (Interview, Singer 1994). Each party had to listen to the concerns of the other and thus came to understand their basic interests (Interview, Abu Ala 1997). Both the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators frequently came to the Norwegians asking questions about the other party: ‘are they playing games; are they serious; do you believe in this; why are they doing this; how did it sound; are you one of us?’ (Interview, Larsen, 1995). Thus, the Norwegians were able to provide assurances that the other side was indeed negotiating in good faith, and according to Abu Aila (Interview 1997) this was the ‘secret of Oslo’. Abbas agrees (1995: 105): ‘[w]ithout a doubt, a thorough understanding of the psychology of negotiation contributed to the success of the mission undertaken by the Norwegian team.’

In the subsequent negotiations on the Gaza-Jericho Accord, other external parties also contributed third-party assistance. The Americans, for instance, who had been active as mediators in previous rounds of the negotiations in Washington in 1992-93, now opted for a somewhat different role as a sponsor of the peace process by hosting
the signing ceremonies in Washington and later by enlarging that role to include supervision of the adherence to, and enforcement of, the agreements reached. Another third party that came to exercise a more limited role as a facilitator and communicator was Egypt, during the negotiations leading up to the Gaza-Jericho Accord. President Hosni Mubarak and Foreign Minister Amr Moussa held frequent consultations with both Israel and the PLO and helped the parties to identify a compromise formula on the size of Jericho and on the border crossing. One strategy which a weaker party in asymmetric negotiations may pursue is to form a coalition in support of its position. The attempts by the PLO to encourage Egypt's participation in the process may be seen as an example of such an effort to balance the asymmetry between Israel and the PLO. However, Egypt's influence diminished as Israeli-Egyptian relations became increasingly constrained because of disagreements on the normalisation of relations between the two countries, and Egypt's insistence that Israel should sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1994 (Bowker 1996: 48-50; Heikal 1996: 483-507).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have analysed various efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict between 1993 and 1995. Particular attention has been given to the dynamics and interplay between agent, structure, strategy and interaction, which resulted in three major negotiated agreements.

First, there was a significant shift in the frames of negotiation during this period, particularly concerning the revision of enemy images. In the Oslo channel, the frames were characterised primarily by problem-solving, since both parties expressed their readiness to alter and (re)define Israeli-Palestinian relations through a joint process of negotiations. Yet, in subsequent negotiations, the frames became more competitive, partly because of the shift in and expansion of the number of negotiators, but also because of the asymmetry of power between the parties. In asymmetric negotiations, it is frequently more difficult to recognise problem-solving since the weaker party has

\footnote{Many Israelis view the peace with Egypt as a 'cold peace' and the Israeli government wanted an improvement by, for example, a symbolic state visit of President Mubarak to Israel.}
limited options while the stronger party is inclined, at times, to utilise its strength. However, between the chief negotiators (Abu Ala, Savir) and the political leaders (Arafat, Peres, Rabin) a growing sense of partnership and working trust evolved over time.

Second, domestic structures restrained the negotiation process in several ways. First, the political leaders did not have an unambiguous domestic mandate to negotiate, particularly since the DOP was concluded in secrecy, which many Israelis and Palestinians found democratically offensive. Second, the legitimacy of the peace process was undermined by the lack of an overall interpretive scheme for the political leaders to communicate with their domestic publics. One reason for this was that the DOP did not constitute a peace agreement with a clear outcome. Beilin (1999: 3) puts it poignantly:

We thought we were absolved of the need to continue moulding public understanding, and in this we were wrong. We were also mistaken in that we didn’t show the public what we envisaged at the end of the process, and we thereby exposed ourselves to unnecessary accusations and questions. The combination of a firm agreement on principles and an effort to explain things even among circles remote from the peace camp could have changed perceptions of the political process.

The response of Palestinian and Israeli leaders to domestic opposition differed, which partly may be traced to the diversity in political culture (see chapter four). For instance, with the increasing suicide attacks by the Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the PLO leadership showed an ambivalence as to whether to confront and curb the terrorist activities of these groups, since the PLO for a long time had ruled on the principle of consensus. The Israeli government, in contrast, was on a collision course with the radical right, particularly after the Hebron massacre in 1994. Rabin in particular was targeted—a process which culminated when he was assassinated by an Israeli Jewish extremist in November 1995.

Third, the negotiation strategies utilised were a combination of secret and official tracks and third-party facilitation, so-called two-track diplomacy. Secrecy was frequently sought when the negotiations involved vital principles of security; when concessions and compromises were problematic; when the official negotiations were deadlocked; and when the negotiation process was overly exposed by the media. The official public negotiations were characterised by a combination of high-level meetings and sub-committees in which the Israeli and Palestinian delegations worked on details. Since the parties
from the outset expressed a desire for direct and problem-solving negotiations, the appropriate third-party intervention was in the form of pure mediation. Norway in particular came to play a critical role by facilitating a supportive and secret milieu for communication and negotiation in the initial phases of the negotiation process.

Fourth, the negotiation process was basically driven by a shared political motivation to construct and transform Israeli-Palestinian relations, but it was also restrained by an uncertainty about the direction of the peace process, which led to ‘problems of meaning.’ The Israeli government wanted to end the occupation, but lacked any long-term focal point for negotiations. This may be exemplified by the contradiction inherent in the DOP, which stipulates Israeli withdrawal, while Jewish settlements remain in place. By comparison, the declared intention and aim of the PLO is that the peace process will lead to a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.

Finally, on the question of how these negotiations transformed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel continued, on the one hand, to be an occupier while the Palestinians still did not exercise national self-determination. On the other hand, the mutual recognition between the PLO and the Israeli government broke the long-held non-recognition of each other and transformed the intractable pattern of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Moreover, the agreements enabled the Palestinian people for the first time ever to exercise territorial and political autonomy in Palestine, which includes a Palestinian authority, parliament and elections.

To conclude, in contrast to previous chapters, we are here able to discern a significant shift not only in the behaviour but also in the meaning of the conflict, owing to the mutual recognition between the Israeli government and the PLO. This change, however, was not paralleled to the same extent in Israeli and Palestinian domestic arenas, which came to undermine the overall peace process.
Chapter 10

TRILATERAL DIPLOMACY

Aafter the Israeli election of May 1996, a new government came to power under the Likud leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu. The question posed by many was how and in what ways the peace process would be affected by the emergence of a new government that had explicitly declared its opposition to the agreements signed between the Israeli Labour government and the PLO. Major disputes soon arose over the appropriate interpretation of the DOP, leading to a stalemate in the peace process. However, despite several deadlocks and violent clashes between the Israelis and the Palestinians, two agreements on implementation were negotiated and signed: the Hebron Protocol in January 1997, and the Wye River Memorandum in October 1998.

In the analysis below, special attention will be given to the shifting frames of negotiation and their implications for the peace process. How did the parties overcome various obstacles, and what kind of influence did third parties exert? In accordance with the theoretical framework of part four, emphasis will also be placed on the negotiation strategies utilised as well as the interaction between the negotiation process and the domestic arenas.

Competitive Frames of Negotiation

Competitive frames are characterised by an emphasis on autonomy, individualism and self-interests, which may be enhanced in a process that includes the use of coercion and threats. The frames of the parties in the period 1996-98 are characterised by these features.

In May 1996, Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu won the Israeli election by a margin of 29,000 votes over Shimon Peres (Morris 1996: 75). Hence Netanyahu was able to form a new coalition government
Negotiation with six new parties. One question that was decisive for the continuation of the peace process was whether this government was to be guided by ideology, populism or pragmatism. Further Israeli redeployment in the West Bank contradicted the ideology of revisionist Zionism, which claims that this area is an integral part of the Land of Israel. Populism, on the other hand, implied giving in to pressures from various active domestic interest groups, such as the settlers' movements. Finally, pragmatism meant that the new government would continue to implement the DOP and the Interim Agreement (Ha'aretz 8 October 1996; Zayyad 1996: 85-90). Thus, we need to delineate the cognitive and ideological beliefs as well as the frames of negotiation of this new political actor.

The self-image was vividly illustrated during the election campaign, in which the Likud profiled itself as the protector of Israeli security under the election theme 'peace with security.' This theme also resounded among the Israeli public, especially after several suicide attacks by the Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the spring of 1996. The political message of the Likud was that it would seek peace with the Palestinians and Israel's neighbours; that agreements with the PLO which were 'forced upon' the Likud would still be adhered to; and that security considerations would take precedence during the negotiations (Arad 1998; Netanyahu 1996a: 148; The Jerusalem Report 13 June 1996). According to the Likud, this implied that several aspects of the peace process had to be rectified. For instance, the principle of reciprocity was to become a prerequisite for the continuation of the peace process, and the negotiations ought to focus on permanent status since the definition of Palestinian autonomy was to be renegotiated.

Concerning the preferences and intentions of the Likud, while in opposition it had outlined its view on Palestinian autonomy as a permanent rather than an interim settlement. Hence, a solution to the conflict was to be found in a functional rather than a territorial arrangement. The formula should be applied primarily to the West Bank, where Palestinians were to exercise civil powers without Israeli interference. Political rights were to be linked to Jordan, since most West Bank Palestinians hold Jordanian citizenship. Excluded from this arrangement would be Jewish settlements and other 'strategic areas,' such as the Jordan valley, whereas the Gaza Strip and its stateless

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113 The coalition included three religious parties (Shas, National Religious Party, and Yahadut HaTorah) and three secular parties (The Third Way, Tsomet and Yisrael Ba'Aliya).
Palestinians would need a different, more ‘generous’ solution, although one that had not yet been specified (The Jerusalem Report 16 December 1993; The Jerusalem Post, int. ed., 19 April 1994)

Regarding perceptions of the ‘other,’ the dominant frame of the new government was characterised by strongly held enemy images and a deep mistrust of the intentions of the PLO. With a retrospective time frame, the Israeli government interpreted the PLO’s explicit acceptance of Israel and of a two-state solution as a phased plan originating from 1974—the establishment of a Palestinian authority on any liberated land constituting the first phase, and the liquidation of Israel the second phase. Moreover, with a stereotyped enemy image, the Likud did not see any major difference between the intentions of the PLO and the Hamas. As Netanyahu (1995: 116) concluded, they both ‘share the basic strategic goal of doing away with Israel’ and ‘Arafat has never been negotiating for peace, but for the creation of a state which he says will constitute the first stage in the notorious “phased plan” to destroy Israel’ (quoted in The Jerusalem Post, int. ed., 19 April 1994).

The understanding of the conflict was, according to the new government, based on ‘realism’ rather than ‘naive optimism,’ which embraced the assumption that real peace in the Middle East would not be feasible until the Arab world become more democratic. Thus, ‘peace by deterrence’ was to be the appropriate strategy for the new Israeli government (Arad 1998; Netanyahu 1993: 244; Bar-Illan 1996: 14). This alteration in the Israeli frame ‘constituted the return of the old “adversary paradigm,” by which a constantly besieged Israel trusts no one, dares not take risks for an unguaranteed peace, and insists that its only choices are to overcome or be overcome’ (Zitrain Eisenberg and Caplan 1998: 145).

