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Interpersonal Trust and Institutional Change in Post-Communist East Germany
Hedin, Astrid

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The Politics of Social Networks
the politics of social networks
The Politics of Social Networks

INTERPERSONAL TRUST AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN POST-COMMUNIST EAST GERMANY

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Preface and acknowledgements

There is always a story behind every choice of topic for academic dissertations. The path that eventually led me to the PDS was a fascination with the fates of those liberated by the democratizations of former East Bloc countries. In the eventful autumn of 1989, I experienced the “velvet revolution” from the streets of Prague. We spent Christmas with some students squatting a building of the Charles University and experienced the installment of Vaclav Havel as president on New Year’s Day. The iron curtain had been lifted. In the summer of 1992, I returned to Bratislava, interviewing young journalists and artists about their new situation. I was curious: what happens to people when a suffocating authoritarian system is toppled? How do they seize such opportunity?

In the summer of 1994, I listened to a seminar at the International Political Science Association’s conference in Berlin, where a person on the panel caught my attention. Petra Bläss, a young Ph.D. candidate in literature, chaired the committee organizing the first democratic elections in East Germany, which were held in March 1990. In the autumn of the same year, Bläss took seat in the new all-German parliament for the PDS, the successor of the East German state communist party SED. I decided to interview Bläss for a Swedish daily newspaper. How could a young feminist end up in parliament for an old communist party? With this puzzle in mind, I later formulated a research proposal.

Little did I realize that this topic would also bring me to the heart of so common a historical debate and fervent political conflict. The representation of women in the PDS touches on historical German-
German discords, the debate on the nature of Communism, as well as controversies within and about feminism. During the course of the research project, I have had to navigate these troubled seas (Hedin 1999; 1998; 1997). Needless to say, these challenges have been tremendously rewarding.

However, the tendency of others who are less initiated to identify me with my object of inquiry – the PDS and/or its feminist politics – has been a continuous source of personal frustration. Given the contested political status of the PDS, it might be worth remarking that in this study, the PDS and its feminist policies are not brought to court, but to the laboratory.

I would like to take the opportunity to warmly thank all of the people who have helped, supported and inspired me in this academic enterprise.

My first and cordial thanks go to my academic advisor, Professor Lennart Lundquist, at the Lund University Department of Political Science. I would especially like to thank Lennart for the times he has reminded me that academic work is not only important, but a great pleasure, as well as for his confident and generous academic advice: “You should do exactly as you like! That’s what I’ve always done.”

I am extremely fortunate to have enjoyed the informal mentorship of two scholars, who have supplied pep talks and taken me along to several interesting conferences, from Harvard to Helsinki. I am very grateful to Professor Myra Marx Ferree of the University of Wisconsin and at the time visiting scholar at the Wissenschaftszentrum-Berlin. In the early stages of the project, she urged me on with practical advice: “It’s a three-article thing.” During the writing up of the thesis, Professor Pushkala Prasad of Lund University and Skidmore College, U.S.A coached me in the field of organization studies. Thanks, Pushi.

Professor Gert-Joachim Glæßner, head of the Berlin Humboldt University’s new department of political science, generously accepted to host me as a visiting Ph.D. candidate, from September 1996 until April 1998. In Berlin, I shared an office in the building of the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft in Berlin-Mitte. The Ph.D. candidates Cornelia
Neubert and Constanze Schweinsteiger were both wonderful office-mates.

The three friends in Berlin who have helped me the most in gaining an understanding of German politics and history, East and West, are Dr. Ingrid Miethe, and the journalists and graduates in history Stefanie Flamm and Jan Selling. With their three very different perspectives, their intellectual commitment and generosity, they pushed and inspired me to make my own readings.

Trying to list all the individuals who were helpful in a project such as this is notoriously hazardous. Many people have gracefully read and commented on early versions of various parts of the thesis, presented as conference papers at the ECPR (European Consortium of Political Scientists), ISA (International Studies Association), EGSG (East German Studies Group), COS (Copenhagen Business School Center for Research on Public Organisation and Management), EGOS (European Group for Organizational Studies), NSU (Nordic Summer University) and the Swedish and Nordic associations of political scientists, as well as at the seminars of the Lund University Department of Political Science. I would like to express my gratitude to all of these readers for their constructive criticism.

I am especially grateful to Dr. Anders Uhlin and Gissur Erlingsson, who performed a thorough reading of the whole draft thesis for the traditional “trial seminar”. I am also indebted to the following persons for excellent and very helpful written comments on larger blocks of the final manuscript: Caroline Boussard, Dr. Mikael Carleheden, Dr. Sven-Olof Collin, Christian Fernandez, Dr. Ella Johansson, Karl Löfgren, Dr. Ingrid Miethe, Dr. Bo Petersson, Dr. Richard Sotto, Dr. Erika Svedberg, Peter Svensson, Dr. Jonas Tallberg, Maria Wendt Höjer and Dr. Cecilia Åse.

I am deeply grateful to all the good friends and colleagues who have supported me along the way in this project. I would have liked to mention many more names, but I will keep it very short and single out just three persons, thanking Karin Bäckstrand for the many good laughs at our coffee-breaks, Ulla Johansson for introducing me to her friends and working weekends at the coast, and Måns Lindgren
for being there. To my family – my parents, my two elder sisters, brothers-in-law and six lovely nieces and nephews – I look forward to adding a fifth Doctoral degree, which will be the first one in the social sciences.

I would like to thank a number of institutions that have funded my research: The Department of Political Science at Lund University generously employed me as a Ph.D. candidate and teacher for a good four years. The Swedish Institute supported my extended stay in Berlin, which was crucial for this study. Together with the DAAD (Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst), the Swedish Institute also financed my language training, where I acquired a GDS diploma. The most faithful financiers of my travels to various conferences have been Ekedahl-Lundbergska fonden and the Faculty of Social Sciences at Lund University.

Last but not least, I would like to thank all of my interviewees. Interviewing not only supplied the case study with indispensable information, but was also an irreplaceable experience, a first-hand exposure to a unique historical legacy and transformation.
CHAPTER I

Introduction

The basic error of all materialism in politics – and this materialism is not Marxian and not even modern in origin, but as old as our history of political theory – is to overlook the inevitability with which men disclose themselves as subjects, as distinct and unique persons, even when they wholly concentrate upon reaching an altogether worldly, material object. [...] The realm of human affairs, strictly speaking, consists of the web of human relationships [...].


Social network relations matter to politics. Starting up a new political organization is typically performed by a group of trusted friends, colleagues or buddies, drawing on their social network resources. Within an institutionalized organization, social network relations pattern informal communication and cooperation. In organizational entrepreneurship, as well as in everyday institutional life, relations of interpersonal trust structure interactions. These relations take time to establish. Relations of interpersonal trust constitute an enduring structure that limits and enables agency. When an organization is under external pressure to change, social network structures may outlive formal organization, guiding the trajectory of organizational reform.

This book applies a social network perspective on institutions. How social network structures may steer the trajectory of change in political institutions is theoretically argued and empirically illustrated. Social network analysis has its origins within anthropology, but has been developed within management studies and new economic sociology.
In this book, the social network perspective is presented as a contrast and complement to new institutionalist analysis.

The case study of the book involves the rapid reform and beginning re-institutionalization of a former state socialist party, the East German PDS. I try to show how the analysis of interpersonal networks is a rewarding methodology for retracing and understanding the trajectory of organizational transformation. Conversely, the de-institutionalized situation, the very swift and surprising democratizations of former state socialist systems, is a setting where the importance of interpersonal networks was particularly evident, offering a good opportunity to examine and analyze the role of social network structures and mechanisms in organizational takeovers and change.

I argue that social network relations may be especially crucial bases of cooperation and agency in phases of radical and rapid organizational change, when old institutions crumble and new ones take form. In a de-institutionalized context, political entrepreneurship may have to rely on pre-existing, trust-carrying social network ties for recruitment and coordination of collective action. In the course of interpersonal interaction, beliefs and ideas are formed and spread through social influence and deliberation. In this regard, social network analysis may be a key to institutional path-dependence.

From a social network perspective, organizational development is path-dependent on pre-existing structures of social networks. It is contingent on the structuring and restructing of networks. The claim that social networks are important to political change rests on an assumption of history as “inefficient” (March and Olsen 1984; 1989; 1995). It assumes that organizational development is not a simple mirror image of underlying social forces; not predetermined or necessary. Historical development is bounded, but not optionless (Sztompka 1993).

The field of organization studies cuts across several disciplines. The social network framework of analysis reviewed, amended and employed in this thesis has been most prominently developed within new economic sociology (Granovetter 1973; 1974/1995; 1985; 1988/
Aim of the Study

In this book, I compare, contrast and argue for certain compatibilities between the social network approach and new institutionalist frameworks. Specifically, I suggest the social network approach as a complement to political science new institutionalism, March and Olsen’s normative new institutionalism (March and Olsen 1984; 1989; 1995). I argue that the social network approach should be a relevant and rewarding framework of analysis for the study of organizational entrepreneurship and reform, such as political party change – with which the case study is concerned. Related to this, I argue that the social network approach should also be pertinent to the emergence and change of inter-organizational networks, such as policy networks.

Why Social Networks?

Why choose a social network approach to analyze political developments? Conversely, why choose this particular case to explore the usefulness of social network analysis? I have three very general arguments for these choices: Firstly, the importance of social network structures may be particularly evident in radical and rapid political transitions. Hence, the case study is based on one such example. Secondly, I argue that it is important to theorize on how social networks work since these may be growing more important in today’s emerging decentralized and semi-autonomous forms of political organization. Thirdly, social network cooperation may be both efficient and exclusive simultaneously, and hence relevant to discussions of democracy and difference. I shall restate these three points in turn:

Political Transitions

I argue that social networks may be especially crucial structures of social coordination in periods of radical and rapid political change, when old institutions are toppled and new must be formed. For
example, in a rapid transition to democracy from a post-totalitarian system, where alternative institutions have not had any chance to emerge, collective action will have to rely on non-institutional structures such as personal connections developed under the old regime. In the context of East Germany, this phenomenon has primarily been discussed in relation to economic entrepreneurship (Offe 1996b; Grabher and Stark 1998). I claim that the analysis of interpersonal networks may be a rewarding approach to backtrack and understand the development of new political formations following the very swift and surprising democratizations of former state communist systems. Conversely, this might be a setting where the importance of personal networks is particularly manifest, offering a good opportunity to examine and develop lines of argument around how social networks work.

*The Network Society*

Networks have been claimed to be an increasingly important feature of post-modern, post-liberal politics in Western democracies. I argue that the informality and semi-autonomy of network forms of organization make social network analysis relevant to this emerging morphology of civil and political society. Whereas ten years ago, market and hierarchy were still unchallenged as dominating metaphors for the architecture of politics (Cerny 1990), the network is emerging as a competing ideal type, a new social morphology of society (Castells 1996). In the classic Weberian ideas on hierarchical organization and management, the modern growth of bureaucracy meant extending rationality (Mitchell 1991). Neutral administrative practice outmoded previous models of state activity. In the ideal-typical liberal state, networks coincide with formal organization (Lundquist 1987: 66).

In contrast, in the information age, there are both practical and democratic reasons why organization can and perhaps should take more decentralized and semi-autonomous forms. Network models are applicable, for example, to emerging forms of government by organizational concertation or agreement (Streek and Schmitter 1991); the “negotiating state” (Lundquist 1991: 24–25); the European Union as a system of negotiations in networks (Jönsson et al. 1998); the state and civil society mix in the policy-making of the emerging
aim of the study / 17

“organizational state” (Knoke et al. 1996); organizational fragmentation and interorganizational negotiation in local government (Bogason and Toonen 1998; Bogason 1998); post-modern corporate organizations (Kanter 1993); civil servant semi-autonomy in state administration (Lundquist 1987: 196); and the “associative democracy” of civil society (Hirst 1997). The social network perspective may provide one important framework for understanding the network organization of the future (Brass 1998).

Democracy and Difference

The social network perspective may also be relevant to discussions of pluralist democracy, discursive or deliberative democracy and the current lively debate on “democracy and difference”; i.e. the challenges that multi-culturalism and demands for gender equality pose to post-modern political institutions (Habermas 1996a; 1996b; Phillips 1995; Benhabib 1996a). I would argue that informal personal networks can, simultaneously, be both an asset to and a problem for the attainment of various democratic ideals. Social networks may facilitate the cooperation necessary for the establishment and running of political organizations (Tocqueville 1840/1946; Putnam 1993), but may simultaneously be exclusive (Taylor 1998), circumvent formal democratic rules of decision-making and impede or delimit deliberative democracy (Habermas 1992; Elster 1998c).

Within contemporary political science, social networks are often claimed to be the basis of democratic community (Putnam 1995; 2000; Sztompka 1999). Social network relations produce the social capital and trust that makes the Italian democracy work (Putnam 1993) and advances the economic productivity of high-trust societies and ethnic minority groups (Fukuyama 1995). In these optimistic accounts, soccer clubs, choirs, church groups, charities, fraternal and veterans associations, parent-teacher associations and bowling together make all the difference (Putnam 2000: 28; Putnam 1995).

But who bowls together? In stark contrast to the rosy accounts praising the virtues of community stands the literature on power elites, where members of higher circles mingle on the golf course and in gentlemen’s clubs (Mills 1956). According to elitist studies, associations such as boarding schools and private clubs create a “class-wide
rationality” among corporate directors (Useem 1982, 1984). Corporate interlocks produce an “inner circle” with leverage on government policy in Great Britain and the United States (ibid.). Old school ties, political party membership and residence lay the basis for “enforceable trust” – a key factor in French high finance (Kadushin 1995).

The studies of bowling, and the studies of golf and golf-court decision-making both build on aggregate analysis of social networks, one defining social networking as a virtue and the other as a vice. The social network perspective outlined in this book differs from such literatures on several important accounts. I argue the relevance of a qualitative analysis of social networks. Rather than broad statistical aggregates, this study focuses on social network structures and mechanisms among a small number of real-life individuals.

From this more myopic perspective, I would argue that social networks cannot be defined a priori as either virtue or vice. In the close study of actual specific social network processes, the virtuous and unvirtuous aspects of social network action may be less neatly separable (compare Etzioni-Halevy 1993; Marsh 1995). On the one hand, spontaneously emerging social networks, building on interpersonal trust rather than threat, are integral to the vivacity of democratic life. Uncoerced, spontaneous and trustful cooperation in social networks is efficient and solves problems of collective action. On the other hand, trust-carrying social networks are exclusive. Hence, if social network structures and social network mechanisms matter to political organization, then this may constitute an asset, as well as a challenge, to the realization of democratic ideals.

The Case Study

On November 9, 1989, after months of regime-critical protests, when tens of thousands of East Germans had fled to the West, and hundreds of thousands had participated in oppositional demonstrations, the opening of the Berlin wall was abruptly announced at an SED press-conference. Three weeks later, the “leading role” of the state-carrying party SED, die Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, was removed from the GDR constitution, ending party hegemony over the country. Concurrently, the SED was reformed. At an extraordinary party
congress, a new party chairman and party government were elected. The enormous vessel of the SED – its membership base of over two million, its many buildings and offices, its approximately 40,000 employees, its economic assets, and, not least, its ideological heritage – had been boarded by a new crew.

The new party chairman elect was Gregor Gysi, a GDR lawyer who had defended regime critics at political trials. His closest associate in the PDS was Lothar Bisky, vice-chancellor of the Potsdam-Babelsberg College of film and television. Other party government members included critical academics and reform-oriented regional party secretaries catapulted into office during the weeks preceding the fall of the Berlin wall. In February 1990, the SED was renamed Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus, Party of Democratic Socialism, and ran for office in the first East German democratic elections. In these March 1990 elections, the PDS gained 16.4 percent of the votes. After German reunification in the autumn of 1990, the PDS entered the all-German Bundestag. Reaching an all-time high of 34.7 percent of the votes in east Berlin in the 1994 federal elections, two electoral terms after democratization, the party had an average of roughly 20 percent of the votes in former East Germany. This makes the PDS the smallest party of the emerged three-party system in the five new eastern states of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Feminist Turn of the PDS

This study does not take a grip on the PDS reformation as a whole, but focuses on a specific and curious feature of the democratic transformation, namely the high representation of women at the top levels of the PDS and the party’s ideological turn to feminism. During its early years, in accordance with feminist demands, the PDS adopted a statutory 50 percent quota for women to the party government as well as to parliamentary mandates. The old socialist party has also made a surprising programmatic turn to feminism.

Why did the SED-successor take a feminist turn? Several background factors were favorable to the feminist development, factors which set the GDR apart from other East Bloc states. One distinguishing ideological attribute of GDR socialism was the propagation of an ostensibly women-friendly form of “Mommy politics” (Ferree
At a first glance, PDS feminism may be mistaken to be simply an SED heritage. The SED heritage alone, however, can explain neither the PDS 50 percent quota for women to political mandates, nor the party’s turn to feminism as opposed to “Mommy politics”.

The GDR citizen’s rights movement was different from those of other East Bloc countries in the flourishing of regime-critical women’s groups. During the last months of the GDR, numerous women’s groups raised political demands that the SED state should live up to its propagated ideal of gender equality. However, despite the efforts of East German feminists to gain leverage on the reformation of the SED, they were less successful at gaining access to the PDS top echelons of power than – curiously – were West German feminists. Although the 50 percent quota for women was originally a demand from East German feminists, the decisive thrust that made the PDS adopt the quota came instead from a handful of West German feminists, recruited to the PDS through intermediaries of trust in an unrepeated infusion of West German leftists.

These Western feminists gained access to the inner circles of the party and managed to convince the PDS leadership that a 50 percent quota for women was an appropriate policy. A quota would demonstrate to Western voters that the former communist party had been successfully reformed and modernized. From an electoral perspective, the feminist turn may be interpreted as a – largely unsuccessful – move to gain Western leftist voters. From the perspective of intra-party tactics, the quota may to a certain degree have helped the inner circle of SED reformers to block the access of the older SED cadre to party government and parliamentary mandates (Moreau 1992: 260). However, interpreting the turn to feminism as an intra-party tactic or electoral strategy does not answer the question of how this specific tactic or strategy came to prevail. Likewise, a programmatic analysis of PDS feminism and the basis of its support in the party membership may answer questions about the degree of ideological continuity versus ideological modernization, but does not explain why the reformation of SED ideology took the specific direction that it did.

I try to demonstrate how the takeover and reformation of the PDS can be successfully retraced and analyzed within a social network framework of analysis. Feminist norms, ideas and cognitions did not gain
access to the PDS reform process as disembodied discourses. Neither was the feminist development an objectively given necessity. Instead, feminist ideas and convictions entered the PDS reform processes with specific individuals. My study highlights the importance of trust-carrying social network ties, pre-dating the crucial short time span of swift and radical institutional change. It also discusses the importance of intermediaries of trust and non-redundant or “weak” ties, enhancing the contingent or chance character of institutional change.

PDS and Post-Communist Studies

The specific authoritarian, post-totalitarian heritage of the PDS sets it apart from other political parties in the Federal German Republic (Eckhard 1994; Thompson 1998; Fritze 1998). The PDS is an almost unique case in that the post-communist party has been catapulted directly into a fully-fledged, stable and unsparing Western democratic system. In this respect, the PDS is a social scientist’s rare laboratory case (Offe 1996a). From this perspective, the development of the PDS could be expected to expose the limits and weaknesses of formal democratic frameworks.

I claim that studying the PDS can tell us something not only about transitions from post-totalitarian rule, but of the conditions of democratic governance in general. The difference between the inner workings of the PDS and those of West European political parties in general is assumed to be one of degree rather than of kind. The analysis focuses some of the social network dynamics within the top echelons of the PDS. These social network dynamics are analyzed not primarily concerning their democratic character, but concerning questions of continuity and change, i.e. political entrepreneurship and institutionalization.

The social network antecedents of the PDS reformation point to the limits of totalitarian rule (Heinz 2000). Despite the efforts of the SED-state to control all organizational life in the GDR, to a certain, limited extent, social networks could still provide sheltered corners or “niches” in the system (Lindenberger 2000; Flam 1998: 69). Despite the attention given to social network relations developed before the fall of the SED-regime, the case study does not tie in to earlier research agendas of communist studies (Eckhard 1995; Timmermann 1995).
Compared to the field of communist studies, other theoretical perspectives are applied to a different subject matter: I apply general organization theory not to the SED organization during the GDR, but to the efforts of organizational entrepreneurs reforming the SED into the PDS after the fall of the SED-regime.

**Research on the PDS**

There is a plethora of good empirical overviews of the PDS, but a dearth of theoretically focused analyses of specific phases or aspects of the party (Phillips 1991; Bortfeldt 1992; Moreau 1992; Welzel 1992; Gerner 1994; Brie et al. 1995; Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung 1995; 1997; Neugebauer and Riester 1996; Neugebauer and Stöss 1996; Agasøster 1996; Barker 1998; Nakath et al. 1998; Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung 1997; Neugebauer and Stöss 1996; Agasøster 1996; Barker 1998; Nakath et al. 1998; Sturm 2000). Interestingly, apart from two or three articles by PDS politicians and their assistants (Knake-Werner and Kiesbauer 1995; Schröter et al. 1996), there is to my knowledge no literature whatsoever on the representation of women or feminism in the PDS. Furthermore, in the literature on the PDS, this aspect of the party is conspicuously absent. Evidently, the scientific interest in this phenomenon has not been appreciated.

**Methodological Considerations**

So far, I have delineated the main lines and logic of the study. In the last few pages of this chapter, I present the case study material and discuss the research design and process. I then conclude with an extended overview of the chapters to come.

**Interview Material and Access**

The case study is based on 30 interviews with current and former centrally placed politicians and functionaries of the PDS, primarily at the federal, but also at state level, concerning their recruitment to and current activity within the PDS. Also, I have studied the inner dynamics of the PDS by sitting in on several meetings of the federal party executive, internal meetings of the PDS faction in the federal German parliament, the yearly party convention, several intra-party
conferences on various themes, an internal meeting of the federal and state party speakers on women’s issues (*Frauenpolitische Sprecherinnen*), as well as a meeting of the central election campaign planning committee for the 1998 elections.

The interviews were pre-announced as “biographical interviews” and my research-interest to be the high representation of women in the PDS and a wish to compare male and female biographies. The interviews centered on the simple and open question: “How did you get into the PDS?” Specifically, I tried to draw out information on the process of recruitment and nomination. Without exception, these narratives involved the mention of personal connections at crucial junctures of the road into office. Certain interviews were less biographical in character and came to center more on questions on the history behind the women’s quota in the PDS and on the current structure of influence and decision-making in the party. I concluded the interviews by asking whom I might interview next. In this manner, I would “snowball” interviewees. The interviews were pre-announced as being two hours long. Some interviewees, particularly those in bundestag, did not have that much time to spare. Most other interviews were that long; some interviewees spent considerably more time on me and granted repeated interviews.

The case study also builds on autobiographies published by several of the more prominent PDS politicians, on analyses written by academics associated with the PDS, as well as on scientific research on the democratic transition of the autumn of 1989. The autobiographies helped me gain important background information as well as relevant biographical information. The analyses of the PDS written by academics more or less associated to the PDS have of course been valuable sources. Here, the line is difficult to draw between what should be counted as scientific works and primary sources. Good political analyses of the PDS have been published by the research foundations *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*, associated to the German social democrats (SPD) and by the *Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung*, associated with the Christian democrats (CDU).

The scientific study of the transition to democracy in the fall of 1989 is an expanding field of research, where much valuable archival documentation is currently being analyzed and published. This material is mostly relevant for the phase of SED disintegration, prior to the
reformation into the PDS, but also for some aspects of the early phases of the PDS.

How did I get access to the PDS? I had several inroads into the party organization. I presume that my initial interview with the party election manager and strategist André Brie may have opened up avenues for other interviews, but this is only a speculation. This interview was set up with the help of a letter of recommendation from the Humboldt University, where I was at the time a visiting Ph.D. candidate. Apart from “snowballing” interviews, I also chose whom to interview based on my readings of party materials and biographies; and from observing PDS party meetings, writing letters or simply walking up and introducing myself at party conferences. Generally, however, the best interviews were granted through a recommendation from another interviewee. I also asked interviewees to put me in touch with chosen interviewees. Additionally, I had been in touch with one PDS Member of Parliament for a newspaper interview years earlier, which was also useful.

Key to the openness of the PDS organization was surely the party’s efforts to gain democratic legitimacy. Access is generally open to party government meetings, as well as to several bundestag meetings. I also managed to distinguish several reasons as to why I as an individual researcher was granted a certain goodwill. First and foremost, I was researching a theme that was regarded to be a positive factor for the public image of the party; namely its high representation of women. I also spent a considerable amount of time researching the party.

A Note on the Research Design and Process

Fruitful research processes less often follow the orderly track laid out in the original research proposal. Consequently, the best manner of presenting a research project is seldom a chronological account of the research process. Still, this actual chronology may be of interest. For example, it is commonly considered an advantage if the research process produces unexpected results and the researcher is forced to go back to the literature. In this iterative pattern-matching procedure, an initial theoretical statement or proposition is compared to case findings, the statement revised, and the revised statement compared to further details of the case study (Yin 1984: 113–115). Hence, such
heuristic case studies tie directly into theory building (Eckstein 1975: 104–108).

This research project originated from a substantial familiarity with the literature on women in politics; and a conviction that any study of “women” should have implications for literature on political science in general. I also had some insight into the literature on transitions to democracy. From the large literature on women in parliamentary politics, I had concluded that formalized and centralized nomination procedures should enhance the recruitment and influence of female politicians. In the literature on transitions to democracy, I had noted the widespread critique of all-too agency-oriented models: in the study of transitions to democracy, the actor-structure problem had been “solved” by assuming that at the moment of transition, actors were the masters of structures, whereas over time, the adverse relation would prevail. I thought it reasonable that social networks should be important structures in democratic transitions, when institutional structures are destabilized or obliterated. Hence, the PDS’ turn to feminism was an interesting deviant case, since, although informal social network structures had – I hypothesized – been important to the transition, the reformation of the party had resulted in a high number of women representatives.

At the outset, I had originally expected that the common tendency to gender differentiation in social networking would have been transgressed in the PDS, perhaps due to the societal structure of the GDR, where women to a larger degree were present on the labor market and in the system of education. I soon had to abandon this idea. In fact, the social network structures guiding the reform process were indeed almost exclusively male. A surprise in the research process was the importance of intermediaries of trust and non-redundant ties. Despite the general tendency to similarity interaction in social networking – the “strength of similarity” outlined in Chapter 5 – it only took one trust-carrying, non-redundant social network tie to help bridge a handful of women with feminist ideas into the entrepreneurial process at the right moment. This recruitment was then crucial for the feminist turn of the PDS.

During the interview phase, I felt compelled to do a substantial amount of reading on the East German political context as well as German 20th century history in general. These readings have been
very important for my understanding of the political context, as well as my ability to make an informed defense of my choice of research object. Traces of these readings can be found in the outline of the historical context of the PDS reformation made in Chapter 6 and in Hedin 1999.

After having concluded the field study, I again reached for the literature on organizations to see if I could find corroboration for some of the more fascinating phenomena in the social network dynamics of the PDS. This I found, for example, in Burt’s article on the “genderedness of social capital”, and in Coleman’s conception of “intermediaries of trust”. Together with Ibarra’s articles on the general genderedness of social networks, these arguments are laid out in Chapter 5 on the “strength of similarity”. The “hub” around which the research-design rotates, connecting the case with the theoretical argument in Chapter 4, is the argument of the “strength of similarity”, made in Chapter 5.

During the field study, I gradually found more and more support for a simple hypothesis: that how a person gets into an organization relates to their later organizational fate. Being formally elected into an organizational position is not the same thing as being integrated into the most influential informal organizational networks. Conversely, informal recruitment based on interpersonal trust is likely to lead to inclusion into informal circles within organizations. I found similar ideas featured, for example, in some shorter passages in Granovetter’s early work on social networks (1974/1995), reviewed in Chapter 3.

A Note on the Case Study Method

As in most case studies, I keep theory and case separate in the account of the project (Yin 1984: 139). In the research process, however, the findings of the case study have laid the ground for my discussion of the organization studies literature. The conclusions, made on the basis of the field study, are condensed into the formulation of an abstract model of social network action. This “logic of interpersonal trust” is extensively argued in Chapter 4. The theoretical argument is stated in abstract form, emphasizing the generality of the developed framework, which should, I argue, be applicable to numerous contexts. Presenting the case in a separate chapter helps do justice to the
complexity of actual events. Supplying the account of the reformation of the PDS with a fair amount of historical context and detail strengthens the case made.

Is it possible to generalize from a case study? While some philosophers of science are more pessimistic on this account (c.f. King et al. 1994: 34–74, 24–25), the defenders of the case study are more optimistic (c.f. Eckstein 1975; Yin 1984; Flyvbjerg 1991; George 1979). A rule of thumb is that the possibilities of generalization depend on the grounds for choosing the case (Eckstein 1975: 132, Flyvbjerg 1991: 145, 132). As stated, I have chosen to look at the social network dynamics of the SED reformation into the PDS since I have assumed it to be a case where social network structures and mechanisms should be particularly influential and readily observable. In relation to the proposed logic of interpersonal trust, the organizational entrepreneurship in the PDS is an extreme case: it is chosen to be revealing, to make a point particularly well (Flyvbjerg 1991: 149; Eckstein 1975: 106).

Are case studies biased toward verification of the initial hypothesis? Defenders of the case study approach have a clear negative answer to this question (Flyvbjerg 1991: 154–156). Qualitative case studies do not give more room for the researcher’s subjectivity than do, for example, pre-structured quantitative studies. The rigor of the qualitative case study lies in the fact that the researcher ventures so close to reality and must investigate it on its own conditions. Hence, case study researchers are often forced to discard preconceived ideas or theories (ibid.). The case study makes intensive observation possible and is a learning process for the researcher, which can give a deeper and more advanced form of understanding of complex social phenomena.

Plan of the Book

For the sake of overview, I shall finish this chapter by summarizing the chapters to come no less than twice; first very briefly and then somewhat more extensively. Additionally, I again give overviews of the text in each chapter. Notably, the chapters of the book are rather long, but divided into shorter sections. The overviews are intended to be maps of the “main roads” and “highways” of the argument, which the reader might want to refer to now and then during the
perhaps sometimes tedious journey through the smaller streets of the text. With the help of the overviews, it should be possible to take shortcuts in the reading.

In the next chapters, I in turn outline the social network approach (Chapters 3 and 4); a proposed social network model of institutional change, namely a “logic of interpersonal trust” (Chapter 4); and an argument on the genderedness of social networks and networking, the “strength of similarity” (Chapter 5). After these three chapters, where the argument is held on an abstract, theoretical level, I go on to the illustrating case study. I first outline the historical context of the case study (Chapter 6), and then illustrate the “logic of interpersonal trust” and “strength of similarity” with examples from the case study of the representation of women in the PDS (Chapter 7).

Chapter 2
Social Networks and Historical Change

A number of theoretical frameworks could be made to bear on a social network analysis of the PDS reformation. Here, I list some of these works and relate them to the study. Some of these represent “blind alleys”; i.e. sets of research questions that I have abandoned in favor of letting the study maintain its theoretical focus on social network structures and mechanisms. Still, I think my study might perhaps be of indirect interest in relation to the following fields of research: feminist or gender studies, and political party studies.

Chapter 3
Social Networks and Policy Networks

Networks have been claimed to be an emerging morphology of postmodern society. The third chapter introduces and discusses the network metaphor, comparing it to models of markets and hierarchies. Then, the literature on policy networks is discussed and related to the social network approach. In the last part of Chapter 3, the social network literature is introduced and some key concepts within it discussed.
Chapter 4

The “Logic of Interpersonal Trust”

The fourth and central chapter argues and formulates a social network model of action, the “logic of interpersonal trust”. The logic of interpersonal trust is launched as a contrast, complement and link between March and Olsen’s two models of organizational behavior: the “logic of consequentiality”, which assumes actors to be rational, and the “logic of appropriateness”, which assumes that actors adhere to norms and rules. The proposed logic of interpersonal trust is claimed to be particularly crucial to processes of institutional change; both in slow processes of institutional change, where logics of appropriateness are gradually undermined or changed, as well as in rapid and radical processes of change, when the cognitive and normative status of means and ends are particularly unclear and, it is argued, dependent on social network deliberation and cooperation.

This rather long chapter consists of four parts, which step-by-step build up an extended argument that concludes with the formulation of the “logic of interpersonal trust”. The first part of the chapter is a brief and generally held introduction to the organization studies and new institutionalist literature, which is contrasted to the social network approach of new economic sociology. It is argued that new institutionalist approaches are weak at explaining institutional change. Hence, in a second section, some of Anthony Giddens’ methodological recommendations for the study of social change are reviewed. Giddens differentiates between face-to-face interaction versus geographical and spatial distantiation, arguing that this division of levels of analysis is more conducive to the study of social change than is the classic micro-macro distinction. Social network analysis, it is noted, operates at the level of face-to-face interaction. The social network approach, it is argued, may help resolve some of the problems surrounding structure and agency within new institutionalist analysis.

In the remaining and major part of Chapter 4, the social network approach is extensively related to, in turn, new economic institutionalism and political science new institutionalism. Specifically, the discussion first takes up transaction cost approaches within new economic institutionalism (NIE), and then March and Olsen’s normative new institutionalism.
Chapter 5

The “Strength of Similarity”

The next chapter provides the link between the general argument on institutional change and the choice of case study. If, as is argued in the preceding chapter, processes of institutional change are dominated by a logic of interpersonal trust, then a gender differentiated character of social networks and networking should be particularly consequential for institutional change.

The argued “strength of similarity” can be divided into two aspects. If, in a de-institutionalized context, the structure of social networks may gain increased importance, then, to the extent that pre-existing social networks are gender differentiated, the effects of the reliance on social network structures will be gendered. Secondly, in situations and organizational positions where uncertainty is high, interpersonal trust will be sought in social network relations, which tend to be based on perceived similarity. According to numerous statistical studies of social networking, gender tends to be an aspect of similarity and difference that overrides other aspects of difference, such as education or organizational position. Also, the organizational structure of society is often such that opportunities for social networking strengthen the tendency to similarity interaction.

In contrast to the new institutionalist discussions of the preceding chapter, the argument of the strength of similarity is based on empirical generalizations drawn from a more empirically orient-ed part of the organization studies literature, namely management studies.

Chapter 6

A Historical Overview

For the reader unacquainted with East German politics, Chapter 6 gives a historical overview of the founding of the GDR and the events of the autumn of 1989. It is argued that in the East German transition to democracy, organizational resources proved crucial to political success. In this political context, the PDS had an enormous advantage in its established party infrastructure and other resources. This made PDS development largely a question of organizational takeover. In contrast,
the informal networks of the East German citizen’s rights movement were soon marginalized. The chapter briefly sketches the history behind the emergence of the present party system in former east Germany and the role of the PDS in the system.

Chapter 7
Social Network Entrepreneurship

The case study illustrates the importance of social network structures and mechanisms to organizational entrepreneurship. The retracing of social network recruitment, deliberation and cooperation is suggested as a methodological key to the path-dependency of institutional reform.

The December 1989 takeover of the GDR state-carrying party SED, Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, and its reformation into the PDS, Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus, is reviewed. In particular, the chapter retraces the PDS’ surprising turn to feminism and the institution of a 50 percent quota for women to party government and parliamentary nominations.