With a competitive frame of negotiation, power becomes a central feature of the process. While in opposition, Netanyahu stated: ‘With the present government [the Labour-Meretz coalition] they [the PLO] think they can get anything they want ... When they realize that there is a firmer hand on the tiller on the Israeli side, they’ll tailor their expectations accordingly’ (quoted in the Jerusalem Report 16 December 1993). This adversarial frame of negotiation persisted; it did not change in any substantial way during the negotiation process. The Likud government was mainly concerned with advancing self-interests and inclined to disregard the PA as an equal partner. With a competitive frame of negotiation, it emphasised Israeli power and control over the occupied territories.
For the PA/PLO leadership, the change of Israeli government represented a new political situation which they had not anticipated: the PA had predicted a Labour victory. Immediately after the Israeli elections, the PA emphasised its expectation that the new Israeli government would continue to implement the Interim Agreement and stated its willingness to 'play the game with them' (Sha'ath 1996: 29). For the PA leadership, negotiations were 'still based on the premise that this peace process is good for Israel, is good for the Palestinians, is good for the Arabs and is good for the world' (Sha'ath 1996: 25). It was even mentioned that a Likud government might be better for the Palestinians, in economic terms, than the Labour Party. The previous government had imposed several closures on the occupied territories, thereby preventing Palestinians from reaching their workplaces in Israel. The Likud, on the other hand, disapproved of any separation of the occupied territories, fearing that the closures might facilitate a long-term political separation and ultimately the creation of a Palestinian state (Sha'ath 1996: 28).

While the PA leadership initially emphasised a problem-solving frame of negotiation, the image of the 'other' began to revert from that of a partner to an adversary. There were growing apprehension and uncertainty about how to interpret the intentions of the new Israeli government. There was, for instance, great concern about the many speeches by the Israeli government that stated its preference for moving directly towards negotiations on permanent status rather than implementing the existing agreement. This shift was understood by the PA leadership as a dismissal of the PA as a negotiating partner, an attempt to unilaterally determine the future for the Palestinians, and an effort to base the permanent status on the present conditions (Interview, Abu Ala 1997; Erekat 1996: 19; Husseini 1996: 25; The Palestine Report 22 November 1996). However, as chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat (1996: 19) said: 'The Israelis cannot make peace with themselves as partners'.

Moreover, analogical reasoning of the PA was also recognised as it feared that the new Israeli government would resume its traditional strategy of establishing facts on the ground, that is, building new Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. From a Palestinian perspective, peace and Jewish settlements were contradictions in terms. The PA therefore adopted an adversarial, competitive frame of ne-

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114 In this chapter I will primarily use the term PA (Palestinian Authority), the body which was elected in January 1996. Al-Fatah dominates the PA as it does in the PLO.
egotiations which included the issuing of threats. For instance, the PA threatened that any attempt by Israel to retract the freeze on building new Jewish settlements would be met with confrontation and a new intifada (Erekat 1996: 19; Sha'ath 1996: 29). Faisal Husseini (1996: 26), Minister of the Palestinian Authority, warned: ‘Either the agreement is implemented and then we can move on to negotiations on final settlement, or it is not, in which case we will not move to the final stage, but instead to the stage of no peace.’ Threatening a crisis may be one option for a weaker party in asymmetric negotiations ‘as a means of keeping the stronger state from backtracking, of resisting threats or coercion, and of ensuring that the issue does not drift too far off the strong state’s agenda’ (Habeeb 1988: 144).

In short, the dominant Palestinian frame of negotiation was characterised by suspicion and anticipation of confrontational and competitive negotiations. Hassan Asfour, a Palestinian negotiator since the time of the Oslo channel, cynically remarked on the harsh language stemming from the Israeli Prime Minister: ‘Netanyahu is not ready to negotiate ... We don’t need a Rambo right now, we need a prime minister. We are very worried’ (quoted in the Jerusalem Report 8 August 1996). However, after concluding the Hebron Protocol with the Netanyahu government, the PA leadership hoped that the agreement signalled a major change in the Likud ideology, that is, an acceptance of territorial compromise which would facilitate a win-win equation in the ensuing negotiations (Erekat 1996: 19).

The ingredients for a win-win situation are based on a two-state solution and I think that what is being discussed in Israel now is not whether the Palestinians should have a state or should not have a state, an entity or not an entity. What they are discussing is the size, the capital, what should be included, whether it should be armed or not. (Erekat 1996: 21)

However, Saeb Erekat (Interview 1999), one of the chief Palestinian negotiator, concludes in 1999 that the Netanyahu government was never seriously negotiating with the Palestinians, which was illustrated by the lack of a permanent Israeli negotiation team. In his view, the ‘real negotiations were among themselves [the Israeli government] which resulted in dictation on us [Palestinians].’
In the Domestic Arenas: Fading Confidence in the Peace Process

Legitimation and domestic approval are important features of intricate negotiations that involve efforts to resolve conflict. As shown in chapter nine, the negotiation process was highly restrained by domestic opposition, which also continued to be the case in the period between 1996 and 1998.

However, one important event which enhanced the legitimacy of the peace process was the Palestinian elections, held in early 1996 in accordance with the 1995 Interim Agreement. Since 1994, when a PLO regime was installed in the Gaza Strip, many Palestinians had become increasingly concerned about Arafat’s autocratic leadership and the commitment of the PA to democracy and civil society. A major question for many Palestinians concerned the meaning of the shift from Israeli occupation to Palestinian rule. Many Palestinians questioned the ability of the PLO to transform itself from a revolutionary organisation into a state-building one (Interviews, Abdul Hadi 1998, Khatib 1998; Dagens Nyheter 20 January 1996; Inbar 1996: 249; Monshipouri 1996: 94-98; Said 1995; The Jerusalem Times 15 July 1994). The Palestinian elections were therefore important events: in the presidential election Arafat won an overwhelming victory (eighty-eight per cent), and in the election to the Legislative Council al-Fatah gained a majority of the seats (fifty-four of the total of eighty-eight), which indicated a domestic approval of both the leadership of Arafat and the peace process. Moreover, the Palestinian elections were recognised as relatively fair and democratic by inter-national observers, who were sponsored and assisted by the EU (Abu Amr 1997: 90-97; Budeiri 1996: 49-53; Ghanem 1996: 513-528; Rabah 1998: 51).

However, among the Israeli and Palestinian domestic publics, the negotiation process did not meet the expectations of peace, prosperity, security and national self-determination. The peace process was instead interpreted with apprehension, since the negotiations was impaired by the ongoing terrorism of Islamic groups and by subsequent Israeli security closures of the occupied territories. In the spring of 1996 the Israeli Labour government became entangled in a military operation in Lebanon, 'Operation Grapes of Wrath,' in

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115 Arafat is particularly worried about becoming a new Gorbachev. He does not want to be associated with a future dissolution of the PLO in the same way as the dismantling of the Soviet Union is associated with former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev (Interview, Abdul Hadi 1998; Yorke 1994: 89).
retaliation for the Hizbollah rocket attacks in northern Israel, which created a delay in the Israeli redeployment from Hebron.\textsuperscript{116} The overall sense of vulnerability and decreasing personal security among the Israeli electorate was a major reason why the Labour Party lost the Israeli elections in 1996. ‘Israelis above all want security; they do not so much want peace with the Palestinians as peace from Palestinians’ (Bowker 1996: 73). Contradictory to many predictions, a new government rose to power on a platform that was highly critical of the peace process on the grounds that it failed to give priority to security and reciprocity. As Sprinzak (1998: 28) concludes, ‘Netanyahu would never have become prime minister without the role played by Hamas and Islamic Jihad’ (see also Diskin 1997).

The negotiation process continued to be highly restrained by domestic events, which came to reinforce adversarial meta-frames and questioning of the meaning of the peace process. For instance, in September 1997 the Israeli government\textsuperscript{117} decided to open for tourism a second entrance to the Hasmonean tunnel, located in East Jerusalem alongside the al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock, the third most holy place according to Islam. The Palestinian reaction was swift and violent, and escalated in areas that included the West Bank, where for the first time the Palestinian police became involved in the violent clashes with, and shooting at, Israeli soldiers. One week later the violence ceased, but it had caused the death of around seventy Palestinians, mostly civilians, and fifteen Israeli soldiers and had left the peace process in total disarray (Rosenblum 1998: 67; The Jerusalem Report 2 October 1997). The crisis vividly came to symbolise a plausible scenario for what could happen if there was a total breakdown of the peace process, but the violence also reaffirmed and strengthened mutual enemy images and mistrust. The Israeli leadership accused the PA of condoning and even encouraging violence and terrorism, which were seen as serious violations of the Interim Agreement (Israeli Cabinet Communiqué, [1996]1997: 293). The Palestinian leader countered that ‘stopping violence requires commitment to what has been agreed upon in Oslo. It requires that building and expanding settlements be stopped’ (PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat (1996)1997: 300). The Israeli decision to open the tunnel drew strong regional and international condemnation (UN SCR 1073, an EU

\textsuperscript{116} The PLO leadership accepted the delay of an Israeli redeployment as a support for Shimon Peres in the upcoming Israeli elections in 1996 (The Time 10 June 1996).

\textsuperscript{117} The decision was taken despite warnings from the Israeli intelligence service and the IDF of the risks involved owing to the stalemated peace process.
declaration on October 1, and an appeal by the Pope), and the United States in particular was increasingly concerned that the entire process was about to derail. In a paradoxical way, however, the crisis persuaded Palestinian and Israeli leaders to meet face-to-face for the first time, and on President Clinton’s initiative the political leaders were summoned to Washington in early October 1996, an invitation both parties accepted.

After the conclusion of the Hebron Protocol in January 1997, yet another crisis occurred which hampered the negotiations on further Israeli redeployment in the West Bank. In March 1997, the Israeli government decided to allow new construction of a Jewish neighbourhood on the hilltop of Abu Ghneim/Har Homa in East Jerusalem. Other Cabinet decisions on Jerusalem were to follow, for example, the decisions to build new Jewish housing units in the Palestinian neighbourhood Ras-Almud and to extend the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem to include Jewish settlements in the West Bank. These unilateral Israeli actions coincided with several terrorist attacks by the Hamas and Islamic Jihad. However, the construction of new Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem has been interpreted by many analysts (see, for instance, Lochery 1999: 30) as a ‘pay-back’ to the right-wing constituency of Netanyahu for the Hebron Protocol of January 1997. Several of the right-wing parties, including many Likud members, utterly opposed any territorial compromise and rejected the PA as a partner in the negotiation process. For example, after the Hebron agreement, Science Minister Benny Begin, son of the late Prime Minister Menachem Begin, resigned from government, and former Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir joined the critics of Netanyahu by declaring: ‘I see in it the abandonment of our hope ... giving away the future’ (quoted in the Jerusalem Post, int. ed., 25 January 1997).

The reactions of Palestinians to these unilateral Israeli actions were strong and further undermined confidence in the peace process. These actions were condemned as a violation of the DOP and as being

118 These actions were all symbolic acts that expressed the government's view of Jerusalem as the exclusive, eternal and undivided capital of Israel. In comparison to the division over territorial withdrawal or annexation of the West Bank, most Israelis agree that Jerusalem has to remain under exclusive Israeli sovereignty (Hermann and Yuchtman-Yaar 1998: 71).

119 The Likud also has members who seek a more centrist platform based on an acceptance of the DOP. For instance, party chairman Michael Eitan concluded together with Labour member Yosi Beilin a joint document on permanent settlements with the Palestinians which included territorial withdrawal (Labor and Likud Knesset Members 1997: 160-162).
against the spirit of peace. As previously mentioned, there is a domestic consensus among Palestinians in the understanding that building new Jewish settlements is detrimental to peace; thus, these actions were interpreted as a signal that Israel had no intention or interest in pursuing the peace process. ‘[T]o approve the building of a settlement neighborhood called “Har-Homa” on Palestinian land of Jabal Abu-Ghneim, constitutes a flagrant violation to international law, and has rendered a painful blow to the principles of the peace process. The dangerous decision threatens to turn the region back into the cycle of violence and conflict, ready to explode at any moment’ (Palestine Ministry of Information, [1997b]1999).

The Negotiation Process: De/Re-Constructing the DOP

The question is how to translate an agreement on principles into a mechanism for the transformation of reality. (Ashrawi 1997: 89)

Central to the analysis of a negotiation process is how the negotiating parties attribute meaning to the process. What are the interpretation and understanding of their intentions and actions as well as those of the other party? From 1996, at the outset, there were tremendous obstacles regarding the meaning of the conflict in general and the peace process in particular, which led to several deadlocks in the negotiations. Shortly after the Israeli election in May 1996, the peace process entered a stalemate, since the parties diverged entirely in their interpretations of the DOP and implementation of the Interim Agreement. The previous Israeli government did not carry out the Israeli redeployment in Hebron; thus the first task was to accomplish an Israeli redeployment in Hebron, and the second task was to continue implementation of the Interim Agreement. Yet, despite the absence of trust and any sense of partnership, the parties did conclude two written understandings: the Hebron Protocol in January 1997, and the Wye River Memorandum in October 1998.

The Hebron Protocol

During these negotiations, the parties came to experience not only a ‘problem of meaning,’ but also one of ‘categorisation,’ such as
strongly held enemy images and ‘credibility’ such as mistrust. One of several reasons why a redeployment in Hebron was postponed was the restraining Israeli domestic context after the Palestinian terrorist attacks during the spring of 1996. As a consequence, the new government insisted on renegotiating the Israeli redeployment there and redefining the principles of negotiation on a strict basis of reciprocity and Israeli security.

At the outset, the Israeli government insisted on rectifying the security arrangements in Hebron and then moving directly to permanent status negotiations. Netanyahu outlined the Israeli negotiation strategy, based on power and reciprocity, to his party members after meeting with Arafat in September 1996:

[We would continue to settle Eretz Yisra’el, that this is our basic right which is inherent both in that agreement and in our understanding, in our common sense and in our warm, warm Jewish hearts ... We informed the Palestinians that the era of one-sided giving is over, that they are the ones who will now have to give and not just take ... [W]e march toward a different goal, not to a Palestinian state but to autonomy ... We are strong, we control the area, and we can act and show our determination, both in negotiations and in other spheres. (Netanyahu [1996b]1997: 162-163)]

The PA, in contrast, asserted that there already was an agreement on Hebron which Israel accordingly should adhere to and that, before moving to permanent status talks, the Interim Agreement had to be implemented. The focus of the negotiations, according to the PA, should therefore be on creating a timetable for the implementation of the Interim Agreement; such as further Israeli redeployment from the West Bank, the release of Palestinian prisoners, the opening of an airport and a seaport in the Gaza Strip, and safe passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Andoni 1997; Nofal 1997-1998: 78). With little trust for each other, and a tremendous gap between their respective expectations regarding the peace process, both parties came to issue several statements in which they accused each other of violating the DOP. These statements may also be seen as an attempt by the parties to signal to and mobilise domestic and international opinion for their respective negotiation positions (Government Press Office [1996]1999).

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120 For instance, the Israeli President Weizman, who otherwise has been a strong supporter of the peace process, called for a temporary suspension of the negotiation process because of the terrorist attacks (Heikal 1996: 539).
The ‘problem of categorisation,’ such as strongly held enemy images, was in the initial stages of the negotiation process expressed by Netanyahu, who refused to meet or shake hands with Arafat. However, after the tunnel crisis in September 1996 the two leaders met for the first time, and this led to several more high-level meetings in late 1996. The deadlock was partly broken by the parties agreeing to renegotiate some of the security arrangements in Hebron and then proceed towards implementing the Interim Agreement. For the Palestinians, the gains were the linkage to other issues in the Interim Agreement, whereas Israel’s acceptance was conditional on the right of Israel to unilaterally decide about the size and timing of future redeployments (The Jerusalem Post, int. ed., 25 January 1997).

The January 1997 Hebron Protocol was made possible only by the active intervention of the United States, which gave assurances and provided side-letters to both parties. The continuation of the ‘problem of meaning’ was expressed by the parties’ refusal to sign the Hebron Protocol without the attachment of a ‘Note for the Record.’ In this document, the American mediators outlined what had been agreed upon and the appropriate interpretations of the Hebron Protocol, as well as the agenda for subsequent negotiations121 (Protocol Concerning the Redeployment 1997: 317-20; Note for the Record 1997: 322-23).

Hence, despite the successful conclusion of an agreement, these negotiations did not overcome the ‘problem of credibility’ or of ‘meaning’. The Palestinians cynically remarked afterwards that Israel apparently signed the Protocol because of American pressure, and chief negotiator Saeb Erekat (1996: 20) described the competitive negotiations on the Hebron Protocol as characterised by ‘no trust, no confidence between the two parties whatsoever. Every time we looked at each other, we wondered what each would pull out of the hat the next minute, despite our mutual need to reach the agreement’. Hence the conditions for the ensuing negotiations were not favourable and the parties re-entered new deadlocks. Not until October 1998 did they conclude a new understanding, the Wye River Memorandum, on further implementation of the Interim Agreement.

121 These negotiations should include such issues as further redeployment, the release of Palestinian prisoners, safe passage for Palestinians between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Gaza air- and seaports, a commitment to resume negotiations on permanent status within two months after the implementation of the Hebron Protocol, revision of the Palestinian National Charter, commitment to fight terror and violence, strengthened security cooperation, and a reduction in the size of the Palestinian police in accordance with the Interim Agreement.
Shortly after the implementation of the January 1997 Hebron Protocol, there was yet another wave of terrorist attacks in Israel, accompanied by the Israeli government’s sanctioning of new Jewish settlements. Hence, these actions further exacerbated the problem of ‘credibility’ and strengthened enemy images. The parties returned to mutual accusations of violations of the agreements. For the PA, the main concern was how to limit and protest against the expansion of Jewish settlements while negotiating the further release of Palestinian prisoners, the opening of the Gaza airport, and safe passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Palestine Ministry of Information [1997a]1999). Arafat ([1998]1999) accused the Israeli government of trying to ‘get rid of the principles of the peace process.’ The Israeli government, on the other hand, accused the PA of granting a ‘green light’ for the terrorist activities of the Hamas and Islamic Jihad and of promoting a ‘revolving door’ policy, that is, threatening the escalation of violence during the negotiation process (The Jerusalem Report 20 March 1997). Netanyahu also blamed the PA for organising violence and encouraging incitement. For instance, the Palestinian commemoration of fifty years since the al-Naqba (the exile of the Palestinians in 1948) was regarded by the Israeli Prime Minister as an organised event to ‘protest the founding of the State of Israel’ (Netanyahu 1998).

In October 1998, President Clinton therefore decided to invite the parties to hold high-level negotiations at Wye Plantation (Maryland, USA) in order to enforce a deadline, add prestige, and ensure the parties’ commitment to conclude an understanding on the implementation of the Interim Agreement. With the involvement of the United States as a full partner, the process became a trilateral negotiation. At Wye the parties negotiated around the clock, and after eight days of strenuous and competitive negotiations, which included the personal involvement of President Clinton, the interlocutors concluded a memorandum on the precise details of implementation (The Palestine Report 30 October 1998; The Time 2 November 1998; for a critical assessment, see Aruri 1999). The agreement stipulates four phases for an incremental Israeli redeploy-
ment over a period of twelve weeks, in which each phase will be evaluated against Palestinian obligations. The CIA will play a key role in monitoring Palestinian compliance and supervising security cooperation (Albright, Berger, Ross [1998]1999; The Wye River Memorandum [1998]1999).

After the conclusion of the Wye agreement, the Americans anticipated that there would be a growing partnership between the parties, even assuming that their interests were not necessarily incompatible.

What you begin to see is not so much the issue of trust suddenly emerging, but the beginnings of relationship ... These kinds of relationships are forged through crucibles of pretty hard times. When this [Israeli] government came in, it inherited a relationship; it didn't really develop a relationship. What has happened, I think, in the last month---and especially now, with eight days of very concentrated work together--is that we begin to see a very different kind of interaction. (Albright, Berger, Ross [1998]1999)

There were several signs, however, that the problems of 'meaning,' 'credibility' and enemy images still persisted. Madeleine Albright, Dennis Ross and the US Ambassador to Israel, Edward Walker, all provided the Israeli government with letters of assurances, specifying the details and interpretation of what had been agreed in the Wye River Memorandum. The requirement for side-letters exposed the deep mistrust on the part of the Israeli government regarding Palestinian intentions and the strong attachment to the written rather than oral understanding of the text (U.S. Letters of Assurances to Israel, [1998]1999). Moreover, returning from Wye Plantation, the Israeli Prime Minister was faced with both domestic opposition and a divided cabinet. The Wye Memorandum was approved by the government, however, with the abstention of five ministers and several additional conditions attached to the approval. The Cabinet was to verify and approve every phase of the implementation according to

122 The control of the PA in area A will expand from three to eighteen per cent, while decreasing in area B, from twenty-four to twenty-one per cent. Hence, Israeli control in area C will be reduced from seventy-three to sixty per cent. Regarding the release of Palestinian prisoners, it has not yet been defined who that will include, but the release will proceed in phases, starting with 750 out of a total of 3,000.