It is shown extensively how the reformation of the SED into the PDS was dependent on social network structures as well as re-structuration, i.e. on pre-existing ties of interpersonal trust, as well as the mobilization of non-redundant resources through non-redundant or “weak” social network ties. Notably, early social network mobilization brought very few women into the entrepreneurial process. The PDS quota decision is instead retraced to the later informal recruitment of a small circle of West German leftists, via crucial intermediaries of trust. In short, it is argued that the feminist turn of the PDS was contingent on social network entrepreneurship and mobilization of resources, giving institutional reform a contingent or chance character.

Chapter 8
Conclusions

In the concluding chapter, some methodological implications of the social network approach are outlined. Three fields of research are suggested as examples of where the social network approach outlined in this study should be relevant, namely in studies of governance and public administration, in studies of similarity and diversity in
organizations, and in studies of political leadership and political transitions.

In the last few pages of the book, I sketch some possible connections between ongoing debates within democratic theory and the proposed models of social network structuration and social network agency. The “strength of similarity” argues the relevance of social identity and expressiveness to democratic organization. The social network “logic of interpersonal trust” highlights the communicative power inherent in the “web of human relationships” (Arendt 1958, 1969).
This chapter reviews two theoretical perspectives on which the following study is not based. In order to anticipate some common questions, obviate misunderstandings and put the reader on the right track, I discuss some of the analytical concerns that may first spring to mind at the mention of the theme “the feminist turn of the PDS”; namely feminist analysis and traditional political party analysis. In this chapter, I outline how the social network perspective and illustrating case study of the book are indirectly relevant to these two other fields of study.

Firstly, the social network perspective outlined in this book can be read as a critique of the feminist critique of democratic revolutions. I argue that the genderedness of social networks – that men tend to have male rather than female friends – may be one relevant explanation for the observed “masculine” character of democratic revolutions, since in situations of radical and rapid institutional change, the political salience of social network structures increases. The social network perspective on gender inequality stresses simple micro-level tendencies or social mechanisms, which implies the contingent character of male domination. This contrasts to traditional feminist analysis, which regards various aspects of gender equality as parts of one single system or process.

However, as explained in Chapter 1, the focus of the following study is neither women nor gender inequality. Instead, the feminist turn of the PDS is analyzed as a case study of the relevance of social networks to institutional change. As developed in Chapter 5, I do not
focus on gender relations as such, but suggest the genderedness of social networks as an analytical key to the role of social networks and networking in institutional change.

Secondly, in this chapter, I discuss the literature on political parties. I highlight some of what political party theory has to say about the importance of social network mechanisms. Specifically, during the formative phase of political party development, informal “teams” may form within the party leadership. From a social network perspective, the discussion of “teams” in the literature on political parties implies that party formation and change can be analyzed in terms of social network entrepreneurship. In the remaining chapters of the book, I continue to outline and employ this alternative line of inquiry: social network analysis.

**Feminist Studies**

As emphasized, this study is neither a feminist study nor a study of women. The focus is not gender inequality, but the importance of social network mechanisms in institutional change. However, the social network perspective may certainly be relevant to feminist concerns. Feminist research has shown that women in organizational settings tend to have weaker access to informal interaction networks (Ibarra 1992; 1993). Social networks and networking tends to be gender differentiated. Feminist studies focus on the role network mechanisms play in creating and reinforcing gender inequality.

The claim made in the case study of the PDS – that social network dynamics have an impact on the representation of women in a political party – can be related to several discussions within feminist and gender studies: one pertaining to the character of democratic revolutions, the second a less philosophical and more empirically oriented research agenda on the number of women in parliaments. Both discussions belong to the traditional feminist lines of inquiry and are not representative of the most recent developments within post-modern feminism. In turn, I shall review and comment on these two traditional fields of study within feminist research.
Feminist Critiques of Democratic Revolutions

When, in the mid 1980s, the historian Joan Scott published her call for “gender as a useful category of historical analysis”, this marked a turning point in feminist social science (Scott 1986/1999). Scott raised the theoretical pretensions of the emerging field of research on “women’s history” by claiming the genderedness of history itself. Within “women’s history”, women were being made the focus of historical inquiry and subjects of historical narratives: writing “her story”. Because of the past male dominance within the discipline and male historians’ tendency to privilege men as the subjects of historical narratives, the new tradition of writing women’s history enriched the discipline. Still, Scott was concerned that women’s history could be perceived as a simple “addition”. Commonly, the “adding women in”–perspective has been scorned by feminist analysis (Silverberg 1990).

The launch of gender as an analytical concept was meant to establish the general importance of gender difference in the conceptualization and organization of social life (Scott 1986/1999: 20).

The feminist ambition is not only to restore women to history, but also “restore history to women” (Kelly 1984; Scott 1986/1999). This means problematizing traditional historical periodization, categories of social analysis, and theories of social change (Kelly 1984). Gender as an analytical concept should introduce a new narrative, different historical periodization and different causes (Scott 1986/1999: 19). To feminist researchers, the “engendering of historical narrative” means giving women – or gender relations – their own historical narrative, with different categories of periodization and different structural regularities (Benhabib 1995a: 19). Benhabib reminds us of Hegel’s joke or “quip” that Africa has no history. Like the retrieval of African history, writing women’s history entails challenging simple, homogeneous and linear Enlightenment narratives of progress (Scott 1999: 207ff; Benhabib 1995a: 19). Significant turning points in history have not had the same impact for one sex as for the other (Kelly 1984).

Feminist historians have challenged classic interpretations of historical progress and regress since, it is claimed, democratic revolu-
tions have not brought the fruits of liberty to women to the same degree as to men (Scott 1986/1999: 19–24). For example, feminists
claim that during the Renaissance, the scope and powers of women were markedly restricted; and hence “there was no renaissance for women” (Kelly 1984; Scott 1986/1999: 19). The classical Athenian civilization and the French Revolution suffer similar critiques (Kelly 1984; Scott 1999b), as do the American and English revolutions (Tétrault 1994: 18) and the Russian revolution (Hirdman 1988: 59). Likewise, numerous feminist studies have sought to demonstrate how hallmarks of modernity like the technological development and the rise of medical science have not lead to women’s liberation (Scott 1986/1999:15–27; footnote 13).

The East European Example

Within feminist studies, the recent democratizations in East and Central Europe have been interpreted along the same lines, contradicting dominant notions of progress. Feminist writers on reform in state socialist countries conclude that “[t]here is no reason to suppose that any democratization of the public sphere will ameliorate male dominance and female subordination” (Phizacklea et al. 1992; Eisenstein 1989). Rueschemeyer dubs women “the losers in the recent transformations”, since women have lost out socially and economically in post-communist societies (Rueschemeyer 1994b: 226). In East Germany, which was arguably the most “women-friendly” of the East Bloc states, nearly 90 percent of women were eligible for employment, contributing 40 percent of the family income, constituting half of college and university students, and reaching almost the same level of education as men (Rueschemeyer 1994a). In communist parliaments, women constituted a third to a fifth of members (ibid.).

With the collapse of state socialism, the position of women is said to have deteriorated (Einhorn 1993, Rueschemeyer 1994a). Feminist analyses of East Bloc democratizations tend to interpret women’s interests as somehow being “sacrificed to the transformation” (Funk 1993: 2). In East Germany, women were both the “makers and victims” of German unification (Schaeffer-Hegel 1992). The political marginalization of women was a “triumph of the [West German] Fatherland” (Young 1999). Einhorn concludes that the Eastern European transitions have brought “male democracies” (1993). Watson sees “the rise of masculinism in Eastern Europe” (Watson 1993).
Moghadan claims East and Central European democracies suffer the “resurgence of patriarchal discourses” and have a “male face” (1995: 348). She compares the democratic revolutions of East and Central Europe with the 1979 turn to Islamization in Iran, arguing that, from a feminist point of view, the immediate outcome of both revolutions was “patriarchal rather than emancipatory” (Moghadan 1995: 352).

In contrast, feminists with an Eastern European perspective protest that it is misleading to compare post-democratization conditions with the former state socialist systems (Siemenska 1996; Janova and Sineau 1992). Women in communist parliaments were “token women”, brought in to show that an ideological principle had been met (Siemenska 1996: 89). For example, in the GDR, on the one hand, the equal rights of women were declared in the constitution; and the state continuously declared the emancipation of women a central concern (Hampele 1993a). On the other hand, no woman was ever a full member of the real center of power: the government of the ruling party SED, the Politibüro; nor present in the leading functions of the central party bureaucracy, the Parteiapparat (ibid.: 290; Wejnert 1996: 8).

In a more problematizing vein, Waylen suggests creating a “framework for analyzing the interplay between gender relations and democratization” (Waylen 1994). Specifically, it has been noted that despite a strong female participation in the oppositional movements pressing for democracy, women have been badly represented in the ensuing democratic party politics (ibid.). According to the feminist literature, this has tended to be the case both in Latin American and in East Central European transitions. In Latin America, women’s movements were successful in the transition phase, effecting legal change and creating new institutions, but did not gain access to post-democratization party politics (Jaquette 1989).

Within the citizen’s rights movements of East and Central Europe, with the notable exception of East Germany, few women’s or feminist groups developed (Wejnert 1996: 11; Ferree 1994; Schaeffer-Hegel 1992; Young 1999). However, women were well represented in the dissident groups during the 1970s and 1980s and in the demonstrations against the socialist regimes (Waylen 1994; Wejnert 1996). Examples include the Polish Solidarity, where 50 percent of the members and some prominent movement personalities in 1980–1981 were women.
Still, in the Polish Round Table negotiations for democracy in 1989, only 1 out of 60 participants was a woman; and by 1996 less than 10 percent of parliamentary deputies were women (ibid.). In Czechoslovakia, one fourth of all political prisoners were women; and within the Czechoslovak Charter 77, 18 percent of signatories and 34 percent of leading spokespersons were women (Wejnert 1996: 9–11). In Czechoslovakia, only three women dissidents were members of the 1990 non-communist Federal Assembly (ibid.). Comparing the statistics of opposition movements and demonstrations to those of the ensuing parliamentary politics, it seems that it would have been beneficial for women if the politics of social movements had been continued (Wolchik 1993).

In conclusion: in the overall context of the feminist literature on the “masculinist” new East European democracies, the PDS is an interesting deviant case with its high representation of women and feminist politics. In the first democratically elected all-German parliament, 47 percent of the members of parliament elected on the PDS ticket were women (Hoecker 1995: 110ff; Cornelissen 1993). In comparison, the whole German federal parliament, Bundestag, consisted of 20.5 percent women (ibid.). In the first democratic state parliaments in the eastern Länder, elected in 1991, 15.9 percent of deputies were women (ibid.).

In the context of feminist critiques of democratic revolutions, the case of the PDS shows how democratic revolutions are not inherently anti-egalitarian in their consequences for women. Indeed, on the one hand, this study argues that the increased salience of social network structures and mechanisms may be one important reason why democratic revolutions tend to have gender-differentiated consequences. In an uncertain and de-institutionalized political context such as a democratic transition, social network relations are central to the organization of politics. Given that men tend to have male rather than female buddies and friends, this is one possible factor that helps explain the low representation of women in the formative phases of democratic institutions, and hence in post-democratization politics.

Importantly, on the other hand, the feminist turn of the PDS suggests that the specific consequences of the centrality of social network structures and mechanisms is not given, but contingent. Despite the centrality of social network structures in the transformation
of the PDS, the party instituted a 50 percent quota for women and adopted a feminist political profile.

**Feminist Theories of “Fratriarchy”**

The feminist critique of democratic revolutions also extends to normative democratic theory. During the 1980s and 1990s, feminist political theorists have meticulously drawn out the – in older times often explicitly stated – assumptions of gender inequality built into classic as well as recent theories of democracy, from Aristotle’s to the early Rawls’s.

Aristotle’s city-state democracy is held together by friendship, based on equal respect, face-to-face contact, common interests and consensus making (Mansbridge 1983: 8–10). From a feminist view, Aristotle’s concept of “friendship”, central to normative political philosophy, translates as “brotherhood” (Phillips 1991: 29, 125). According to radical feminism, “it is no accident that fraternity appears historically hand in hand with liberty and equality, nor that it means exactly what it says: brotherhood.” (Pateman 1988: 40). In this vein, democratic revolutions have been given a Freudian interpretation, as the demise of paternal, i.e. authoritarian, rule and the institution of a fraternal, i.e. masculinist, social contract (Pateman 1988). Recent contributions to feminist theory argue that in modern society, patriarchy has been replaced by a “regime of the brother”, a “fratriarchy” (MacCannell 1991, reviewed in Sjørup 1998). According to the literary theorist MacCannell, unlike pre-modern patriarchy, which rested on tradition and inheritance, modern brotherhood is relationally produced and exercised within the formal-legal limitations of power laid down by liberal democratic systems (Sjørup 1998). In a line of argument inspired by psychoanalysis and literary theory, it is claimed that, just as patriarchal society did not allow the mother function, modern society suppresses the sister function.

With the rapidly increasing numbers of women in the professions, this regime of the “generalized brother” is under challenge (Sjørup 1998). I mean that such contemporary developments are also a challenge to feminist theories of patriarchy. They raise the question of whether feminist theory can capture processes of progress in gender equality, or whether feminist interpretations must be revised. Without
aspiring to represent the complexity of the theoretical argument, I note Derrida’s claim that fraternization “cannot always necessarily be reduced to patriarchy” (1997: ix). In the context of feminist theories of fratriarchy, the PDS is an interesting deviant case. In the PDS, organizational entrepreneurship and decision-making based on friendship and interpersonal trust resulted in a 50 percent quota for women and a programmatic turn to feminism.

**Feminist Interpretations of Political Change**

Feminist theory seeks a historical system and logic to male domination. Feminist studies commonly reject the liberal view of gender inequality as the simple “sum of numerous small-scale deprivations” (Walby 1990: 4). The call for a new periodization of history was originally launched within socialist feminism, which aspired to extend the tools of class analysis to gender relations, launching sex as a social category (Kelly 1984). The ambition was not only to extend and revise Marxist theory to analyze gender relations (Hartmann 1979/1986), but to theorize patriarchy, building on the latest feminist findings within psychoanalytic theory (Hartsock 1983; MacKinnon 1982; Chodorow 1978/1999; Gilligan 1982). To understand the later evolvement of feminist theory, I believe that it is important to have these origins in mind. Within early feminist theory, metaphors of class conflict, regarding women as an ontological category with certain – albeit limited – parallels to class, were prominent. Gender was conceptualized as a system of power relations in and of itself. Despite the post-structuralist turn within contemporary feminist theory, metaphors of “gender struggle” and “gender hierarchy” continue to shadow feminist reasoning.

In early post-structuralist feminist analysis, gender was interpreted as a means of “signifying power relations” (Scott 1986/1999) and “feminization” equated with “oppression” (Ferguson 1984). In this line of reasoning, women politicians are not women in power, but “companions of power” – power by definition being male (Maleck-Levy and Penrose 1995). Women’s interests are not represented just because women are “physically present”, but only insofar as they act in “feminist consciousness” (Scott 1999b: 211–212; Acker 1990). The “driving force” of history is claimed to be the primacy of the male norm; “women are always three steps behind, while men
constantly push the development of civilization forward” (Hirdman 1988: 58).

Traditionally, the feminist research paradigm has bypassed the “if” question concerning the subordination of women, in favor of the “how” question. “This is the stand I take. I call it feminism.” (Hirdman 1988: 61). In traditional feminist analysis, theories of patriarchy have served as a paradigmatic assumption, laying the foundation for a productive phase of puzzle-solving research – what Kuhn terms “normal science” (compare Couvalis 1997: 90–101; Webb 1995: 88–92; Williams and May 1996: 32–36). Within contemporary organization studies, for example, notwithstanding some “unease” about the determinist tendencies of theories of patriarchy, patriarchy remains the overall framework for feminist discussions (Colgan and Ledwith 1996: 15–16; on feminist organization studies, see also Chapter 5).

Within recent feminist political theory, partly contradictory approaches are involved in vivacious and elaborate critiques and exchanges on the question of patriarchy and historical change. For example, “pragmatic” or “neo-pragmatic” lines of analysis regard patriarchy to be subject to “historical shifts”, rendering theories of patriarchy a fallibilistic character (Fraser 1995a; 1995b). Indeed, “neo-pragmatic” feminist theorizing claims to take an interest in “historical shifts” in gender relations. But does neo-pragmatic feminist theorizing really allow for patriarchy to change, or only its forms?

In the prevailing post-structuralist turn within feminist theorizing, historical shifts are conceptualized as “historical shifts in cultural significations” (Fraser 1995b: 165). In my reading, it is unclear what this amounts to. Is this a feminist assumption that sexism, i.e. gender inequality, is “monotonously similar” – albeit “endlessly variable” in its forms – across time and history (Benhabib et al. 1995)? Does it assume gender to be “variations on an unchanging theme of patriarchal domination” (Scott 1999a: xii)? Seemingly, the relevant issue in the debate between traditional and post-structuralist feminism seems to be whether it is women or an abstract femininity that are oppressed:

Should we approach history to retrieve from it the victims’ memories, lost struggles and unsuccessful resistances, or should we approach history to retrieve from it the monotonous succession of infinite “power/knowledge” complexes that constitute selves? (Benhabib 1995b: 114).
In short, post-structuralist feminism has attempted to free itself from determinist conceptions of gender, arguing that gender relations are social and cultural constructs, subject to historical change. However, seemingly, post-structuralist feminist theorizing risks becoming the captive of the categories of the discourse theory framework. Discourse theory generally conceives the conceptions of the world to be ordered as binary and hierarchical states of opposition – “antagonisms” (Howarth 1995; Dyrberg et al. 2000). Thus gender identities, like other identities, may easily be presumed to take the form of binary and hierarchical states of opposition. Since the basic assumption of feminism is that women are the victims, the oppressed, it seems difficult to break with the metaphors of “gender struggle” and “gender hierarchy”.

In other lines of post-structuralist analysis, gendered categories are ostensibly de-coupled from actual women and men. However, with the use of terms such as “feminized” or “masculinized”, post-structuralism runs an inherent risk of stumbling into reconstruction, into a rumination of antiquating stereotypes, reifying the very dichotomies it sets out to criticize. Within feminist theory, the questioning of this feminist self-victimization comes almost exclusively from deconstructivist feminism, which claims that women are in fact not an ontological group (Alcoff 1988; Cálas and Smirich 1996; Butler 1995). Of course, this claim undermines the traditional foundation of feminist theory (Benhabib et al. 1995; Benhabib 1995a; Fraser 1995b: 161–165).

Rehabilitating “Adding women in”

The concept of gender was originally launched to facilitate pointing out and changing inequalities between women and men (Scott 1986/1999: 3). As an analytical concept, gender has evolved within theories of patriarchy, where it connotes a system of power relations. Hence, I think it is doubtful whether treating gender simply as difference – as this study does – can count as intra-paradigmatic to feminist organization studies. Instead, reinterpreting Joan Scott’s classical argument – that gender is a useful category of feminist historical analysis – I suggest that the concept of gender can be useful for lines of analysis other than feminist, but that this presupposes disassociating the concept from theories of patriarchy. I suggest that gender and the findings of
feminist studies of organizations can also be pragmatically employed within other research paradigms.

I would argue that the potential consequences on social science of simply “counting women in” should not be underestimated. According to the feminist critique, many social science theories and paradigms have been developed by predominantly male scientists who – as a group – have a bias for generalizing from male experiences, observations of men and social spheres where men traditionally have had a stronger representation. Thus many theories and paradigms are of course sensitive to critique through the inclusion of women, and the traditional spheres and experiences of women, in research (Ferree et al. 1999). Today, it is generally acknowledged that feminist studies have generated new problems and perspectives, and exposed hidden contradictions in social scientific accounts. This project has been successfully instigated. Within political science, feminist research has influenced other branches of research especially where it has managed to draw non-feminist theory into dialogue, bridging the communication disjuncture to other research paradigms (compare Webb 1995: 91). For example, feminist interventions have had a fundamental impact on the field of normative political theory (Parekh 1996; see for example the Habermas dialogue with Fraser, Benhabib).

In other fields, such as for example political party studies and the literature on women in parliaments, studies of women have landed on the gender studies shelves, leaving the major part of the literature unaffected (Diplock 1999). Studies of the gender gap in voting, of political parties’ attempts to gain the “women’s vote”, of the political dynamics surrounding women’s under-representation in party politics, etc. are all treated as a discrete object of study, a separate subject area, namely “women and politics” (ibid.). This literature is reviewed by feminists, read by feminists and lands on the women’s shelf. In this sense, the full potential of the gender studies literature to influence mainstream political science has not yet been realized.

The “Women in Parliament” Literature

According to the literature on women in parliaments, which factors decide the representation of women? On this question, a considerable and cumulative literature has developed, albeit delimited to the field of
women’s studies. Early studies of women’s parliamentary representation answered popular doubts about the “supply” of women candidates, arguing that demand and supply were two sides of the same coin (Randall 1987: 95–156). An unwieldy broad range of factors was listed and investigated, including the nomination process within parties; central party control over setting candidate lists; nominations for safe seats; the political opportunity structure; electoral systems; the number of seats in an electoral district; the staying in power of incumbents; one-party domination of certain electoral districts; voters’ preferentials for male or female candidates; the readiness and determination of party leadership to promote women; party ideology; party women’s organizations; the number of women representatives already attained (the critical mass argument (Dahlerup 1988); sex-role socialization; women’s psychological perceptions of themselves in relation to the political world; women’s location in the social structure; and the representation of “women’s issues” (Randall 1987: 95–156; Carroll 1985). Notably, the early research agendas already included the factors discussed in this study, namely the determination of the party leadership to promote women, recruitment and nomination procedures, “generalized resistance in informal relations” inside the legislature, and exclusion from important informal organizations (Randall 1987: 95–156).

After well over a decade of research on women’s representation in parliaments, the factors most commonly mentioned in the literature as favorable for women’s representation are arguably party-list proportional systems of representation, and central party control over nomination procedures. Comparing the uneven advance of women in 24 Western parliaments, Norris concluded that socio-economic factors were statistically insignificant, cultural factors weakly relevant, and the electoral systems very influential in the number of women in parliaments (Norris 1985). This finding has been confirmed by numerous studies (for example Hoffhaus 1993; Rule 1994) and the exact design of the most favorable election system – numerous rather than few nominations for a party in each electoral district – has been pinned down (Lovenduski and Norris 1989; Matland 1993, 1995).

In more generally held qualitative lines of argument, the Scandinavian welfare states have been argued to have mobilized women politically, since they have simultaneously raised women’s socio-economic
status and politicized traditional “women’s issues”, such as child-care and other social and family policies (Hernes 1987; Siim 1991). Quantitative studies confirm that women’s labor force participation is a social basis for the politicization of gender equality (Banaszak and Plutzer 1993; Wilcox 1991). However, this of course does not predict how support for gender equality or “women’s issues” will translate into party politics. One innovative study shows how, statistically, women and men may perceive the parties they vote for differently (Wängnerud 1994). For example, women voting for the Swedish Centre Party tended to perceive it primarily as environmental and family-oriented, while male voters for the same party tended to see it as a farmer’s party (ibid.).

A third line of analysis has emphasized how political parties have failed to politicize issues concerning women’s position in society (Dahlerup 1984). The structure of party competition, such as the entry of new political parties, has been discussed as a potential factor that may increase women’s representation (Studlar and Welch 1992; Lovenduski 1993; Sainsbury 1993; Nicholson 1993; Norris 1993: 317–319). However, the creation of new parties has historically been a rather rare occurrence (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Instead, the importance of women’s strategic agency within party organizations has been emphasized (Lovenduski 1993; Caul 1999). The focus has landed on party ideology and the adoption of women’s quotas (Nicholson 1993; Kolinsky 1991; 1993; Meyer 1990). Formal-centralized recruitment systems have been observed to facilitate the nomination of women (Guadagnini 1993; Leijenaar 1993; Norris 1993). In contrast, informal-centralized nomination procedures have been claimed to be more open to personal patronage, allowing the “old boy network” to block opportunities (Norris 1993: 321–327).

In the context of the literature on the political representation of women in parliaments, the PDS is not a deviant case. The party has an informal-centralized nomination procedure, a formal quota for women, and operates within a largely proportional election system – the latter two being favorable background conditions for the representation of women. Retracing the social network path-dependence of PDS’ development, I seek the roots of the party leadership’s readiness to promote women.
Political Party Studies

Research on political parties can be divided into studies of parties as units within a party system (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sartori 1976; Mair 1997; Kitschelt et al. 1999) versus studies of parties as organizations (Michels 1915; Duverger 1959; Panebianco 1988; Katz and Mair 1992; Harmel and Janda 1994). This study looks on the PDS organization as an institution, discussing the role of social networks in institutional change (Nee and Ingram 1998). It is concerned with one specific aspect of the PDS – the representation of women at the top echelons of the party – as an example of institutional change. The new institutionalist turn within organization studies is more recent than the most influential formulation of political parties as organizations (Panebianco 1988) and has also not been picked up by later work on political parties (Harmel and Janda 1994; Harmel and Svåsand 1998; Bale 1999).

In the classic account of parties as units within a party system, early party systems “freeze” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Hence, the Western party systems of the 1960s reflected the societal cleavage structures of the 1920s or earlier. During the centuries before mass enfranchisement, as well as – in some cases – on the very eve of democratization, various sociocultural cleavages resulting from the national and industrial revolutions were translated into party oppositions (ibid.: 33ff). The final breakthrough of democratization and mass mobilization left few openings for new movements (ibid.: 51). This evokes the question of why some conflicts established party oppositions and others did not (ibid.: 1):

What happened at the decisive party-forming phase in each national society? Which of many contrasts and conflicts were translated into party oppositions, and how were these oppositions built into stable systems? (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 34).

In Chapter 6, I briefly sketch the East German democratization from this perspective. During the first years of democratic politics, pre-established formal organizations and material resources proved to be very important bases of electoral success. Few openings were left for the informal networks of the GDR citizens’ rights movement. In retrospect, it is evident that political longevity was a question of access to, or takeover and change of, established organizations such
as the communist party SED. As a consequence, the *ancien régime* versus pro-transformation cleavage (von Beyme 1994) has been overlaid by the German East-West opposition. Only a few years after democratization, the PDS was the only eastern-based political party in the new all-German party system, which explains much of its electoral fortune (Howard 1995). This institutionalist perspective on the new German party spectrum focuses on the individual party organization, as opposed to macro-level sociological analysis, which centers on the system of socio-cultural cleavages among voters (Berglund et al. 1998; Ware 1996: 8).

From a party system perspective, the high representation of women within the PDS can perhaps be seen as part of a process of politicizing a socio-cultural cleavage. In many party systems, party competition has worked to increase the representation of women, integrating new issues into party programs (Skjeie 1992: 94; 1994; Lovenduski 1993: 1–2; Bergqvist 1994). In the case of the PDS, the party entered an electoral arena where demand for the representation of women was being pressed from several sources. The PDS made a potential contribution to party competition by installing a 50 percent quota for women. What impact this has or has not had on German politics lies outside of the scope of this study. An educated guess might be that the PDS competition in the new Bundesländer, where the CDU lost heavily at the 1998 elections, may have had a beneficial impact on the appointment in the year 2000 of Angela Merkel, an east German woman and former Helmuth Kohl protégée, as the new CDU chairperson.

**Party vs. Organizational Theory**

During much of its history, research on political parties has been dominated by party system approaches, rather than organizational approaches. In the study of parties and party systems, the political party itself is an obvious lacunae (Katz and Mair 1992: 3; Mair 1997: 1–2) or almost a black hole (Petersson et al. 2000: 20). Researchers have seldom gotten inside parties and mapped processes of leadership selection, the role of party executives and staff, or factors that guide party change (Katz and Mair 1992: 3; Harmel and Svåsand 1997). Likewise, within research on the post-democratization politics of East and Central Europe, this lacunae in the theorizing on political parties has been
mirrored in a striking absence of research on developments within parties, party organization and internal structure (Lewis 1996b).

At the beginning of the century, the path-breaking studies of political parties by Michels, Ostrogorski and Weber made a lasting impact on organization theory (Schlesinger 1987). Since then, with the important exceptions of Duverger (1959/1964) and Panebianco (1988), the communication between organization studies and political party research has all but languished away (Schlesinger 1987; Panebianco 1988: xi–xii; Mair 1997: 1–2).

The most influential work currently on political parties as organizations, Angelo Panebianco’s 1988 book, imported several different findings and concepts from organizational studies. Most prominent among his references is Perrow’s volume on complex organizations (1972; Panebianco 1988: xi–xviii). Panebianco’s analytical framework is designed specifically for political parties only. The crux of this is of course that Panebianco’s importation of organization theory was a unique event. Before Panebianco, the state of application of organization theory to political parties could be characterized as “underdeveloped” at best (Schlesinger 1987: 764; Perrow 1972). After Panebianco’s book, and with few exceptions (cf. Bale 1999), newer developments within organizational studies have not been brought to bear on political party studies.

But are not political parties such peculiar animals that they need their own field of research? Yes and no. The notion of political party has been used to refer to organizations as different as East Bloc communist parties and American political parties (Schlesinger 1987: 764; Sartori 1976). Commonly, parties are differentiated from other organizations on the grounds that they fulfill specific functions that no other organizations do. Political parties nominate candidates for public elections to representative bodies (Sartori 1976: 56–70; Petersson 2000: 20–22; Kitschelt et al. 1999: 44). However, several authors note that political parties are as multifaceted as miniature political systems – and that there should be as many ways of studying them (Sartori 1976: 71; Katz and Mair 1992: 6).

Much of the zest in research on political parties as organizations has been consumed in complicated exercises of classification. Parties are classified according to party goals, policy orientation or structure. The literature has been criticized for offering a “confusion of methods
of classification” (Schlesinger 1987). Classic distinctions like those between a “mass party” and a “cadre party” (Duverger 1959/1964) are “essentially vague”, confounding a variety of organizational and strategic aspects (Katz and Mair 1992). Furthermore, in the tradition of Michels, research on parties as organizations has often had a distinctly normative angle. The very definition of party often rests on a specific model of democracy, confounding description and evaluation (ibid.: Schlesinger 1987; Gibson and Harmel 1998). Whose party is it? Should a party be evaluated according to how well it represents a specific class, gender or ethnic group; how it represents its members (Michels); its electorate (Duverger); or perhaps how it links up with civil society according to norms of deliberative democracy (Habermas 1996; Elster (ed.) 1998); or how it measures up to deliberative ideals of intra-party decision-making (Teorell 1999)?

Contemporary Tendencies toward Oligarchy?

Robert Michels’ iron law of oligarchy is primarily concerned with how a party represents its members. According to the “iron law”, the division of labor between party leadership and ordinary activists within a political party organization always results in oligarchy (Michels 1915/1958; Söderfeldt 1969). For reasons of efficiency, party congresses and second rank leaders must entrust the executive with many tactical decisions – a mandate that the executive strives to enlarge. The party bureaucracy demands educated, full-time, professional and specialized leadership. Party leaders become indispensable and the distance to the rank and file grows. The governing bodies of the party can act independently, at their own discretion (Michels 1915/1958: 169).

In contemporary work on political party organizations, the normative aspects of Michels’ iron law of oligarchy are taken less into account (Panebianco 1988: 6–9). Today, we observe a tendency or trend, rather than an iron law, toward an electoral-professional type party organization (Panebianco 1988: 17–20). The roots of this development lie first in the transformation of social structures, making electorates more heterogeneous and more volatile; and, secondly, in technological change of the mass media, restructuring political communication towards personalized campaigns, making party leadership less dependent on members, activists and the larger party bureaucracy. Election
campaigns are led through the media, are focused on the party leader or leadership and must be organized by the party headquarters (von Beyme 1996; Heidar 1997). Such factors contribute to tendencies of centralized power in political parties. However, obviously, these trends are not irreconcilable with normative ideals that focus on dimensions of democracy other than the influence of party membership, such as electoral party competition and links to civil society. Still, the decline of party organizations is a challenge to contemporary Western democracies (Petersson et al. 2000).

In the new democracies of East and Central Europe, the trend toward weak party organizations and unstable party systems is even stronger than in the West (Mair 1997; Mainwaring 1998). In this respect, East European politicians have “leap-frogged” their Western counterparts. Democratizations in East and Central Europe have created leader-focused “media parties” or “electoral-professional parties” (Kopecký 1995), “post-modern parties” or “American parties” (von Beyme 1996), or “media-based cadre parties” (Perkins 1996). In many cases, top politicians with media charisma were granted a platform to establish their internal party position. Election campaigns fell into the hands of a small circle of political novices grouped around the new party leader.

These tendencies should make party formation and change amenable to social network analysis. To retrace the path-dependent development of parties, I argue that we should turn our attention to the small circles of persons at the top of party organizations. Some hints in this direction can also be found in older studies of political parties, as for example in Duverger’s work.

Oligarchy means government by a small group, in Duverger’s vocabulary, the inner circle (1958/64: 151–168). Inner circles can have shifting characteristics. A camarilla, clique or clan is based on close personal solidarity. A typical camarilla is a clique grouped around an influential leader. In contrast, teams are more egalitarian. The bonds of a team develop horizontally rather than vertically. Teams may be formed in various ways. They may be strategically constructed pacts made by a number of contenders for power, such as the young generation within a party. The typical team, however, is a spontaneous fellowship forged during training or other shared origins. Discussing the French Radical Socialist party, Duverger suggests that such teams
can emanate for example from a local party organization; from an old boys’ group of students, such as from the École Polytechnique in Paris; from a group collaborating within another organization, such as a ministry; or from a group knit together in war, serving in the same regiment or in the Resistance movement during the second world war. Here, Duverger’s observations clearly neighbor on social network analysis. However, these pages of his work are seldom put to use.

In this study, I do not try to alter or amend established models of party organization or categorizations of parties. Instead, I turn directly to the literature on social networks within organization theory and employ this literature to political party change, arguing that other institutions than political parties can also be studied with a similar approach. How then does a social network approach relate to traditional studies of party change? The social network approach does not “falsify” dominating models of party change. Rather, it gives another set of answers to a different set of questions, posed from a contrasting analytical perspective.

Environment vs. Purposive Action

At the center of contemporary studies of party change stands the question of environmental versus internal factors of change. Research revolves around questions such as whether party change is primarily intentional or unintentional; endogenous or exogenous; developmental or evolutionary (Harmel and Janda 1994; Harmel and Svåsand 1997).

Classic party system studies regarded the timing of organizational developments and the interplay with electorates as decisive in the freezing of political alternatives (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 53). Changes in the political environment alter the party organization (Katz and Mair 1992). In contrast, “purposive action” theories of party change view parties as “tools” over which organizational actors strive to gain control (Panebianco 1988; Harmel and Janda 1994; Müller 1997). Panebianco argues against the “sociological prejudice” of earlier party system research. Parties are more than just mirror manifestations of social divisions in the larger political arena (Panebianco 1988: 3ff). Parties do not answer mechanically to the demands of social groups. The “teleological prejudice”, furthermore, presumes that parties act as goal-oriented groups – be it according to ideological goals or electoral
aims (ibid.). In the ideological version of the teleological prejudice, winning elections is a means of realizing ideological goals. In the electoral version, ideology is a means of electoral success. The extreme form of teleological prejudice assumes that parties behave like vote-maximizers, party organization mirroring their efforts toward electoral survival (Panebianco 1988, 277; Downs 1957).

In a similar vein, new institutionalists and social network theorists argue against the functionalist basis of economic theorizing (March and Olsen 1984; 1989: 1ff; 1995; Granovetter 1985). Like transaction cost approaches (Williamson 1975), economic theories of political parties build on functionalist assumptions, assuming away all action that is inconsistent with the logic of electoral survival (March and Olsen 1989: 7–8). Here, however, the similarities between Panebianco and social network approaches end. The social network approach has fundamentally different answers to the question: what shapes an organization when not the party environment?