123 The Palestinian obligations include revising the Palestinian National Charter, fighting terrorism, collecting illegal weapons, preventing incitement to violence, security cooperation, and reducing the number of Palestinian police in compliance with prior agreements.
Palestinian compliance, and the new pre-conditions included that the PLO would refrain from making a unilateral declaration of statehood on 4 May 1999 and that the third Israeli redeployment, as stipulated in the Interim Agreement, would include only one per cent of the West Bank (Ha'aretz, eng. ed., 12 November 1998; PM Office 1998). According to the Israeli Prime Minister, the Wye Memorandum was not to be seen as a question of trust, it's a question of verification. We've installed verifiable concrete steps of Palestinian implementation ... We remain attached to the Land of Israel. We try to keep as much of it as we can under our jurisdiction' (quoted in the Jerusalem Report 23 November 1998).

For the PA, the Wye Memorandum was interpreted as a concrete step towards the implementation of Israeli redeployment, with the involvement of the United States as a full partner in the peace process. To verify the vote on the nullification of anti-Israeli clauses in the Palestinian Charter, President Clinton was to attend the session in the Gaza Strip, an event which was interpreted by the PA as an implicit American recognition of a Palestinian state in the making. Moreover, Palestinian security cooperation with the United States was perceived as an achievement, since the PLO had long argued for an international presence in the occupied territories (The Jerusalem Report 23 November 1998).

With the persevering enemy images and competing interpretations of the DOP, the parties had reached only the first stage of implementation before the process became stalled. With the end of the five-year interim period on 4 May 1999, the future direction of the peace process and the permanent status of the occupied territories remain highly uncertain.

**Negotiation Strategies: Track One and Principal Mediation**

From the outset, the communication between the new Israeli government and the PA was characterised by distrust about the sincerity and commitment of the other party to a negotiated settlement. The negotiation strategies that were employed and favoured came to mirror the parties' competitive frame of negotiation. For instance, owing to the 'problem of categorisation,' which included strongly held enemy images, the new Israeli Prime Minister was reluctant to meet with
Arafat. Thus, in the initial stages several secret talks were held between Israeli and Palestinian aides to the political leaders on the seemingly incompatible understandings of the implementation of the Interim Agreement and on the guiding principles for negotiations. These secret talks can be contrasted to the Oslo channel, in which secrecy was sought to enable problem-solving. After intensive Norwegian facilitation by Terje Larsen and Mona Juul, several private meetings between Netanyahu’s national security adviser, Dore Gold, later appointed Israeli ambassador to the UN, and the chief Palestinian negotiator, Abu Mazen, resulted in the first meeting between Arafat and Netanyahu in September 1996, shortly after the tunnel crisis (The Jerusalem Post, int. ed., 14 September 1996).

From then on, the negotiation strategies were primarily based on track one negotiations, which were, however, punctuated by deadlocks. Official, formal negotiations between the chief negotiators were held in parallel with high-level meetings and summits, which were surrounded by a high degree of publicity and media attention. These summits were often convened on American initiatives to revive the peace process, particularly in times of crisis and tension, when the two leaders publicly restated their commitments to the peace process.

Yet at Wye Plantation, the Americans opted for a semi-private milieu, inspired by the model of the Camp David negotiations, to enforce deadlines and pressure the parties to reach an understanding on the implementation of the Interim Agreement. As American Middle East Co-ordinator Dennis Ross (Albright, Berger, Ross [1998]1999) remarked:

[W]e came to the conclusion that if we did not bring the leaders together in a concentrated way, we simply couldn’t pull together the further redeployment, all the aspects of security, all the various interim issues. There was simply no way to resolve everything because we were too bogged down in individual issues. The process of bringing everything together also began to produce rather different perspectives from the two sides about what kinds of packages could produce outcomes.

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124 Terje Larsen was now stationed in the Gaza Strip as a UN Co-ordinator of Palestinian aid, and Mona Juul at the Norwegian Embassy in Tel Aviv.
Principal Mediation

With predominantly competitive frames of negotiation, there are a greater focus on power, and negotiations are viewed in more confrontational terms. Since this type of negotiation frequently runs the risk of deadlock, third-party intervention may be deemed particularly important.

Several third parties were engaged in the various phases of the process, but it was the United States that came to exercise the decisive, forceful role as the principal mediator between two parties who lacked any sense of partnership. With an escalation of violence, the Clinton administration decided that it was necessary to intervene in an attempt to act as a 'bridge-builder' in order to re-establish relations. However, at the outset, the American negotiation team, headed by Dennis Ross and Warren Christopher, insisted on bilateral negotiation structures since they assumed that direct negotiations between the parties would enhance trust and a sense of partnership. The Americans feared that more active American participation might be used by the parties as an excuse, to avoid addressing obstacles and finding solutions in a joint bilateral process (Ross [1996]1999).

The Israeli government was reluctant to enlarge the American role as the principal mediator, being concerned about the implications for the 'special relationship' between the United States and Israel. The P.A., on the other hand, had long desired an active American intervention to force Israel to comply with further territorial withdrawals (Interviews Khatib 1998, Zayeed 1998; Ashrawi 1997: 81). As previously mentioned, a weaker party in asymmetric negotiations frequently desires support from external actors in order to balance the negotiations. As former Palestinian negotiator and adviser to Arafat Nofal (1997-1998: 81), stated:

If, during the rule of the Labor party, Palestinians and Israelis did not feel a need for a decisive U.S. role in the negotiations, during the Likud rule, however, 18 months of faltering negotiations underscore the need for a third party. This means that the American administration should change its concept of the role of sponsorship and should participate as a full partner...

Adherence to and enforcement of an agreement usually depend on a degree of trust between the parties and their commitment to the continuation of the process. In a situation such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with a high degree of uncertainty about implementation, a mediator may intervene as 'generator of trust,' par-
particularly when the suspicion of the opposing party is strong. By monitoring and supervising compliance with an agreement, a mediator may help to sustain a peace process and hold the parties accountable to their negotiated commitments (Aggestam and Jönsson 1997: 786; Cohen 1998; King 1997).

As the main sponsor of the agreements signed by the previous Israeli government and the PLO, the United States became highly involved in various attempts to break deadlocks, such as presenting American ideas and formulae. Furthermore, the Americans played the role of a guarantor and trustee in order to promote the construction of a shared understanding between the parties on the implementation of the Interim Agreement. As mentioned before, the parties refused to sign the Hebron Protocol without the ‘Note for the Record’ that American mediator Dennis Ross had prepared.

In 1997, American Secretary of State Warren Christopher was replaced by Madeleine Albright, who was to intensify the American efforts to move the peace process forward. In her first major speech on the Middle East, she emphasised the need for the parties to change their attitudes towards the negotiation and pointed to the necessity for a problem-solving approach. According to Albright, the principles of negotiation should be based on a mutual commitment to security and against violence; an avoidance of unilateral actions; an acceptance to resolve outstanding differences at the negotiation table; and an affirmation of partnership and a commitment to negotiation as the only way to resolve conflict (Albright 1997: 153-155).

With the perseverance of adversarial and competitive frames of negotiation, the United States became intensively involved, transforming the bilateral negotiations into a ‘three-way bargaining structure’ (Princen 1992: 24). The American mediators reasoned that the stalemate in the peace process was ‘a crisis of partnership between Israelis and Palestinians wherein short-term tactical considerations have too often trumped broader understandings of common interest and cooperation’ (Albright 1998: 160). Concerned about a collapse of the peace process Albright stressed that ‘time is no longer an ally;’ in May 1998 she therefore proposed a four-part agenda, which incorporated: (1) an acceleration of the permanent status negotiations, (2) enhancement of security by curbing terrorism, (3) Israeli redeployment and (4) a ‘time-out,’ by avoiding ‘unhelpful unilateral steps’ (Albright 1998: 159-162). Moreover, the United States suggested that Israeli redeployment would pertain to at least thirteen per cent of the West Bank, a proposal that was rejected by both parties. The PA demanded a redeployment of at least thirty per
cent, while Israel did not want to go beyond nine per cent (The Jerusalem Post, int. ed., 4 April 1998). The American mediators assumed that, since the parties were not able to respond constructively to each other, they might respond more positively to American formulae. Hence, in an endeavour to renew the spirit of partnership, the United States stepped in as a temporary partner, while stressing that it was neither part of the conflict nor intending to impose a solution. Yet, remaining ambivalent and reluctant about the enlarged American role, Dennis Ross emphasised that ‘[f]acilitation is a whole lot more productive in terms of reaching agreements where the parties themselves solve problems together. We’ve had to do a lot of mediation because they weren’t doing any of that on their own’ (Albright, Berger, Ross [1998]1999). The PA in particular appreciated the American presence as a ‘witness and referee’ in the trilateral meetings on security, since it strengthened the Palestinian position vis-à-vis Israel (Interview, Erekat 1999). Furthermore, the United States publicly supported the Palestinian position on a second Israeli redeployment before resuming negotiations on permanent status of the occupied territories. The United States required that the Israeli government respond to the timing and size of the second redeployment (Ha’aretz, eng. ed., 20 November 1997).

During the negotiations on the Wye Memorandum, the United States added prestige to the process by including President Clinton, to act as a formulator, and the CIA, to act as a bridge-builder on security issues. The CIA was to monitor Palestinian compliance, a type of cooperation welcomed by the Palestinians, while the Israelis only reluctantly agreed as they feared future disagreements with the United States over the evaluation of Palestinian compliance (Albright and Arafat [1998]1999; The Time 2 November 1998).

Additional third-party assistance

The American mediation was paralleled by other third parties who attempted to facilitate communication in and alternative interpretive schemes for the negotiations. Egypt, as discussed in chapter nine, had been involved as a facilitator in some previous phases of the process, but because of the increasingly tense relations with Israel that role was minimised. Still, President Mubarak aspired to influence the peace process and made several attempts to intervene, especially during the negotiations on the Hebron Protocol. The Egyptian proposals, however, were rejected by the Israeli negotiators since they were
suspicious of the Egyptian intentions and motives for intervention. The Palestinian delegation, in comparison, encouraged Egyptian involvement and sought support for its position in order to compensate for the asymmetry with Israel. Consequently, rather than playing the role of a third party, the Egyptians came to side with the Palestinians, putting two Egyptian consultants in the negotiation at Arafat’s disposal and providing advice on strategies (Ashrawi 1997: 88; Andoni 1997: 22; Interview, Khatib 1998; The Jerusalem Report 3 April 1997).

Jordan’s role as a third party may be described as more ceremonial, with the presence of King Hussein, who tried to instil hope and trust during some decisive phases of negotiation. It should be noted that the Israel-Jordan peace agreement signed in 1994 was largely linked to the accomplishment and consolidation of peaceful relations between Israel and the PLO. Hence, Jordan’s involvement was based on self-interests, and King Hussein was greatly disturbed by the actions and statements emanating from the new Israeli government. In a letter to the Israeli Prime Minister, he complained about the ‘continuous attempt on the part of the Israeli prime minister to demolish the Palestinian-Israeli Oslo agreements and change the very essence and facets of the peace process’ (King Hussein [1997]1998: 152).125 At several high-level meetings both parties asked King Hussein to participate since he was able to function as a bridge in the communication between the parties, for instance, during the summit in Washington in 1996, shortly after the tunnel crisis, whereas Egypt declined the invitation to attend.126 Moreover, during the Hebron negotiations, King Hussein intervened and was able to persuade Arafat to accept a timetable for the first Israeli redeployment. Later, at Wye, the King ‘inspired’ more than persuaded the parties through his dedication to the process (Albright, Berger, Ross [1998]1999; Andoni 1997: 23).

Finally, the European Union was becoming an increasingly important third party, particularly in the field of economics and as a significant force in consolidating the peace process. The EU, the largest donor of aid to the PA (it contributed more than half of the total

125 In Israel, there is an overall positive attitude towards the peace with Jordan. However, another crisis occurred between Israel and Jordan with the failed attempt of the Israeli secret service, Mossad, to murder a Hamas leader in Amman in September 1997. In order to overcome the crisis, Netanyahu released the imprisoned Hamas leader, Ahmad Yasin, at the request of King Hussein.

126 Arafat emphasised that it was thanks to the persuasion of Hosni Mubarak that he attended the summit (PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat [1996]1997: 299).
amount of aid given), also assisted and monitored the 1996 Palestinian elections. Moreover, as part of the wider effort to achieve regional integration, a Euro-Mediterranean partnership agreement was signed in Barcelona in 1995, with the participation of twenty-seven countries. Yet, in the diplomatic arena the EU has been marginalised, despite its declared ambition in recent years to play a more substantial diplomatic role as a third party alongside the United States. As underscored by the EU Commission: 'This role would be much improved if the parties and the U.S. acknowledged the need for the European Union, both at the Ministerial level and through its Special Envoy' (Commission of the European Communities 1998: 151).

In 1996, the EU designated the Spanish ambassador to Israel, Miguel Angel Moratino, to serve as a special EU representative to the peace process. However, Israel rejected any European role and limited Moratino’s role to that of monitoring and reporting on the negotiations (de la Gorce 1997: 6). The Palestinians, in contrast, had strongly urged the EU to become more involved in order to balance the special relationship between the United States and Israel. Thus, the EU provided the PA with a letter of assurances upon signing the Hebron Protocol. It stipulated that the EU will use ‘all its political and moral weight to ensure that all provisions in the agreements already reached will be fully implemented on the basis of reciprocity by both Israeli and Palestinian sides in a timely fashion’ (Letters of Assurances, 1997: 322). EU actions in the diplomatic arena were otherwise confined primarily to declarations, for instance, on the tunnel crisis and on Har Homa. In these declarations, the EU stated its position on Jerusalem by not recognising Israeli sovereignty in East Jerusalem and in 1997, for the first time, by declaring its support for a Palestinian state: '[t]he creation of a viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian entity is the best guarantee of Israel’s security' (Council of Ministers 1997: 147-148; for the quote, European Union 1997: 136).

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127 A more active approach to the Middle East peace process was only reluctantly accepted by the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands, as they feared negative American and Israeli reactions.
128 Two controversial visits were made during the tense period 1996-97 by British Foreign Minister Robin Cook and French President Jacques Chirac. Both expressed criticism of the stance taken by the Israeli government on the peace process in general and specifically on building new Jewish neighbourhood in East Jerusalem.
Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter clearly describes the non-linear pattern of resolving conflict. Several obstacles, which the parties in previous years were able to overcome, such as mistrust and enemy images, reemerged during the negotiation process between 1996 and 1998. Hence, the transition from conflict to cooperation can be depicted as cyclical, surrounded by uncertainties and risks of re-appearing problems of meaning and credibility. To provide knowledge about the oscillation between progress and deadlocks, it would be too simple to attribute the shift in the negotiation process only to the change of government in Israel. The interplay between agent and structure and its implications for the strategic interaction must also be acknowledged.

First, the frames of negotiation were highly competitive, with distinguishing features such as the use of threats, advancement of self-interests and rigidity in concession-making. These frames of negotiation emanated from enduring enemy images and an absence of trust and partnership between the interlocutors. From the outset, the new Israeli government was highly critical of the peace process and of the PLO in particular, while still committed to negotiations based on the principles of reciprocity and Israeli security. By comparison, the PA was cautiously monitoring whether the new Israeli government would abide by the Interim Agreement. Over time, however, the Palestinian frames of negotiation became competitive, which included threats of a new intifada and international coalition-building in support for its position on the peace process against that of Israel. In spite of the conclusion of two agreements, these frames of negotiation did not alter in any significant way.

Second, the negotiation process continued, as before, to be highly restrained by domestic politics. Large parts of the Israeli and Palestinian domestic publics had become increasingly uneasy about the direction and outcome of the peace process. Contrary to their expectations, Israelis felt a decreased personal security while Palestinians experienced worsening socio-economic conditions and frustration at not being able to exercise national self-determination. Hence there did not exist an unequivocal domestic approval of or an overall interpretive scheme for the peace process. Yet, the new Israeli government rose to power on a domestic mandate which stipulated a continuation of the negotiations while reorienting the process according to Israeli security concerns. The government, however, was highly restrained by its right-wing constituency, which resulted in several contradictions between policy and action. The PA was being
criticised domestically both for the failures of the peace process and for the lack of democratic rule. The Palestinian elections in 1996 were therefore important in that they generated legitimisation of the Palestinian Authority and an implicit approval of its policy regarding the negotiation process. However, apprehension about Israeli unilateral actions in Jerusalem led to violent clashes and calls by many Palestinians to end the peace process.

Third, the strategies utilised were based on the competitive and asymmetric nature of the negotiations. With a process constantly punctuated by deadlocks, several high-level meetings were held between the political leaders, followed by formal negotiations between the Israeli and the Palestinian delegations. Initially, secret channels were operating between the parties, since Netanyahu was reluctant to meet Arafat face-to-face. At Wye, the negotiation milieu shifted to a semi-private one where for nearly a week the parties negotiated under time pressure in order to conclude an agreement on the implementation of the Interim Agreement. Two agreements were thus concluded between 1996 and 1998, but only after forceful third-party intervention. These negotiations became trilateral when the United States initiated direct negotiations with each party and acted as a surrogate who was to bridge between the parties due to the lack of trust and partnership. Through various efforts, the American mediators tried to reassure the parties and build bridges between their negotiation positions, for example, by issuing side-letters, presenting formulae and, after conclusion of the Wye Memorandum, assuming responsibility for monitoring security compliance.

Fourth, the interaction between the parties was, as mentioned above, characterised by mistrust, incompatible understandings of the conflict, attributional errors and strongly held enemy images. The negotiation process was primarily focused on how to reconcile the different interpretations of the DOP and the Interim Agreement. The Palestinians insisted on continuing a step-by-step approach during the interim period, which was based on the understanding 'territories-for-peace.' The Israelis argued for a shift directly towards negotiations on permanent status of the occupied territories based on the notion 'peace-for-peace.' Even though two agreements were reached, there was no substantial 'learning of the game' nor any shared understanding, as manifested by the parties' reluctance to sign the agreements without American assurances and written interpretations of the agreements.

To conclude, the analysis in this last chapter on the negotiation process reveals the intricate processes of reframing and resolving
conflict. Resolving conflict challenges long-held understandings and images of conflict. This is one reason why the problem of shifting meaning of conflict becomes exacerbated by extremist violence, which tends to confirm stereotyped enemy images. Reframing and resolving conflict may also create more dissonance in the self-images and enemy images of one political actor than in those of another, for instance, in a comparison of the images held by Labour with those of the Likud. Finally, intractable conflict in particular tends to nurture national identity. For example, the Palestinian identity has been to some extent sustained and strengthened by the resistance and struggle for the liberation of Palestine as defined in the Palestinian National Charter. Thus, an alteration in the meaning of the Charter may pose a challenge to the sense of identity of many Palestinians.
Part V

Conclusion
Chapter 11

(UN)ENDING CONFLICT

The origin of this thesis lies in a basic puzzle about continuity and change in conflict, in particular, how adversaries in an intractable conflict, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, move towards cooperation and negotiation. The overall objective has been twofold: (i) to advance conflict research concerning the processes of transition from conflicting interaction to cooperation; and (ii) to improve knowledge about these processes in the Israeli-Palestinian case. The inductive and deductive interplay between theoretical and analytical concepts, on the one hand, and the empirical analysis, on the other hand, have resulted in a theoretical model for the empirical analysis of reframing and resolving conflict, which will be presented and discussed below. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications for conflict research and the transformative characteristics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

A Strategic-Interactive Model for the Empirical Analysis of Reframing and Resolving Conflict

In chapter two, a meta-theoretical model was presented and throughout this study I have theoretically defined the various elements of the model. The outcome of this endeavour is a strategic-interactive model of reframing and resolving conflict, as shown below. The model consists of a framework which is useful for empirical analysis of change and continuity in conflict over time and thus does not focus on a particular ending or outcome of conflict. Rather, the overriding ambition in constructing such a model has been to explicitly address the ongoing cyclical and dynamic nature of conflict. In the following sections I will discuss how the model has advanced theoretical insights and provided a useful framework for empirical analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Meaning of conflict

In this study, the understanding of conflict is based on the assumption that conflict is socially constructed. The meaning of conflict has therefore played a central, critical role in the analysis, with an emphasis on how it is perceived, interpreted and understood. Meaning of conflict is linked to the other two sensitising concepts of reframing and resolving in that they ultimately concern alterations in the meaning of conflict. To elaborate theoretically and empirically on the concept of meaning, I have first made an analytical distinction between agent and structure; and second, a linkage between meaning, behaviour and intractable conflict.
• Analytical dualism

In contrast to constructivism and structuration theory, I argue for an analytical dualism of agent and structure in order to identify change more precisely. This dualism is based on the premise that we first need to avoid the pitfalls of methodological individualism and social determinism. An objective has therefore been to strike a balance between norm-conforming and intersubjective structures of action, on the one hand, and agents' intentional reasoning and subjective meaning of conflict, on the other hand. Second, change in agent and structure are often identified on different time scales. For instance, the effects of the strategic interaction on agents are often more immediate than the effects on structures. Hence, without an analytical dualism between agent and structure, the temporal dimension of change will be more difficult to identify. As seen in the model, an analysis of ideological and cognitive beliefs about self/enemy images is made in order to delineate the meaning of conflict at the level of agent. At the structural level, the meaning of conflict has been approached via the concept of political culture, which illuminates meta-frames and interpretive schemes of conflict.

• Linking meaning and behaviour: alliance and third-party relations

Structure contains not only norms and rules but also patterns of behaviour. Patterns of relations over time are assumed to generate norms, which contain expectations concerning appropriate action in conflict. As the model shows, I have limited the analysis at the international level to patterns of relations over time between adversaries, allies and third parties.