*Purposive Action Models of Party Formation*

In purposive action models of party organization, politicians’ pursuit of electoral success is over-shadowed only by their pursuit of intra-organizational power (Panebianco 1988; Harmel and Janda 1994). According to Panebianco, parties are contested “tools”, which party leaders strive to control. The internal power-game is presumed to be played out by gaining control over the organization’s vital “zones of uncertainty” in its relation to the environment (Panebianco 1988; Sjöblom 1968). Zones of uncertainty include expert knowledge and competency; environmental relations with the electorate and with other organizations; the internal and external communications system; formal rules, their interpretation and enforcement; party financing; and recruitment (Panebianco 1988: 33–36; compare Sjöblom 1968). The power basis of organizationally dominant coalitions, inner circles, clans, cliques, teams – i.e. the leadership group – rests on the control of these “trump cards” (ibid.). Drawing on contingency theory, developed within organizational studies, organizational structure is assumed to be the result of functional adaptations to the organizational environment (Panebianco 1988: 183–235, 279). The impact of the political environment on the party is not, however, automatic or
functionalist, but mediated. Through its effect on the party’s zones of uncertainty, the party environment decides the balance of the internal organizational power-play. The impact of the environment is particularly strong when the party is un- or deinstitutionalized, such as at the moment of its formation (Panebianco 1988: 53).

The way in which the cards are dealt out and the outcomes of the different rounds played out in the formative phase of an organization, continue in many ways to condition life of the organization even decades afterwards. [T]he crucial political choices made by its founding fathers, the first struggles for organizational control, and the way in which the organization was formed, will leave an indelible mark. (Panebianco 1988: xiii).

During the organization’s formative phase, the organizational entrepreneurs – the leaders – select key values and design the organization according to these (ibid.: 53). The leaders spell out the ideological aims of the party and select the organization’s social base, its “hunting ground” (ibid.). In this view, at the moment of its creation, the organization is the rational tool of its leadership. Institutionalization is the process by which an organization gradually incorporates its founder’s values and aims. With fermenting institutionalization, the organization grows less amenable to change.

In developments of Panebianco’s model, party change is assumed to result from leadership change, change in dominant faction/s, and/or external shocks (Harmel and Janda 1994). Together with the party’s degree of institutionalization, these three variables explain changes in party organization, strategy and ideology/policy positions. The three factors are assumed to be “additive, at least” (ibid.). A change of leadership has a greater impact when accompanied by a change of dominant coalition. An external shock – such as the collapse of East Bloc communism – may create a clear broad mandate for a new leader. External shocks may also cause the party to re-evaluate the effectiveness of institutionalized means for reaching its ideological and/or electoral goals. In summary, in purposive action models, party change seems to be a battle between irrational institutionalization and rational adaptation to the environment, mediated by an internal organizational struggle for power.
In contrast to purposive action models of party formation and reform, the social network approach, as developed within new economic sociology, reformulates the question of organizational entrepreneurship to a problem of collective action (Granovetter 1992). The social network approach makes three key points that differentiate it from, for example, prevailing models of political party change (Swedberg and Granovetter 1992). In various ways, purposive action is claimed to be “embedded” in social network structures and rationales (Granovetter 1985).

Firstly, individuals are not assumed to be acting only according to economic rationales – here, vote maximizing behavior – and/or a pursuit of power and status – but also according to other social rationales. Individuals are sociable beings and individual cooperation is assumed to depend, to some degree, on sociability and interpersonal trust.

Secondly, and centrally, the social network approach points to the social network structure as a limiting and enabling influence on individual action. For example, a party leader is dependent on finding advisors, aids and candidates whom he or she can trust.

Thirdly, the social network approach assumes norms and cognitions to be to some degree formed and sustained in social network interaction (Nee and Ingram 1998). The impact of the electoral environment is mediated and conditioned by the norms and cognitions of the organizational entrepreneurs. For example, in the case of the PDS, the cognition that feminist politics would help the SED-successor gain democratic credibility on the West German electoral arena was brought into the party reformation process through social network ties of interpersonal trust.

These three points make organizational formation and reformation path-dependent on social network structures and mechanisms. In the context of political parties, this leads us back to the question briefly anticipated by Duverger: where and how do the organizational leadership teams take form? And what impact does this have on party policies and structure?

We shall return to these questions in the case study in Chapter 7. First, however, in the following three chapters, I shall discuss at length the social network perspective in relation to – in turn – the policy network literature, new institutionalism, and management studies.
CHAPTER 3

The Network Society

Social Networks and Policy Networks

In the last ten years or so, “network” has become an increasingly popular catch-phrase in political lingo, both inside and outside of academia. What is a “network”? The network metaphor is employed in a variety of literature. While social network analysis focuses on the relationships between persons, policy studies see organizations as parts of inter-organizational networks.

Political science centers on the concepts of policy networks and issue networks. The post-modern challenge to government steering discussed in the literature on governance has been posed in network terms (Jordan and Schubert 1992a; Knoke et al. 1996; Rhodes 1997; Marsh 1998a). State administration is intertwined with non-governmental organizations in what has been described as “self-organizing, inter-organizational networks” (Rhodes 1997: 15). Thus, steering the state becomes a question of “managing complex networks” (Kickert et al. 1997; Lundquist 1987: 66–75).

Similarly, international affairs analysts describe the trans-national cooperation of organizations in terms of informal networks, rather than in terms of the individual rational actors of game-theory, or the institutional focus of regime-theory (Gordenker et al. 1995: 11–26).

In contrast, sociologists conduct social network analysis, investigating the importance of social network relations between individual persons for the actions of the individual, for social movements and organizations (Knoke and Kuklinski 1982; Knoke 1990a; Scott 1992; Wasserman and Galaskiewicz 1993; Wasserman and Faust 1994; Hedström and Swedberg 1994; Edling 1998; Sandell 1998).
In non-academic discourse, the terms “network” or “networking” often have strategic connotations. Corporate strategy advisors teach companies the skills of corporate multinational networking. In everyday politics, we speak of “grassroots” networks and old-boys’ networks. In “self-help” guides, future managers learn the skills of networking for job promotion and business success. A guide on “Breakthrough Networking” advises: “The days of cradle-to-grave security are over. To control your career or build your own business in the new millennium, you need to build/maintain your own network.”

Overview

In this chapter, I shall, for the purposes of this study, draw out some of what the policy network literature has to say and does not have to say about the importance of social networks. I argue that the informal, emergent or “network” character of inter-organizational relations in the post-modern network society is likely to render the social network approach relevant. If a social network perspective is applied to policy networks, inter-organizational networks may be conceived of as interpersonal relations between link-pin individuals.

I begin by an introduction of the network as a metaphor. The network metaphor can be understood in contrast to market and hierarchy. I then discuss the policy network literature, criticizing its tendency to static analysis and snap-shot methodology. I argue that social network structures and mechanisms may be relevant to how inter-organizational or policy networks change. In the two last parts of the chapter, I first introduce the social network literature, presenting some of its classic work in some detail. I then review the hypotheses on social network recruitment and discuss some concepts from the literature. Building on this introduction, Chapters 4 and 5 continue to outline the theoretical argument of how social networks may matter to institutional change.

A Metaphor and Approach

What do the various uses of the term “network” have in common? Within the social sciences, network analysis is regarded not as a
coherent body of theory but rather as an analytical tool (Hay 1998), a method (Scott 1992: 37–38), a middle-level theory (Frances et al. 1991), a metaphor (Dowding 1995), a strategy, a perspective or a loose federation of approaches (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). This metaphor or approach is not necessarily connected to any specific grand theory such as liberal-pluralism, Marxism or structuralism (Frances et al. 1991: 5). Emirbayer and Goodwin complain of an unfortunate lack of interest in situating network analysis within the broader traditions of sociological theory (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994: 1412).

Within political science, both pluralist, corporatist and clientelist structures of policy-making have been described in network terms (Schneider 1992; Jordan and Schubert 1992b; see also Raab 1992; van Waarden 1992).

I view network analysis as a general approach or perspective, and just as in most of the political science network literature, I intend to put the network concept to a “relaxed metaphorical usage” (Dowding 1995: 139; Lundquist 1997: 16).

Three Models

In my view, concepts such as market, hierarchy and network are in the first place abstract constructs or metaphors that help us think about how society is organized. Empirical reality has of course been important in the construction of these metaphors, but an important quality of such models or metaphors is their relative simplicity. They are only partial truths, somewhat one-sided abstractions which emphasize certain features and suppress others (Morgan 1980: 611). The choice of metaphor decides what organizational research should be about (ibid.: 620).

The network metaphor can be understood for example in contrast to models of market and hierarchy (Thompson et al. 1991). As with the general models of markets and hierarchies, there is no simple consensus on how networks work (Frances et al. 1991: 4) or where, one might add, the model is relevant. However, as with market and hierarchy, certain basic traits are rather consistently associated with the model. To sketch the outlines of the network approach and develop a general understanding of it, I shall start by contrasting the network model with those of market and hierarchy.
Markets, hierarchies and networks can be seen as competing or complementary basic models of how social life is coordinated (Thompson et al. 1991). Coordination means bringing otherwise disparate activities, events or actors into relationship (Frances et al. 1991: 3). Coordination implies that tasks and efforts of actors or agencies are ordered, balanced, brought into equilibrium or made compatible.

Markets
The building blocks of market models are the assumption of the “economic man”. In traditional economic theory, individuals are self-motivated, they seek to maximize their own welfare, and they have full information and act rationally (Frances et al. 1991). Coordination is attained through market exchanges and the price system. No actor organizes the system, but instead, the economic “invisible hand” guides coordination.

Translated to an organizational context, the market metaphor expects recruitment and influence to mirror individual human capital and resource dependence.

Hierarchies
In contrast to the “invisible hand” of the market, in hierarchical models, coordination is consciously organized. The coordination of actors and agencies is not spontaneous and decentralized as in a market model, but controlled, centralized and guided by rules (Mitchell 1991). In Weber’s ideal type model, organizations are tools – rational and efficient instruments – which are centrally controlled, where internal differentiation is codified in and set by formal rules, recruitment takes place on the basis of merits and the organization has clear and definite boundaries towards the environment (Brunsson and Olsen 1998: 14–16). Actors in certain formal positions take decisions and their orders are implemented neutrally and impersonally. Coordination is administration by legal or bureaucratic authority (Weber 1991).

Viewing an organization as hierarchic, we would expect recruitment to be meritocratic and decision-making to be guided by formal rules.
Network analysis differs from the other two models in the central role it gives to relations, and foremost informal relations (Knoke and Kuklinski 1991: 174–175). In other words, in network models, the building blocks are relations and the focus lies on the pattern and structure of the interrelationships of actors. An important point of departure is the rejection of explanations of human behavior or social processes solely through the attributes of actors (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994: 1414; Knoke and Kuklinski 1982: 9–13). This contrasts with the atomistic perspective of market approaches, which picture individual actors as making choices and acting without social ties to other actors. A basic tenet of network analysis is that the structure of relations among actors and the location of individual actors in the network have important consequences for the perceptions, attitudes and behavior of the actors. Relations, not only attributes, shape behavior.

In network analysis, the relevant social structure is the emergent and actual pattern of linkages – as opposed to the formally prescribed. The focus on emergent informal relations, as opposed to hierarchical relations guided by formal rules, contrasts with the formalistic focus of hierarchical models. Networks are most often thought of as flat forms of organization, less formal, more egalitarian and more cooperative than hierarchies (Thompson 1991: 171). Typically, network models imply informal relationships between vitally equal agents or agencies (Frances et al. 1991: 14). The spontaneous cooperation of colleagues is an image of the typical network cooperation. However, networks can convey not only (collegiate) persuasion, but also authority and coercion (Knoke 1990b).

Social Networks

What can a social network do for an individual? The most commonly mentioned functions of social networks are exchange of resources and information; the facilitation of trust and cooperation; and recruitment. For example, social networks can be important for access to resources such as money and expertise, on the job training and mentoring (Kanter 1977), exchange of information, social influence
(Marsden and Friedkind 1993), social support (Walker et al. 1993), socialization, influence and domination (Knoke 1990b), collective identity (S. Phillips 1991), belief systems (Erickson 1982), as carriers of organizational “memory” (Lundquist 1997), diffusion of ideas or inventions (Edling 1998), entrepreneurship (Greve 1995), getting a job (Granovetter 1973), job effectiveness, career advancement, professional advice, political access and advocacy for promotion (Ibarra 1993), recruitment to social movements (Wisely 1990; Sandell 1998), trust, cooperation, coordination (Chisholm 1989), decision-making processes (Knoke 1993), and developing inter-organizational ties (Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz 1993) (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1993).

Sociological network analysis and management studies have been more concerned with individuals and their personal networks, whereas political scientists have described inter-organizational linkages in network terms. As mentioned, within political science, network perspectives have been applied to, for example, policy-making and international organizational cooperation. Making a very general description of the development, one can say that political science and international affairs have imported some concepts from the longer sociological tradition of network analysis, put these mathematically and stringently defined sociological concepts to a more metaphorical usage, and integrated them with models and concepts from their own disciplines, as well as from policy science and organization theory (compare Klijn 1997: 29). In this study, the focus is not primarily on what a social network can do for an individual actor, but how social network structures and mechanisms may have an impact on the organization in general and, in particular, on processes of change within political organizations.

Social Networks in the Policy Network Literature

Stable patterns of informal interaction, such as policy networks, can be analyzed as “new institutions”. Traditional or “old” institutionalism focuses on legal structures and formal rules and includes the comparative study of formal constitutions. A possible contender would be the study of informal governance structures, i.e. the policy network
literature. Policy network analysis has pointed both to the role of shared values, drawing on the new institutionalist framework of organizational studies, and to the role of resource-dependence and exchange, related to rational choice institutionalism (Peters 1996: 209–212).

In policy network studies, networks are typically regarded firstly as impersonal structures, which are not dependent on personal ties between specific individuals; and secondly, as independent variables. In the policy network literature, mapping a stable network pattern of interaction might explain for example which type of policy is made, how interest groups are able to influence government, or which types of decisions are taken by corporate governments or other organizations. From a social network perspective on institutional change, the focus is the reverse, taking the institution not as the explanation, but as what is to be explained. How then might the social network approach contribute to the study of policy network change?

The Policy Network Literature Criticized

Network analysis focuses on actual, emergent relations as opposed to formal hierarchy. Likewise, the literature on policy networks maps the actual relations that have emerged between state agencies and organizational interests in the formation of policy. Various types of policy networks are compared regarding, for example, the number and type of actors involved, the structure of their relations, and the degree of formalization versus informality of their relations (van Waarden 1992). In turn, such classifications can answer questions of whether policy-making in a specific field takes the form of corporatism, policy community or issue network, or any of a number of other models of the relationship between the state and interest groups, such as “pantouflage” and “parentela” (van Waarden 1992: 38–49; Smith 1993: Chapter 4).

Dowding complains that these types of classifications are lepidopterist – insect-collecting – approaches, lacking in explanatory value (Dowding 1995: 141). Further, some literature on policy networks has been criticized for actually explaining outcomes with the help of actor attributes, using the network approach only for descriptive purposes (ibid.: 137–147). Explanations based solely on bargaining models or
resource-dependency, which focus on the resources each actor has to offer the other actors, do not need the network metaphor (ibid.).

Thus, two problematic tendencies can be distinguished in the literature on policy networks: the failure to capture political change (Smith 1993; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Dowding 1995; Klijn 1996; Hay 1998), and over-reliance on factors of explanation other than those primarily focused by network analysis (Dowding 1995). Below, we shall return extensively to the theme of what social network analysis might suggest regarding policy network change.

**Static Analysis**

Both in sociological network literature and in the literature on policy networks, research has tended to use a “snap-shot” methodology, neglecting the importance of networks in processes of change (Klijn 1996). Hay complains that network formation is “one of the most sadly overlooked, least discussed, and yet obviously crucial aspects of networking” (Hay 1998: 45). Social network analysis has received critique for providing successions of static maps of network configurations, without discussing why changes occurred (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994: 1426). Policy network analysis has focused on the patterns of relations between actors, overlooking how these patterns are created, changed or sustained (Klijn 1996).

**External Pressures of Change**

Since the literature on policy networks is concerned with institutionalized relationships between interest organizations and the state, its focus is on stability, not on change (Smith 1993: Chapter 5). Although the policy network literature says very little about how policy networks change, there are some general arguments about when and why change occurs (ibid.). These explanations focus on pressures provoking change, but do not specify its course. Martin Smith reviews and criticizes existing theories of change, dividing them into three types:

The first type of theory focuses on social and economic change as a cause of policy network change. Social change may introduce new issues on the political agenda, new groups may gain power, and new sources of information may wring the control of political agendas out
of the hands of dominating policy communities. For example, the new social movements have been shown to undermine and change existing policy networks. Smith criticizes the social and economic explanations to be determinist or even teleological. Societal economic and social change does not move society to a predetermined stage.

At the other end of the rope, the state can be taken over by political majorities critical of interest group influence. Political explanations focus on how the state structures its own relationship with pressure groups. The Reagan and Thatcher governments’ efforts to limit the influence of organized interest groups, such as trade unions, are a case in point. Smith criticizes the political explanations for exaggerating the degree of control that the government actually has over interest group influence. In spite of the Reagan and Thatcher governments’ efforts, little changed.

Third, pluralists focus on the possibilities of pressure groups of forcing political issues onto the agenda. In their view, it is political actions that cause the breakdown of established policy communities. Issues make it onto the political agenda if a clear problem or crisis is taken up and represented by an interest group, political party or government department which pressures the government. Smith criticizes pluralist theories of change to be voluntaristic and exaggerate the degree of access that interest groups have to the political agenda.

The Failure of General Theories

Smith concludes that economic, social and political forces may very well affect policy networks, but that they do not determine exactly how change will take place. In his own words: “the outcomes of external pressures are likely to be very variable” (Smith 1993: 93). General theories of change fail to specify the mechanisms through which change occurs. Social, economic and political pressures do cause policy network change, but how this change affects the policy network depends on the nature and agency of the network itself. In Smith’s view, general theories of change are not possible. Historical complexity is too great to allow for far-reaching generalizations about policy network change.

On this point, Smith agrees with Anthony Giddens, whose methodological recommendations we shall return extensively to in the next chapter. A common claim is that a social network approach should be
able to bridge the micro-macro gap in social analysis, but less often the two levels of analysis are actually bridged in network analysis of processes of change. Here, I shall argue that social network analysis may provide one of many possible such bridges, specifying some mechanisms through which policy network change may occur.

**Inter-Organizational Links as Interpersonal Relations**

In general, case studies on policy networks and inter-organizational relations play down the importance of interpersonal links, but they do not neglect it (Rhodes and Marsh 1992). For example, in a study of international cooperation in response to AIDS, Gordenker et al. concluded that close informal relations, based on skill and trust, between individuals representing organizations appeared at crucial junctures in every instance of cooperation studied (Gordenker et al. 1995: 147). In accomplishing cooperation, know-how was important, but also “know-who” (ibid.).

Often, networks are visualized as lines drawn between points, i.e. network “links” between network “nodes”. As Jönsson notes, in inter-organizational networks – such as for example the EU policy-making networks – the nodes are actually individuals, persons whose job it is to interact with the environment of the organization (Jönsson 1999: 218–219). Even although they are formal representatives of their organizations, personal relations may develop, breeding trust, a sense of belonging together, thus rendering cooperation an informal character. Jönsson et al. note very briefly that interpersonal links are considered to be important in the institutionalized EU networks of policy negotiations (Jönsson et al. 1998: 327; compare Jacobsson and Sundström 1999: 84–93).

Similarly, Wilks and Wright, comparing studies on government-industry relations in Western Europe, the United States and Japan conclude that in all three areas, informal relations are important (1987). For example, in the Federal Republic of Germany, persons with a legal training staff both government and industry. This facilitates mutual understanding and good communications and opens up for the emergence of an influential set of informal relations (ibid.: 286–288). In France, the *grands corps* fraternities, with roots in the French
elite education system of the *grandes écoles*, operate as a set of informal relationships, linking civil servants in the government to certain enterprises (ibid.). However, such literature discusses the role of social networks only in rather general terms and does not develop any social network models of analysis.

Compared with the European literature on inter-organizational relations, the American literature on sub-governments has a longer tradition of interest in interpersonal relations between key individuals in institutions (Truman 1951; Rhodes 1997: 32–36; Marsh 1998b: 4–7). The best-known label within this literature is that of the “iron triangle” of policy-making; a network of policymakers and interest groups who monopolize access to decision-making and resist effective government steering (for a recent application, see for example Yishai 1992).

In the same vein, the literature on interlocking directorates in American corporations goes back to the 1930s or longer, but has also made use of Mills’ theories of the “power elite” (Mills 1956; discussed in Dahl 1958; Held 1987). Studies have looked at the interlocking of board membership in American corporations as an indicator of control (see for example Mizruchi and Bunting 1981; Burt 1980; Useem 1984). When one or more persons sits on the board of two firms, this may be a method for the two firms to escape classical market constraints, the argument goes. With the help of statistical modeling and mathematical computation of interlocks, corporations have been classified for example as “controlling”, “allied” or “controlled”.

**Policy Networks and Change**

In summary, the above-mentioned literature claims that informal personal networks are important, but remain at an aggregate structural level of analysis, neglecting agency. Thus, they do not capture political change. In contrast, Raab argues that the focus on trust and cooperation requires micro-level analysis, i.e. taking the level of personal networks seriously (Raab 1992: 77–78). While much policy network analysis deals with the concept of trust at an institutional level of analysis, he sees this as unsatisfactory. If we want to study how networks evolve, we must look at human agency. There is always some combination of necessity and choice for actors to make, he argues:
There may be institutional and statutory reasons why, for example, relationships are forged between central and local government officials and outsiders in a particular policy sector. But there may also be a wide latitude for choice in the way these relationships are constructed, in how people are brought in or excluded, in how the frequencies of interaction are decided, in how much and what kinds of information are exchanged, and in other features of networking about which participants make decisions. (Raab 1992: 79–80)

Raab’s argument opens up the possibility that interpersonal networking may influence politics, even where formal institutions and external pressures of change are at play.

In the same vein, Torstendahl and Stråth emphasize that institutions within the state have to relate to each other in non-regulated ways, and that this networking activity includes the maintenance of good relations between the persons acting in the institutions (Torstendahl 1992: 3; Stråth and Torstendahl 1992).

I would like to argue that social network approaches might be particularly relevant for the study of the emergence and change of inter-organizational networks, as well as of organizations.

**Generalized vs. Interpersonal Trust**

I have tried to argue that policy network studies generally pay no or scant attention to social bases of cooperation – or when they do, fail to theorize on their findings. One helpful distinction should be that between generalized vs. interpersonal trust (Giddens 1990; Granovetter 1985). Most network studies seem to assume trust to be a general property of a society or an institution. “Generalized trust” is most often contrasted to ”particularized trust”, which assumes that people trust others of the same ethnicity, creed, etc. In contrast to both concepts, the notion of interpersonal trust highlights the concrete relations between specific individuals.

In this respect, as with one book discussed earlier – Gordenker et al. on international cooperation in response to AIDS – Chisholm’s study, discussed in the next chapter, is unusual in its detailed opening toward the type of social network analysis outlined in this study. On reading their arguments, it is clear that both Gordenker et al. and Chisholm assume trust to be a property of specific individual relations.
Wilks and Wright, on the other hand, seem to be more inclined to view trust as a generalized property. They speak of general background factors, such as legal training, which might facilitate trust between actors in government and industry. However, on the other hand, they also write of informal relationships with their roots in the French *grands corps* fraternities. Here it is not completely clear whether Wilks and Wright assume that social network ties have actually been forged during education in the *grandes écoles*, or whether they regard it to be more important that individuals with a similar background forge new ties more easily.

Other lines of work that focus on the importance of generalized trust within larger social groups for economic cooperation are analyses of ethnic entrepreneurship (Waldinger et al. 1990; Fukuyama 1995). Here, trust is assumed to be generalized, but only within a delimited ethnic group. Concordantly, ethnic groups with a high degree of generalized trust are more successful entrepreneurs (Waldinger et al. 1990) or more prone to creating large corporations (Fukuyama 1995). In Chapter 5, we shall return to the issue of interpersonal trust in economic theory, political theory and organization theory.

**Network Approaches to the Study of Political Change**

The possibility of a double focus on actors and structures makes network analysis a promising tool with which to study processes of political change (compare Sztompka 1993: 191–201). Some authors briefly suggest the compatibility of network analysis with Giddens’ concept of structuration (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994: 1412; Hay 1995; Klijn 1996: footnote 7) (Giddens 1979, 1984). A central tenet in network analysis is that actors both affect and are affected by the network structure. Actors in a network are important reference points for each other’s actions (Knoke and Kuklinski 1991). The structure of relations among actors, and an actor’s location in this structure, affects the actor’s perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and behavior – which in turn has consequences for the system. In other words, the actor’s “can”, “will” and “understand” (Lundquist 1987: Chapter 2) is affected by the actor’s position in various networks. Each actor is simultaneously part of the network structure limiting and enabling the actions of
other actors (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994: 1418). Each actor’s networking affects and is affected by the network structure as a whole.

In the next chapter, we shall return extensively to the issue of structure and agency in institutional change, discussing how social network analysis may help bridge the structure-agency gap. In a de-institutionalized situation, I argue, social networks are likely to be more important as a structure, limiting and enabling agency. Here, in the last remaining part of the chapter, I shall first give a general introduction to the social network literature.

The Origins of the Social Network Approach

The social network approach to social analysis has been developed in parallel within a number of disciplines. It cannot be decisively placed within any one discipline or with any one group of researchers (Borell and Johansson 1996: 9). However, two important antecedents can be found within anthropology and social psychology. The concept of “social network” is most often attributed to the anthropologist tradition (Johnson 1994). In a study of a fishing community in northwest Norway, the anthropologist John Barnes found that understanding the community’s administrative system and system of production did not suffice for the analysis of how the community functioned. He identified “social networks” as a third crucial social structure, parallel to what we today would call market and hierarchy. Social networks consisted of the informal social relations of friends, neighbors and relatives:

People invite their friends to supper, or to a sewing party for the mission, or for a shooting trip (...) (Barnes 1954: 49).

The social network of each individual was partly inherited, from kinship, and partly built up by the individual himself or herself. Most, but not all ties, were between persons who regarded each other as approximate equals. A network was defined as a system of relations that did not necessarily have a head, any center or boundaries. The network concept simply implied that each person was in touch with a number of people, some of whom were directly in touch with each
other, and some who were not. Barnes and other social anthropologists used the network as an image or metaphor:

The image I have is a set of points, some of which are joined by lines. The points of the image are people, or sometimes groups, and the lines indicate which people interact with each other. (Barnes 1954:43).

Today, the concept of social network is widely used within social anthropology foremost as a metaphor or heuristic device. However, a branch of social anthropology has also developed social network studies with great scientific rigor, focusing on the refinement and development of statistical analytical techniques (see the journal *Social Networks*).

Parallel to the social anthropology studies, a mathematical approach to mapping networks – sociometric methods – was developed within social psychology in the USA in the 1930s (Borell and Johansson 1996). In the 1950s, sociometric mapping methods were then put to use in US research on small groups, mapping social configurations of individuals by “measuring” the patterns of communication between them. As mentioned earlier, this tradition of formalized, mathematical analysis of social networks is continued within sociology today (Scott 1992).

When Mark Granovetter – whose work we shall look closer at shortly – launched his argument of the importance of “weak ties” in the early 1970s, he was breaking with the small group focus of earlier social psychology research (Granovetter 1973). His work was a step in the direction of a more metaphorical usage of the network frame of analysis, relaxing the ambition of a strict mathematical treatment of network data, instead relying on qualitative interviews to achieve more complex arguments on the structure and functioning of social networks. This broadening of the focus brought social network analysis closer to the anthropological view of social networks as a social structure, shifting the level of analysis to that of larger structures (Granovetter 1985).

*Bringing Granovetter’s Work to Political Science*

In my presentation and development of the social network approach, I shall start out from the work of Mark Granovetter, the perhaps most prominent representative of the currently emerging social network perspective within organizational research. Showing the crucial role
of contact networks in the labor market, Granovetter (1973, 1974/1995) challenged the adequacy of neoclassical economic theory in a core domain of the economy. The traditional neoclassical economic view of the labor market assumes that labor market mobility depends on wages, without specifying how the connection is made between work that needs to be done and people who are willing to do it. Instead of presuming supply and demand to be separate processes, the social network approach highlights the process of matching (1995: 38). As mentioned earlier, in network models, the building blocks are relations. This contrasts with explanations of social processes solely through the attributes of actors. Granovetter claimed that social networks constitute a social structure, deciding the job possibilities for a given individual. The structure and dynamics of social networks are the focus of his scientific inquiry.

**Embeddedness and Sociability**

In later articles, Granovetter has extended his argument beyond the immediate field of labor market research, claiming the social network perspective to be generally applicable to economic organization. “New economic sociology”, presented in the next chapter, challenges the adequacy of neoclassical economic theory, arguing that all economic action is socially “embedded” (Granovetter 1985; Granovetter and Swedberg 1992). In the “embeddedness” line of social network analysis, the “prosocial” character of humans is taken into account (Mansbridge 1990a).

Other lines of social network analysis have stayed within a strictly economic view of self-interested individuals, regarding social networks as a given response to resource-dependence, constrained only by structural opportunity (Blau 1977; 1994; Calhoun et al. 1990). In contrast, the assumption of the importance of prosocial behavior, of interpersonal sympathy and trust quarrels with economic models – but in a less radical manner than for example claims that individuals should be motivated by abstract commitments (Sen 1978). According to the “embeddedness” argument, individuals are far from “irrational” in an economic sense, but their rational actions are “embedded” in social network structures, which condition motives, perceptions and available alternatives of action.
In the next chapter, I shall review the discussion between economic theories of organization and sociological perspectives—the discussion that Granovetter engages in—and then contrast the social network perspective with political science models of organization, giving special attention to the new institutionalist school within political science. In short, I am trying to introduce the social network perspective into political science analysis of organizations and political change.

Here, I shall first extensively present and discuss the early work of Mark Granovetter. I shall use his study *Getting a Job* to develop some hypotheses on political recruitment. In the later study, Granovetter’s “getting a job” translates into “getting a position in post-communist party politics”.

*A Network Classic in Organizational Studies*

Mark Granovetter’s work over 20 years embodies a cohesive line of thought, starting with a—now classic—empirical study out of which he has subsequently developed the theoretical consequences more fully. His 1974 dissertation *Getting A Job – A Study of Contacts and Careers* was re-published with a new afterword in 1995. The book is a study of the impact of personal contacts on job finding and careers. In the majority of Granovetter’s cases, individuals came to know about new jobs through their personal contacts and not through formal “universalistic” procedures, such as general announcements in newspapers. Earlier research on the U.S. labor market had confirmed that 60 to 90 percent of jobs were found informally (Granovetter 1974/1995: 5–17). An important determinant for getting a job is who one knows and what relation one has to them, but also who, in turn, are the friends of one’s friends, and so on. Later research applying Granovetter’s findings have solidly confirmed the value of social networks for jobs and promotion (For overviews of this research see Granovetter 1994: 147; Burt 1998: 12–13).

In *Getting A Job*, Granovetter questioned a number of persons who had found a job on how they got it. His sample consisted of male professional, technical and managerial workers, thus isolating the possible effects of class and gender. In the study, he found that for this homogeneous sample group, the higher the income, the more likely it was that the respondent had gotten to know about the job through personal contacts.
Contacts seemed to explain what is usually considered “luck” in job finding. Personal contacts were found to lead to better jobs than other methods.

This evoked questions about the detailed circumstances under which a given individual would have such contacts. The research focus was directed to the origin, nature and maintenance of the interpersonal ties mediating the passage of the job information (ibid.: 6). Each interviewee was asked how he had first come to know the person who had supplied the necessary information for getting the job, whether his tie to this person was weak or strong, if the tie had been forged in a work or a social situation and how the tie had been maintained up until the time that the job-information had been passed.

Hypotheses on Social Network Recruitment

Granovetter’s findings provide a preliminary set of hypotheses of how political recruitment might work, given specific conditions. To give the reader a feel for the approach, I shall quickly sum up the findings of *Getting A Job*.

Most of Granovetter’s respondents preferred finding a job through personal contacts to finding employment through other means (1974/1995: 12–60). This, I argue, points to the importance of interpersonal trust in job mediation. According to Granovetter’s study, information secured through personal contacts was perceived to be of higher quality than information available through other media. Better jobs, offering the highest pay, prestige and job satisfaction were much more likely to have been found through personal contacts. The best jobs were mediated through short chains of contacts forged in work situations, where the informant would often “put in a good word” for them. Generally, those who had found work through longer chains of contacts – that is through the contacts of their contacts’ contacts – were less well placed in the labor market, younger, more dissatisfied, more poorly paid and more likely to be considering leaving the job they had found. Job finding through remote links thus resembled finding a job through formal advertisements.
The book *Getting a Job* supplies some interesting insights into how social networks may have an impact on recruitment, especially in a situation of political change. An interesting intermediate category (which we shall come back to in the present study of post-communist politics) were the “two-chain” candidates, i.e. the persons who had been recommended for a job by a person both they and the employer knew who had acted as a “bridge of trust” between them (Granovetter 1974/1995: 60). This way of finding individuals for positions seemed particularly useful for organizations moving into new areas, where the relevant social networks had not yet been forged (ibid.). In other words, we may hypothesize that interpersonal trust is particularly likely to guide organizational recruitment when an organization is moving into a new and unmapped organizational field. This suggests the crucial impact that non-redundant ties may have – or, as in Granovetter’s well-known terminology: “the strength of weak ties”.

*Getting a Position in Post-Communist Politics*

The questions Granovetter posed to his interviewees in *Getting A Job* overlap with some of the questions I have asked politicians and party functionaries of the post-communist party PDS. It turned out that the two-chain form of recruitment was important to the development of the PDS. Crucial individuals acted as bridges of trust between the party leadership and those recruited. Concordant with Granovetter’s line of reasoning about organizations moving into new areas, the two-chain form of recruitment is likely to be an important mechanism for example in a situation where political parties are being (re)formed quickly and fundamentally, such as under the pressures of swift democratization. I mean by this that the situation could be compared to a firm moving into a new area, where the relevant networks have not yet been forged, a situation of political entrepreneurship in an unmapped political landscape. This was confirmed in my study of the PDS, where intermediaries of trust played an important role, for example, in the party’s efforts to expand its organization into West Germany.

My study also suggests a very crucial extension to Granovetter’s analytical framework. In the last pages of *Getting A Job*, Granovetter discusses his finding that those who had found their job through
contacts were considerably less likely to be considering quitting than those who had found their jobs through other means. This is very strongly confirmed in the development of the PDS. Partly, this might be due to the fact that the better quality jobs were found through personal contacts. But, as Granovetter notes, another reason is not hard to imagine: those entering a work situation through contacts may have automatic entry into the cliques and friendship circles of a workplace (Granovetter 1974/1995: 135). In my investigation of the PDS, I have extended the study to the time-period after “getting a job” – i.e. being recruited to the PDS party organization – probing the role of the original “job-finding” informal networks for the later inner dynamics of the organization. In Chapter 7, I argue that in these and other regards, social network recruitment constitutes a form of path-dependency for organizational development and institutional change.

Family-Social vs. Work Setting Ties

Before we proceed with the general argument, a short word on terminology might be in order. In this study, as in Granovetter’s work, the term social network is used interchangeably with “informal contacts”, “interpersonal relations”, “personal networks”, etc. Here, I would like to make a brief note first on “family-social” versus “work” ties, and then on “weak” versus “strong” ties, highlighting some contradictions and complexities in the literature.