Alliance relations are most often constructed on shared threat perceptions which indicate mutual interpretive schemes. What has been of interest in this study is the ways in which these shared understandings facilitate and restrain specific actions in conflict. For example, pan-Arabism has long served as an overall meta-frame and interpretive scheme of the Arab states and the PLO. Its emphasis on Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine has generated legitimation for various armed and violent actions taken by Palestinian groups.

Relations with third parties, by comparison, are related more specifically to change and how third parties can act as 'teachers' for normative change in conflict, that is, for resolving conflict. Emphasis is placed on how third parties provide disputants with alternative interpretive schemes of conflict, which frequently are expressed in
various formulae containing normative expectations about appropriate actions to resolve conflict. For instance, in the Israeli-Palestinian case, UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 constitute a normative reference point for most third parties involved in the conflict. The General Assembly has also issued several resolutions, although these are much less shared, since they have been more articulate on Palestinian national self-determination and sovereignty than on Israeli security concerns.

• Intractable conflict: self/other and political culture

It is intriguing to study change in an intractable conflict since this type of conflict has resisted efforts to resolve it. To enhance knowledge about the problematique of reframing and resolving conflict, the characteristics of an intractable conflict need to be explicated and understood. In this study, I have argued that self-images and political culture become part of the construction of conflict; thus, for a conflict to become tractable, a change in self-images and political cultures is required. This change, which I will discuss below, is frequently perceived differently by various political actors. The empirical analysis highlights how the self-images of the Likud are constructed to a significant degree on the basis of a pessimistic and conflict-ridden world-view and how they generate convincing arguments for the need for a territorial and militarily strong defence of Israel. To resolve conflict would therefore pose a challenge to these self-images and create a dissonance in the established beliefs.

The meaning of conflict, if it persists over time, tends to become ingrained and institutionalised in society and politics. Both Palestinian and Israeli self- and enemy images are to a large extent built on historical experiences and sustained by attributional errors. National identities are also nurtured by the conflict. For instance, after the war of 1967 the PLO nurtured a distinct Palestinian identity on the negation of Israel, which provided unity around the popular slogan that Palestine could only be liberated through revolution and armed struggle, as described in the Palestinian National Charter. Hence, reframing and resolving conflict may according to some Palestinians pose an existential threat to their national identity. A similar problem is also recognised in Israeli society. Yossi Beilin (1999: 4), one of the initiators of the Oslo channel, poignantly states: 'We are so used to non-peace and perpetual danger that we shall have to accustom ourselves to the new situation.'
Reframing conflict

The study of the reframing of conflict requires an analysis of processes over time. In this regard, the strategic-interactive model is particularly appropriate, since it does not focus on one static outcome or a sequential event, but rather on cyclical and dynamic processes. The concept of reframing shares several features with the theory of ripeness in that both focus on change and negotiation. However, reframing as I have defined the concept is still favoured because first, it has been used as a sensitising concept; second, it includes an agent-structure approach; and third, it seeks to go beyond the ‘diagnosis’ of a ripe moment and focuses instead on the cyclical processes preceding negotiations. Reframing basically refers to a change in the meaning of conflict at the level of both agent and structure. For the empirical analysis, the concept has been operationalised and linked to negotiation by highlighting time and change; motivation, opportunity, and focal points; and turning points in conflict.

- Time and change in conflict

The study of time and change requires an analysis of situated actors, that is, how actors are placed in a structural strategic context facilitating or restraining action. Agents are, however, also guided in their actions by their own understandings, preferences and perceived capacities in a specific situation. Hence the analytical dualism between agent and structure enables us to analyse change more precisely while recognising the interplay between them. For instance, one major driving force behind the official PLO endorsement of a two-state solution in 1988 originated from explicit domestic demands, which contained the expectations of an end to Israeli occupation as well as the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Similarly, in the late 1980s, a growing conflict weariness could be identified among the Israeli public, which was manifested in the acceptance of the idea of ending the Palestinian uprising through a political solution. A new Israeli government was brought to power in 1992 on a domestic mandate which approved and lent legitimacy to the negotiation process. However, change concerning the mutual recognition originated from agents and not from domestic pressures. It was the Israeli and Palestinian political elites who took the decisive step to officially recognise each other, which signalled a significant alteration in the meaning of the conflict.
Change and continuity are often perceived differently among political actors. Thus, I have emphasised time frames in order to illuminate the linkage between reframing and efforts to resolve conflict. Two time frames have been put forth: a retrospective time frame, characterised by a conservative and passive approach to change; and a prospective time frame, in which change is encountered with an active approach, by taking part in constructing it. Different time frames may thus contain contrasting accounts of how to reframe and resolve conflict. A comparison between Labour and the Likud in the late 1980s reveals divergent responses to the intensification of third-party intervention. The Labour Party took an active part in the efforts to prepare a negotiation process, whereas the Likud had a more passive and retrospective time frame. Also, the PLO has for a long time exhibited a retrospective time frame emphasising the return to 'historic Palestine'. This is one reason for its ambiguous policies in the 1980s, for instance, when it first endorsed the Amman Accord in 1985 and then withdrew its support. However, by endorsing a two-state solution in 1988, it appears that the PLO now has a prospective time frame, judging from its emphasis on the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Nonetheless, the Israeli and Palestinian prospective time frames are increasingly challenged by domestic meta-frames, such as messianic Zionism and political Islam. These frames tend to emphasise past-oriented time and a 'return' to what they view as 'true' Islam and Judaism.

Reframing and negotiation: motivation, opportunity, focal point

In order to conceptualise the linkage between reframing processes and efforts to resolve conflict by negotiation, I have devoted attention to three concepts: motivation, opportunity, and focal point.

Motivation refers to a change in the perceptions of agents. Negotiations are favoured and an explicit willingness is expressed to search for a mutually satisfying agreement to resolve conflict. However, the empirical analysis showed that in 1991, the motivation to negotiate was low among the Palestinian and Israeli political elites. Instead, motivation only evolved with the change of Israeli government in 1992 and as a result of direct negotiations between Israel and the PLO in 1993.

Opportunity focuses more specifically on the structural strategic dimension, that is, how structures facilitate a negotiation process. For instance, the low motivation among the Israeli and Palestinian political elites in 1991 can be contrasted to several changes in the
international arena which facilitated a negotiation process. The decline of pan-Arabism and the de-ideologisation of Soviet foreign policy constituted considerable change in the interpretive schemes of the conflict. These alterations were reflected in alliance relations and an increasing moderation in the Middle East regarding an acceptance of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The changes were illustrated by the participation of most Arab states in the Madrid Conference, which generated international approval and legitimation of the negotiation process.

Finally, the concept of focal point emphasises coordination of expectations with regard to the timing of and agenda for negotiations. Again, in the empirical analysis, the concept proved in a paradoxical way to be useful, since it highlighted the lack of focal points in 1991 between the parties and the great difficulties encountered in constructing an agenda both before the Madrid Conference and afterwards in Washington. This is one reason why American mediation was primarily concerned with procedural obstacles, such as combining bilateral and multilateral frameworks for negotiation. The American mediators implicitly assumed that, if the parties began to negotiate, such a behavioural change would be accompanied by a change in the meaning of the conflict.

• Turning point: change in behaviour and meaning

The concept of turning point is used to indicate transition from one phase of conflict to another. In order to more precisely understand the processes before the commencement of negotiations, I have suggested that we make a distinction between turning point in behaviour and meaning of conflict. For instance, the media often presents illustrative pictures of disputants at a negotiation table, shaking hands before the press. Implicitly, it is assumed that the meaning of conflict has been changed. A strong emphasis is also placed on actors and behaviour, whereas the structural strategic features that facilitate or restrain negotiations are ignored. The start of the Madrid Conference in 1991 constituted an important behavioural turning point in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, since it was the first time ever that Palestinians and Israelis faced each other at the negotiation table. Yet, there was no significant change at the time in the meaning and understanding of the conflict, which raised the question of the tractability of the conflict. The Israeli government attended the conference sessions primarily because of pressures exerted by American mediators and since most of the Israeli preconditions were fulfilled.
The behavioural change therefore did not create any dissonance in its long-held understanding of the conflict. The PLO, on the other hand, was officially excluded from the process, although it informally instructed the Palestinian delegation. Since the PLO leadership was not officially invited, it lacked the incentives to advance the process. Palestinian participation in the Madrid Conference was, however, considered vital by the PLO because of domestic and international expectations.

Resolving conflict

I have advanced the sensitising concept of resolving by focusing in particular on negotiation strategy and process. In contrast to negotiation theory, which tends to put an exclusive emphasis on actor, I have also included the structural strategic context of negotiation. Hence, to delineate how strategies are situated in time and place, I suggest that we analyse both agents' frames and the structural characteristics of negotiation. In the empirical analysis, a number of observations were made about the negotiation process: tension between negotiation and domestic legitimation; obstacles to communication; negotiations as a learning process which facilitates the (re)construction of meaning of conflict; and a cyclical pattern of resolving conflict.

- Interplay between frame and strategy of negotiation

Two perspectives on agents' frames of negotiation have been advanced, namely, competitive and problem-solving, as seen in the model above. These two perspectives contain two divergent understandings of strategy, process and outcome.

Competitive frames are often associated with parties that are less motivated to resolve conflict. Self-interests and autonomy are considered more vital than an agreement, which normally implies concession-making. Power is an integral component of and central to any negotiation strategy, since it facilitates the use of coercion and rewards. Principal (power) mediation may therefore be acceptable and appropriate, particularly in negotiations characterised by asymmetry. For the weaker party, principal mediation may turn the process into 'trilateral diplomacy,' which can compensate for the lack of power. This was, for example, the case at the Wye negotiations in 1988, when the United States became a full partner by holding direct
negotiations with both parties and assumed responsibility for monitoring security compliance. However, re-examining the Wye Memorandum and recognising the almost immediate deadlock after the conclusion of the agreement, it might be debated to what extent a third party may act as a ‘surrogate’ and compensate for the lack of trust between two interlocutors. From the distinction previously made about behaviour and meaning, principal mediation can be considered a suitable strategy in a pre-negotiation phase, when the focus is primarily placed on influencing behaviour. The American mediation in 1990-91 illustrates such an effort, in which the mediators focused almost exclusively on bringing the parties to the table. However, whether a principal mediator may to a significant extent influence the interlocutors’ meaning of conflict is more doubtful. An agreement is sustained over time only if the parties share an overall interpretation of an agreement; thus, other mediation strategies might be more useful for changing the meaning of conflict.

A problem-solving frame of negotiation stands in stark contrast to a competitive frame in that the motivation to resolve conflict and the willingness to search for a mutually satisfying formula are central to any favoured negotiation strategy. Hence the relationship between interlocutors is not characterised by competition but by partnership and trust. The understanding of concession-making is therefore contrasted with a competitive frame since a problem-solving frame views concessions as being part of a long-term and mutually beneficial exchange between the parties. However, it should be emphasised that problem-solving frames are difficult to construct and uphold, particularly in asymmetric negotiations that involve security and national interests. The stronger party is often inclined to make use of its strength to pursue unilateral strategies, which is in contradiction with a problem-solving working relationship.

In the empirical analysis, problem-solving frames were particularly prominent in the Oslo channel. After facing several obstacles in Washington and experiencing the limitations of public and official diplomacy, the parties were motivated to search for alternative ideas. In this regard, the negotiation milieu became critical. In a secret, quasi-official, small-group setting, the parties confronted self- and enemy images and explored and identified common interests, which enhanced trust and empathy for the other party. Consequently, it can be argued that problem-solving frames need to evolve in a less formal, official setting and in this regard third parties can play a critical role as facilitators, as illustrated by the Norwegian mediation. Yet, as I mentioned above, problem-solving frames are often difficult to
uphold, which was noted in the empirical case. There were several reasons: first, the number of negotiators was increased in the negotiations that followed the Oslo channel; second, the same degree of secrecy was not possible since it contradicts the norm of modern diplomacy to keep the public informed; and third, obstacles to the transformation of principles into the details of implementation arose. Thus, strategies utilised after the Oslo channel were characterised by ‘two-track diplomacy,' which combined public and official negotiations with secret back channels.

• Situated negotiators: tension between negotiation and domestic legitimation

Resolving conflict poses a challenge to many domestic groups since the meaning of conflict has become a central element in the construction of their identities. A tension between political elites who attempt to resolve conflict and their need for domestic legitimacy to pursue negotiations can therefore be assumed. Particularly in intractable conflicts, rivaling interpretations of a peace process may come to restrain negotiations. Competing meta-frames are often expressed in terms of who is a patriot and who is a traitor. Resolving conflict may therefore be viewed as treason by some opposition groups since it concerns a re-evaluation of the conflict.

Several examples of how the negotiation process was restrained by opposition groups were found in the empirical analysis. Palestinian Islamic groups and Israeli radical right-wing activists in particular interpreted the peace process as an existential threat to their identities since these identities are based on exclusive particularistic features and on a zero-sum understanding of the conflict. However, there were two main reasons for the exacerbated tension between negotiation and domestic legitimation: (a) the lack of an overall interpretive scheme for the peace process; and (b) the increase of extremist violence and terrorism. First, the DOP did not itself constitute a peace accord but rather contained a number of principles concerning the interim period and how to negotiate its implementation. The DOP not only avoided dealing with the major obstacles, such as Jerusalem, borders, Palestinian refugees and Jewish settlements, but it also included several contradictions and ambiguities with regard to Israeli territorial withdrawal during the interim period. These ambiguities opened the agreement for a number of opposing interpretations of it. Consequently, the Israeli and Palestinian political leaders lacked an overall shared interpretive scheme to persuade their own domestic public of the advantages of the peace process. Second, the increase
violence and terrorism, paralleled by an unclear direction of the peace process, strengthened the fear and enemy images among Palestinians and Israelis. Thus, a distinct dissonance between the political elites and domestic publics on the peace process can be identified. Accordingly, coordination is required not only between adversaries but also between political leaders and their own domestic publics. It is interesting to note in the empirical analysis the growing recognition and mutual awareness among the Israeli and Palestinian leaders of the necessity that both parties gain domestic legitimation for pursuing the peace process. Concerns regarding the other party’s lack of domestic legitimation were illustrated in 1994, after the Hebron massacre. In this case the Israeli leadership took several concrete steps, such as releasing Palestinian prisoners and initiating implementation of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement before it was concluded. Similarly, after the intensified Islamic suicide attacks prior to the Israeli elections, the PLO leadership agreed to postpone the controversial Israeli withdrawal from Hebron, as stipulated in the Interim Agreement, in order to boost a Labour victory in the upcoming elections.

The negotiation process: obstacles to communication while learning through interaction

As noted elsewhere, parties often negotiate even when no major alteration in the meaning of conflict has occurred. As a consequence, interlocutors frequently come to experience obstacles to communication, particularly the ‘problem of meaning,’ that is, contrasting understandings of conflict. Yet, there are also times, particularly when both parties have prospective time frames, when negotiations come to constitute a learning process in which the parties get to know the ‘other’ and learn how to play the ‘game.’

Other obstacles to communication are the problems of categorisation and credibility, which the empirical analysis showed frequently came to present barriers in the negotiations. In the initial stages of the Washington negotiations, the ‘problem of categorisation,’ that is, the perseverance of enemy images, was vividly illustrated by the refusal of the Israeli government to negotiate with the PLO. Similarly, the ‘problem of categorisation’ reappeared in 1996, despite the existence of mutual recognition, with the change of government in Israel. The new government was headed by Netanyahu, who at first did not recognise any major difference between the PLO and the Hamas.
Categorisation is also linked to the ‘problem of credibility’ in that strong enemy images contain deep suspicion and mistrust of the other party. From 1996 to 1998, despite the existence of three agreements, the negotiation process was characterised by competitive frames and an overwhelming lack of partnership between the parties. The ‘problem of explanation,’ including attribution errors, is also identified at several instances during the negotiation process. Each party was inclined to view the other as a unitary actor, which often resulted either in an exaggerated view of the extent of control each leadership had over its domestic public, or in an ignorance of the other party’s domestic concerns.

Still, the negotiation process constituted a learning process, in that the parties came to recognise shared interests and possibilities to resolve conflict. For example, even though the Washington negotiations did not result in any agreement, the parties explored various ideas about and details for interim self-government, which provided the basis for the DOP. Another example is how the parties in Oslo learned about the prospect of concluding an official agreement between Israel and the PLO, which had not been anticipated since the original intention for the Oslo channel was only to provide a back channel to the negotiations in Washington.

Negotiation outcome: cyclical pattern in the transformation of conflict

The model has been particularly useful for the empirical study since it allows for an analysis of conflict over time. Reframing and resolving conflict do not proceed in a linear pattern towards one particular outcome or ‘end.’ Rather, the processes may be characterised as cyclical, with oscillation between periods of conflict and cooperation. What has proven particularly challenging is the implementation of agreements, which is a common problem in several conflicts.

However, the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO in 1993 constitutes one distinct change: the conflict became tractable and moved away from a zero-sum understanding. Another significant alteration is the establishment of a Palestinian Authority in parts of Palestine, which signals a substantial compromise on both sides regarding the claims to (re)establish ‘historic Palestine’ and a ‘greater Israel.’ Saeb Erekat (Interview, 1999) underlines that to transform the conflict ‘is not one day event ... Israelis are going through labour pains and we [Palestinians] are going through labour pains.’ To conclude, despite inherent weaknesses in the DOP and its related agreements, they still constitute a transformation of the conflict.
insofar as Israelis and Palestinians are now acting upon new ‘social realities.’ Several challenges lie ahead, such as reaching an agreement on the final status of the occupied territories, which requires agreed rules and norms to guide peaceful conduct and relations.

Implications for Conflict Research

The main theoretical objective of this thesis has been to improve and complement conflict research concerning transitional processes from conflicting interaction to cooperation. On the basis of a deductive and inductive interplay between theoretical concepts and empirical analysis, I have constructed a model for the analysis of the processes of reframing and resolving conflict. The model has aimed at addressing a number of theoretical dimensions which are lacking in conflict research, such as process analysis over time and the problem of agent-structure. Moreover, the model presents a framework for empirical analysis of conflict that can be utilised not only for single cases but also for comparative studies of conflicts. I will here discuss five implications of this study for conflict research: the time dimension in conflict, agent and structure, eclecticism, comparative studies, and meta-theory.

First, based on the assumption that most studies in conflict research are characterised by a static or linear analysis, this theoretical model has been constructed with an explicit aim to analyse dynamic conflict processes over time. As was seen in the empirical analysis of Israeli-Palestinian relations between 1988 and 1998, the conflict processes delineate a cyclical pattern of change and continuity which the model was able to address and analyse.

Second, the model not only emphasises a temporal dimension but also uses an agent-structure approach, which can more precisely identify change and continuity in conflict. In conflict research, emphasis is often placed exclusively on either agent or structure. For instance, the conflict resolution approach tends to ignore structures whereas the conflict transformation approach overemphasises structure over agent. The interplay between agent and structure is therefore only implicitly assumed. As this study views agent and structure as mutually constitutive, the model highlights both the attributes of agent, such as willingness, understanding and capacity, and structural characteristics such as legitimisation, signification and power.

Third, an eclectic approach has been favoured since the overarching aim of this thesis has been the advancement of theory. There are a
number of ways in which theories might be utilised. Theoretical pluralism is one approach which seeks to test and compare different theoretical perspectives. Theoretical synthesis, by comparison, explicitly tries to combine various theoretical perspectives, which are viewed as commensurable, into a new synthesis. Theoretical eclecticism, which has been favoured in this study, puts a particular emphasis on borrowing and (re)theorising various theoretical 'fragments' and ideas with a strict focus on advancing theory on a specific theoretical problem, in this case, on the processes of reframing and resolving conflict. This kind of approach is therefore characterised by an 'openness' with regard to different theories. For instance, social psychology and negotiation theory have provided theoretical insights into the beliefs of agents; and structuration theory and constructivism have been useful for elucidating how social structure affect action. Moreover, specific theories emanating from the three approaches to conflict research have been drawn upon. Conflict management is useful for an interpretation of realist practices in conflict (see further Vasquez 1993: 90-91), whereas conflict resolution encompasses the problematique of identity politics. Conflict transformation, on the other hand, generates theoretical insights on transformative characteristics of conflict, which are significant when assessing processes and outcomes of negotiation. However, it is important to emphasise that eclecticism and the reconstruction of theoretical ideas require an epistemological and ontological awareness on the part of the scholar. This is the main reason why the entire chapter two has been devoted to reflection on and critical discussion of the diversity of theoretical perspectives in conflict research, the problem of agent-structure as well as the meta-theoretical underpinnings of this study.

Fourth, since the strategic-interactive model outlines general theoretical concepts of the problematique of reframing and resolving conflict, the model is also appropriate for comparative studies of conflict. For instance, in the empirical analysis I have continuously compared the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with other conflicts, such as Northern Ireland and South Africa.

Finally, the model has been constructed on the basis of a number of meta-theoretical assumptions which share several ideas with constructivism and structuration theory. The material world does play an important role, which is illustrated in the asymmetric negotiations between Israel and the PLO. However, this study has not attempted to make an objective analysis of the material conditions, nor to provide a causal explanation of change and continuity in conflict. The focus is rather on the advancement of some theoretical problems regarding
reframing and resolving conflict, which emphasise how conflicting parties interpret, understand, and give meaning to political ‘realities.’