In the book Getting A Job, Granovetter differentiated between social networks emanating from work settings versus from social settings. The latter, “family-social” contacts included, aside from kinship ties, for example friends from fraternal organizations, sports, recreational or hobby groups, neighborhood, college or summer vacations (1995: 50). For finding a job, contacts emanating from a work situation showed to be more useful than “family-social” ties (1995: 48). Although friends from the family-social sphere might be more motivated to help with job information, they were normally less in a position to do so. On the other hand, when it came to finding another type of job than one had earlier worked within, “family-social” ties proved more helpful, providing links to new types of jobs.

The distinction between “family-social” versus work setting ties is an interesting one because it cross-cuts some of the distinctions made
in other literature. In Granovetter’s study of the US labor market in the 1970s his distinction between “family-social” versus work setting ties proved to be useful. In Granovetter’s and other studies within new economic sociology, social ties forged in work settings are in focus. But the distinction between family-social versus work setting ties actually crosscuts a distinction that has more often been made in the literature, namely between kinship ties versus the social ties emanating from civil society. In a common view, it is a hallmark of modernity that politics and economics are not built on kinship ties, but rest on fraternal ties forged in the associations outside of the family.

From Tocqueville and onwards, non-family civil society links have been hailed as a political virtue. In the same vein, in his well-known study of the institution of regional parliaments in modern Italy, Putnam claims that membership in civil society associations such as soccer clubs and church choirs had a positive impact on the development of regional democratic institutions (Putnam 1993). However, these studies more seldom discuss the details of actual political recruitment to office.

In my study of the PDS, the ties my interviewees named to have been important emanated from work settings or political organizations – not from fishing clubs or summer vacations. In this respect, in the terminology of Granovetter, they were “work” ties rather than “family-social” ties. On the other hand, these ties had a distinct social character, involving friendship and interpersonal trust. In the institutional transformation of the PDS, spontaneously formed social networks emanating from work situations have proven to be most relevant, but there are also some examples of the relevance of the type of “family-social” contacts described by Granovetter.

**Weak vs. Strong Ties**

The distinction commonly made between “weak” and “strong” ties is surrounded by some lack of clarity. A strong interpersonal tie is characterized by a larger degree of time spent together, more emotional intensity, mutual confiding and reciprocal services (Granovetter 1973: 348). In a research study, strong ties can be operationalized as those whom interviewees name to be their “friends” and weak ties those categorized as “acquaintances” (ibid.: 355). In Mark Granovetter’s most well-known article “The Strength of Weak Ties” (1973), he
argues that acquaintances with whom we do not share the same friends are more likely to be able to provide us with non-redundant information, telling us something we did not already know. Weak ties are more likely to link together members of different small groups (Granovetter 1973: 363). According to the hypothesis, strong ties are typically parts of a close-knit network, where everyone tends to know everyone, and thus each person tends to receive the same information from multiple sources. This, the argument goes, makes “weak” ties crucial for the diffusion of information, innovations and mobility opportunities.

According to the counter-argument, persons with whom we do not share the same friends and information-flow are not necessarily “weak” ties or superficial acquaintances. Conceivably, they may also be close friends. According to Burt, for providing a bridge to new information, it is less the strength of the tie that is important but rather where the link leads (Burt 1992; 1998; Borell and Johansson 1996: 100–103). If the tie bridges a “structural hole” it may still provide a non-redundant flow of information (Burt 1992). Indeed, this actually becomes clear in Granovetter’s own earlier discussion of the importance of “family-social” ties for job searching. According to the study Getting A Job, family ties – which in a social respect are “strong” ties – may provide a person with crucial job information concerning new job market sectors. However, Granovetter later argues that this is an improbable scenario: “except under unlikely conditions, no strong tie is a bridge” (1982: 351)(his emphasis). I agree with Burt that this risks confusing the argument. Tie-strength does not cause redundancy; it is merely a common correlate.

**Bridging Takes Trust**

As some examples in this study will highlight, if bridging two networks requires trust and involves future cooperation, crucial bridges may have to be fairly strong ties. Indeed, in contrast to Granovetter – although based on a slightly different universe of cases than he is referring to – I would like to argue that bridging takes trust. This becomes clear if we think of Granovetter’s argument of two-chain links. Recommending another person for a job obviously involves trust. The employer has to trust the person issuing the recommendation –
his or her judgment as well as honesty. The person issuing the recommendation has – if he or she values the tie to the employer – to trust that the person recommended will be able and willing to do a good job. Presumably, the person accepting the job might also be influenced in his or her decision by the person doing the recommendation.

Thus, I argue that constructing such a two-chain bridge, linking two persons or clusters of persons, takes trust. Indeed, the nature of the bridge may depend on what it is intended to transport. Conceivably, rumors, non-valuable innovations, and less-treasured information might be spread through weak ties. Examples might be rumors of social uprisings, urging others to join social movements or spreading innovations whose value does not deteriorate by being shared (see for example Sandell 1998).

**Instrumental vs. Social Ties**

Weak ties differ from strong ties only on a continuous scale. In real life, the distinction between “friends” and “acquaintances” is continuous and relative to the context. Curiously, Granovetter sees workplaces and formal organizations as sources of “weak” ties, provided these are non-redundant (1973: 362). I would suggest that it would be relevant to be able to distinguish between various forms of ties emerging from a workplace setting. This fits better with frames of analysis in management studies such as Kanter’s (1977; 1977/1993; Ibarra 1992, 1993), where the formally prescribed relationships in workplace organizations are contrasted with actually emerging informal networks of information exchange and coalitions.

Kanter, on the other hand, distinguishes between informal ties catering to social needs versus more instrumental ties. If we review Granovetter’s definition of a strong tie, Kanter’s categories seem to cross-cut his. According to Granovetter, a strong tie is characterized by a large degree of time spent together, more emotional intensity, mutual confiding, and reciprocal services (Granovetter 1973: 348). Thus, a strong tie is defined by both social and instrumental qualities. Conceivably, we could think of a social network relation characterized by instrumental, reciprocal services without mutual confiding. And we can quite easily imagine an emotionally intense social tie that is
not instrumental. Distinguishing between instrumental vs. social strong ties may be fruitful for some purposes of analysis. On the other hand, strong social ties involving mutual trust and confidence are regarded to be of especially high instrumental value.

I claim that one of the most important features of social network analysis is how these two – instrumental and social ties – interfere. As argued in Chapter 5, how individuals build their personal networks is not only instrumentally determined, but is likely to follow social rationales as well. Ties forged on social grounds may also have instrumental implications. Centrally, as will be argued in the next chapter, interpersonal trust, resting in part on social aspects of an interpersonal tie, makes instrumental ties more useful, reliable and efficient, and makes it more likely that the tie will exert social influence, forming norms, beliefs and cognitions of the institutional environment.

Conclusions

In this chapter, the network metaphor has been contrasted to those of market and hierarchy. The network metaphor highlights informal, emergent relations between actors, as opposed to actor resources (market) or formally prescribed relations (hierarchy).

The relevance of social network relations to policy network change has been argued. The critique of the policy studies literature was reviewed, that it tends to use a “snap-shot” methodology, neglecting change and treating policy networks as the cause of policy – or the “independent variable” – rather than what is to be explained – or the “dependent variable”. It was argued that external social, economic and political pressures do not determine exactly how policy networks change. This opens up the possibility that social network structures and mechanisms may influence if and how inter-organizational cooperation emerges. Although the policy studies literature does not completely neglect the impact of interpersonal relations, it does not employ a social network framework of analysis on institutional change. In the remaining part of the book, one such framework will be proposed and illustrated.

In the last part of this chapter, the social network approach was given a preliminary introduction. The social network perspective
focuses on interpersonal rather than generalized trust. It highlights how social aspects of network formation are intertwined with more instrumental rationales. This was illustrated by a review of the early work of Mark Granovetter, who showed the importance of “weak” or non-redundant social network ties to job-matching processes. This early study laid the foundation for the later field of “new economic sociology”, which will be contrasted in the next chapter with new institutionalist theories of organization.
How do organizations change? Organizational studies give no conclusive answer to this question. During the last three decades, all the basic assumptions of organization theory have been challenged (Brunsson and Olsen 1998; Clegg and Hardy 1996). Weber’s model of organizations as formal-legal, rationally designed and efficient tools, as well as the seminal behavioralist works on organizations of the 1960s, have been meticulously dismantled (ibid.). But despite the many interesting insights obtained, no coherent alternative consensus on how organizations work has emerged:

Gone is the certainty, if it ever existed, about what organizations are; gone, too, is the certainty about how they should be studied, the place of the researcher, the role of methodology, the nature of theory. (Clegg and Hardy 1996: 3).

Today, the field of organizational studies can be described as a set of evolving conversations, with emergent vocabularies and grammars (ibid.). Due to paradigmatic conflict – between for example, functionalist approaches such as contingency theory and economic theories of organization on the one hand, and on the other, interpretative approaches concerned with understanding a subjectively created social world – conversations have been partly disconnected (ibid.; Burrell and Morgan 1979: 21–37; Berger and Luckmann 1967).

Given the inconclusiveness of meta-theoretical debates dominating the field, Clegg and Hardy resolve that it is time to move on (1996: 8). In the same vein, Brunsson and Olsen infer that researchers should
perhaps scale down any remaining ambitions of producing general, law-like theories of organization (1998: 22). Instead, they recommend that researchers should locate mechanisms and causal patterns that seem frequent, and indicate some conditions which make these more or less likely. Specifically, there is a need for interpretations and explanations of the dynamics of organizational change (compare Scott 1995: 66ff; Peters and Pierre 1998).

The Line of Argument

In this book, I suggest some organizational mechanisms and causal patterns operating at the social network level of analysis, treating social network models as metaphors, which help us to interpret organizational dynamics (Dowding 1995). The social network concept and level of analysis is comparatively closer to concrete, empirical reality, in the sense that it is easier to put into practice as a research program than are the more abstract new institutionalist frameworks (Swedberg and Granovetter 1992: 9; Sjöblom 1993). The social network embeddedness argument has been developed as a sociological critique of economic approaches to organizations (Granovetter 1985). However, it makes no imperialist claim vis-à-vis other sociological approaches; it only emphasizes that it is essential to look at the actual, emergent interactions of individuals and groups (Swedberg and Granovetter 1992: 10).

The embeddedness argument can be applied both as an empirically based critique of new economic institutionalism (Granovetter 1992; Swedberg and Granovetter 1992); as a social network foundation for sociological new institutionalisms (Nee and Ingram 1998); or even as a new institutionalism in itself, regarding “congealed social networks” as institutions (Granovetter 1992: 8; Goodin 1996: 6). In this chapter, I contrast the social network line and level of analysis with that of other versions of new institutionalism within political science, namely the sociologically oriented normative new institutionalism (March and Olsen 1984; 1989) and agency theory versions of new economic institutionalism (Williamson and Ouchi 1981; Pollack 1997).

I argue that social network structures and mechanisms should be especially influential on the course or trajectory of organizational change, i.e. to formative phases prior to organizational institutionalization. Social network ties, I argue, are relevant to organizational
entrepreneurship, cooperation and recruitment. Furthermore, social networks may be carriers of ideas and beliefs and may socialize individuals into cognitions and norms. As an organization institutionalizes, the fermenting of informal groups and coalitions within an organization – the formation of close-knit subgroups such as “inner circles” – may be an important aspect of its institutionalization. Thus, to understand an organization, it should be useful to retrace its social network history.

I relate the social network approach to some of the broader debates within new institutional theory, a dominant branch of organizational theory. The social network argument of the new economic sociology or new sociology of economics (here NES) has been developed by Mark Granovetter and Richard Swedberg as a reaction and contrast to the new economics of organization or new institutional economics (NIE) in general, and to the NIE of Williamson and Ouchi in particular. In this chapter, I review and discuss this contrast. Within political science, the normative new institutionalism of March and Olsen is probably the most influential version of non-economic new institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996). I confront the social network approach with March and Olsen’s normative new institutionalism. This is a new comparison, since NES has been developed as a critique of economic approaches to institutions – and, I argue, a very fruitful one.

Granovetter criticizes NIE as having an “undersocialized” view of human action and sociological approaches as having an “oversocialized” view. Applying Granovetter’s argument to normative new institutionalism, like sociological approaches, it has an “oversocialized”, or perhaps better “overpolitcized” view of human action (Sjöblom 1993). Thus, both new institutionalisms – NIE and normative new institutionalism – obscure agency, which is of course central to the understanding of political change. Agency, I argue, can be better understood from within a social network framework of analysis.

Interestingly, both March and Olsen’s new institutionalism and Williamson and Ouchi’s NIE include openings toward social network analysis. These points of connection, I highlight. This exercise has a dual purpose: it is a social network critique of NIE as well as of March and Olsen’s normative new institutionalism. It also serves to outline and present the proposed social network model of institutional change, which is then illustrated in the case study of Chapter 7.
The long theoretical argument debouches into the formulation of a social network model of action: the “logic of interpersonal trust”. This model is proposed as an alternative and complement to March and Olsen’s two models of rational decision-making according to the “logic of consequentiality”; and normative rule-following according to the “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1989). According to the proposed “logic of interpersonal trust”, agency is limited and enabled by social network structures and mechanisms. Agency is conditioned by (1) pre-existing, trust-carrying social network ties (“Whom do I trust?”); (2) deliberation and social influence through these social network ties to others who are trusted (“What do they say?”); (3) mobilization of resources through social network ties (“Can they help me with that?”); and (4) the social network basis of collective action (“Cooperate with trusted others.”).

Overview

The first part of the chapter discusses the actor-structure problem in institutionalist analysis. The chapter starts out with a review of the field of new institutionalism, arguing that new institutionalist approaches generally fail in accounting for institutional change. The social network approach and level of analysis is proposed as a possible remedy for this ailment. The social network approach, I argue, is better at capturing the complex interplay of agency and institutional structure. In a second section, this argument is backed up by a review of some of Giddens’ methodological recommendations for the study of the actor-structure interplay in social theory.

The third part of the chapter applies a social network perspective to new economic institutionalism. It is claimed that social network coordination based on interpersonal trust may be an efficient form of coordination. However, the concept of efficiency is questioned as a guideline for institutional analysis. It is argued that trust-carrying social network structures limit and enable processes of organizational entrepreneurship and change. In the last few pages of this rather lengthy section, the efficiency of relational contracting in “clans” is discussed. The work on “clans” is contrasted with studies that suggest that successful entrepreneurs must “manage diversity”, i.e. bring non-redundant social network resources into the entrepreneurial
process. This discussion of diversity and similarity is then continued in Chapter 5.

In the fourth, last and central part of this long chapter, political science new institutionalism is reviewed from a social network perspective (March and Olsen 1984; 1989; 1995). It is claimed that structures and mechanisms of interpersonal trust are crucial for the path of change in normative institutions. In contrast to the normative “logic of appropriateness”, the “logic of interpersonal trust” is launched, locating institutional change in processes of interpersonal deliberation and cooperation. Likewise, the garbage-can model of organizational choice is amended with social network parameters, structuring the “streams” of “garbage”. The social network approach, it is argued, is one possibility of bridging the under-socialized conception of actors inherent in accounts of consequential decision-making with the over-politicized logic of appropriateness.

Reconceptualizing Institutions

Since the late 1970s, institutional theory has been connected to and developed within the field of organization studies (Meyer and Rowan 1977). New institutionalist approaches developed as a reaction to behavioralist perspectives. New institutionalism picked up on traditional institutionalism, arguing the relevance of institutions to political behavior, but fundamentally challenging traditional conceptualizations of institutions. The new institutionalist paradigm reflected the cognitive turn in social theory, emphasizing the context-bound character of rationality; organizational routines, culture and symbolic aspects of organization; as well as the role of the social and cultural environment (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 22ff; Nee 1998; Scott 1995: xiii–xvi; Friedland and Alford 1991).

In new institutionalism, it is not only the organization, and not the organization as an organic whole, that may be analyzed as an institution (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 14; Pedersen 1991: 131–134). The concept of institution can apply to intra-organizational as well as inter-organizational patterns of cooperation or exchange, systems of norms and meaning, and symbolic aspects of organization.

A central tenet of all schools of institutionalism is that institutions endure over time; that they have some stability and persistence; that
they cannot be changed at once at the will of agents (Rothstein 1996: 152). Traditional formal-legal institutionalism studies formal organizational structure and state constitutions (Peters 1996; Rhodes 1995). In contrast, new institutionalist approaches look beyond formal structure and uncover actual practices and patterns of interaction, as well as norms and informal rules of appropriate behavior. Compared to traditional descriptive-historical institutionalism, new institutionalism has the higher ambitions of going beyond description to theorize on its findings. Most broadly formulated, institutional theory focuses organizational and inter-organizational structure: “the rules of the game” (Rothstein 1996: 145). The contention regards what should be included in the concept of “rules”.

There are at least as many new institutionalisms as there are social science disciplines (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a: 1). There are new institutionalisms within economics (Moe 1984; North 1986; Williamson and Ouchi 1981); organization theory (Powell and DiMaggio 1991); political science (March and Olsen 1984; 1989; 1995); history (Steinmo et al. 1992); and sociology (Brinton and Nee 1998). The various versions of new institutionalism are united by a common conviction that institutional structure matters. However, in the new institutionalist literature, neither conceptual definitions, nor areas of application are agreed upon – nor always sharply outlined. Institutional rules are taken to include for example routines, customs, habits, decision styles, norms, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organizational forms, beliefs, paradigms, codes and cultures (March and Olsen 1989: 22; Rothstein 1996: 145). With a catch-all, omnibus definition:

Institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior. (Scott 1995: 33).

The problem is of course that the concept of “institution” risks becoming too vague (Sjöblom 1993). If a concept means everything, it means nothing (Rothstein 1996). Johan P. Olsen comments that it would be such a huge assignment to try to identify and systematize the differences and commonalities of all versions of new institutionalism, that one could surely use one’s time in better ways (Olsen 1992: 152). Of course, there is no dearth of excellent comparative discussions of the various new institutionalisms (see for example Scott...
1995: Chapter 3; Hall and Taylor 1996; Rothstein 1996; Peters 1996, 1999; Peters and Pierre 1998). Still, the new institutionalist schools have developed quite independently from each other and include few cross-references (Hall and Taylor 1996: 937). For example, both political science new institutionalism and the NES social network approach have been developed in contrast to economic approaches, but have to my knowledge not entered into any kind of exchange. Since the new institutionalisms have common concerns, it may be fruitful to investigate how some of their insights may be possible to integrate (ibid.).

Given the complexity and extended nature of the involved theoretical frameworks, I shall not attempt any huge systematic comparison, but instead develop my own line of argument, making some points that are specifically related to the role of social network mechanisms in institutional change. As far as I have been able to find, there are no discussions in the literature applying a social network perspective to March and Olsen’s normative new institutionalism, which is curious, considering the many references to interpersonal ties that some of their work includes (March and Olsen 1989: Chapter 3).

“An irony of great theoretical importance”

Institutional change is one of the weakest and most difficult points in institutional analysis (Rothstein 1996: 153). New institutionalist approaches have commonly been criticized for analyzing “comparative statics” and neglecting agency, institutional formation and processes of change (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 14; Pedersen 1991: 141–143; DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 22; Tolbert and Zucker 1996; compare Scott 1995: Chapter 4; Goodin 1996; Peters and Pierre 1998).

Since the concept of institution connotes stability and persistence (Scott 1995: 78), by definition, institutional analysis is more concerned with structures and stable patterns of interaction than with agency and change. The structure-agency problem is inherent in institutional theory (Peters and Pierre 1998). Still, in order to understand organizational change, I argue that we need to focus agency. Where in new institutionalism do we find room for the purposive human agency necessary for organizational entrepreneurship or radical organizational reform?
In spite of their fundamental differences, neither NIE nor normative new institutionalism leave much room for agency. According to the social network critique, it is an “irony of great theoretical importance” that economic and sociological accounts share a view of actors as being atomized (Granovetter 1985: 485; 1992: 6). Building on the utilitarian tradition, new economic institutionalism has an undersocialized view of individual actors as free-floating or independent of any social structure. According to new institutional economics (NIE), individuals act rationally to maximize their self-interest. Organizations are assumed to be created by rational actors who seek to reduce transaction costs and optimize efficiency (Moe 1984). Institutions facilitate mutually advantageous cooperation among rational egoists (Pollack 1997).

Sociological accounts, on the other hand, have an over-socialized view of actors as overwhelmingly sensitive to the opinions of others, slavishly adhering to consensually developed societal norms and values, internalized through socialization (Granovetter 1985: 493; Wrong 1961). Similarly, normative new institutionalism claims individual action to be based on an institutional “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1989). Rule-following is claimed to be a fundamental logic of political action (ibid.: 38).

According to the critique, March and Olsen’s institutionalist “logic of appropriateness” builds on an over-politicized conception of individuals, which assumes interests to be shaped by the political institution and behavior to comply with institutional norms of appropriateness (Sjöblom 1993: 404). This avoids the question of how individuals are constituted (Pedersen 1991: 138). The sources of self are assumed to be the community (Goodin 1996: 18). To this, one might object that although individuals are social beings, they are never fully socialized (Wrong 1961). Also, the over-politicized view of individual actors presupposes that institutions are fully integrated, constituting one single community, revolving around the same system of norms and beliefs.

According to the social network critique, over- as well as undersocialized accounts abstract away from the immediate social context of actors, namely their social network ties (Granovetter 1985; 1992; Swedberg and Granovetter 1992). In the social network line of analysis, agency is “embedded” in – but not over-determined by – concrete, ongoing systems of social network relations. The embeddedness-
argument has a number of theoretical and methodological implications. With social network analysis, a third level of analysis is introduced, in-between the individual and the institutional level. The most relevant social structure that forms individual agency is taken to be neither disattached or disassociated self-interest, nor ubiquitous institutional norms, but an individual’s ongoing social interactions. Furthermore, both cognition and norms are presumed to be influenced by social network interaction (Nee and Ingram 1998; Homans 1950). The social network structure takes form over time, through choice and availability of alters, making social network genealogy the preferred methodology of organizational analysis.

The Social Network Approach

Granovetter and Swedberg list three key propositions of the social network approach as developed within New Economic Sociology (NES) (Swedberg and Granovetter 1992; Granovetter 1992). First, in the tradition of Weber, NES views economic action as a subcategory of social action. This turns the tables on the attempts of economic theorizing to claim applicability to political processes (Monroe 1991). NES argues that social aspects of action are relevant to economic exchange. Economic or instrumental motives are accompanied by and intertwined with non-economic motives, such as sociability, approval, status and power. Action is social because it “takes account of the behavior of others” (Weber 1922: 4, cited in Swedberg and Granovetter 1992: 8). People interact with other individuals, talk to them and think of them (ibid.).

The social network approach as developed within New Economic Sociology is different from more instrumentalist views of social networks. In rational choice accounts of the emergence of social ties, “social capital”, is something an individual invests in:

Individuals may rationally invest in social capital, and the formation of friendships and acquaintances can be seen as just such investments. (Coleman 1994: 170).

In contrast, Granovetter argues that if others perceive that one’s interest in them is mainly a matter of “investment”, then this investment will be less likely to pay off (Granovetter 1988/1992: 256–257).
The interaction with others is generally not confined to “economic investment activity” (ibid.). In the next chapter, I shall focus on sociability, extrapolating on the consequences of individuals preferring to form social network ties with socially similar others. I argue that this is one important social mechanism that may help to explain the configuration of networks.

A second key proposition of new economic sociology is that social action – including economic action – is socially situated or “embedded” in ongoing networks of personal relations (Granovetter 1985; 1992; Swedberg and Granovetter 1992; Crozier 1991). Giving attention to social network configurations within an organization introduces a level of analysis between idealized atomized markets and completely integrated firms (Granovetter 1985: 504). It may be that the psychology of neoclassical modeling is under-socialized and naive, ignoring human goals such as those mentioned above (compare Sen 1978). However, social network analysis is not only concerned with the assumptions of individual rationales of action, but with social networks as an important structure, limiting and enabling agency. Actors are not atomized individuals, solitarily facing institutional frameworks. An action by a member of a network is embedded because it is expressed in interaction with other people (Swedberg and Granovetter 1992: 9). As discussed above, under- and over-socialized conceptions of agency fail to capture the social network level of analysis.

The third key proposition of new economic sociology is that institutions are social constructions (Swedberg and Granovetter 1992: 13–19; Granovetter 1992: 4–5; Berger and Luckmann 1967). This proposition, in turn, consists of three arguments: that institutions are constructed by mobilization of resources through social networks; that this makes institutional development path-dependent; and that institutions are not objective realities, but must be understood as a result of a historical social process, where “the way things are done” has been established by slow, social creation (ibid.). In this framework, institutionalized norms rest on entrenched patterns of social network interaction and their history of emergence (Nee and Ingram 1998).

In summary, social network analysis proposes face-to-face social interaction as a fundamental level of analysis, distinguishable from more macro-level phenomena and from individual, atomized actors (Nee and Ingram 1998; Homans 1950; Giddens 1979). History is
determined neither by “great men”, nor by the social structure in a wider sense (Swedberg and Granovetter 1992: 18; Sztompka 1993). As an empirically grounded critique of economic theory, the social network approach can either be added on to and incorporated into traditional economic analysis, or it may demand a total restructuring of research questions (Swedberg and Granovetter 1992: 7).

Importantly, social network analysis can be applied to the problem of trust. Social networks can be carriers of interpersonal trust and norms of reciprocity that prevent opportunism and solve the problem of coordination and collective action (Granovetter 1992; Nee 1998). In this sense, social network structures can be a basis for agency and hence for institutional change.

More sociological perspectives on social networks put more emphasis on their socializing function: Social networks can be carriers of norms, cognitions and cultural beliefs (Nee and Ingram 1998; Homans 1950; Lundquist 1997). In this sense, social network analysis can be applied as a form of new institutionalism, regarding close-knit, trust-carrying social networks as “institutions” that may persist over time, outliving the formation and dismantling of formal organizational structures.

In the next section, before returning to the review of new institutionalist theory, I shall pick up on the classic discussion of structure and agency. I argue that the social network framework of analysis may enable us to apply some of Giddens’ methodological recommendations to the study of institutions.

Social Networking as Institutional Structuration

The structure-agency problem is a persistent methodological dilemma in political science (Lundquist 1984; 1987; Rothstein 1988; Giddens 1979; 1984; Hay 1995). As discussed, new institutionalist approaches are no exception to this rule. Although most writers on institutionalism recognize the need to overcome the dilemma, ambitions to capture both structural aspects and agency tend to remain at the level of incantation (Rothstein 1988: 29). Below, I shall review Giddens’ structuration approach, which is designed to bridge the actor-structure divide. Specifically, I shall exemplify how a social network framework
of analysis fits very well within the structuration approach. As the alert reader will remember, the NES social network approach promises a route of analysis evading both the atomized, undersocialized view of individual agency in economistic approaches to organization; as well as the over-socialized or over-politicized view of agency in normative institutionalism (Granovetter 1985).

Giddens’ theory of structuration is “probably the single most influential recent contribution to the question of structure and agency within social and political theory” (Hay 1995: 197). Giddens’ approach consists of a set of basic principles of social analysis (Thrift 1985). The structuration approach is not a theory for specific historical situations, but a general framework for social theorizing. It is formulated as a critique of prevalent modes of conceptualizing structure and agency, offering instead the concept of structuration. Giddens states that his concepts are meant to be “sensitizing devices”, useful for thinking about research problems and interpreting research results (1984: 326–327). Specifically, his approach offers a convincing conception of human agency, emphasizing the importance of context for agency. At the heart of the structuration approach is the contention that human agency must be understood in relation to what is present and what is absent when the action takes place (Thrift 1985: 610–611).

In turn, I shall first relate Giddens’ perspective on social structure, his conception of agency, and, finally, list three selected methodological recommendations Giddens makes regarding the study of social change. The review is more of a checklist and reminder than a continuous line of argument and should be read as such.

**Giddens on Structure**

Giddens conceptualizes “structure” differently from its more common usages in the social sciences (1984: xxvii, 19). He claims that the difference between his perspective and common structuralist perspectives is ontological (1984: 2). He writes:

In structuration theory “structure” is regarded as rules and resources recursively implicated in social reproduction; institutionalized features of social systems have structural properties in the sense that relationships are stabilized across time and space (Giddens 1984: xxxi).
According to structuration theory, actors and structures are only separable on an abstract, analytical level, since structures are upheld by ongoing processes of structuration (Giddens 1979; 1984). Consequently, the basic domain of study of the social sciences should be social practices, i.e. how agency, limited and enabled by structures, reproduces and changes these same structures. The structures – the continuously reproduced rules and resources – which limit and enable agency do not have any independent objective existence external to actors, nor are they purely subjective. While structural sociology tends to assume that structures have causal influence on human conduct, structuration theory views social structure as unceasingly mediated through agency; it exists only as it is expressed in human social activity.

Constitutive to the structuration framework of analysis is its distinctive conception of structural constraint. In contrast to a view of structural constraint as strict limits on agency – like the walls of a room from which the individual cannot escape but within which he or she is free to move around at will – Giddens sees structure as implicated in the very freedom of action that the agent has (1984: 174). This means that structure and agency are never separate and can be kept apart only in abstract analysis (Giddens 1979: 60, 95; 1984: 288). In empirical research, the social scientist cannot bracket “agency” or “structure” but must study the process of structuration, i.e. the reproduction and change of social practices over time (Sztompka 1993: 10). In Giddens’ view, it is not possible to make a snapshot of structure, since social structure exists only as ongoing practices and as memory traces orienting the conduct of human agents (1984: 17, 304; Lundquist 1997: 11).

Structuration theory fits especially well as a framework for social network analysis since both emphasize how actors constitute a limiting and enabling “structure” for each other. From our social network framework of analysis, we may note how the social network ties of an individual on the one hand may be enabling, constituting options for increased cooperation, exchange of resources or social bridges to other actors. Simultaneously, however, an actor’s range of alternative actions and his or her perceptions and norms may be limited by his set of social network ties and the social influence that these might exert on him. Actors are dependent on each other but also have a range of
choice and may search to influence the social network structure of which they are a part. Not only may one person’s constraint be another’s enablement: considering the possibility of cooperation, one person’s enablement may also be the condition for as well as consequence of another person’s enabling. By definition, mutual cooperation is not a zero-sum game.

The centrality given in structuration theory to relations between human agents – i.e. to social life – motivates a view of structural constraint as being different from any “force of nature”. Giddens criticizes the view of social structure as non-subjective and external to actors. “Society” is manifestly not external to individual actors in the same sense that the surrounding physical environment is (1984: 172, 174).

**Giddens on Agency**

Perhaps the most widely spread – and harsh – criticism of the theory of structuration is that it amounts to nothing but a form of “sophisticated intentionalism” (Hay 1995: 198). However, considering that Giddens’ aim – and accomplishment – is precisely to bridge the gap between agency and structure, the usefulness of his approach resides in its level of sophistication, i.e. how well or skillfully the intentional agency that he analytically acknowledges is problematized.

Indeed, in Giddens’ view of social change, human actors are the ultimate motor (Sztompka 1993: 196–197). Giddens emphasizes that to be a human being is to be a purposive agent, but he complains that in the philosophical literature, terms such as “purpose” and “intention” have often been confused with voluntarism (1984: 3). In contrast, he assumes human agents to be knowledgeable, reflecting on the conditions and consequences of their actions – but also finite in their capabilities of action and perception. This means that the product of action does not always coincide with intentions. This disparity between what actors intend to do and the consequences that ensue is important to social research (Giddens 1979: 215–216; 1984: 11, 296). There are several arguments stating that what an agent “does”, i.e. agency, must be kept analytically separate from intentions.

Firstly, actors may be acting with intention, but the consequences may be other or additional to their original intention. As a dramatic
The logic of interpersonal trust

Illustration of this argument, Giddens refers to Max Weber’s discussion of the far-reaching consequences of the bullets fired on Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo, sparking off the first World War (1984: 13). In a somewhat different line of thought, in the context of social network analysis, we could for example imagine that an actor forges a social network tie with certain intentions – social or instrumental – but that the same tie at a later point of time may attain unintended enabling or constraining consequences for the actor – for example, passing on or receiving crucial information about a good job (Granovetter 1974/1995) or, in this study, political appointments.

Secondly, individuals can seldom overview how processes of interpersonal interaction contribute to the reproduction and change of larger institutional forms, especially not over a longer period of time. The sum of numerous individual actions may result in something more or other than the intentions of each individual actor (Giddens 1984: 13). Giddens gives ethnic segregation as an example. In social network terms, the sum of numerous individual networking choices may be a social network structure with certain characteristics. In the next chapter, I argue that preferences for networking with socially similar others may be an important factor in shaping emergent social network structures.

Thirdly, Giddens emphasizes that actors often reflect less over their repetitive participation in the routinized reproduction of institutionalized practices (1984: 14). Because of the importance of regularized social practices, without explicitly intending to, actors may support the institutionalization of such practices. Noting that such unintended consequences are significant for the reproduction of institutions is a point where Giddens agrees with sociological new institutionalist theories (1979: 7). However, in contrast to these, which picture institutions as determining human agency, Giddens takes a stronger interest in intentional conduct. He brings the argument a step further, emphasizing that the very institutions which actors routinely help to reproduce constitute limiting and enabling conditions for their further agency (1979: 59). The sustainment of social network ties may perhaps be a case in point, resulting in the habitualization and institutionalization of social network structures (Granovetter 1992: 8).

Despite the importance Giddens attaches to regularized social practices, he claims that actors do have choice and do act intentionally.
“[I]t is a necessary feature of action that at any point of time, the agent ‘could have acted otherwise’” (1979: 56). At the very least, actors always have the choice between attempts to intervene or forbearance. In Giddens’ view, this agency is also conducted intentionally. No unconscious motivational components or “dark currents outside the scope of actors’ awareness” predetermine agency (1979: 4–5). Actors are knowable and routinely reflect on those intended and unintended consequences of their actions of which they are aware.

**Giddens on Social Change**

The centrality Giddens gives to individual agency has consequences for his methodological recommendations concerning the study of social change. Here, I briefly review three points which I regard specifically pertinent for our present purposes. His methodological advice includes keeping an eye on time, spatiality, and “critical phases” of social change.

Firstly, the theory of structuration regards temporality as being integral to social theory (1979: 198). It is a basic mistake to view “snapshots” of social relations as “patterns”: only studies over time can differentiate between stable properties and change (1979: 202). How structures are reproduced and changed must be studied over time. As discussed in the previous chapter, reviewers of policy network studies criticize the literature’s tendency to “snapshot methodology” and argue that for the study of policy network change, a structuration approach should be fruitful. (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994: 1412; Hay 1995; Klijn 1996: footnote 6).

Giddens suggests looking at micro-sociological agency neither as the basis nor as the consequence of “macro-structural” social properties. Instead, he wants to reconceptualize the micro-macro dualism as one of time and space (1984: xxvi). Giddens’ framework focuses on how the limited character of intentionality results from the dimensions of time and space (1984: 10–12). In general, Giddens writes, “the further removed the consequences of an act are in time and space from the original context of the act, the less likely those consequences are to be intentional”. Macrosociological consequences of micro-sociological agency are unlikely to mirror intention and must be studied over time. This can be related to my argument made in the previous chapter, that the social network level of analysis should be relevant to the study
of policy network change. Translated to this context, the broader, long-term consequences of micro-sociological formation and change of interpersonal network ties on macro-sociological phenomena, such as policy networks, are unlikely to mirror intention.

Secondly, Giddens suggests an alternative to the common sociological micro-macro distinction, which contrasts small groups with large collectivities. A more fundamental distinction, he argues, would be to differentiate between face-to-face interactions and interaction with others who are physically absent (1979: 203).

This alternative distinction is clearly compatible with the social network approach. Historically, social power rests on the sociospatial capacity for organization (Mann 1986). Giddens illustrates the importance of spatiality with how class differentiation can be reconceptualized as a matter of space or physical presence. Classes tend to be spatially concentrated within countries, as well as in the international center/periphery system (1979: 206–207). On a national level, class domination is influenced and reproduced by patterns of rural/urban difference as well as neighborhood segregation. Spatiality enables and constrains social actors to sustain their communication. For example, a condition for the formation of a small community is physical presence or availability, i.e. time-space separations that are not too long. Likewise, from our social network point of view, time and space put constraints on the formation of social network ties.

Thirdly, in a short passage discussing “critical phases” of social change, Giddens notes that the theory of structuration suggests the methodological importance of so-called “episodic studies”. He defines critical episodes of radical social change as phases in which “the existing alignment of institutions in a society become transformed”, i.e. disrupted and reshaped (1979: 228–229). In such phases – such as, for example, political revolutions or rapid industrialization – sequences of change of medium-term duration might have far-reaching consequences. It would be useful to identify such “critical phases” and study them in “episodic studies”, because they might entail a “spot-welding” – an instant molding – of institutions, which may subsequently become resistant to further change. In this vein, we may argue that organizational entrepreneurship through the mobilization of social network resources may be analyzed as such “critical phases” of institutional change.
Whether studying “critical phases” of social change or more ordinary social change, Giddens advocates that sociology should become more “historical” in character (1979: 230). Working within his theory of structuration, there do not have to be any logical or methodological distinctions between social science and history.

Further on in the chapter, I shall discuss normative new institutionalism from a social network perspective, arguing that an institutional logic of appropriateness is subject to structuration and reproduction through social network interaction, and thus amenable to social network mechanisms of change. Firstly, however, I shall turn to NIE transaction cost approaches. In contrast to the functionalist character of institutions argued by NIE, institutional formation and change may be historical and path-dependent on social network structures and re-structuration.

New Economic Institutionalism

As discussed above, new economic sociology (NES) criticizes new economic institutionalism (NIE) for its undersocialized view of actors and neglect of social network structures. In line with its heritage from neoclassical economics, NIE takes the individuals and their preferences as a given (Hodgson 1994). In economic approaches to organization, preferences are assumed to be exogenous to institutions, i.e. not the endogenous product of institutional socialization (March and Olsen 1984). Furthermore, NIE builds on the functionalist assumption that, as a result of the economic self-interest of individuals, the most efficient firms will emerge. This, we argued, obscures the structural constraints on agency. Here, I develop on this social network critique of economic institutionalism.

As in Granovetter and Swedberg’s writings, the targeted version of NIE is Williamson and Ouchi’s. Their transaction costs approach is in obvious opposition to more sociologically oriented lines of analysis. Other NIE authors such as Douglas North, working more closely to the political science discipline, have argued that institutional efficiency is a problematic criterion of analysis that must be discarded by institutional analysis (North 1986; Swedberg and Granovetter 1992: 15). We can never in the abstract define which institution would be
optimally “efficient”; we can only specify what would be efficient given a certain institutional structure (ibid.). In further contrast to Williamson and Ouchi, North also acknowledges the importance of historical path-dependency (North 1989). Since entrepreneurs are not interested in long-run consequences and also cannot foresee the actual outcomes of their choices, institutional change is constrained and unanticipated. North, however, looks at economic systems at the national level and not, as is our interest here, on organizational studies (Moe 1984; Weingast 1996).

But why bother with economic theories for the analysis of political organizations? Economic theories of organization are part of the cross-disciplinary field of organizational studies. Both for normative new institutionalism and the NES social network approach, economic theories have provided an important contrast which has helped clarify the argument. Here, I add to these comparisons.

**Questions of Efficiency vs. Path-Dependence**

As emphasized, questions of efficiency, optimality and equilibrium are central to NIE arguments. In the following, I problematize NIE lines of argument from a social network perspective. Firstly, I exemplify how some researchers working within the NIE paradigm have found informal coordination to be efficient. Given certain conditions, social network coordination may be more efficient and adaptive than market or hierarchy. Still, I argue, social network cooperation may also be inefficient at times, for example if it fails to motivate employees, or fails in flexibility. As mentioned, efficiency may be a bad guideline for institutionalist analysis because it may be impossible to specify in the abstract which institutional arrangements would be more efficient. However, social network mechanisms of coordination cannot be discarded as unambiguously inefficient – quite the reverse.

Secondly, I question the functionalist line of reasoning of NIE, which assumes that firms emerge because they are efficient. According to the embeddedness counter-argument, the emergence of firms is path-dependent, contingent on entrepreneurial mobilization of resources through social networks. The emergence of organizations is contingent on social network ties and on cognitions and norms developed in social interaction. Hence, there are no guarantees that an organization of
optimal “efficiency” will emerge. In this respect, the social network argument is closer to political science new institutionalism: history is inefficient (March and Olsen 1984; 1989; 1995).

The Costs of Contracting

Together with principal-agent analysis, transaction cost approaches are the dominant current within economic theories of organization (Moe 1984). Both build on the work of Ronald Coase, who argued that because of costs related to information gathering and contracting, hierarchical organization may at times be more efficient than market contracting. The transaction-costs approach addresses a wide array of “transaction costs”, including bounded rationality, but focuses on what is claimed to be the central problem risked by all forms of delegation, namely opportunism. Principal-agent analysis is a deliberation on the transaction-costs paradigm (Eisenhardt 1989: 63–64). It proposes third party monitoring as a remedy to the agent’s propensity to evade contract fulfillment – “shirking” or “cheating”.

Like rational choice theory, NIE consists of deductive arguments based on classic micro-economic assumptions of individual competitive self-interest. New economic institutionalism (NIE) views organizations as an efficient, functional response to costs of contracting. Organizations – bureaucracies, hierarchies or monitoring arrangements – are created when the price-mechanism of the open market proves less efficient than hierarchy for the coordination of economic activity.

Principal-Agent Analysis

Describing principal-agent analysis very simply, the model envisions a hierarchical situation of cooperation, where the main problem is monitoring. The “principal”, paying for the goods and services that an “agent” delivers, must monitor that the “agent” lives up to the contract. With the hiring of an independent monitor, a bureaucracy is created. Notably, the principal-agent model has been developed for discussions of the modern corporation where ownership and control are separate (Fama 1980). Here, security holders are the “principals” and managers the “monitors”. Principal-agent analysis is controversial in its narrow focus on incentives and self-interest, but has been applied
to a wide field of organizational topics (Eisenhardt 1989; for a critical appraisal see Perrow 1972/1986). Political scientists have employed principal-agent models to problems of supranational delegation in the European Union (Pollack 1997; Tallberg 1999).

Like other versions of NIE, principal-agent analysis has been criticized for its socially “disembedded” view of actors. For example, building on the agency theory of NIE, the literature on corporate control assumes that capital market pressures determine corporate takeovers. In contrast, Davis and Thompson suggest that major features of American corporations may be the result of political struggles, rather than purely utility-maximizing moves (Davis and Thompson 1994: 146). They argue that managers and owners are embedded in social networks extending beyond the firm. Common interests are recognized – or socially constructed – by mutually acquainted actors, sparking collective action. Davis and Thompson argue that such mobilization may have an impact on board selection and functioning as well as corporate strategy and structure (ibid.: 170). Their critique is an example of the “embeddedness” argument of new economic sociology.

**Williamson’s Transaction Costs Approach**

The main current within economic theories of organization is transaction cost economics. It has a long tradition, but has been developed most prominently by Oliver Williamson. His research-program on “markets and hierarchies” was a deliberation on the respective efficiency of the two organizational forms (Williamson 1975; Williamson and Ouchi 1981). In the view of transaction-cost economics, organizations are created where the market fails to arrange economic transactions efficiently. Among the problems that the market price-mechanism may not be able to handle - i.e. “market failures” – are dependency and opportunism. When two parties make a contract, they so to say invest in each other. Once a supplier or employee has tailored his production and routines to meet the demands of a certain buyer, he cannot immediately be as productive, were he to be hired by another firm. Conversely, the firm could not instantly find someone else with the same special experience or skills. This situation of dependence creates an opening for opportunism and trickery, including guile and
deceit. Some agents may try “cutting corners for undisclosed personal advantage” (Williamson and Ouchi 1981: 351).

Where principal-agent analysis envisions contract monitoring to solve such uncertainties, Williamson sees an incitement for the creation of hierarchical organizations. By buying out the person the firm sells to, or by buying out their supplier, the firm can reduce uncertainty. A hierarchy replaces the uncertain market contract. According to the model, this explains why the firms of today’s economy grow ever larger. In Williamson’s deductively based argument, hierarchies may indeed be efficient.

Social Networks as a Redress for Economic “Externalities”

A key point where economic theories of organizations meet network analysis has been in the analysis of cooperation and trust (Thompson 1991: 171). In the place of formal institutions, informal social networks may be able to solve some of the problems of coordination that transaction-cost economics has identified. In economic theorizing, “commodities” such as trust, similar values, loyalty or truth-telling have practical and economic value, but cannot be traded on an open market (Arrow 1974; Misztal 1996: 77–88). Trust among people is “extremely efficient” because it is a remedy for the failure of the price system to deal with uncertainty and moral hazard. Trust is considered to be a “higher or more elusive value than pollution or roads” (Arrow 1974: 23–26). Trust is needed for collective action, but, as Arrow repeats, unfortunately (sic!), it cannot be bought.

The social network approach stresses the role of concrete interpersonal relations in generating trust and discouraging malfesance (Granovetter 1985: 487–493). Even in the modern economy, not only societal norms and institutional arrangements, but also social relations have a central role in generating trust. In this view, conceptions of generalized morality or systemic trust are not unimportant, but rest on assumptions of human agency as oversocialized. Trustworthy behavior is not an automatic or general response to societal norms. Trust is not a property of the individuals but of their relations. Hence, an actor wants to know whether a particular person can be expected to deal honestly not with anyone in general, but with themselves
personally. This question is answered by looking at the past relationship of the two persons with each other, or, as a second-best alternative, by receiving a personal recommendation from a mutual acquaintance or friend. This information is cheap, rich, detailed and more likely to be accurate (ibid.). When economic or instrumental relations are sustained over time, they become overlaid with social content which strengthens norms of reciprocity and discourages opportunism.

Some network studies suggest that informal coordination based on personal contact and trust may be more efficient than formal, hierarchical organization (Chisholm 1989) and more efficient than the narrow pursuit of self-interest associated with market models (Lorenz 1991: 191; Fukuyama 1995). Dowding claims that one of the most important results from the policy network approach is how fragmented groups are able to act in concert, wielding more power than the sum of each member’s efforts (Dowding 1995: 157). Certain problems of cooperation and coordination may be better solved through network forms of organization than in either hierarchies or markets (Thompson et al. 1991).

From a social network perspective, the institutional arrangements that transaction-cost theorists propose are mere substitutes for interpersonal trust (Granovetter 1985: 489). In recent writings, Williamson agrees with Granovetter that “real trust” cannot be substituted with threats (Williamson 1994). Credible commitments cannot be functionally substituted through the use of bonds, hostages, information disclosure rules, specialized dispute settlement mechanisms, and the like (ibid.: 97). However, Williamson regards commercial relations to be “invariably calculative” and hence interpersonal trust to be irrelevant for economic interaction. In contrast, Granovetter argues that in economic life also, concrete personal relations and social network structures generate trust and discourage malfeasance or wrongdoing (1985). Like Weber, he regards economic action to be a subcategory of social action.

Social Networks as “Oil for the wheels”

Is informal cooperation efficient? Within organizational studies, the views on informal cooperation and coordination have shifted over time. In the Weberian ideal type of a formal hierarchical bureaucracy,
as well as in classical management theory, informal relations were regarded primarily as a hindrance to central control (Perrow 1972/1986: 49–78; Scott 1998: 33–55). Informal relations disturbed the rationality of the system and made it difficult for managers to use the organization as a tool.

In contrast, later work within the so-called natural systems school of organization studies regarded informal patterns of interaction as an oil for the wheels of formal organization (on Chester Barnard see Perrow 1972/1986: 62–78; Scott 1998: 56–68; Chisholm 1989: 20–39). The informal organization emerging within a formal organization evolved as a “natural”, functional response to failures and shortcomings of the formal framework and helped make the latter more efficient. For example, informal interaction made communication more efficient within an organization.

Most important was that informal interaction allowed for the development of a sense of community of purpose that became morally binding on participants – which was assumed to be vital for productive cooperation (ibid.). Material rewards were found to be “weak incentives” which had to be complemented with nonmaterial, interpersonal and moral bases for cooperative effort. Still, Barnard and the natural systems school of organizational studies assumed formal organization to be the only organizational form capable of conscious, deliberate and purposeful action.

In current organizational studies, informal networks are often regarded to be both efficient and purposeful forms of cooperation; either as deliberate actors (Jönsson 1987) or as an aggregate outcome of individual conscious actors (Chisholm 1989). As discussed earlier, more recent work on policy networks does not build on any assumption that informal inter-organizational cooperation should be inefficient. Quite to the contrary, the literature claims that network forms of informal coordination and cooperation may in many cases actually be more purposeful and efficient than formal organization.

A good example is a case study of the public transport system of the San Francisco Bay Area, where Donald Chisholm demonstrates the efficiency of emergent informal coordination (Chisholm 1989). Chisholm works within the NIE paradigm, but his case study shows some of the possible overlaps with social network analysis. I shall review it at some length, since it illustrates well some of the points I have made.
The Efficiency of Informal Coordination

In his study of the public transport system of the San Francisco Bay Area, Chisholm argues that, compared to formal hierarchical organization, the informal inter-organizational networks he has studied are more stable, reliable and better capable of steady and continuous adaptation. Informal networks allow for communication and trust which remedy economic “externalities” (Arrow 1974). Organizations, which are formally independent but in practice interdependent, may deal with the resulting uncertainty by forming informal networks. The goal of Chisholm’s study is to show the possible efficiency of such informal coordination, especially compared to what could have been achieved with the help of centrally designed formal structures.

The concern of new economic institutionalist approaches is efficiency and not organizational history or change. Institutions are explained functionally: they emerge because they are efficient (Williamson and Ouchi 1981: 355). Chisholm’s analysis thus remains within the resource-dependence perspective that dominates so many studies of policy networks. Informal contacts are a priori assumed to be somehow automatic responses to interdependence. Still, this begs the question of whether there would perhaps have been multiple possibilities of network patterns to solve a smaller, larger or simply different set of coordination needs. How do we explain cases where interdependent organizations fail to cooperate? Working within the Nie paradigm, Chisholm’s study is not designed to answer these questions. He tersely concludes that “[t]hese informalities develop because individual actors in the system seek ways to reduce uncertainty resulting from inter-organizational interdependence.” (1989: 189) (my italicization).

The transaction-costs framework assumes organizations to be rather rational problem-solving entities, and – notably – equates individual rationality with that of the firm. With studies that show the importance of interpersonal relations in generating inter-organizational cooperation, the ambiguity of the level of analysis becomes apparent (Zaheer et al. 1998). In the transaction-costs framework, “economic agents” behave opportunistically, including “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson and Ouchi 1981: 351). But who are the “economic agents” – individuals or organizations? And how does trust or distrust translate
from the individual to the organizational level? One study suggests that interpersonal trust plays a “distinct though subordinate” role in relation to established inter-organizational trust (Zaheer et al. 1998: 156). Plausibly, this role should be more important in deinstitutionalized contexts. As cooperation is institutionalized, interpersonal trust or distrust of boundary-spanning personnel grows less important (ibid.: 143–144).

Facilitating Informal Coordination

The trust developed between individuals is not unimportant to inter-organizational cooperation. Returning to our Bay Area public transit system example, it shows in some detail how mutual adjustments of organizations are accomplished by way of informal personal relationships. When the turnover of employees is high in a Bay Area transit organization, this cuts the organization off from informal communication (Chisholm 1989: 129). The organization losse its “institutional memory”, i.e. the “knowledge of the informal norms and byways of the organization and of all the facts that are never committed to paper or computer disc” (ibid.).

A number of factors can facilitate informal organization (Chisholm 1989): Managers can place staff in work situations where there is potential to make contacts. If an employee leaving the organization gets another job within the same inter-organizational system, this might create a valuable informal tie. Membership in professional organizations and social groups as well as individual personality might have effects on the forging of ties. Common membership in non-work-related groups gave an extra structural opportunity for people to meet. It also paved the way for informal ties to be forged, since individuals could identify with each other through their participation in common social activities.

Chisholm found that previous acquaintances from work situations outside public transit, for example in education and military service, had helped to forge informal inter-organizational ties that were used for the exchange of “inside information” among the Bay Area public transit organizations. Chisholm writes that “[m]ore than one interviewee expressed the importance of the idea of a ‘transit brotherhood.’” (ibid.: 135). In one case, two organizational managers were members
of the same veteran’s association; in another case a planner and a staffer were members of the same San Francisco neighborhood association.

From the perspective of social network analysis, the notion that pre-existing social network ties influence emergent patterns of cooperation suggests that these are path-dependent. In this view, economic institutions do not emerge automatically in response to economic needs (Granovetter 1992: 7, 9). Rather, economic conditions restrict the possibilities, but which possibilities are actually realized depends on individual and collective agency. Agency, in turn, is facilitated and constrained by social network interaction and pre-existing social network structures, and by the resources available through them.

Shortly, in the last section of the chapter, I shall return to the social network argument of path-dependency. Normative new institutionalism argues that institutional change is path-dependent and history “inefficient”. However, in the last pages of this section, I shall first discuss the efficiency question from yet another angle. The work on organizational “clans” within NIE brings out the efficiency versus inefficiency aspects of homogeneity or social similarity in networking.

**Relational Contracting within “Clans”**

In their formulation of the “Markets and Hierarchies”-program, Williamson and Ouchi leave an opening for the efficiency of informality, but do not relate this in any way to network studies. They write that under certain circumstances, so-called “soft”, “relational” or informal contracting might be an option with clear advantages (1981: 360–364). The concept of “relational contracting” has also been noted within policy studies (see for example Majone 1996: 624–625). One possibility mentioned by Williamson and Ouchi is soft contracting between divisions within a multi-divisional firm. Another example is Ouchi’s work on “clans” (Ouchi 1980; 1981; Ouchi and Price 1993).

Belonging to a “clan”, the parties are less autonomous and have a closer identity of interests, making “softer”, more informal contracting possible. Ouchi’s prime example is how workers in Japanese firms are socialized during lifetime employment into accepting the company’s goals as their own (ibid.). His line of reasoning builds on assumptions of the superior efficiency of preindustrial organization, when members served an apprenticeship during which they were socialized into
accepting the objectives of the organization. According to the model, socialization to shared values is only possible when new members already have values similar to those of the organizational culture (Ouchi and Price 1993). Hence members are selected who have been “presocialized” by similar family or educational backgrounds.

In a clan form of organization, “organic solidarity” removes the need for formal contracting and surveillance (Ouchi 1980: 251). Traditions rather than explicit rules govern the behavior of organizational members. Organizational traditions reduce opportunism, bringing down transaction costs, increasing management control and making the “clan” organization more efficient:

In [modern industrial organizations which closely resemble the clan form], a variety of social mechanisms reduces differences between individual and organizational goals and produces a sense of community. Where individual and organizational interests overlap to this extent, opportunism is unlikely and equity in rewards can be achieved at relatively low transaction cost. (Ouchi 1980: 252)

Examples of clan organizations mentioned by Ouchi are primarily certain Japanese companies, but also the U.S. foreign service and investment banks (Ouchi and Price 1993). Stronger forms of clan mentality, where socialization is more complete, can be found in total institutions such as the American Marine Corps and some monasteries (ibid.).

**Clans and Control**

Ouchi’s work on “clans” was part of the “corporate culture” approach to management developed during the 1980s. The “strengthening of corporate culture” was seen as a means for managers to increase organizational productivity – “strengthening” meaning to align the employees’ normative framework with that of the managers:

A member who grasps such [a set of traditions] can deduce from it an appropriate rule to govern any possible decision, thus producing a very elegant and complete form of control. Alternatively, a disruption of the socialization process will inhibit the passing on of traditions and bring about organizational inefficiency. (Ouchi 1980: 254)
Ouchi’s “clan” model suggested how the control properties of a hierarchy could be replaced with those of a clan (Ouchi and Price 1993). Thus, socialization and commitment could be maximized without recourse to the more extreme forms of explicit, hierarchical control.

Not surprisingly, the corporate culture approach has received severe critique from a moral and democratic point of view (see for example Aktouf 1992; Ray 1986; Rosen and Astley 1988; Willmott 1993). Drawing on critical theory, Hugh Willmott criticizes the collectivist aspirations of corporate culturalism. He argues that the strengthening of corporate culture means making use of recruitment and socialization to exclude all other values. To the extent that corporate culture succeeds in its mission, it eliminates pluralism and becomes a “medium of nascent totalitarianism” (Willmott 1993: 523, 540). In this sense, it would – in principle – be possible to regard Marxist Leninist organizational management philosophy as an extreme case of corporate culturalism (see Lundquist 1982: 231–261 on Lenin’s organizational model).

**Clans and Efficiency**

In addition to the normative critique of the “totalitarian tendencies” of corporate culturalism, there may be doubts as to its practical efficiency. On the one hand, within public administration, “cadre” administration has been argued to be efficient. For example, Rothstein argues that a “cadre” administration, selectively recruited on the basis of ideological merits and controlled through informal contacts, ideological persuasion and socialization may be more efficient than a traditional Weberian bureaucracy (Rothstein 1986). Comparing the implementation of Swedish active labor market policy by a social democratic “cadre” administration specially recruited for the task, to the implementation of comprehensive school reform by a traditional Weberian bureaucracy in the same country, Rothstein concludes that the former implementation by a “cadre” was more efficient (ibid.).

On the other hand, corporations with “clan” type management may not necessarily be efficient. Ostensibly, instead of an increase in employee commitment, managers making use of recruitment and socialization to enforce corporate culture norms may suffer a loss of credibility. Instead of mobilizing the emotional energy of the staff,
imposing corporate values may lead to calculative compliance, boredom, the experience of personal meaninglessness and various forms of workplace resistance (Willmott 1993; Prasad and Prasad 1998). In summary, it may be not only normatively undesirable but also practically very difficult to replace emergent social relations by a “clan” administration, a designed “corporate culture” – or, with a drastic parallel – a “cadre” administration.

I would argue that the efficiency of informality relies on the voluntary character of interaction. In contrast to clan type organizations, social network cooperation is efficient because it is spontaneous and based on interpersonal trust. Still, just as with “clans”, emergent social networks may be lacking in adaptability because of their tendency to similarity-interaction.

*The Homogeneity of Clans*

In his studies of clan organizations, Ouchi noted an important weakness in the model to be their incapacity to adaptation and change. Because of strong socialization and selective recruitment, clan organizations are homogeneous and immobile. Specifically, Ouchi mentions “women and minorities” as employees whom clan type organizations might exclude, at the price of losing out on organizational adaptability and survival (Ouchi and Price 1993: 636).

In the next chapter, I return to this issue of homogeneity, arguing that social similarity is one important factor in social network structuration, and hence an important factor to the path of institutional change. Here, however, we are still primarily concerned with the issue of efficiency. In summary, informal organization of the clan type risks inefficiency because of its lacking adaptability, and possibly also because of difficulties in motivating employees.

*Networks as Entrepreneurs*

In the vein of new economic sociology, spontaneously formed homogeneous or close-knit social networks have been analyzed as efficient bases of economic entrepreneurship. Studies of entrepreneurship have highlighted the importance of homogeneous, trust-carrying social networks for founding a firm (see for example Greve 1995; Grabher
and Stark 1997; 1998). In this view, which draws explicitly on social network studies, the unit of entrepreneurship is not the isolated individual, but networks of actors (Granovetter 2000; Burt 2000; Swedberg 2000). The Nestor of organization theory, Philip Selznick, claimed that an organization that has to invent its’ own model of development usually begins by choosing a homogeneous rather than a diversified group to make the initial decisions (Selznick 1957/1961). Typically, such groups are linked together by relations of interpersonal trust, based on a similar personal, ethnic or communal background (Granovetter 1992: 8).

Managing Diversity

On the other hand, the best entrepreneurs succeed in “managing diversity”, i.e. in bringing in new persons and ideas through non-redundant ties (Grabher and Stark 1997; 1998). The entrepreneur needs a number of non-redundant relations – often termed “weak” ties – that may supply non-overlapping information and introduce the entrepreneur to other resource persons, which may lead to the establishment of new business relations (Granovetter 1973; Burt 1992; Greve 1995). Entrepreneurship is a question of mobilizing resources through social network ties (Swedberg and Granovetter 1992; Granovetter 2000; Burt 2000). In order to be successful, all types of entrepreneurs should belong to a close-knit, trust-carrying social network of alters who in turn have a variety of business related competencies (Greve 1995). Probably, both the entrepreneur’s initial social network and the ability to develop his or her network are important for entrepreneurial success (Greve 1995; Grabher and Stark 1998). Grabher and Stark suggest that the most successful entrepreneurs in post-socialist environments, like the former East Germany, may be pre-existing networks of firms and persons who succeed in “managing diversity” (Grabher and Stark 1998; Kittlaus 1996; Offe 1996b: 183–184).

Conclusions

Reviewing the three basic propositions of social network analysis – that economic rationality is intertwined with social rationales of
action; that agency is embedded in the structure of ongoing social network relations; and that institutions are social constructions – we can formulate a critique of NIE. I have discussed the limitedness of the new economic institutionalist assumptions of competitive, economically self-interested individuals. From the perspective of efficiency, questions of trust, non-competitive relations and mutual assistance should be of interest. As the social network framework of analysis highlights, individuals may indeed be driven not only by motives of efficiency or utility maximization, but also by social rationales of action.

In summary, I have pressed two points of critique of NIE. Firstly, the efficiency argument guiding the market versus hierarchy approaches of principal-agent analysis and transaction-cost approaches was questioned. It was claimed that emergent informal relations may in certain cases be a more efficient form of coordination and cooperation than both market and hierarchy. Specifically, informal network forms of coordination may be faster to adapt in a situation requiring flexibility, and better at handling complex situations of coordination where a central bureaucracy would have difficulty in gathering the relevant information.

Secondly, new economic institutionalism assumes that institutions emerge and are maintained because they are efficient. However, if, as NES suggests, institutions are created through social network mobilization, then there are no guarantees that the ultimate, efficient institution will emerge. The impact of society, polity, market and technology on institutional development is mediated through social networks. This prompts questions about how such relations of cooperation emerge and change. I argued that informal cooperation cannot be assumed to be an automatic response to a situation of interdependence. Institutional entrepreneurship and change are subject to a social network path-dependence.

Normative New Institutionalism

The various sociological, organizational and political science new institutionalisms are united above all by – or perhaps one should say: by little more than – their fundamental differences from economic
theories of organization (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 8). Non-economic new institutionalism rejects the rational-actor models of NIE, focusing instead on normative and cognitive influences on action. Institutions do not just constrain options: they establish the very criteria by which people discover their preferences (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 11). Preferences are endogenous to institutions, rather than exogenous (March and Olsen 1984; 1989).

A major point of contention between economic versus non-economic new institutionalism is whether institutions are “efficient” solutions to historical processes. Non-economic new institutionalism does not regard institutions as functional responses, mirroring rational preferences (March and Olsen 1989: 7–8, 54–56; 119–134). As DiMaggio and Powell write, new institutionalist approaches “reject functional explanations and focus instead on the ways in which institutions complicate and constitute the paths by which solutions are sought.” (1991: 11). Institutions are not very malleable, and not necessarily very efficient. It lies in the definition of the term “institution” that they are slow to adapt both to individual agency and exogenous forces. Institutions may evolve or melt slowly as glaciers (March and Olsen 1989). This conception of institutions does not explain their emergence or change, but explains instead why institutional reform is so difficult to achieve or guide.

In their formulation of political science new institutionalism, March and Olsen explicitly throw out five theoretical styles, some of them economistic (1984; 1989; 1995). They argue that politics does not necessarily mirror its context; that political institutions cannot be reduced to the behavior of individual rational actors; that political behavior is not primarily guided by calculated, utilitarian decisions; that politics is not foremost an instrumentalist but a symbolic enterprise; and that history is not efficient. In contrast to the contextualism, reductionism, utilitarianism, instrumentalism and functionalism that they claim have marked political science theorizing, they emphasize the organizational basis of politics. Within the normative new institutionalist perspective:

- political actors are driven by institutional roles as well as, or instead of, by calculated self-interest; politics is organized around the construction and interpretation of meaning as well as, or instead of, the making of choices; routines, rules, and forms evolve through history-dependent
processes that do not reliably or quickly reach unique equilibria; the institutions of politics are not simple echoes of social forces; and the polity is something different from, or more than, an arena for competition among rival interests. (March and Olsen 1989: 159)

In short, the organization of political life makes a difference, and institutions affect the flow of history. But how do institutions make a difference? Can normative new institutionalism explain institutional change, or only show how difficult it is to achieve or guide institutional reform (March and Olsen 1989: 53–116)? Can it help to conceptualize the interplay between agency and structure, necessary for the understanding of institutional change? I would argue that March and Olsen’s framework is weak, or at best unclear, on this point. However, I suggest that applying a social network approach to their framework may clarify their view of processes of structuration somewhat (Giddens 1979; 1984).

A structuration critique of March and Olsen’s “logic of appropriateness” would highlight how the rules, routines and beliefs that constitute an institutional logic of appropriateness has no independent objective existence but must continually be reproduced by actors. At the micro level, non-economic new institutionalism, such as March and Olsen’s normative institutionalism, is based on a theory of practical action – of routine, taken-for-granted behavior – which would be quite compatible with Giddens’ theory of structuration (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 22–23; Rothstein 1988: 33).

March and Olsen operate with two contradictory conceptions of agency whose relationship is obscure (Sjöblom 1993). Their framework has been criticized for being “confusing as well as brilliant” (ibid.: 397). On the one hand, actors are assumed to abide blindly by the institutional logic of appropriateness, even in non-routine situations and independently of the institutional environment and rational competition (March and Olsen 1989: 8–16). On the other hand, in other decision-making situations, actors are assumed to follow the logic of consequentiality, i.e. the classical model of rational decision-making. Temporal sorting of participants and attention to problems and solutions may bound this rationality. This is the well-known “garbage-can” model of decision-making (Cohen et al. 1972; March and Olsen 1989). The general model of rational or “consequential” decision-making and the garbage-can elaboration of it are both contextualist and reductionist: order is environmentally determined, exogenous to
institutions (ibid.: 16). How, if at all, do these more rationally oriented frameworks fit together with the logic of appropriateness?

The Social Network Approach

In the following, I shall describe how, according to March and Olsen, the logic of appropriateness is dependent for its interpretation and change on social network processes and interpersonal trust. I shall then suggest trust-carrying social network ties as an important structural parameter that may lead streams of problems, solutions and participants into a garbage-can decision-making process.

With the proposed link between the institutional logic of appropriateness and non-institutional garbage-can processes of decision-making, institutionalization is assumed to be a process and a property (Zucker 1977; Tolbert and Zucker 1996). “Institutionalization” is both the process by which an institution comes into being, as well as being a variable (ibid.). The degree of institutionalization describes the degree to which institutional behavior is “stable, recurring, repetitive and patterned” (Scott 1995: 22). Regarding institutionalization as a variable property directs our attention to the micro-processes by which institutions are maintained and resisted (Zucker 1977; Tolbert and Zucker 1996).

The proposed “logic of interpersonal trust” introduces social network relations as an additional level of analysis, in-between the individual actor and the institution. To avoid structural determinism, it may be necessary to take into consideration the existence of multiple structures. As Rothstein remarks, the influence on an actor of different structures at various levels of analysis may be either affirmative - or contradictory (Rothstein 1988: 36–38; Lundquist 1984). I would suggest that the social network structure may or may not counteract other institutional structures, such as the dominant organizational logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989). The social network structure may be regarded as a structural level in-between the individual and the organization (compare Lundquist 1984: 8). In contrast, March and Olsen see the institution as an “intermeshing” of only three systems: the individual, the institution and the environment (compare March and Olsen 1989: 57). The study of change, they write, should be related to the way these three levels intermesh (ibid.).
According to the proposed logic of interpersonal trust, in less institutionalized settings, flows of problems, solutions and participants may enter the decision-making and implementation process via trust-carrying non-redundant or “weak” interpersonal ties (Granovetter 1974/1995). In more institutionalized settings, more tightly-knit, “congealed” social networks may socialize individuals (Granovetter 1992). Broader systems of norms, cognitions and meanings may be produced and maintained as a by-product of informal interpersonal interaction and trustful interpersonal deliberation and persuasion (Nee and Ingram 1998; Homans 1950; March and Olsen 1989: 39–52; March and Olsen 1976).

Swedberg and Granovetter emphasize how patterns of “the way things are done” are the result of slow, social creation, directing our interest to the historical social network processes that produce normative and cognitive aspects of institutions (1992). The social network approach suggests that the impact of the environment is mediated through social network structures and mechanisms. New members are recruited and co-opted through social network mechanisms, bringing new problems, solutions and interpretations of the environment into the organization. With time, such norms and cognitions may alter institutional systems of meaning and the interpretation of the institutional environment, undermining the routinized logic of appropriateness.

The suggested logic of interpersonal trust is of course a simple sketch, far less elaborately developed than March and Olsen’s logic of appropriateness and logic of consequentiality. My ambition is to demonstrate how the thesis of a logic of interpersonal trust may support and elaborate on the normative new institutionalist framework, linking it to the social network approach. The proposed logic of interpersonal trust draws both on the social network literature presented earlier and on sections of March and Olsen’s own framework (1976; 1989: Chapter 3).

In the logic of appropriateness, action is obligatory and the terminology is one of duties and obligations (March and Olsen 1989: 21–38). In the logic of consequentiality, action is anticipatory and the terminology is one of choice and rationality (ibid.). In the suggested logic of interpersonal trust, action is social and the terminology is one of deliberation, cooperation and socialization (Eriksen and Weigård 1997).
For the sake of overview, I compare March and Olsen’s logics of anticipatory and obligatory action to the proposed logic of interpersonal trust by listing their three “litaniess” (March and Olsen 1989: 23). I then continue to discuss the three logics in more detail.

*Anticipatory action:*
1. What are my alternatives?
2. What are my values?
3. What are the consequences of my alternatives for my values?
4. Choose the alternative that has the best consequences.

*Obligatory action:*
1. What kind of situation is this?
2. Who am I?
3. How appropriate are different actions for me in this situation?
4. Do what is most appropriate.

*Social network action:*
1. Whom do I trust?
2. What do they say?
3. Can they help me with that?
4. Cooperate with trusted others.