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Un)Ending: Beyond the DOP

The mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO in 1993 constitutes a significant transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the period analysed here. One basic characteristic of the intractability of the conflict has been the non-recognition of the ‘other,’ which is related to Israeli and Palestinian self-images. Thus, mutual recognition signals an important alteration in the meaning of conflict. However, the DOP and subsequent agreements on its implementation do not constitute peace agreements. Rather, the DOP was originally intended as the first ‘building block’ of a comprehensive peace accord. The intention was that, during an interim period of five years, confidence and trust would be gained, which in turn would enhance the prospects for resolving the hard-core issues of Jerusalem, Jewish settlements, Palestinian refugees, and the final status and borders of the occupied territories. According to the DOP, the final status negotiations would resume no later than three years into the interim period, that is, by 4 May 1997. At that time, however, the peace process was in disarray, fraught with deadlocks, violence and terrorism. Two major factors are identified as undermining the peace process: (1) the lack of a ‘road map,’ in the DOP, which could stipulate the general direction and purpose of the peace process; and (2) the continuation and even escalation of extremist violence and terrorism. Yet, despite the weaknesses of the DOP, the agreement assisted the construction of new social ‘realities,’ such as the instalement of a Palestinian Authority, Palestinian elections, as well as an increasing acceptance among Palestinians and Israelis of a two-state solution.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict at cross-roads: challenges ahead

The direction of the peace process is still highly uncertain and linked in several ways to changes in Israeli and Palestinian self-images and political cultures. Accordingly, it is likely that we will see a continuation of the struggles and competition over the meaning of
conflict which are closely related to the development of Palestinian and Israeli societies. For instance, what role will particularistic norms, such as religion and nationalism, play in comparison with secularism and democracy in future Israeli and Palestinian societies? Resolving such issues as Jerusalem and disputed territories are intimately linked to these issues.

The Israeli elections held in May 1999 brought a new government to power on a mandate to pursue the peace process as well as unite a conflict-ridden Israeli society. This has given me the opportunity in these last pages to end on a more optimistic note regarding the prospects for the future. Let us return to and utilise the theoretical model for a brief concluding discussion on the concepts of motivation, opportunity and focal point.

Concerning motivation, the Israeli and Palestinian leaders have expressed their keen interest in making up for lost time, which would indicate that there are prospective time frames among the political elites. The new Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, has in several statements outlined his understanding of and willingness to resolve the conflict and to rebuild trust with his Palestinian counterparts. Similarly, Arafat shares the understanding that relations should be rebuilt but has expressed concerns about the implementation of the Wye Memorandum, which includes Israeli territorial withdrawal. The Israeli government wants to coordinate any further Israeli withdrawal with the final status negotiations. As I have indicated elsewhere, the DOP contains a number of contradictions regarding territorial withdrawal and Jewish settlements, which has raised concerns on both sides.

The opportunity to pursue the negotiation process is presumably more favourable today than it was only a few years ago. In the domestic arena, the Israeli elections of May 1999 signalled that a majority of Israelis have come to terms with the notion of a Palestinian state while being increasingly concerned about the polarisation of Israeli society. The present government enjoys widespread support in parliament and consists of various political factions, though with a dominance of the Labour Party. In the Palestinian domestic arena, unification has traditionally been prioritised, but since the beginning of the peace process there has been a deep division among the Palestinian people. Yet, various Palestinian opposition groups, such as the PFLP and the PFLP, which at first vehemently denounced the DOP for compromising on national Palestinian objectives, have begun to signal their acceptance of what has taken place since 1993. For instance, Arafat recently met with these groups in Cairo in an effort
to unite the Palestinian people for the coming final status negotiations. There has also been some lesson-drawing on the part of the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships on the need for a public dialogue on the peace process. The recent visit to the Israeli parliament by Abu Ala, the speaker of the Palestinian parliament and chief negotiator in Oslo, was described by both sides as ‘public education for peace’ (Ha’aretz, eng. ed. 27 July 1999). However, as noted elsewhere, there is a delicate balance between negotiation and domestic legitimation. If there is an upsurge of extremist violence before the parties have reached an overarching understanding on the main principles for the final status negotiations, the peace process will most likely encounter new deadlocks.

In the international arena, there is continued support for the peace process, coupled with a growing international expectation that Israeli territorial withdrawal will result in the establishment of a Palestinian state. In this regard, third parties, such as the UN and the EU, will play a critical role in the reconstruction of Palestinian society. The United States has already indicated its preference to return to the role of a facilitator rather than that of full partner in the negotiations.

Finally, on identifiable focal points, there is today widespread acceptance of a two-state solution, although the content is still in dispute and highly unclear, particularly on the issues of borders, Jerusalem, Jewish settlements, Palestinian sovereignty and refugees. These issues may present great obstacles in the negotiation process. At the same time, we have seen previous examples of creative solutions; the ‘Stockholm channel’ may be seen as one such illustration. Between 1994 and 1996 a few Israeli and Palestinian scholars met regularly to negotiate and construct principles for the final status negotiations. Their efforts resulted in what came to be known as the Abu Mazen-Beilin document (see further Beilin 1999). A similar endeavour, containing the overarching principles for the direction of the peace process, would provide the Palestinians and the Israelis with a future ‘road map,’ which is very much needed in such a volatile region as the Middle East.
APPENDIX ONE

U.N. Security Council Resolution 242
November 22, 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need
to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in
security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the
United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2
of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a
just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of
both the following principles:

Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence
of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and
recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity
For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; For guaranteeing the
territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through
measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed
to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in
order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted
settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress
of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 338
October 22, 1973

The Security Council,

1. Calls upon all parties to present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. Calls upon all parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

APPENDIX TWO

Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements September 13, 1993

The Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the “Palestinian Delegation”), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the, two sides agree to the following principles:

ARTICLE I

AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

ARTICLE II

FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD
The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

ARTICLE III

ELECTIONS
1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.
2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.
3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

ARTICLE IV

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides
view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

ARTICLE V
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS
1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.
3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.
4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.

ARTICLE VI
PREPARATORY TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorised Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.
2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.

ARTICLE VII
INTERIM AGREEMENT
1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the “Interim Agreement”).
2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council’s executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.
3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements to be implemented upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above.
4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities.
5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

ARTICLE VIII
PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY
In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

ARTICLE IX
LAWS AND MILITARY ORDERS
1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.
2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.

ARTICLE X
JOINT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN LIAISON COMMITTEE
In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.

ARTICLE XI
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC FIELDS
Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.

ARTICLE XII
LIAISON AND COOPERATION WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT
The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.

ARTICLE XIII
REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES
1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.
2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.
3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.
ARTICLE XIV
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA
Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.

ARTICLE XV
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.
3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

ARTICLE XVI
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL PROGRAMS
Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a "Marshall Plan", the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.

ARTICLE XVII
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
1. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.
2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

Done at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993.

For the Government of Israel
For the P.L.O.

Witnessed By:

The United States of America
The Russian Federation

ANNEX I
PROTOCOL ON THE MODE AND CONDITIONS OF ELECTIONS
1. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process, according to an agreement between the two sides.
2. In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the following issues:
   a. the system of elections;
   b. the mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal composition; and
   c. rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station.
3. The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4th June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.

ANNEX II
PROTOCOL ON WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA
1. The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.
2. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement.
3. The above agreement will include, among other things:
   a. Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives.
   b. Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and other mutually agreed matters.
   c. Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt. Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.
   d. A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.
   e. Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes.
   f. An economic development and stabilization program, including the establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment, and financial and economic support. Both sides will coordinate and cooperate jointly and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims.
   g. Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
4. The above agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages:
   a. Gaza - Egypt; and
   b. Jericho - Jordan.
5. The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority under this Annex II and Article VI of the Declaration of Principles will be located in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council.
6. Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period.

ANNEX III
PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following:

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1. Cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Development Program prepared by experts from both sides, which will also specify the mode of cooperation in the management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period.

2. Cooperation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Program, which will also specify the mode of cooperation for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity resources.

3. Cooperation in the field of energy, including an Energy Development Program, which will provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will encourage further joint exploitation of other energy resources. This Program may also provide for the construction of a Petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the construction of oil and gas pipelines.

4. Cooperation in the field of finance, including a Financial Development and Action Program for the encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.

5. Cooperation in the field of transport and communications, including a Program, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza Sea Port Area, and will provide for the establishment of transport and communications lines to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel and to other countries. In addition, this Program will provide for carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways, communications lines, etc.

6. Cooperation in the field of trade, including studies, and Trade Promotion Programs, which will encourage local, regional and inter-regional trade, as well as a feasibility study of creating free trade zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones, and cooperation in other areas related to trade and commerce.

7. Cooperation in the field of industry, including Industrial Development Programs, which will provide for the establishment of joint Israeli-Palestinian Industrial Research and Development Centers, will promote Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and science-based industries.

8. A program for cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and cooperation in social welfare issues.

9. A Human Resources Development and Cooperation Plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes and data banks.

10. An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere.

11. A program for developing coordination and cooperation in the field of communication and media.

12. Any other programs of mutual interest.

ANNEX IV

PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

1. The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a Development Program for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the G-7. The parties will request the G-7 to seek the participation in this program of other interested states, such as members of the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, regional Arab states and institutions, as well as members of the private sector.

2. The Development Program will consist of two elements:
   a. an Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
   b. a Regional Economic Development Program.

A. The Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will consist of the following elements:
   1. A Social Rehabilitation Program, including a Housing and Construction Program.
   3. An Infrastructure Development Program (water, electricity, transportation and communications, etc.)
   5. Other programs.

B. The Regional Economic Development Program may consist of the following elements:
   1. The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, and a Middle East Development Bank, as a second step.
   2. The development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area.
   3. The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza) - Dead Sea Canal.
   4. Regional Desalination and other water development projects.
   5. A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated regional effort for the prevention of desertification.
   6. Interconnection of electricity grids.
   7. Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources.
   8. A Regional Tourism, Transportation and Telecommunications Development Plan.
   9. Regional cooperation in other spheres.

3. The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups, and will coordinate towards their success. The two parties will encourage intersessional activities, as well as pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, within the various multilateral working groups.

AGREED MINUTES TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS

A. GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS

Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these Agreed Minutes below.

B. SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS

Article IV

It is understood that:
1. Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis.
2. The Council's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it.
Article VI (2)

It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows:
1. The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorised Palestinians who will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and any other authorities agreed upon.

2. It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be affected.

3. Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also will provide for the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the direct taxation office.

4. Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will immediately commence negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of authority on the above offices in accordance with the above understandings.

Article VII (2)
The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.

Article VII (5)
The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.

Article VIII
It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for cooperation and coordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police will be accomplished in a phased manner, as agreed in the Interim Agreement.

Article X
It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee. It is further agreed that each side will have an equal number of members in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee will reach decisions by agreement. The Joint Committee may add other technicians and experts, as necessary. The Joint Committee will decide on the frequency and place or places of its meetings.

Annex II
It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.

Done at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993.

For the Government of Israel
For the P.L.O.

Witnessed By:

The United States of America
The Russian Federation

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