*The Logic of Appropriateness*

The corner-stone of March and Olsen’s framework is the thesis of the “logic of appropriateness”. According to normative new institutionalism, individuals let the institutional logic of appropriateness guide their behavior (1989: 21–38). In institutions, people behave as they are supposed to do. Action is dictated by institutionalized routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organizational forms and technologies that define which acts are normal, natural, right and good. Rules define relationships among organizational roles (March and Olsen 1989: 21–38). Behaving in accordance with the institutional logic of appropriateness, an actor asks himself or herself what kind of situation they are in; which role or identity they have; and what the most appropriate behavior is for a person like them in the given type of situation.
The logic of appropriateness is ubiquitous, a “fundamental logic of political action” (1989: 38). Routines apply not only in routine situations, but are a standard organizational response to both novel and politically important situations (ibid.: 34, 38). “Rules” connote both routines and conventions as well as beliefs and paradigms – i.e. both norms and cognitions. For example, organizational experts learn rules “as catechisms”. Rules, conventions and roles are accessible to individuals who have not themselves lived through the experience. Organizational routines survive considerable turnover of individuals. Individuals are socialized into a set of rules and accept their appropriateness. Individual will and personality is less important.

According to the critique, the argument that institutions are dominated by rules and rule-following behavior rests on an “over-politicized” conception of human agency (Sjöblom 1993; compare Wrong 1961; Granovetter 1992). In Sjöblom’s opinion, the argument that all individual interests and preferences are shaped endogenously by institutions has “an almost totalitarian ring” (1993: 404–405). Can the thesis of the logic of appropriateness help us understand institutional change under revolutionary conditions, such as the East German democratization? Can it capture the dynamics of the emerging network society, discussed in the previous chapter? Is it adequate for the analysis of the modern policy networks, where administrators must increasingly make autonomous and discrete decisions? In Sjöblom’s judgment, it is not:

“The logic of appropriateness” is part of a political theory for accountants, bureau chiefs and clerks, who are anxious to make mistakes; in the worst case it is a political theory for the programmed bureaucratic robot. (Sjöblom 1993: 402).

March and Olsen’s work can be read as an optimistic account of Scandinavian consensus-oriented political institutions. However, according to the critique, their framework could just as well be applied to the former East German regime (Sjöblom 1993: 405). March and Olsen acknowledge that the rules of appropriate behavior may both be imposed and enforced by coercion or authority; or they may be learned and internalized through socialization (March and Olsen 1989: 22). However, the emphasis in March and Olsen’s argument is not on “aggregative institutions”, where the problem of coordination is one
of compliance (ibid.: 117–142). Rather, their argument privileges “integrative institutions”, where the underlying logic is one of obligation and duty (March and Olsen 1989; 1995).

March and Olsen maintain that behavior governed by rules is neither trivial nor unreasoned (1989: 22). They claim that the process by which rules of appropriateness are determined and applied is a process involving “high levels of human intelligence, discourse and deliberation” (ibid.). In integrative institutions, the logic of appropriateness is assumed to evolve in processes of reasoned deliberation in search of the common good (1989: 124). I argue that some of the unclarity surrounding March and Olsen’s argument can be resolved by a close reading of their chapter on the institutionalization of meaning, which emphasizes the importance of interpersonal trust and communication (1989: Chapter 3; 1976).

The Institutionalization of Meaning

The rules and routines defining appropriate behavior are supported and elaborated by – or may be contradicted by – systems of meaning, i.e. beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures and knowledge. A close reading of March and Olsen reveals that the institutionalized systems of meaning are assumed to rest on social network interaction. Clusters of beliefs and values, cognitions and norms take shape within institutions, through processes of discussion and persuasion with trusted others (March and Olsen 1976; 1989: 39–47). Social linkages of friendship and trust form understandings of events (1976: 60). An organizational participant will – to the extent to which he or she trusts others with whom he has contact – see what they see and like what they like (March and Olsen 1976; 1989: 39–47). Processes of coming to believe that something exists or is true are linked to perceptions of what is desirable; norms develop in parallel with cognitions. Learning is a form of attitude formation.

The interpersonal trust directing the formation of meaning is distinct from the generalized trust associated with the logic of appropriateness. The classical bureaucrat can be trusted to act in a manner that is appropriate given his position and the situation (March and Olsen 1989: 119). Generalized trust is sustained by socialization into the institutional logic of appropriateness (ibid.: 27). In contrast, interpersonal trust or
antagonism is a property of specific interpersonal relations. From this perspective, the organization consists of individuals with varying patterns of interaction; varying degrees of interpersonal trust; and varying degrees of integration or alienation in relation to the organizational logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1976: 63).

Most of the time, an individual has difficulty in maintaining a view of the world that is different from that of an unanimous group of trusted others (ibid.). If different trusted people uphold different preferences and perceptions, the frequency of interaction will be especially important. This observation is in line with Homans’ classic work on small groups (Homans 1950) as well as later sociological models, which locate the emergence and monitoring of norms to close-knit social networks (Nee and Ingram 1998). These arguments shift the attention away from the content of systems of meaning to the social mechanisms that give rise to and uphold cognitions and norms:

Taken together, these propositions suggest a view of reality forming that emphasizes the impact of interpersonal connections within a political system and the affective connection between the system and the participant on the development of belief, as well as the interaction between seeing and liking. (March and Olsen 1989: 45).

The details of the informal structure of interaction and trust within an organization will form its system of institutionalized meaning (ibid.). Concordantly, the social network approach claims that the details of social network structure will determine institutional development. This, in turn, should bring our attention to processes of network structuration. March and Olsen assume that individuals will seek contact with people they trust and avoid persons they do not trust. Hence, there is a tendency for individuals to be drawn together into groups that share interpretations and preferences within the group but not across groups (March and Olsen 1976; 1989: 39–47). Since communication structures within an organization are differentiated, individuals come to “see” and “like” different worlds (March and Olsen 1976: 59).

Within an institution, informal subgroups may evolve who develop cognitions and beliefs different from the dominating institutional system of meaning (March and Olsen 1989: 45). In a brief sentence, March and Olsen note that such subcultures may be the sources of
radical shifts (ibid.). Seemingly, subgroups are only expected to emerge when there is organizational “slack”, which may be “eliminated”. But can “slack” be “eliminated”? According to Granovetter, the organizational analysts today who expect organizational behavior to conform to formal organizational charts are “sociological babes in the woods” (Granovetter 1985: 502). Likewise, Meyer and Rowan expect interpersonal cooperation to develop independently of formal guidelines (1977). In the view of social network analysis, the emergent structures of informal interaction are what an organization is all about.

Formal organizations do not have “memories”, but individuals who inhabit them do (Lundquist 1997). Social networks can be carriers of organizational memory, of world views, ideological convictions, policy formulations, information, or solidarity (ibid.). Emirbayer and Goodwin briefly note that Bourdieu’s understanding of “fields” has striking analytical affinities with social networks (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994: 1426, footnote 8; see also DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 25–26). Larger social networks may carry political and cultural discourses (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994), belief systems or ideologies (Erickson 1982). Social networks containing trust and positive experiences of cooperation are likely to persist over time, perhaps outliving formal organizations, carrying ideas with them (Aldrich 1982).

In the next chapter, we shall return to the issue of network formation, arguing that a pervasive factor affecting the formation of social network ties, and hence the development of interpersonal trust, is the common tendency to network with socially similar others. I argue that the strength of similarity is most manifest when institutional action is allowed to follow the logic of interpersonal trust, based on emergent social network structures, rather than either the logic of consequentiality, based on resource-dependence, or the logic of appropriateness, based on institutionalized rules and routines.

“Garbage-Can” Processes of Change

While broader systems of belief change at a slow pace through social network discussion and persuasion, individual problems and solutions may be linked into decision-making like garbage, discarded in random order into a waste can. In the well-known “garbage-can” model of collective choice, the coupling of participants, problems and solutions
is decided by temporal sorting (Cohen et al. 1972; March and Olsen 1976/1979; 1989). The garbage-can model claims that the allocation of attention is an important aspect of the boundedness of rationality. In the model, temporal sorting and the allocation of attention decide decision-making outcomes.

In the eyes of its admirers, the garbage-can model meritoriously highlights the ambiguity of goals and beliefs and the inherent randomness of organizational choice (Moe 1984: 749). In the view of its critics, the model is only pre-theoretical, lacking in realism and too loose as a metaphor (Rasch 1989). Mucciaroni suggests that the model’s strengths may be preserved if certain of its weaknesses can be overcome, viz. if it can be complemented by specific structural factors, specifying how “streams” of problems, solutions and participants are coupled to the decision-making situation (1992). This would make it possible to retrace the impact of historical antecedents and broader historical patterns. Specifying the structural parameters of the “streams” would tell us what kinds of problems and solutions are most likely to be coupled (ibid.).

Building on our earlier discussions of the social network bases of entrepreneurship, I would suggest that the garbage-can model may be applicable in such a situation. Given that an organizational entrepreneur finds his or her close associates, as well as important non-redundant relations, on the basis of previous acquaintance and interpersonal trust, pre-existing social network structures will condition entrepreneurship.

Granovetter exemplifies the social network parameters of organizational entrepreneurship with the formation of the electrical utility industry in the United States in the late 19th century. Drawing on a unique set of personal ties, including those of his personal secretary, Thomas Edison was able to mobilize a number of resources and make organizational decisions that structured the entire industry (Granovetter 1992: 8–9; Swedberg and Granovetter 1992: 18). Notably, the crucial personal network relations were forged prior to and independently of the entrepreneurial event.
Conclusions

In this chapter, I have argued that both economic new institutionalism and sociological versions of new institutionalism fail to capture agency, which is of course a central concern for studies of institutional change. Drawing support from Giddens’ theory of structuration, it was claimed that the social network approach may be better at capturing the complex interplay between institutional structures and individual agency.

Within institutions, emergent social network groups may either support and uphold, or question and counteract more or less institutionalized norms, cognitions and rules. Institutional logics of appropriateness are interpreted, conceded to or contradicted according to the logic of interpersonal trust, which relies on emergent social network structures.

The organizational response to environmental pressures for institutional change is not necessarily functional or efficient, but is mediated through social network recruitment, deliberation and cooperation. It was noted that organizational entrepreneurship often relies on social network cooperation and mobilization of resources. The launching of a new organization or reform of an existing institution may rely on pre-existing ties of interpersonal trust and their access to material and organizational resources, as well as norms, cognitions and ideas that enter the decision-making process through crucial non-redundant or “weak” ties.

Following up on the argument that social network ties are crucial to institutional change, Chapter 5 discusses the role of social similarity in the structuration of social networks, launching a model of the “strength of similarity”. In Chapter 7, the two proposed models – the “logic of interpersonal trust” and “strength of similarity” – are then illustrated in a case study of the take-over and reformation of the former East German communist party SED into the PDS.
The Strength of Similarity

Gender in the Structuration of Social Networks

A central tenet of the social network approach to organizational studies is the interdependence of instrumental and social rationales of action (Granovetter 1985). This chapter links the social network model of action to two empirical generalizations from the management studies literature. Firstly, social networks may achieve an increased impact on organizational decision-making and recruitment under conditions of high uncertainty, such as in processes of organizational change (Pfeffer et al. 1976; Kanter 1977/1993). Secondly, informal intra-organizational networks tend to be gender-differentiated (Ibarra 1992, 1993). I suggest using the second observation to study the first.

Social network studies suggest that influence exerted through social network ties has an impact on the workings of organizations. Particularly when social consensus is low, when organizations do not have well-developed paradigms of operation, and to the extent that organizations operate with uncertain technologies and preferences, the tendency to resort to social network communication and cooperation may be heightened. Under conditions of organizational uncertainty, social network relationships gain in importance.

Secondly, findings in management and other organizational studies, confirmed by common insights of social psychology, suggest that individuals tend to form network ties with others who are socially similar. This applies to gender similarity in particular. I discuss how the tendency for social network ties to be based on social similarity can originate in a search for trust, in expressiveness, and in organizational opportunity. All three factors explain why social networks in organizations tend to be gender-differentiated.
In this chapter, I discuss the complex interaction of these two tendencies. I argue that similarity-interaction is an important social mechanism because it forms the structures that are the base of social network action, outlined in Chapter 4 as “the logic of interpersonal trust”. Additionally, as the reviewed studies suggest, the tendency to immediate similarity-interaction may be stronger when uncertainty is higher, i.e. in phases of institutional change and in organizational positions from which change may be accomplished. These two aspects of similarity-interaction add up to what I choose to call “the strength of similarity”.

This chapter forms the link between the more abstract theoretical arguments in Chapter 4 and the case study. I discuss reliance on informal networks as a response to conditions of organizational uncertainty. Furthermore, I argue that the study of the representation of women in male-dominated organizations may provide particularly useful case studies of the role of social networks in institutional change. Notably, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, unlike in feminist analysis, the focus is not on gender relations as such, but on the importance of social network mechanisms for the trajectory of institutional change.

**Overview**

This chapter reviews literature drawn largely from the field of management studies, which, in comparison with the new institutionalist literature, are less abstract and more oriented toward making empirical generalizations. The chapter consists of five sections of varying length. It starts with a short introduction to the phenomenon of similarity-interaction. The second section contains a brief re-statement of some key points made in earlier chapters, contrasting the social network approach to market and hierarchy, i.e. to economic and bureaucratic models of organization.

In the third section of the chapter, I review discussions of the concept of trust in economic, political and organization theory. I repeat some propositions from earlier chapters, arguing that political theory has tended to neglect the importance of interpersonal trust between concrete individuals. Instead, political theory has taken an interest in interpersonal trust only in as far as it produces a “spillover” effect, producing trust in institutions or generalized trust.
In the fourth, central and longest section of the chapter, I then set up a model of the “strength of similarity”: The tendency both to turn to a logic of interpersonal trust, relying on pre-existing social network ties, and to momentary similarity-interaction should be strongest when and where organizational uncertainty is high. The logic of interpersonal trust, as well as similarity-interaction, should be most manifest: a) in organizational situations where paradigms are undeveloped or unclear, such as when an organization is under external pressure to reform; and b) in organizational positions where uncertainty is high, demanding close communication and loyalty. Since organizational uncertainty is likely to be a feature of institutional change, it is argued that similarity-interaction, as well as the reliance on the logic of interpersonal trust, should be particularly characteristic of processes of institutional change. Three factors are reviewed which may enhance similarity-interaction: a search for interpersonal trust in perceived similarity, individual expression of social identity, and structural opportunities for interaction.

In the last and fifth part of the chapter, the tendency toward similarity-interaction is discussed as a “social mechanism”, which can be extrapolated for heuristic purposes. I argue that the micro-level phenomenon of similarity-interaction is not any timeless social law, but only an observed common social tendency. Neither can the macro-level consequences of similarity-interaction be taken as pre-determined. The relationship to feminist theory is briefly reviewed and the chapter concluded.

**Similarity-Interaction**

A common finding in social network analysis, confirmed by social psychologists and sociologists, is the tendency in emergent, informal networks to similarity-interaction. Given a formal organizational framework and a specific distribution of individual resources, people tend to prefer forming network ties with socially similar individuals. The tendency to similarity-interaction has been observed to apply to attributes such as age, gender and race, as well as to characteristics such as education, social class and cognitive and attitudinal similarity (Marsden 1988; Brass 1998). Here, I shall discuss the tendency to similarity-interaction in social networking as it applies to gender.
Studies of emergent social networks in organizations have suggested that men commonly have a tendency to socialize with and choose to work with other men, and women to form ties with other women (Kanter 1977/1993; Lincoln and Miller 1979; Miller et al. 1981; Brass 1985; Marsden 1988: 70–71; Ibarra 1992; 1993; Kilduff and Mehra 1996; Mehra et al. 1998; Holgersson 1998; Burt 1998).

Presuming – as earlier research indicates – that more tightly-knit social networks have a tendency to be gender-differentiated, then retracing the recruitment and integration of women into male-dominated organizations may help us to discern how social networks work. Furthermore, if – as this chapter argues – social network influence as well as similarity-interaction is enhanced by organizational uncertainty, then such retracing should be particularly rewarding for the study of social network influence on organizational change.

Social Similarity as a Basis for Strong Ties

In this chapter, the focus is on stronger, rather than weaker ties. According to the similarity-interaction hypothesis, the strength of a social network tie is likely to be enhanced by some degree of perceived similarity. Conversely, informal circles of strong network ties – “cliques” – are likely to entail some degree of social cohesion, advancing normative and cognitive agreement, shaping views and behavior (Pattison 1994). Similarity-interaction is more marked in the formation of stronger, i.e. friendship-like ties. Research on work-related ties has suggested that cross-sex ties often tend to be weaker than same-sex ties (Ibarra 1993: 68). The expressive, social identity aspect is one plausible reason why hetero-philous ties tend to be weaker than homo-philous ties: men seek male friends and women seek female friends. Generally, homogeneous ties are likely to be stronger than heterogeneous ties (Granovetter 1982).

In social network analysis, expressive or friendship aspects of social ties are part of the definition of a strong network tie. A strong tie is commonly defined by a larger degree of time spent together, more emotional intensity, mutual confiding, and reciprocal services (Granovetter 1973: 348). A strong tie is more close, stable and binding than a weak tie and takes longer time to forge (Ibarra 1993: 62). Instrumental ties may be both enhanced and strengthened by
factors such as mutual understanding and trust – common aspects of friendships. Conversely, expressive, i.e. friendship ties may be of, or may gain, instrumental importance.

According to social network studies, strong ties fulfill other instrumental functions than do weaker ties. Weak ties with diverse acquaintances may for example transport important non-redundant information and diffuse ideas that do not decline in value by being shared (Granovetter 1974/1995). In this chapter, the focus is on stronger rather than weaker ties, i.e. on ties that contain trust and thus make close cooperation and communication possible. Strong ties contain trust, which may be necessary for closer forms of cooperation. Strong ties may be strategic for social support (Walker et al. 1994); recommendations for recruitment or promotion (Burt 1998); professional assistance (Kaufmann 1990); and informal influence (Marsden and Friedkin 1994).

This chapter proposes that gender-similarity-interaction should be regarded as a social mechanism, i.e. a likely tendency, found in a range of different social settings (Hedström and Swedberg 1998b). Thus, gender is proposed as a useful category of analysis for the development of social network approaches to organizational change. For example, the Nestor of organization theory, Philip Selznick, observed that a novel organization typically begins by choosing a homogeneous rather than a diversified group to make the initial organizational decisions (Selznick 1957/1961). This, I argue, hints at the importance of similarity-interaction in organizational change. Given that social networks are gender-differentiated, analyzing patterns of gender differentiation may help throw light on the organizational role of social networks.

**Gender as Social Similarity**

One of the best-established findings in the social network literature is that friends tend to be similar (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987: 374). The tendency to similarity-interaction has been found to apply to various aspects of similarity and difference, such as gender. As a factor structuring informal networks, the effects of gender similarity is much more pronounced than for example the effects of education and occupation (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; Blau 1977). In the social network literature, gender has been found to be an important

One promising agenda for social network analysis is how inequalities are produced and reproduced (Granovetter 1994). The study of gender differences in networking patterns has been employed to demonstrate detrimental effects for women, for example in terms of difficulties of job promotion; limited access to informal decision-making and valuable information on the informal workings of an organization; and lower legislative effectiveness (Kanter 1977/1993; Ibarra 1992; 1993; Dahlerup 1988; Blair and Stanley 1991). More recently, similar-gender preference – “homo-sociability” – in networking has been discussed as a feature of the social construction of masculinity (Wharton and Bird 1996; Kilduff and Mehra 1996).

Here, I shall employ the literature on gender studies for a quite different purpose. I am not interested in analyzing gender inequality or the social construction of gender. Instead, the focus on the genderedness of social networking will be inverted, zooming in on the role of social networks in organizations. I argue that if social networks are gender-differentiated, then studying the gendered dynamics of organizational change may help us to discern where and when social network mechanisms, as opposed to formal procedure and resource-dependence mechanisms, dominate developments.

Social Networks versus Market and Hierarchy

How do social network mechanisms differ from those of formal organization? By definition, social network relations are informal and emergent. In contrast, as discussed in Chapter 3, in the Weberian ideal-type of legal-rational bureaucratic organization, the structure of informal networks strictly mirrors the formally prescribed structure of positions and authority (Weber 1991). An impersonal organizational order is presumed to form informal inter-organizational interaction, rather than vice versa. Organizational authority and spheres of competence are delimited by formal rules, not by emergent informal
networks of cooperation. Recruitment and promotion are based on formal merits — human capital — as well as seniority and individual achievement, not on social capital and trust (Burt 1998; Coleman 1990). In a Weberian ideal-type of organization, a member of a corporate group is not loyal to a cohesive social network group, but to an impersonal order.

In critical accounts, rationality and formality have been claimed to be more of legitimizing myths for organizations than a correct image of their factual workings (Meyer and Rowan 1977). In this view, formal structure is a myth and ceremony upheld in order to conform to and be legitimated by other institutions in the organization’s environment. For example, formal organizational principles such as universalism and expertise are rationalizing myths, proliferated by isomorphic pressures originating in the bureaucratization of modern society. In practice, Meyer and Rowan argue, formal organizational structure is de-coupled from prevailing social behaviors. In actual work activities, organizational coordination, interdependence, and mutual adjustments among structural units are handled informally. Thus, interpersonal relations are rendered very important (ibid.):

[I]ndividuals are left to work out technical interdependencies informally. The ability to coordinate things in violation of the rules — that is, to get along with other people — is highly valued. (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 353).

Meyer and Rowan identify demands for efficiency as the pressure that causes a de-coupling of formal organization from actual work activities. They suggest that formal structure may conflict with technical activities and demands for efficiency. Here, the line of argument of Meyer and Rowans resembles that of economic models of organizations, in the sense that both assume organizational structure to be an efficient response to environmental demands.

Whether social network interaction impedes or enhances organizational efficiency is a theoretically multifaceted and empirically complex question, I would argue. Empirical answers to the question depend, among other things, on which perspective on and definition of “efficiency” is adopted (M. Meyer 1990). To suggest the multifaceted character of the theoretical question: social network ties may be “efficient” in the sense that they may make cooperation possible. On the other hand, the centrality of social capital — which I shall develop
more on below – may mean that human capital and other resources do not come to full use. Depending on changes in the environment, closed circles of cooperation may prove to be inflexible and thus less “efficient”. In such contexts, non-redundant resources and information, relayed through non-redundant or “weak” network ties, may be crucial to flexibility.

The Social Network Approach

As outlined in Chapter 4, the social network perspective on organizational analysis has been developed as a critique primarily of economic models of organization (Granovetter 1974/1995; 1982; 1985; Granovetter and Swedberg 1992). This perspective claims that organizations do not necessarily function rationally in the sense described by economic models of organization. Instead, economic transactions are “embedded” in a structure of social networks (Granovetter 1985).

In Chapter 3, I suggested that social network models of organization have two crucial features. First, the logic of coordination implied by the network metaphor differs from hierarchical or market models of coordination (Thompson et al. 1991). Network models capture cooperation and reciprocity, rather than hierarchy or competition (Powell 1991). Typically, network models imply a “flat” organizational form, informally and cooperatively run (Thompson 1991). The emblematic network relationship is that between essentially equal social agents, such as colleagues or business partners. Network cooperation may be exclusive to outsiders and may be based on ties of loyalty. At their core, network relations embody trust. Arguably, the most important attribute of network operation is the formation and sustainment of trust (ibid.).

A second feature of the social network approach, which partly differentiates it from the broader category of network approaches, is its focus on concrete interpersonal relations (Granovetter 1985). Whereas the broader category of network approaches stresses informality as a central feature of coordination, the social network approach develops more extensively on this feature. The social network approach focuses interpersonal networks and puts distinctly social aspects of human behavior at the center of analysis. According to social network analysis, people are integrated into society not only through the formal
relations of the economy and political system, but also through informal and personal social network ties (Scott 1992). They are assumed to be social beings who seek to establish social ties with others. This social aspect is assumed to be relevant to instrumental interpersonal interaction.

This leads to predictions of human behavior which differ from other models of organization, such as economic and bureaucratic models. Individuals are viewed as interdependent rather than independent and autonomous. The structure of social relations is assumed to constrain and enable individual action (Wasserman and Galaskiewicz 1994: xi-xvii). Relational ties between individuals are presumed to channel both material resources and nonmaterial resources such as political support and friendship (ibid.). According to social network analysis, “being in the right place” in an organization’s informal network of communication is an important determinant of individual influence (Brass 1984).

The social network approach maintains that the structure of social networks is a relevant and important societal structure. In the social network view, organizations consist of patterns of repeated social interactions. The organizational social network structure is a result both of the pattern of formally prescribed positions, as well as of informal, emergent interactions. Organizational members may modify the formal patterns of workflow or engage in communication and cooperation outside of the formal patterns. Conversely, organizational members may seek to formalize emerged social network patterns.

**Strong vs. Weak Ties**

As discussed in Chapter 3, two common categories of analysis employed in social network studies are “strong” vs. “weak” social network ties (Granovetter 1974/1995). Strong ties correspond roughly to what we usually call “friendships”, whereas weak ties can be translated as “acquaintances” (ibid.). However, social network analysis is interested both in the social and the instrumental aspect of network ties. A strong interpersonal tie is characterized by a larger degree of time spent together, more emotional intensity, mutual confiding, and reciprocal services (Granovetter 1973: 348). Thus, a strong tie is defined by both social and instrumental qualities. I would argue that a
central tenet of the social network approach is that social and instrumental aspects of interpersonal relationships are interrelated and interact. In his classic study of the strength of weak ties, Granovetter demonstrated how people successfully found jobs through their acquaintances, rather than through market mechanisms (1973).

As noted in Chapter 3, the concept of “weak ties” is twofold (Burt 1992). In Granovetter’s early work, he assumed that acquaintances were also people who could supply us with non-redundant information, whereas friends were assumed to be part of closely-knit social circles, sharing the same, and thus redundant information (Granovetter 1982). Here, I speak of strong ties not in terms of their redundancy or non-redundancy, but in terms of the definition provided above. When speaking of ties that provide non-redundant information, I call them non-redundant ties, avoiding the confusing term “weak ties”. In this usage, Granovetter’s classic article would be renamed “The Strength of Non-Redundant Ties”.

This study develops on the assumption that organizational interpersonal ties, carrying instrumental, job-related functions, also have a social aspect. In focus are stronger rather than weaker ties, i.e. ties that contain trust and thus may form the basis of informal cooperation.

Before going on to the central section of this chapter – the formulation of the “strength of similarity” – I shall review some discussions of interpersonal trust and similarity in economic, political and organization theory.

In this chapter, I discuss three factors that may trigger similarity-interaction and hence influence the formation of social networks and development of interpersonal trust, namely uncertainty, expressiveness, and opportunities for interaction. These three factors all help to explain the tendency to similarity-interaction that influences the formation of organizational social networks.

**Trust and Similarity**

In search of trust and identity, individuals have a tendency to network with others who seem similar or whom they wish to resemble. Opportunities to interaction are given by the formal organization in question, but also by societal substructures such as the system of education and
kinship structures. The uncertainty/trust and expressiveness/identity factors can be put in contrast both to formal organization, which gives opportunity for interaction; and to resource-dependence, which gives a “rational” incentive to interaction. Compared to the search for social identity, the search for trust is more compatible with the type of rationality assumed by economic models of organization. However, as emphasized in earlier chapters, the two may interact. Organizational trust and loyalty are often cultivated in distinctly social settings, an obvious example being the corporate executive round of golf.

Uncertainty and Trust in Economic Theory

Perhaps the most common account for similarity-interaction is that similarity may smooth trust, which in turn is a crucial basis of informal cooperation. This uncertainty/trust perspective on similarity-interaction is derived foremost from economic thinking.

To the economist, trust, similar values and loyalty are crucial “externalities” which make cooperation possible in the face of risk and uncertainty (Arrow 1974). Trust makes fruitful cooperation possible. According to Luhmann, in the face of risk, trust “releases creative, uninhibited, innovative, entrepreneurial activities” (Sztompka 1999: 103). Furthermore, trust is dependent on familiarity (Luhmann 1988). Fukuyama suggests that the level of generalized trust is a cultural characteristic of a particular ethnic group (1995). For example, certain ethnic entrepreneurs in the United States proliferate on a high level of generalized inter-group trust. Thanks to such cultural traits, high-trust societies such as Germany, Sweden and Japan have managed to build very large corporations.

In his classic article on the “rational fools” of microeconomic modeling, Amartya Sen suggests that recognizing certain “externalities” would not require a serious revision of the basic structure of economic models (Sen 1978). Sen contrasts interpersonal sympathy to commitment and claims that the former is more easily incorporable into economic models. While sympathy may count as an “externality” facilitating productive cooperation, commitment to a principle is more obviously likely to involve counter-preferential choice. In comparison, interpersonal sympathy does not quarrel as radically with the basic assumption of economic theory viz. self-interest (ibid.).
I would claim that expressiveness could both coincide with and contradict more instrumental motivations. As feminist studies of social networks in organizations have shown, for an organizational minority, expressive and instrumental networking needs are likely to diverge (Ibarra 1992). And what of the “loyalty” factor that Arrow mentions? I would argue that, depending on its specific character, loyalty may well count as a commitment to an ideological principle, in collision with reasonable approximations of self-interest. This similarity of loyalty to ideological commitment is obvious if we think, for example, of the loyalty of communist cadres to their party. Loyalty to the organization and its leadership enhances organizational governability.

It may be that the assumption of individual self-interest is particularly misplaced in political analysis (Mansbridge 1990a; March and Olsen 1989). However, the importance of “pro-social” behavior, and affective and normative choices have also begun to leave their mark on economic models of organization. Developments and critiques of traditional economic models give more attention to externalities such as trust, and to the social embeddedness of economic transactions. For example, successful entrepreneurs have been found to typically base their enterprises on a core of similar others, since similarity breeds trust and cooperation (Greve 1995; Grabher and Stark 1997; 1998). A central tenet in new economic sociology, based on Granovetter’s often cited “embeddedness” argument, is that even modern Western economic systems rely not only on systemic confidence, but on interpersonal trust, built and sustained in social networks (Granovetter 1974/1995; 1985; Swedberg and Granovetter 1992).

Uncertainty and Trust in Political Theory

In political philosophy, the traditional focus has been on generalized, systemic trust and not on specific interpersonal relations of trust. Commonly, it is assumed that in modern functional systems, interpersonal trust is not as important as impersonal, anonymous confidence in the system (Luhmann 1988). Luhmann claims that in modern Western democracy, participation in the economy and in politics is no longer a matter of personal relations. Before modernization, kinship networks of economic and political elites decided the history
of Europe. Today, Luhmann argues, unlike in pre-modern societies, interpersonal trust is no longer as vital.

In the recent wave of renewed social science interest in questions of trust, most authors seem to share this traditional outlook. Commonly, in social science discussions, systemic or impersonal trust is in focus. As for interpersonal bonds of trust, cultivated in the organizations of civil society, these are seen to be of interest only in as far as they produce a general “spill-over” effect, producing systemic trust (Tocqueville 1840/1946; Luhmann 1988; Putnam 1993). The opposite situation, difficulty in finding partners who warrant trust, difficulties in mobilizing trustful engagements and activities may disseminate, disperse or “spill over” into distrust of the system (Luhmann 1988; Sztompka 1999). Virtuous vs. vicious “loops of trust” create a culture of trust or a culture of distrust in for example post-communist parliaments, governments, presidents and church (Sztompka 1999).

Other authors, however, have a different view of the role of trust in society. In the post-industrial transformation, interpersonal relations of trust may be growing more important (Misztal 1996). Indeed, interpersonal relationships of trust – friendships – can even be seen as the key “post-industrial” type of relationship (ibid.: 185). As reliable alliances, friendships may cope well with crucial features of the post-industrial condition: uncertainty and risk (Beck 1992) and network forms of organization (Castells 1996). In states where systemic trust has deteriorated to nil, such as former communist societies, interpersonal networks may be important bases of cooperation which outlive systemic collapse (Grabher and Stark 1998). As we shall return to in the case study in Chapter 7, this latter perspective points to the importance of analyzing concrete social networks as they exist and evolve.

In summary, in the uncertainty/trust view of social networking, risk and uncertainty produces the need for trust, which is provided in the reliable alliances of friendship. But who are our friends, who do we choose to network with? Reviewing sociological and anthropological writings, Misztal concludes that we choose our friends among those who resemble us in terms of gender, age, occupation and race (Misztal 1996: 184).
Uncertainty and Trust in Organizational Theory

In modern bureaucratic organizations, there are many situations when people, rather than impersonal procedures must be trusted (Kanter 1977/1993: 48; Pfeffer et al. 1976). Interpersonal trust is crucial to innumerable aspects of organizational life, some more than others. In the age of high technology, as organizational fluidity increases, networks of contacts may be becoming even more important (Kanter 1993: 300).

According to the uncertainty/trust argument, interpersonal trust is rendered more important in the face of organizational uncertainty. Here, I draw on the work first of Kanter and then on Pfeffer, Salancik and Leblebici to outline a model of similarity-interaction based on the uncertainty/trust argument. All of these authors writing in the late 1970s, they reach the same conclusion: that social familiarity and social influence will be used more in organizational decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. Checking the databases for references, this argument has seldom been noted and does not seem to have been elaborated on by other researchers on organizations.

Kanter’s classic 1977 study of the management of the corporation “Indsco” is most often cited because of her arguments on the opportunity-structure created by the proportions of minorities and majorities in an organization (Kanter 1977/1993: Chapters 8 and 9; Kanter 1977). Kanter’s model of opportunity structures is very well known and has been widely discussed. In order not to confuse the reader already acquainted with her work, I shall briefly review the opportunity-structures model before turning to other parts of Kanter’s work.

Simply put; in an organization with a low proportion of females, women have little opportunity to form useful social networks of their own (Kanter 1977). According to the opportunity-structure model, organizational minorities, such as for example women, suffer exclusion from important informal networks – since these are typically homogeneously male – and therefore lack well-placed organizational allies.

The opportunity-structure model has been applied for example to political party organizations. The argument goes that in Scandinavian political parties, in passing the 30 percent mark, women may have become a “critical minority” (Dahlerup 1988). With increased
proportions, women have sufficient numbers of peers to act as a group, easing the pressures of being a minority. When the opportunity-structure changes, the efficiency and influence of women politicians may increase, making possible changes in political culture, discourse, policy and the reaction to women as politicians (ibid.). Below, I shall return to the opportunity-structure argument, restating it somewhat.

However, first and foremost I would like to call attention to another facet of Kanter’s analytical framework which has not gained the same resonance; namely, her analysis of similarity-interaction itself. Why are informal networks homogeneous with respect to gender in the first place? Are they always homogeneous? According to what I choose to term “the strength of similarity” argument, similarity-interaction is a variable tendency, which is stronger in moments and positions of institutional uncertainty.

The Strength of Similarity

Various theories in sociology and social psychology suggest that an important condition, which enhances social influence on decision-making, is uncertainty. Under conditions of uncertainty, we are more likely to rely on informal relations for guidance, i.e. to act in accordance with the logic of interpersonal trust (Chapter 4). To the extent that pre-existing social networks are gender-differentiated, this reliance on informal relations is gendered. Secondly, the same factors that make social networks gendered in the first place are also directly active in decision-making under uncertainty.

Kanter’s model of opportunity-structures builds on a fundamental observation, which has been largely overlooked in the discussions of her work, namely that pressures to similarity-interaction are heightened by organizational uncertainty (Kanter 1977/1993: Chapter 3). According to Kanter, homo-sociability is more pronounced in organizational contexts characterized by uncertainty. Conditions of uncertainty enhance the tendency to informal similarity-interaction:

The greater is the uncertainty, the greater are the pressures for those who have to trust each other to form a homogeneous group. At different times in an organization’s history, and at different places in its structure,
a higher degree of uncertainty brings with it more drive for social similarity. (Kanter 1977/1993: 49).

In a similar vein, Pfeffer et al. claim that social influence is inevitable in decision-making situations of great uncertainty (1976: 240–241). In their treatment, “social influence” includes both influence exerted through pre-existing social network relations as well as immediate reliance on social familiarity for guidance. The observation that uncertainty breeds social influence, they argue, is well corroborated by the social psychology literature. As a model, it is parsimonious and generalizable to many contexts (ibid.). According to Pfeffer et al., social influence should be most prevalent:

- under conditions of organizational uncertainty, i.e. in new or changing organizations, when organizational paradigms are undeveloped or unclear
- in high uncertainty positions within organizations, i.e. positions demanding close communication, cooperation, and loyalty in non-routine, high discretion tasks

I argue that the strength of similarity would be likely to be most manifest in those organizational situations and positions specified by Pfeffer et al.. Below, I first develop more closely on the uncertainty/trust perspective on similarity-interaction. I then discuss how the tendency to similarity-interaction may be enhanced by two complementary tendencies; namely, the search for loyalty and governability, and the search for expressiveness and social identity. Finally, I discuss the impact of structural opportunity as a further factor that may reinforce the strength of similarity.

The discussion of similarity-interaction is held in general terms, but is developed specifically as it may apply to gender. As is acknowledged in a concluding section on “social mechanisms”, gender is of course a social construct that is subject to historical change (Scott 1986/1999). The salience of gender as an attribute of “difference”, as well as the salience of similarity to network formation and interpersonal trust, will vary depending on both societal and organizational context. I do not mean to propose the “strength of similarity” as any universal or timeless law, but rather as a probabilistic model, based on past observations of social tendencies. Breaking up the “strength of similarity”
into a number of separate – but potentially additive – components also suggests its contingency.

**Organizational Uncertainty**

What, then, is organizational uncertainty and when does it occur? Traditionally, organizational uncertainty has been seen to derive from the organizational environment and to be related to questions of power and resource-dependence (Thompson 1967; Sjöblom 1968). Here, we are interested not in organizational uncertainty itself, but in when and where it is likely to trigger a search for interpersonal trust based on social similarity and on pre-existing social network ties. On this point, Pfeffer et al. and Kanter have some compatible but slightly different propositions, supported in parts by other literature.

Pressures for social similarity and informal bases of trust are likely to be strongest during specific historical phases and in certain structural positions within the organization. In the early beginnings of organizations, entrepreneurs are likely to surround themselves with a group of similar others, especially in cases where there is no map or guide of organizational development and the members lack experience (Selznick 1957/1961; Greve 1995; Grabher and Stark 1997; 1998). Concurrent with this argument, entrepreneurs starting up non-isomorphic organizations should be particularly prone to rely on pre-existing social networks as well as social similarity (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Likewise, when organizations are changing rapidly, elites are likely to fall back on social similarity as a basis for trust.

Within the organization, homogenizing pressures are stronger where organizational uncertainty is higher (Kanter 1977/1993). In positions where work is non-routine and discretion is high, in positions demanding cooperation within teams and “smooth” communication, “different” individuals are likely to be scarce. Generally, these conditions are more prevalent as one proceeds up the ranks (ibid.). Additionally, it is at the higher ranks that influence by means of personal discussion and transmission of information is least determined by structures of corporate bureaucracy and most determined by social relationships (Burt 1997). In top jobs, the lack of formal structure makes it important that managers work closely together, with some consensus and mutual trust (Kanter 1977/1993). Individual people rather than impersonal
procedure must be trusted. This goes for example for the informal inner circle of management. Since management is a collective enterprise, managers must “pull in the same direction”. Solidarity, obligation, predictability and loyalty to the organization are mustered both through common social origins and common membership in social networks inside the organization (ibid.). Kanter comments that in the early large corporations, these social networks were often kinship ties, whereas today, this is more rarely the custom.

In summary, a position in which common language and common understanding is important rewards homogeneity. For example, the work situations of top management may generate a preference for people with whom one communicates most easily. In Kanter’s study of corporate managers:

There was a decided wish to avoid those people with whom communication was felt to be uncomfortable, those who took time to figure out or seemed unpredictable in their conduct. (Kanter 1977/1993: 58).

Where communication has to be rapid and accurate, a backlog of joint experience and frames of reference may facilitate communication. The search for social certainty and predictability pushed managerial work into a closed circle of homogeneous peers: “people who had been through the same things together and could easily understand each other” (ibid.).

A slightly different view of uncertainty would focus more on specific tasks than on organizational positions. Pfeffer et al. define uncertainty as “a lack of social consensus about purposes and the means of achieving them” (1976: 230). Uncertain preferences, technologies and standards of evaluation leave decision-makers open to social influence. In the absence of shared decision-making criteria, processes of social influence will account for more of the variance in outcomes. Norms of reciprocity sustained in social networks and informal communication with trusted others influences decision-making. In decision-making situations of great uncertainty, social influence is inevitable (ibid.). Conversely, uncertainty, and thus social influence, is reduced when an area of decision-making is paradigmatically more well-developed and more stable.
Social Influence

How, then, does social influence operate? Social influence has two facets; it relies both on established social networks and on social mechanisms similar to those that influence social networking, viz. perceived similarity. On the one hand, social influence works through entrenched social network connections. On the other hand, in the face of uncertainty, decision-makers may rely on criteria of social similarity as well as familiarity in their ascription of judged competence. For example, Pfeffer et al. suggest the possibility that panelists assessing a research-proposal may easily transfer and generalize their respect and liking for other specific panel members to their institutions. Such mechanisms would be consistent with the literature on interpersonal attraction. The envisioned cognitive process would proceed something like this:

[H]ere is a proposal from institution A; I don’t know much about either the proposal or the institution, but fellow panel member X is from A, and he seems to be quite bright and we get along well; therefore, the proposal must be pretty good. (Pfeffer et al. 1976: 239)

In quantitative studies of social influence, two aspects – pre-existing networks vs. social similarity and familiarity – can usually not be held apart (Pfeffer et al. 1976; Wennerås and Wold 1997). Given the statistical evidence of some form of social influence, it cannot be made clear whether decision-makers on the one hand communicate with their social network relations to gain information that they trust; whether they engage in more or less implicit reciprocal exchanges; or whether they simply observe what their acquaintances do for guidance (Pfeffer et al. 1976).

Ostensibly, the reliance on entrenched social networks will be more important when the decision to adopt a new idea involves more uncertainty. For example, in a classic study of the diffusion of a new drug, Coleman et al. found that a physician's use of a new drug depended on their position in the social network structure (1957 and 1966). Given the uncertainty associated with the use of a drug new on the market, physicians were found to turn to their professional network for guidance:

...a doctor will be influenced more by what his colleagues say and do in uncertain situations, whenever and wherever they may occur, than in

Governability as a Version of the Trust Problem

Another classic explanation of the rationality behind similarity-interaction is that it facilitates governability. This line of argument is related to the uncertainty/trust argument, but not quite identical. In the governability perspective, the networks in focus are consciously recruited, socialized and pronouncedly hierarchical. This contrasts with the more common usage of the social network metaphor, which is associated with voluntary, emergent networks of a rather egalitarian character. A typical image is the spontaneous cooperation of colleagues. However, in real life, the distinction between these two kinds of networks is of course a sliding scale and may be difficult to draw at all. In my view, a central insight of social network analysis is not only how social aspects of network ties may interact with instrumental aspects, but also how formal, hierarchical organization interacts with and is dependent on informal social networks. Therefore, I suggest regarding the governability/loyalty view as a subcategory of the uncertainty/trust argument.

According to Selznick, in the life history of an organization, the initial staff is typically homogeneous and embodies a shared general perspective (Selznick 1957/1961; Kanter 1977/1993: 49). This argument is similar to Duverger’s proposal, discussed in Chapter 2, that an inner circle, such as either a “clan” or a more egalitarian “team”, may crucially influence a political party. In Selznick’s account of organizational entrepreneurship, a cohesive “institutional core” may either be consciously designed through selective recruitment from a particular social group and indoctrination (Selznick 1957/1961). It may also evolve “naturally”, through day-to-day interaction, and ferment through shared key experiences – such as internal conflicts and other crises (ibid.).

Selznick emphasizes the search for governability as the root of institutional core homogeneity. Where tasks cannot be settled by routine formulae, the organizational leadership must ensure that there is a homogeneous institutional core that brings about a “spontaneous regularity of response” (ibid.). The shared general perspective assures
that decision-making conforms – in spirit as well as in letter – to necessarily vague early policies and broadly formulated general rules. Thus, with a homogeneous “institutional core”, the organization is more easily governed. From this perspective, the general problem of leadership is control of core-formation. A solution to this problem may be the recruitment of socially similar others to top management positions.

Within management circles, uncertainty of criteria for evaluation may lead to a demand for personal attachment and a diffuse, unlimited commitment to the organization (Kanter 1977/1993: 63–67). Loyalty is confirmed by serving many years in the same corporation and spending long hours at the office:

> Corporations like Indsco create organizational loyalty by ensuring that for its most highly paid members the corporation represents the only enduring set of social bonds other than the immediate family. (Kanter 1977/1993: 66)

Similarly, in the “clan” type of organization discussed in Chapter 4, management control of the organization is achieved through selective recruitment and socialization (Ouchi 1980; 1981; Ouchi and Price 1993). Since it is assumed that socialization is only possible when individuals are already “pre-socialized” by similar backgrounds, “dis-similar” employees are not included in informal interaction:

> Because [the clan type organization] is so homogeneous with respect to values and beliefs, it is hostile to deviant views, including those that may be important for future adaptation and survival. Employees who are dissimilar, such as women and minorities, are regularly excluded from the mainstream. (Ouchi and Price 1993: 636)

A governability perspective highlights how similarity can be associated with loyalty. This similarity may be given from the outset, or it may be formed gradually while working together in close-knit networks of strong ties.

**Expressiveness**

The expressiveness argument further emphasizes specifically social aspects of social network ties. On an abstract level, it is possible to
distinguish between instrumental social network ties and expressive social network ties. In practice, however, social network ties are often both instrumental and expressive. Instrumental ties involve the exchange of job-related resources, such as information, expertise, professional advice, political access and material resources. “Expressive” or “primary” ties involve the exchange of friendship and social support and are characterized by higher levels of closeness and trust than those that are purely instrumental (Ibarra 1992: 59). As the definition of a “strong tie” implies, an instrumental tie may gain crucial strength by being given expressive qualities. As discussed previously, interpersonal trust in strong network ties is facilitated by some degree of emotional intensity (Granovetter 1973). Thus, instrumental and expressive aspects of social network ties overlap and interact.

Expressive aspects of network formation may spill over into work ties in at least two ways. First, ties forged or developed in “expressive” contexts, i.e. in non-work settings, may gain instrumental importance in organizational contexts. Secondly, expressive aspects of network ties may coincide with instrumental aspects of ties, crucially reinforcing and enhancing them. A common example is the organizational “old boy’s network” which reinforces social ties “on the golf course and over martinis at the club” (Doerfel and Claffey 1998).

A recent branch of feminist theorizing, masculinity studies, have given increased attention to the social construction of masculine identity. In this literature, it is argued that male preference for similarity-interaction is a feature of “identity work” (Collinson and Hearn 1996b; Roper 1996; Kilduff and Mehra 1996). In order to stabilize their masculine identity, male individuals identify with men in positions of power, while differentiating themselves from women and other men. For men in male-dominated organizations, identity networks can coincide with power networks, creating an “identity bonus” (Kilduff and Mehra 1996). Male processes of identification and friendship formation may create exclusionary pressures that marginalize women from crucial informal networks (Mehra, Kilduff and Brass 1998). Thus homo-social behavior reproduces homogeneous male networks within and between organizations (Collinson and Hearn 1992b: 14). As in Kanter’s framework, the tendency of men to interact with other men is interpreted as a quest for power. However, the masculinity studies are interesting in that they suggest how preferences for homogeneity
in social networks may also partly be grounded in an expressive search for identity. According to the social network perspective, this tendency may spill over into the formation of instrumental relations. In a similar line of reasoning, Kanter suggests that male managers tend to put power and privilege in the hands of similar others because this “provides reinforcement for the belief that people like oneself actually deserve to have such authority” (1977/1993: 63).

The expressiveness argument may have different implications for different organizational groups. For minority groups, expressiveness aspects of social networking are likely to contradict rather than reinforce more instrumentally motivated networking tendencies (Ibarra 1992; 1993; Elmes and Connelley 1997). Kanter’s opportunity argument considers peer-group solidarity as a consequence of organizational constraints (1977/1993: Chapter 6). When the career aspirations of a specific group are depressed because of non-career-track jobs and because of a lack of access to informal organizational networks, this may affect group mentality. A group with blocked organizational mobility – such as, in Kanter’s study, women – may even develop an anti-successfulness peer solidarity. Getting promoted becomes an act of disloyalty to the group (ibid.). In summary, for women in male-dominated organizations, the expressive search for identity is likely to conflict with more instrumentally motivated efforts to achieve trustful cooperation with organizational power-holders.

According to the argument made in this study, strong social network ties involving interpersonal trust, which makes close cooperation possible, are likely to gain crucial importance under conditions of organizational uncertainty. Likewise, tendencies to similarity-interaction are likely to be strengthened in the face of organizational uncertainty. This latter observation is perhaps better accounted for by the uncertainty/trust perspectives than by the expressiveness argument. Before summing up the model, I shall discuss one last factor that may contribute to similarity-interaction, namely opportunity.

Opportunity and Social Capital

The opportunity argument focuses the structural opportunities for social interaction. The tendency to interact with others who are similar in socially significant ways is constrained or reinforced by the availability
of similar others. According to this line of argument, dissimilar social structural locations of men and women lead to distinct opportunities for and constraints on the formation of close personal ties (Moore 1990). For example, women in male-dominated organizations have less opportunity to form same-gender networks (Ibarra 1992; 1993; Kanter 1977/1993). Where women are in the organizational minority, they have little choice but to network with others who are dissimilar.

According to Blau’s classic macro-sociological “opportunity-structure” postulate, “social associations depend on the opportunities for social contact” (Blau 1977; Moore 1990; Marsden 1990). In this line of analysis, the diversity of a person’s individual network is assumed to depend on the contexts in which he or she has had the opportunity to access network alters. However, Blau’s framework has not been designed with the intent of analyzing micro-level phenomena (Marsden 1990). Quite to the contrary, Blau contends that separate theoretical conceptions are required for different levels of analysis (Blau 1987 quoted in Marsden 1990: 408). On a micro-sociological level, given a specific opportunity structure, some range of choice remains whether to associate with accessible people (Marsden 1990; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; Elmes and Connelly 1997). As discussed above, individual predispositions influence similarity-interaction.

Still, the opportunity perspective may also be relevant on a micro-sociological level of analysis (ibid.). In Blau’s framework, it is societal “substructures” which provide opportunities for individuals to form social relations with others. Substructures include for example the family, the workplace, neighborhood and voluntary associations. From the perspective of this study, viewing gender as a useful category of analysis, we may note that substructures are likely to include varying proportions of men and women. To the extent that women are present in the workforce in the same numbers as men, job-markets still tend to be to some degree gender-segregated. Likewise, many voluntary associations are gender-differentiated. The kinship network is likely to be a substructure that promotes cross-sex integration (Marsden 1990: 398).

Restricted networking opportunities reinforce tendencies to similarity-interaction. Thus, if we are analyzing the social network dynamics of a particular organization, we may want to know which “substructures” are relevant to this organization. For example, Chisholm found
that informal ties originating from education, military service and from veterans’ and neighborhood associations had been relevant for the emergence of informal cooperation within the San Francisco Bay Area public transit system (Chisholm 1989).

Social relations, having some persistence over time, may be seen as resources for the individuals in question. Trustful social relations with others may facilitate action and cooperation. From this perspective, the social network is an important resource, termed “social capital” (Coleman 1990: Chapter 12). Whereas human capital is a quality of individuals, social capital is a quality created between people. For the individual, human capital is useless without the social capital that makes its application possible. Social capital is the relations with friends, colleagues and contacts through whom one’s financial or human capital can be put to use (Burt 2000: 282).

Social Capital and Gender

Coleman contends that social capital is a by-product of activities engaged in for other purposes (1990: 312). Much social capital comes into being without anyone willing it. From this perspective, an analysis of social networks in an organization should map the relevant substructures from which organizational network ties may originate. However, social capital may also be created more intentionally. Coleman mentions four factors that facilitate the creation of trustful social relations: social network closure; the stability of informal organization; common ideology; and relations of dependence (1990: 318–321).

These factors suggest that formal organizational frameworks may provide important opportunities for social capital to emerge. From this perspective, trust might be seen to follow rather than precede cooperation (Gambetta 1988a). However, here, women may pose an interesting puzzle (Burt 1998). Women in male-dominated organizations are less likely to form strong ties with the organization’s dominant coalition, and, when they are “dissimilar” in relation to the organization’s dominant coalition – i.e. when this is male-dominated – women are more dependent on such strong ties. Hence, studying the integration of women into male-dominated organizations may highlight how social networks work.
In the American corporations that Burt has studied, women do not get the same returns as men on their non-redundant ties. Theoretically, non-redundant ties – which Granovetter termed “weak ties” – should provide rich information benefits, profitably bridging what Burt calls “structural holes” and make the individual attractive to other people as a contact in their own networks (Burt 1992). In contrast, belonging to a clique – a small network of interlocked relations – should constrain action. However, Burt finds that a woman’s odds of promotion depend less on the quality of her own network of non-redundant ties, and more on whether she has a strong tie to a male sponsor who will recommend her – and who in turn has good non-redundant ties (Burt 1998). In Burt’s study, managers brokered introductions to other senior managers. In other words, women had to depend on “borrowing” the social capital of a strategic partner already connected to disconnected groups in the firm and beyond. This is consistent with Kanter’s observation that in a male dominated organization, sponsors are more important for women (1977/1993: 181–184). However, as discussed above, on expressive or identity grounds, male seniors are likely to prefer sponsoring someone in their own image. For members of an organizational minority, sponsors may be more difficult to come by (ibid.: 184).

In the organization Burt studied, women were promoted earlier than their male peers, as a result of the company’s conscious efforts to bring women into the senior ranks (1998: 15–16). Similarly, in Kanter’s “Indsco”, high-performing women were deliberately promoted to showcase the company’s openness to women (1977/1983: 184). The interesting point for our present purposes is that women arrived in top positions by another route than men commonly did. In Burt’s terminology, women were promoted by “borrowing the social capital of a strategic partner”, i.e. by having a sponsor introduce her to his connections (1998). In other words, for dissimilar persons, stronger ties were required for promotion. In Burt’s terminology, women in these firms had a “legitimacy problem” or a “diversity problem”. The same dynamics also applied for younger men and for men who for some reason or other were regarded as “suspect”. These needed an established insider to provide the “cues” (ibid.).

Intermediaries of trust are present in many areas of social life (Coleman 1990: 180–185). For example, it is well known that without
the proper personal connections, outsiders do not do business in Japan (Burt 1998: 24; Granovetter 1994: 160–162). Ostensibly, the centrality of informal social network mechanisms in organizational dynamics should differ according to context. Conditions of organizational uncertainty may create a search for trust and efforts to attain governability a demand for loyalty. Thus, I have tried to argue that qualitative case studies of the recruitment and integration of women in male-dominated organizations may help to decipher the role of social network structures and mechanisms.

Similarity-Interaction as a Social Mechanism

In summary, repeating the hypothesis that was initially stated, I have claimed that similarity-interaction and the importance of social network forms of decision-making and recruitment should be most prevalent when organizations face uncertainty; as well as in organizational positions which demand close communication, cooperation, and loyalty in non-routine, high discretion tasks.

The tendency to similarity-interaction, I claim, is a parsimonious hypothesis and may provide a useful heuristic device for many contexts. I suggest regarding the “uncertainty-breeds-similarity-interaction” model as a social mechanism, as a likely tendency (Hedström and Swedberg eds. 1998). Furthermore, I suggest employing this “social mechanism” as a building block of heuristic models. This is a slightly different usage from the conventional application of “social mechanisms”, which does indeed acknowledge that social mechanism-based models may be regarded as ideal-types (Hedström and Swedberg 1998b: 13), but still seems to be searching for universally valid generalizations. Below, I shall outline what I mean by terming similarity-interaction a “social mechanism”.

The “social mechanism” paradigm of research takes up the rational-choice tradition of modeling, in the sense that it uses mathematical techniques and (weak versions of) methodological individualism to construct explanatory models. The social mechanisms-paradigm can be seen to answer the early 1990s calls to expand the range of formal modeling to accommodate motives other than self-interest
Social mechanisms are hypothetical models that explain individual behavior (Gambetta 1998). Compared to traditional rational choice modeling, social mechanisms tend to be less formally formulated, more based on verbal analysis and more impressionistic (Cowen 1998). In contrast to traditional rational choice modeling, the social mechanisms paradigm builds on the Weberian insight of social action as distinctly “social”, i.e. directed to the behavior of others (Hedström and Swedberg 1998b: 12–13; Williams and May 1996: 47–68). A “social mechanism” is defined as a “molecular interpersonal mechanism” (Elster 1998a: 61).

Because of the inherent complexity of human relations, a social mechanism is not a social law, but a “likely tendency”. A social mechanism is “a plausible hypothesis, or set of hypotheses, that could be the explanation of some social phenomenon, the explanation being in terms of interactions between individuals and other individuals, or between individuals and some aggregate” (Schelling 1998: 32–33). In Robert Merton’s definition, social mechanisms are “social processes having designated consequences for designated parts of a social structure” (Cowen 1998: 128). They can be used to explain either the emergence of a phenomenon or its survival over time. In contrast to social laws, social mechanisms are not deterministic but probabilistic (Hedström and Swedberg 1998b: 8). They are “frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns” that allow for explanation, but not for prediction (Elster 1998a: 45).

The social mechanisms approach is closely connected to methodological individualism (Elster 1998a). Assumptions are made as to likely biases and inclinations of individuals. Models are then constructed by abstractly extrapolating the consequences of numerous individuals acting and interacting according to a specific hypothetical mechanism. Social mechanism-based models try to make sense of social phenomena by analyzing the behavior of individuals. An understanding of social phenomena is sought in mechanisms operating at the individual and interpersonal level. This of course precludes explanations based on methodological “wholes” or social groups, such as class, ethnic group or gender. For example, traditional theorizing on patriarchy (Walby 1990) and critical theory traditions of feminist analysis (Benhabib 1995b) would not be possible to reformulate within a social mechanisms-approach. As emphasized, in this
chapter, the focus is not gender relations *per se*, but on social network dynamics.

I argue that extrapolating on certain social network mechanisms gives a heuristic tool, which can be put to interpretative use in case studies of organizations. Although this is not always remembered, rational choice models are not realistic but heuristic devices (Lundquist 1993: 82–84; Ward 1995: 93). In contrast to the sometimes occurring more dubious uses of rational choice modeling, the ambition within social mechanisms-studies seems to be to keep a clear mind as to the distinction between model and reality (Hedström and Swedberg 1998b: 13–15). Abstract and intentionally simplified analytical models should make a complex reality easier to understand.

The social mechanisms approach, however, still seems intent on finding generalizable social mechanisms, valid over time and geography. Frequent parallels are drawn to the “basic mechanisms” of the hard sciences – biology, for example (Hedström and Swedberg 1998b: 2–3, 15; Elster 1998a: 47). Seemingly, the approach aims to uncover scientific foundations:

> [T]here are general types of mechanisms, found in a range of different social settings, which operate according to the same logical principles. Our vision of an explanatory sociology contains an ensemble of such fundamental mechanisms that can be used for explanatory purposes in a wide range of situations. (Hedström and Swedberg 1998b: 2)

Taking a skeptic, post-positivist stance toward these ambitions, I would instead like to emphasize the historically specific, contextual character of any social mechanism we believe to observe, as well as any social mechanism model we might like to invent.

For example, the uncertainty/trust argument made in this chapter claims that trust is sought in social similarity. I have contended that gender is a pervasive and important aspect of perceived similarity and difference, relevant for the formation of interpersonal ties within organizations. Furthermore, given the traditional gender-differentiation of the job market, system of education as well social sphere, gender is likely to coincide with other aspects of difference. However, as the last three decades of feminist research have shown, gender is of course a social construct (Scott 1986/1999). Thus, the salience of gender as a significator of “difference” should vary according to context.
Fraternal friendship, Jacques Derrida suggests, may also encompass women (Derrida 1997). Possibly, the cross-sex friendship may even be a sign of the post-modern times.

Post-positivist perspectives stress how humans are unique in their capacity to engage in reflection about themselves and their environment (Williams and May 1996: xi; Lundquist 1993: 70–75; Hughes and Sharrock 1990). In this light, it is clear that a social mechanism will always be situated within a specific historical, institutional, cultural—or, if you will, discursive—context. However, it lies in the nature of the social mechanisms approach that it is not able to capture the impact of institutional or discursive structures. Thus, the social mechanism approach cannot cover the whole of political life. Neither can it perhaps find the timeless “micro-foundations” of human behavior (Elster 1998a: 47). Still, in my view, it may be very useful for clarifying and drawing out important—although contingent and changeable—features of social life. The point of the social mechanisms exercise is simplification, extrapolation and interpretation. By abstracting and analytically accentuating prevalent patterns of human interaction, we may gain a heuristic tool which may further our understanding of social phenomena.

**Similarity-Interaction Extrapolated**

In this chapter, I have argued that gender similarity-interaction is a social mechanism that is likely to have an impact on organization, and that this impact should be particularly pronounced under conditions of organizational uncertainty, such as organizational entrepreneurship and change. How, then, would an organization function if this social mechanism were to remain undisturbed by conflicting tendencies? In an agent-based model of similarity-interaction, Robert Axelrod argues that the social influence exerted through similarity-interaction leads to local convergence and global polarization (Axelrod 1997). In other words, those actors who are already similar will interact, and in the process they will grow more similar. This will create convergent, homogeneous groups.

This model rests on the well-supported premise that in a group or clique, where the members interact more with one another than with outsiders, they tend to work out common norms (Homans 1950).
Social influence is likely to be most operative not in authority relations, but when people interact as approximate social equals, as is often the case in emergent social networks (ibid.: 134–136). Interpersonal influence may be exerted in friendship relationships and between friends who are also competitors (Marsden and Friedkin 1994). The social network may become a structural base of belief systems (Erickson 1982).

If we apply this model to gender, we would expect women, as well as ideas that are uncommon among men, to be excluded where social network decision-making and recruitment is prevalent. For example, we would expect organizational entrepreneurship as well as decision-making and recruitment in organizational phases of uncertainty and change to be male-dominated. This, I argue, suggests that organizations where the number of women has increased rapidly should provide particularly interesting case studies of the role of social networks in organizational change.

Relation to Feminist Theory

The gender similarity-interaction model developed in this study does not equal a feminist analysis, since it does not focus gender relations as such, but reduces gender relations to a case of similarity-interaction. How then does the argument relate to feminist theory? The approach developed in this chapter leans on the early work of Rosabeth Moss Kanter, supported by and developed with the help of other studies. Kanter’s 1977 book counts among the classics in the study of gender and organizations. However, the standard textbook references to her work are often coupled with a critique of her allegedly lacking awareness of gender as a relation of power. For Kanter, it is not men as men that dominate in male-dominated organizations, but incumbents of powerful positions (Witz and Savage 1992: 13–32). In her framework, it is power differences and the different proportions of women and men in an organization that explain their different organizational fortunes.

I see two main contentions between feminist theory and approaches such as Kanter’s. Firstly, to feminist theory, gender is not simply “difference”, but a system of power relations in and of itself. Witz and

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1 See also the critique of the feminist critique of democratic revolutions made in Chapter 2.
Savage comment that: “A notion of power inequalities as in any way built into the very fabric of gender relations themselves is strangely absent from Kanter’s analysis.” (1992: 28). Similarly to masculinity theory, the “gender of oppression” is male (Hearn 1987). Furthermore, feminist organizational analysis focuses on how this system of power-relations extends beyond the individual organization. According to feminist perspectives on organizational analysis, Kanter diverts attention away from the “root cause” of organizational gender inequality, which is societal sexism and patriarchy (see for example Yoder 1991; Witz and Savage 1992; Walby 1990: 4–5; Miller, Lincoln and Olson 1981: 312–313). On these two grounds, this study’s perspective on gender relations does not agree with prevailing theories of patriarchy (Walby 1990) and is more similar to Kanter’s approach.

Conclusions

The “strength of similarity” argument suggests that similarity-interaction should be most influential, as well as most prevalent, in processes of institutional change. In the face of organizational uncertainty, individuals are more likely to turn to their social network ties for guidance. To the degree that social networks are gender-differentiated, this is likely to have gender-differentiated consequences. Drawing on a wide range of writings, it was also argued that similarity-interaction may be a direct response to uncertainty and that in this context, gender may be a salient factor of perceived similarity.

Based on the “strength of similarity” model, I argue that mapping patterns of integration and segregation of non-similar persons may be a rewarding methodology to make visible the role of social network relations in organizations. This chapter advocates investigating the representation of women in male-dominated organizations in order to capture the role of informal social networks in organizational change. Notably, in contrast to feminist studies, the focus of the ensuing case study is not on gender relations as such, but on the importance of social network dynamics to organizations in general and in processes of institutional change in particular. Hence, the case study employs a traditionally feminist concept, namely gender, for a nominally non-feminist type of study.
The extrapolation of the “strength of similarity” argument rests on the presumption that gender tends to override as well as coincide with other aspects and perceptions of difference and similarity. That gender is a pervasive and dominating aspect of social organization has been validated especially within feminist research. However, the strength of this tendency is of course subject to contextual variation as well as historical change.
The chapter consists of five sections. In the first two sections, I provide some historical detail on the formation of the SED and founding of the GDR, and an overview of the course of East German democratization and German reunification. In the third and longest section, I discuss the east-west tensions following German reunification. I argue
that in the emergence of the new German party system, the organizational resources of established institutions proved to be very important. With German reunification, the only addition to the West German party system was the SED-successor, PDS. From a social network perspective, the political influence of specific social networks was dependent on their access to such institutional resources.

In the fourth section, I briefly outline the role of the PDS in the new German party spectrum: as a regional protest party, a socialist heritage, and as a left-wing contender to the German Greens. In the fifth and last section, I discuss the Frauenpolitik or “women’s politics” of the SED, arguing that PDS feminism is not a simple continuation of the SED legacy. In the next chapter, I shall retrace the feminist turn of the PDS from a social network perspective.

The Founding of the GDR

On April 30, 1945, in the first civilian airplane to land in the Soviet occupied zone of Germany, was a small group of exiles, prepared during their time in Moscow to build a new administration (Furet 1995: 400 drawing on the autobiographies of Wolfgang Leonhard). On the plane was Walter Ulbricht, who was to head the GDR until 1971, when Erich Honecker managed to win the favor of the Kremlin and took over power (Stephan 1997: 70–71). On the plane was also Otto Grotewohl, who, less than a year later, in 1946, was to lead the Soviet zone social democrats into forced junction with the Communist Party. The product of forced unity was the Party of Socialist Unity, die Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Within two years after the merger of the East German social democrats into the SED, the party leadership announced that the SED should be shaped after the Soviet model. The new Cadre party took form during extensive intra-party purges, at their most intense during 1948–1951 (Malycha 1997: 29–35; Weber 1999: 112–122). The “cleansing from hostile and degenerated elements” aimed to extinguish all intra-party opposition. Hosting attitudes of hostility towards the Soviet Union was a criterion for party exclusion. Show trials were a part of this intra-party battle against “social-democratism”. Party cleansings were aimed both at prisoners of war who had returned from American, English or Yugoslavian captivity;
as well as at former exiles who had fled to Western Europe, Latin America or the United States after 1933. On October 7, 1949 the GDR – *die Deutsche Demokratische Republik* – was founded and the SED officially proclaimed itself the state party.

**Totalitarian Ambitions**

The SED regime had a totalitarian ambition of controlling every aspect of society (Dreschler et al. 1997: 141–143; Siegel 1996; Thompson 1998; Jesse 1998; Hedin 1999). In its aspiration to an ideological, political and organizational monopoly, it systematically violated human and civil rights. Law and constitution did not delimit the power of the party. The SED’s ambition of forming a new, socialist human being entailed intrusions into the private sphere of citizens.

As an illustrating curiosity: at a party congress in 1958, the party chairman, Walter Ulbricht, issued Ten Commandments (sic!) for the new socialist humans. The socialist subjects were not only instructed to “always support the international solidarity of the working class” (1st commandment) or to “help put an end to the exploitation of humans by humans” (3rd commandment). Additionally, the GDR citizen was commanded to “always strive to improve your achievements, be thrifty and strengthen the socialist work discipline” (7th commandment), “raise your children in the spirit of peace and socialism into well-educated, physically steeled persons of strong character” (8th commandment) and “lead a clean and decent life and respect your family” (9th commandment) (quoted in Vorsteher 1997: 37, my translation).

**Anti-Fascism**

The SED portrayed itself as a stern, educating hand, which was to lead the German people right again, “seduced” as they had been by Nazism (Gläßner 1997: 23). The SED, in turn, was guided by the “friendship” to the Soviet Union, under the Orwellian slogan “Stalin is peace” (Stoecker 1997; Scherstjanoi 1997).

The most central component of the SED’s legitimacy to power was ostensibly its claim to anti-fascism. According to the diehard SED founding myth – *der Gründungsmythos* – the GDR was an anti-fascist state:
a myth the moral imperative of which paralyzed the opposition for decades. After democratization, the opposition movement’s efforts to come to terms with the past have included “posthumously” breaking the spell of the former regime’s pretense to moral superiority in questions of anti-fascism. For example, in a personally held settling of accounts with the SED regime, Ehrhard Neubert, a co-founder of the oppositional group Neues Forum, undermines the GDR’s image as the more determined of the two Germanys in the post-war “cleansing” of nazis (Neubert 1998b). Among other things, he notes that in the Soviet zone of occupation, prosecution of Nazis was instrumentalized for party purposes and included arbitrary sentencing of “other enemies and critics of Communism” (ibid.: 842–843, drawing on other works).

The Soviet Connection

The anti-fascist ideology tied the SED tighter than other East Bloc regimes to its Soviet brother-party, the KPdSU. Given the military strategic centrality of East Germany, the Soviet Union kept the reins short on its ally. In the first years of the GDR, in 1948, the SED-regime renounced all claims to an independent “German road to socialism” (Weber 1999: 112–122). Ironically, the most radical SED refutation of Soviet control was Erich Honecker’s refusal in the late 1980s to heed Michail Gorbachev’s call for liberalization (Scherstjanoi 1998; Oldenburg 1996). In response to Gorbachev’s moves towards openness and restructuring – Glasnost and Perestroika – Honecker proved to be a hardliner, radically announcing a “Socialism in the colors of the GDR” (Meuschel 1992: 301–305).

In November 1988, the SED then banned the journal Sputnik, a German language review of articles from the Soviet press. The banning of Sputnik set scattered SED intra-party reformers into motion, who had been inspired by Gorbachev’s concept of a societal “revolution from above”, guided by the party (Gorbachev 1987: 55–59; Brie 1993; Land and Possekel 1994; 1998). The SED, however, was to prove chanceless.
The GDR’s Demise

Exactly 40 years after the founding of the GDR, on October 7, 1989, the visit to Berlin of the new KPdSU chairman sparked its demise. During his visit, Gorbachev made it clear that the Breschnew doctrine was no longer applicable, and he expected other East Bloc states to choose their own course. He stated that in the event of peaceful demonstrations, Soviet troops stationed in the GDR would not stand at the disposal of the regime. Gorbachev urged the SED leadership to take initiative in reforms. In a speech to the SED party government – das SED- Politbüro – Gorbachev dropped his famous hint that “those who come too late will be punished by life itself”:

I have told comrade Honecker – and I would like to repeat this, dear Comrades, in front of you all: [...] The party must have its own view and suggest its own approach. If we stay behind, life will punish us straightaway. (Michail Gorbachev to the SED Politbüro on October 7, 1989, quoted in Kuhrt et al. (ed.) 1996: 223; my translation)

Still, the citizen’s rights movement in the GDR, which had been hoping for a more radical intervention by Gorbachev, was deceived. Two days after Gorbachev’s visit, the hitherto largest regime-critical demonstrations erupt in Leipzig. Approximately 70 000 participants take to the streets. As promised, Soviet troops do not intervene. Some local party officials succeed in curbing government violence (Maier 1991: 13; Neubert 1998a: 854). Ten days later, Honecker is ousted, but replaced by his own chosen pretender, Egon Krenz. From then on, multiple sources of pressure lead to collapse of the regime. On November 9, the Berlin wall is opened (Schabowski 1991: 302–303; compare Neubert 1998a: 884). On December 1, 1989, the GDR “People’s Parliament” – die Volkskammer – takes the bold decision of removing the “leading role” of the SED from the constitution. In retrospect, it is clear that from this moment on, the road to democratization was paved.

SED Reformers

The roots of the PDS are to be found in a timid, intelligentsia intra-party opposition – so called “SED-reformers” – who, inspired by Michail
Gorbachev’s moves toward liberalization, remained loyal to the Soviet Union when Erich Honecker turned his back on Perestroika. The SED-reformers consisted of scattered individuals and groups, foremost within academia, but also within the party organization. They believed in a political revolution after Gorbachev’s model, initiated from above by a reforming party under new leadership. The ideological abyss dividing the intra-party reformers from the citizen’s rights movement—which was also largely socialist in character—was of course the pivotal question of whether the SED should remain in power (Neubert 1998a: 870–872; Land and Possekel 1998: 198–211).

When some of these SED-reformers eventually took control of the party in early December 1989, electing a completely new party government and renaming the party into the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the conditions for reforming the GDR were already gone: democratization and German reunification were under way. Whether they fully realized this or not, it was only after the SED had been robbed of power that SED-reformers gained access to the party. Later, these SED reformers would be taken by surprise both by Gorbachev turning a cold shoulder on the PDS (Nakath et al. 1998) and by electoral defeat.

**German Reunification**

Meanwhile, having toppled the regime, the revolution was slipping out of the hands of the opposition movement—*die Bürgerbewegung*—as well. On November 28, 1989, the West German government coalition under Chancellor Kohl proposed a ten-point program for the “overcoming of the partitioning of Germany and of Europe” (quoted in Maier 1991: 65–67; Jäger 1996). The Chancellor declared his support for the GDR opposition’s newly formulated demand for free elections. He also suggested that after free elections, German reunification was possible—if the German people so wished. If the GDR would elect a democratic government, Kohl announced, the Federal Republic of Germany was prepared to develop confederative structures between the two German states, with the ultimate goal of creating a federation.
The Bürgerbewegung Appeal “For our country”

Simultaneously with the Kohl initiative, some prominent GDR artists and members of the opposition launched a competing vision for East Germany. The appeal “For our country” demanded an independent GDR as a “social alternative to the FRG” (quoted in Maier 1991: 14, 53). According to the appeal, if the GDR did not insist on its independence, it would sell out its material and moral assets and be pocketed or monopolized by the Western Bundesrepublik. But “it is not too late”, the appeal urged, “for us to recall the antifascist and humanist ideals from which we once started out” (my translation).

How representative this appeal was of the atmosphere in the citizen’s movement – die Bürgerbewegung – is a complicated question. The appeal drew on the anti-fascist founding myth of the GDR – a moral play of mirrors in which a large part of the opposition were not yet capable of navigating.

The appeal “For our country” was eventually instrumentalized by the SED and signed by the new party chairman, Erich Honecker’s chosen successor Egon Krenz. Although no opposition group supported the appeal, the “German question” still divided the movement and caused long discussions (Neubert 1998a: 882–890). In the meantime, ordinary GDR citizens were growing weary of the opposition’s hesitation. As East Germans took to the streets in ever larger numbers, the slogan of the Bürgerbewegung – “We are the people” – changed into “We are one people” and “Germany united Fatherland”. In the streets, Kohl’s ten-point program had a field day. Seemingly, East Germans wanted instant access to the West German D-mark and did not want to risk any backlash into state socialism.

Exit Bürgerbewegung

In the first free elections to the East German Volkskammer on March 18, 1990, the Bürgerbewegung suffered a serious electoral defeat. Bündnis ’90, the alliance of various citizens’ groups and initiatives, received only 2.9 percent of the vote. Together with the Greens, the eastern Independent Women’s Association (ufv) gathered only 2 percent. Even the Bürgerbewegung group Demokratischer Aufbruch (DA), which supported Kohl’s ten-point-plan, contributed with only 0.9 percent
to the Alliance for Germany, led by the CDU (40.8 percent). The unmistakable winner of the election was Helmuth Kohl’s CDU. The other two larger parties were the social democrats and the reformed communists. With 21.9 percent, the SPD received a distant half of the CDU share of votes. The PDS deceived both its supporters and opponents, gathering 16.4 percent – a dismally low or dismally high result, depending on vantage point.

The political marginalization of the Bürgerbewegung marked the end of the idea of a reformed socialism – but also, and importantly, the end of the idea of democratization within the boundaries of the GDR. Dominated by the CDU and the SPD, both supported by their sister-parties in West Germany, the democratic Volkskammer opted for a rapid reunification under the §23 of the FRG constitution. The only parties to vote against the decision were the Bürgerbewegung alliance Bündnis ’90 and the reformed SED, now PDS. Between August and October 1 the same year, the eastern liberals, social democrats and christian democrats all merged into their respective Western sister-party. On October 3, 1990, reunification followed.

The Democratic Deficit of Rapid Reunification

The decision to reunite under §23 of the constitution of the Bundesrepublik meant that the former GDR was incorporated as five new Länder into the existing West German federal structure. The choice of a rapid reunification under §23 was criticized for creating a democratic deficit, for which coming generations would have to pay a political mortgage (Habermas 1990). According to the critique of the reunification procedure, East Germans were not given the chance to a process of self-determination, forming a republican national identity built on patriotism for a self-determined constitution. Instead, they were “manipulated” by a political strategy that conceded to or played into the hands of economic nationalism, DM-Nationalismus (Habermas 1990: 211, 217; Williams et al. 1996). In the opinion of the critics, a better alternative would have been to reunite instead under the §146 of the FRG constitution. Under this procedure, the citizens of East and West Germany would
have had the chance to deliberate and decide on a new common constitution.

I would argue that the continued existence and electoral success of the PDS feeds on this “political mortgage”, incurred in the rapid reunification. In this section, I shall outline the forging of the new German party system, where the PDS emerged as the sole party that could lay claims to represent primarily voters in the new, eastern states.

**Marginalization Discussed**

The critique against Western dominance in the process of democratization and reunification has caused much discussion in the literature on contemporary German politics. On the one hand, Western guarantees have smoothed democratic transition. For example, the transfer of Western institutions and administrative personnel to the new German states has effectively transformed the cadre-administration into a modern-type Western administration (Glaßner 1996).

On the other hand, the dominance of western German institutions has caused a deficit in self-organization and representation of interests in the new German states. For example, western German corporate actors have not always cooperated with their new counterparts in the east. Particularly, interest organizations with a more stable monopoly of representation towards the state, such as trade unions and employers’ organizations, were more prone to act competitively towards their eastern counterparts, driving out eastern competitors or ignoring the eastern membership (Wielgohs 1996).

**The Weakness of the GDR Opposition**

The citizens’ movement in East Germany came to exert far less influence on post-democratization politics than, for example, the Polish Solidarity or Czech Civic Forum and Slovak Public Against Violence. Soon after reunification, the East German Bürgerbewegung was all but extinct as a political force. Why was the citizen’s rights movement so quickly marginalized? The literature provides at least two complementary lines of explanation. One focuses on the programmatic and organizational weakness of the East German Bürgerbewegung. The other emphasizes the strength and dominance of the West German
political establishment in the reunification processes. In the remaining part of this section, I shall outline the two perspectives in turn.

The SED government had a number of strongholds over its opposition that other East and Central European Marxist-Leninist regimes, such as the Polish and the Czechoslovak governments, lacked. According to the conclusions of the first so-called Enquete-kommission – the German parliament’s investigation of the history and consequences of SED Dictatorship – in the GDR, anti-fascism was the perhaps most effective factor of ideological integration (Dreschler 1997: 141–163). In his standard work on the GDR opposition, the protestant priest and former regime critic Ehrhard Neubert notes anti-fascism to have been “the most important ideological instrument to block a democratic development and support anti-Western enemy images” (Neubert 1998a: 317, my translation).

How could anti-fascism be such an effective tie between the regime and its critics? Unlike in other East Bloc countries, in the GDR, the national question was effectively blocked by the regime’s claim to anti-fascism. In general, the intellectuals – authors, academics – were one of the politically most conformist groups in the GDR (Miethe 1999: 25; Meuschel 1992; Torpey 1995). This contrasted with other East and Central European countries where the intellectuals – such as the initiators of the Czech Charta ’77 – were central to the formation of an active system opposition. As Germans, the East German intellectuals felt inhibited to appeal to nationalist sentiments against the Soviet-supported regime. In the words of the GDR author Christa Wolf, born in 1929: “Because we, as young people, who grew up under fascism, were filled with guilt [we were] thankful to those who had saved us from it.” (quoted in Thompson 1999: 40; Meuschel 1992: 28).

The belief in the GDR claim to anti-fascism is a key to understanding the lack of openness to Western ideas of democracy (Habermas 1991: 144–146). According to East Bloc anti-fascist ideology, Nazism was not a product specifically of German history (Goldhagen 1996; Rürup 1996) but a by-product of capitalism instead. Thus, the SED could perpetuate an image of West Germany as an unredeemed capitalist state, whereas East Germany was claimed to have overcome Germany’s fascist past by adopting state socialism (Thompson 1999). Hence, the SED’s renaming of the Berlin wall, erected in 1961, as an anti-fascist protective wall – anti-fascistischer Schutzwall.
The dominating image in the literature of the GDR opposition is that instead of demanding Western-style democracy, the opposition vainly fought to make the regime live up to its own proclaimed (socialist) ideals. As Thompson notes, strictly speaking, the GDR regime critics were but revisionists (Thompson 1999). The opposition did not intend to provide a personal or programmatic alternative to the regime. They did not aim to dissolve the prevailing arrangements of power, but only to reform them. So far, it has not been shown convincingly that any larger numbers of persons among the oppositionists before the autumn of 1989 demanded free elections or the universal right to organize (Jesse 1999b: 337–339). The question of the opposition’s understanding of democracy still waits to be consolidated by more research (ibid.).

Taking a step towards further nuancing of the picture of the GDR opposition, Ingrid Miethe (1999) shows how some activists within the GDR Bürgerbewegung were indeed attempting to break the spell of anti-fascism. For example, within the group Frauen für den Frieden – which belonged to the cofounders of Neues Forum – the legitimating self-understanding of the GDR was undermined. The militarism of the GDR was discussed as a continuation of conditions under Nazism, implicitly drawing parallels between the GDR and the Nazi state. Thus, among the East German 1989 generation, Miethe may have found the missing equivalent of the West German 1968 generation, who tried to confront the country with its Nazi past (see also Jesse 1999b: 338). On the other hand, central components of the anti-fascist doctrine of the GDR regime remained unquestioned. Importantly, groups such as Frauen für den Frieden still defined themselves in contrast to West Germany (Miethe 1999). In summary, despite the more nuanced and complex image that emerges, the Bürgerbewegung activists must still be characterized as a “loyal” opposition.

However, in a study of illegally circulated writings – so-called Samisdat – Rainer Eckert argues against the view that the GDR opposition only aimed to reform state socialism (Eckert 1999a). In the Samisdat publication, radix-blätter, between 1987 and 1989 several oppositionists criticized the GDR without referring to any renewed socialism. On the other hand, in the same publication, others demanded democratization and openness in the GDR in order to realize the humanist goals of socialism and referred to Gorbachev’s reform efforts
as a “last chance”. Eckert concludes that the realization of the demands of the opposition would indeed have brought GDR socialism to a fall – but, crucially, the question remains open to whether the citizen’s rights activists were really aware of this (ibid.; 1999a: 777).

The regime itself regarded the secret police, Stasi, to be its most important instrument of power (Dreschler et al. 1997: 66). The Stasi thwarted all attempts at independent organization. Also, the GDR regime had the unique possibility of ousting regime critics to West Germany (Hirschmann 1993; Meuschel 1992).

In summary, both regime indoctrination and repression seems simply to have been more successful in the GDR compared to, for example, Hungary or Czechoslovakia. The anti-fascist argument was an efficient means of political integration, labeling all opposition “fascist”. The secret police, Stasi, were more omnipresent; and the opposition movement was drained of potential leaders and activists, who were expelled to West Germany.

Sudden Mobilization

Only in the very last moments of the GDR could the opposition become more outspoken. The last six months of the GDR were a window of opportunity that many GDR citizens used to organize themselves. Political mobilization was sweeping. In a matter of months, in the autumn and winter of 1989/90, a plethora of small organizations and initiatives filled the newly conquered media and public sphere with life. In the words of some feminist activists in the suddenly burgeoning East German women’s movement: “the time of chaos was the best”…”it was a period when anything was possible” (Ferree 1994: 606).

However, in the first democratic elections of March 1990, these social movements were not able to translate their activity into votes. Numbers that represent large and vigorous social movements may be trivial when translated into votes (Ferree 1994: 617). Evidently, citizen’s movements, such as the various initiatives within the Bündnis ’90, simply were not the vanguard of the political turmoil of late 1989 (Poguntke 1998). As communicated through the election results, GDR citizens did not have the same political preferences as the oppositional socialist intellectuals. Also, the broad range of organizations was unable to unite on any political program, save their critique of the SED. In short,
from one perspective, the programmatic and organizational weaknesses of the East German citizens’ movement well explain their failure to reach political influence. Compared to their Western competitors, the Bürgerbewegung groups, who came stumbling out of the ruins of SED dictatorship, were “amorphous and unsophisticated” (Silvia 1993: 33), i.e. disorganized and unprofessional.

**The Strength of West German Political Parties**

In contrast to these Eastern weaknesses, the immense advantage of the West becomes obvious. From this perspective, the East German Bürgerbewegung can be seen as a social movement, which was marginalized by the direct participation of West German political parties and professional politicians in the East German election campaign (Kamenitsa 1993; Kamenitsa 1998; Ferree 1994; for a critique of viewing the Bürgerbewegung as a social movement, see Miethe 1999: 30–44).

Compared to the political amateurs of the Bürgerbewegung, Western politicians were considerably better trained at crafting and conveying political messages with the necessary skill and simplicity, and in dealing with the media (Kamenitsa 1998). The superior assets of the Western “sister-parties” also included money to purchase advertising, media and campaign consulting, public opinion polling, and staging of events. Those eastern organizations which had a Western sister-party received hard currency support for their party-building activities (ibid.).

As mentioned, the overwhelming victor of the first democratic elections was the CDU. However, it is unlikely that the CDU received such strong support on account of their eastern organization. Rather, political analyst interpreted the vote for the CDU as a vote for Chancellor Kohl and for reunification.

**Patterns of Party Integration – the CDU**

Initially, the West German CDU wished to support the Bürgerbewegung group Demokratischer Aufbruch (DA). However, after the very poor showing of the DA in the March 1990 elections (0.9 percent), the CDU shifted strategy and instead linked up with the East German CDU – a problematic choice. As part of the “anti-fascist bloc”, the
GDR-CDU was an important support of the regime, directed and watched over by the SED (Suckut 1994). The Eastern CDU was the largest of the so-called bloc parties, which together with the SED made up the sham government coalition of the GDR. Membership in a bloc party promoted professional careers and opened up opportunities for state positions (Weber 1999: 340; Suckut 1994: 117–118, 121).

As early as 1952, the GDR-CDU had declared that it “recognizes the leading role of the SED as the party of the working class without reservations” and declared itself “convinced that the successful development of socialism in the GDR is possible only on the basis of the advanced science … of Marxism Leninism” (quoted in Weber 1999: 142; my translation). As late as on the last party congress before democratization, in October 1987, the GDR-CDU acknowledged the “leading role” of the SED (Weber 1999: 339). It can be counted to the democratic merits of the GDR-CDU that together with other bloc parties, on November 13, 1989, it demanded the abolishment of the “leading role” of the SED from the GDR constitution and free elections (Hertle and Stephan 1997: 82). On December 1, 1989, the minority CDU faction of the GDR Volkskammer then voted to abolish the “leading role” of the SED. But so did the SED members of the Volkskammer. All in all, the support of the western CDU for the GDR-CDU can hardly be said to have favored any independent GDR opposition. Through this move, the western CDU found an eastern ally with a broad membership base and a well-developed party infrastructure.

**Patterns of Party Integration – the SPD**

The social democrats, the SPD, were the second largest party to emerge from the democratic March 1990 elections. In comparison to the CDU, at a first glance, the SPD may seem to have a cleaner slate in relation to the GDR system. The eastern partner of the SPD was a newly formed organization, dominated by oppositional clerics (Silvia 1993: 33–34). The eastern SPD (or then: SDP) established itself as an organization in October 1989, demanding parliamentary democracy, party pluralism and a democratization of the economy (quoted in Maier 1991: 21). Scrupulously, the eastern social democrats banned from membership
all former members of bloc parties or of the SED. In this sense, the SPD made a clean break with the ancien regime. This, however, also meant that, just like other Bürgerbewegung groups, in the electoral campaigns, the eastern SPD lacked the very important party infrastructure that the SED/PDS and the bloc parties had. The eastern SPD had little possibility to compensate for the eastern CDU’s scores of offices throughout the GDR, hundreds of thousands of members and solid party infrastructure (Silvia 1993: 35). In the new Bundesländer, the SPD long remained “left behind” (Silvia 1993).

After democratization, the SPD’s weak organizational structure is one of several factors that have contributed to the continued weakness of the SPD in the new German states. Additional factors are the east-west tensions within the party and the heritage of the late Ostpolitik (Silvia 1993). Ironically, when it comes to the SPD, it is the western party organization that is more burdened by the past. Under Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, the cold war tension between the two Germanys had eased (Faulenbach 1997). When the western SPD entered the opposition in 1982, the party continued to cultivate its contacts with the SED, hoping to preserve the detente, counteracting Chancellors Kohl’s more conservative policies (Silvia 1993: 30). According to the critique, this is where SPD’s Ostpolitik “mutated”, turning a deaf ear to the calls of the GDR opposition (ibid.: 29). As late as 1987, the western SPD issued a joint paper together with the SED – the infamous SPD-SED Papier - hoping to help reformers inside and outside the SED in their struggle against SED hardliners. In the same line of action, in late September 1989, the parliamentary chief of the western SPD opposed eastern oppositionals’ plans to form an eastern SPD (Silvia 1993: 30–31). Seemingly, in the autumn of 1989, the western SPD still betted on a gradual reform of the GDR, led by the SED.

The New Party System

The course of East German democratization and reunification provide an important background for an understanding of the current German-German political landscape. Two elections after reunification, at the turn of the millennium, the five new Bundesländer have a three-party system, where the CDU and the SPD compete to be the largest party.
The **PDS** gatherings roughly 20 percent of the eastern vote, depending on **Bundesland**.

In the new party system, the classical division between *ancien régime/apparatus* versus opposition/popular forums has not found a clear-cut expression (compare von Beyme 1994; Hellén et al. 1998). The most fervent opponent of the **PDS**, as the representative of the *ancien régime*, is clearly the **CDU**. For example, in the run-up to the 1998 elections, when it was clear that the last remnants of *Bündnis '90* would fail the parliamentary threshold, several prominent former oppositionists shifted over to the **CDU** – a jump from the leftist side of the party spectrum to the conservative camp. In this instance, the cleavage *ancien régime* versus opposition indeed dominated over other divisions. Still, **CDU** animosity in relation to the **PDS** is largely based on an appeal to voters in the old German states, even at the perceived cost of support in the east (Schmidt 1997). Reaching its peak in the 1994 elections, fervent **CDU** campaigns geared at the **PDS** “red socks” drew on deeply entrenched anti-communist sentiments in the west, and effectively mobilized western voters. When an **SPD-Green** coalition had been installed with the “tolerance” – the passive support – of the **PDS** in the eastern state Sachsen-Anhalt, the **CDU** started a “red hands” campaign, alluding to the merger of the **SPD** and the communist party into the SED in 1946. The **CDU** campaigns were very valuable for the **PDS**, who according to most analysts gained much eastern support from them. The **CDU** strategy made possible a **PDS** appeal to eastern Germans as “We socialists” – a slogan in the 1998 elections. Whereas in the 1994 elections, the stigmatization of the **PDS** clearly benefited the **CDU** (Lees 1995), in the 1998 elections the **CDU** suffered a devastating electoral defeat in the new **Bundesländer**.

**The PDS as Regional Protest Party**

During the first years after reunification, the legitimacy of the new party system fell continuously in the eyes of voters in the new German states (Niedermayer 1995). The clear beneficiary of this development was the **PDS** (ibid.). Since reunification, east Germans have almost doubled their support for the **PDS**, from 11.1* percent in the federal
elections of December 1990, to 19.8% percent in the 1994 elections and 21.6% percent in the 1998 federal elections (*including east Berlin).

The PDS has been able to claim itself the representative of “eastern” interests in the united Germany (McFalls 1997). Indeed, in a 1994 survey, 59 percent of eastern voters regarded the PDS as the party that stood up most convincingly for the interests of the east German population (quoted in Betz and Welsh 1995: 100). The PDS has emerged as an east German protest party, profiting on, as well as proliferating, an emerging “post-festum patriotism” or “secondary ethnification” (Offe 1995b), an “ethnic” animosity towards the West (Howard 1995).

The sources of eastern so-called post-unification dissatisfaction are a matter of debate. Is it caused by material deprivation, which can be explained within a traditional definition of politics as “who gets what, when and how?” (Lasswell 1958). Or is post-unification dissatisfaction more a matter of history and identity, better analyzed by regarding politics as a discursive struggle over meaning, answering questions such as “who are ‘we’?” (Howarth 1995).

Looking at the new German states at an aggregate level, Cusack (1999) argues that satisfaction with the German political system is a secondary phenomenon, caused by underlying economic factors. He notes a statistical correlation between expressed content with democracy and economic conditions: “On an average, since unification, the Eastern level of satisfaction with system performance has been about two-thirds the level found in the West. Correspondingly, the standard of living, wages and many other measures of economic performance in the East approximate two-thirds of those in the West.” (Cusack 1999: 666).

The PDS as Socialist Heritage

In contrast to Cusack’s materialist explanation, Wiesenthal (1998) argues that post-unification dissatisfaction does not appear to be of a predominantly economic nature. Compared to the people of other former communist countries, east Germans are economically extremely privileged. Still, curiously, the level of post-democratization dissatisfaction is far above other East and Central European countries. Since satisfaction with the political system is significantly below the level of
endorsement of the new economic system, dissatisfaction must have other than economic sources (ibid.). Drawing largely on context knowledge, but providing some statistical support, Helmut Wiesenthal formulates two other plausible explanations. According to the second, so called “socialist legacy” hypothesis, the GDR’s cultural legacy impacts on present political views. Wiesenthal reminds us that the SED succeeded in inculcating socialist world views and values to an extent that has no counterpart in other East and Central European countries. In the GDR, socialism was a substitute for national identity. In relation to West Germany, the GDR was involved in a “system competition” between a socialist and a capitalist institutional order. According to the third, “treatment response” hypothesis, east Germans are now reacting against the perceived ruthless and paternalistic behavior on the part of westerners. Expressions of post-unification dissatisfaction maintain – but also create – an east German collective identity (Wiesenthal 1998).

The PDS in the East and West

How does the PDS profit from post-unification dissatisfaction? Contrary to expectation, the PDS’ voters are not primarily the economic “losers of unification”. Prior affiliation with the SED-regime by far outdoes unemployment as a source of support for the PDS (Zelle 1999). The socialist legacy and the “treatment response” hypotheses better explain PDS support than does material deprivation (compare Wiesenthal 1998, Cusack 1999).

In the old, western Bundesländer, the PDS lacks both an organizational and an electoral basis. In the west, the party’s electoral support has barely exceeded 1 percent. From a Western perspective, the PDS has programmatic similarities to the fundamentalist wing of the German Greens (Betz and Welsh 1995). Parts of the PDS’ program have striking affinities with policies of the German Greens. Accordingly, the modest western gains of the PDS have been made in areas where the Greens have traditionally had strong support, such as Berlin-Kreuzberg, Hamburg and Bremen (ibid.). Given the larger population of the old German states, these western votes are still of crucial importance for the PDS’ ability to climb the 5 percent threshold to the Bundestag.
In summary, the PDS can be described not only as a post-communist party, but also a—so far rather unsuccessful—contender of the German Greens and, importantly, as an eastern regional protest party.

PDS Feminism

In the following chapter, the PDS organization will be studied in a “myopic”, “close-up” fashion, focusing on how individuals and their social network interconnections have affected the trajectory of institutional change. Here, in the last section of this chapter, before I embark on the case study, I provide a few crucial remarks on the broader historical and political context of the feminist politics of the PDS. I argue that the high representation of women within the PDS and the party’s feminist policies are an example of change rather than continuity with the SED. On the other hand, the SED claim of superiority over West Germany in questions of gender equality echoes in the statements of eastern—but not the western—feminists within the PDS.

Since the first democratic East German elections, the PDS has had a high proportion of women among its representatives. In the first (and last) democratically elected Volkskammer, elected in March 1990, the PDS was represented by 27 women and 39 men. With 41 percent women, the PDS had a proportionally higher number of women MPs than all other parties (Penrose 1993). Following the same pattern, in the bundestag of 1990–1994, 8 out of 17, or 47 percent of PDS members of parliament were women. In the bundestag of 1994–1998, 13 of 30, or 43 percent of PDS MPs were women. In the present PDS bundestag faction, elected in 1998, 21 out of 36, or 58 percent of

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MPs are women and the new party chairperson, Gabi Zimmer, is a woman.

In 1991, the party adopted a statutory 50 percent quota for women to all party government positions as well as to the nominations for parliament. Later, similar quotas were adopted by the party organizations at the state level. In early 1998, the PDS parliamentary factions at state level included between 44 and 53 percent women, depending on Land, making the PDS the party with the highest proportion of women MPs in the parliaments of the eastern Länder. In 1998, three out of five parliamentary factions in the eastern states were headed by women, and the Berlin faction was headed by a Doppelspitze; a joint chairmanship of one woman and one man.

Since December 1989, feminist women have built their own organizational structure within the PDS—a right that received formal guarantees in the 1991 statute. Furthermore, the party governments on federal and state level have speakers on women’s issues: Frauenpolitische Sprecherinnen. The PDS Bundestag faction has a special feminist “cross-cutting” (Querschnitt) working group, with access to the other four working groups of the faction.

The PDS has a higher proportion of women members than the SED had. In early 1989, 36.5 percent—or 850,000—of SED members were women (Gerner 1994: 132). With democratization, women members had a slightly lower propensity to leave the party than had men. In the summer of 1990, 41.9 percent of PDS members were women (ibid.; Schröter et al. 1996). In 1999, 46 percent of the party’s approximately 100,000 members were women (PDS website).

Several of the feminist positions of the PDS contrast with the SED Frauenpolitik. The issue positions most inspired på Western feminism have been developed predominantly within the party’s faction in the federal parliament, Bundestag. On the state or Länder level, PDS feminist policy tends to show a larger degree of continuity with SED Frauenpolitik. Still, even at the state level, PDS feminism is far from any simple continuation of SED policy. In the last few paragraphs of this chapter, I shall briefly discuss the SED Frauenpolitik.

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1 Quote from the PDS party statute: “(4) Frauen haben das Recht, innerhalb der PDS eigene Strukturen aufzubauen und Frauenplenen durchzuführen”.
Western Feminist Analysis of the SED
Frauenpolitik

During communist times, it was very difficult for researchers from the West to gain reliable information on the GDR political system. After democratization, research on the now-gone system has expanded very rapidly. With the introduction of free speech and the opening of archives, much Western social science research has – politely speaking – grown obsolete. After the emotionally laden anti-communism of the 1950s and 1960s, during the 1970s, much research stumbled into the opposite pitfall, \textit{viz.} failing to contrast the state socialist system with Western ideas of democracy (Jesse 1995). The GDR regime was compared neither to totalitarian regimes, nor to Western democracies. Only several years after the fall of the Berlin wall has it grown commonplace to discuss the GDR as a branch of Soviet communism, focusing on its totalitarian ambitions (Hedin 1999).

Western feminist analysis must – unfortunately – be said to have been particularly prone to taking an apologetic stance toward the SED-regime. Within Western feminist research – especially amongst scholars of a socialist inclination – the feminist achievements of the SED were lauded, often misrepresenting realities of everyday life under authoritarian rule. During the 1980s, positive assessments on the SED-regime’s efforts to reach gender equality focused on the field of paid labor. In post-war times, the SED strove to involve women in production; in the 1960s to promote education for women; and in the 1970s, under Erich Honecker, to alleviate the combination of work and children, with social policies such as paid maternity leave and provision of state child-care. Indeed, already under the Soviet occupation authorities (SMAD), in 1946, equal pay for equal work was instituted.

Western feminist studies of the GDR tended to focus how the representation of women in GDR “politics” was higher than in most Western countries. In more rare writings, SED policies were even seen as a unique model for the West to follow:

\[\text{S}tate\ intevention\ in\ the\ legal,\ economic,\ educational,\ and\ social\ spheres\ has\ achieved\ an\ internationally\ unprecedented\ degree\ of\ self-determination\ for\ women,\ coupled\ with\ the\ guarantee\ of\ rights\ for\ which\ Western\ women\ still\ struggle.\ (\text{Einhorn} 1989: 300).\]
However, even here, the authoritarian drawbacks of life in the GDR were also noted:

Women’s freedom [is] circumscribed – not least by organizational constraints. [...] …since all meetings involving more than seven people are required to be reported and officially authorized. (Einhorn 1989: 300).

**SED Frauenpolitik in Cold War Competition**

Post-democratization research charts how the SED-leadership used the “women’s question” as an instrument of propaganda (see for example Winkler 1997). With the help of the “women’s question” – which, in the early 1970s it declared to have “solved” – the SED-regime hoped to gain domestic as well as international legitimacy. In a typical formulation from 1962, the SED Central Committee declared its readiness to implement gender equality:

[The new life of the women in the GDR] is example and model for the whole of Germany. Also for the women of West Germany, who still today are restricted in their rights and exploited (...). (Central Committee of the SED, quoted in Onnasch 1999: 425, my translation).

The SED-regime aspired not only to form a “new socialist human being” but to educate a new socialist woman as well. The formulation of the regime’s women’s policies – *Frauenpolitik* – was highly centralized and in effect controlled by the SED *Politibüro* and its Secretary General. The *DFD – Demokratische Frauenbund Deutschlands* – was founded under the auspices of the Soviet occupation authorities in 1947 (Winkler 1997: 444–5). The top echelons of the DFD were occupied by SED cadre and since 1957, the DFD recognized the leading role of the SED in its organizational statute (Hampele 1993a). Together with the SED, the *Blockparteien* and other regime-controlled organizations, the DFD had seats in the People’s Parliament, the *Volkskammer*. In 1989 the DFD had approximately 1.5 million members. The existence of the DFD constituted a breach with the Soviet model of society (Hampele 1993a: 297). Indeed, the *Frauenpolitik* of the GDR will surely remain of interest for social scientists as a somewhat deviant case within the East Bloc.

Except for the early years of 1946 to 1950, the SED party statute did not include a quota, since this counted as a social democratic
tradition (Hampele 1993a: 286; Winkler 1997: 446). However, in many fields of society of the GDR, equal representation of various social groups – so-called *paritätischer Repräsentation* – was practiced, which resulted in *a de facto* quotation of women. For example, in the 1950s, the central party leadership strove to include 20 percent women among the party cadre (Wagner 1998: 41). In the 1980s, the Berlin city council set its goal as high as 40 percent women among the selected cadre candidates for office (ibid.: 105). However, at this time, local party secretaries included only 11.9 percent women (ibid.: 96).

Throughout the four decades of the GDR, only five women reached the top echelons of GDR power, the SED Politbüro – however without gaining full membership (Winkler 1997: 455). Those women were Lotte Ulbricht, married to party secretary Walter Ulbricht; Margot Honecker, married to party secretary Erich Honecker; Hilde Benjamin, Minister of Justice and responsible for many of the early post-war political show trials against oppositionists; Hanna Wolf, vice-chancellor of the party university “Karl Marx”; and Inge Lange, head of the women’s division of the SED Central Committee.

### Conclusions

Given the historical context of the emergence of the PDS, how can the feminist politics of the party be interpreted? Specifically, are the feminist politics of the PDS a state socialist heritage or an expression of change? I argue that three interpretations of PDS feminism all have some support. First, in certain respects, the feminist politics of the PDS shows some continuity with SED policy: especially among the ordinary party members in the eastern states, SED policies of gender equality and the former SED’s claim to supremacy over West Germany in questions of gender equality contribute to the internal party support of the new feminist policies. Secondly, PDS feminism was part of SED reformists’ and eastern feminists’ efforts to modernize the SED. Third, the PDS turn to feminism was part of an effort to reach legitimacy and support in the West as a new left party, by including a Western feminist agenda.

How, then, did the PDS come to choose this particular path to “modernization”. In the following chapter, the emergence and intra-
organizational consequences of PDS feminist policies will be discussed from a social network perspective. As outlined in Chapter 5, feminism is analyzed as norms, means and cognitions that tend to be carried by female rather than male actors. Gender is employed as a useful category of analysis to capture the role of social network structures and mechanisms in institutional change.
In the literature on democratization, the concept of “path-dependence” has been discussed as a third alternative to dualist conceptions of the “hyper-stability” of old institutions vs. possibilities of deliberate institutional design (see for example Offe 1995a; Linz and Stephan 1996: 55–83; Putnam 1993: 177–185). In this book, social network analysis is proposed as a methodological key to institutional path-dependence.

Most treatments of the problem of “path-dependency” concentrate on the democratic quality of post-transition politics, rather than the specific ideological path taken by a political party. In the line of social network analysis proposed in this book, the focus is instead on the latter. Given that an institution is subject to environmental pressures for reform, I claim that social network structures and agency can crucially influence the trajectory of institutional change.

In this chapter, I present the case study of the reformation of the East German communist party, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), later renamed Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS). Specifically, with the help of social network analysis, I retrace the party’s unexpected turn to feminism.

In the autumn of 1989, the SED was in a state of collapse, succumbing to the external shock of multiple sources of pressure for democratization. However, in spite of the de-institutionalized situation, I would argue that the party organization was still not a simple “tool”, with which the new party leader could deliberately design a
vote-maximizing institution (Panebianco 1988). The formation of the PDS can neither be fully explained as a simple continuation of theSED heritage, nor as a purposive-rational adaptation to a new organizational environment. I argue that the reform of the SED into the PDS was also subject to social network path-dependence. The specific trajectory of organizational entrepreneurship was conditioned by social network structures and mechanisms, rendering developments a contingent or chance character.

**Social Network Path-Dependence**

The social network approach to path-dependence highlights the problem of organizational entrepreneurship and reformulates it into a problem of collective action (Chapter 4). Pre-existing ties of interpersonal trust are assumed to guide recruitment and facilitate cooperation (Chapters 3 and 4). The formation and organizational access of informal leadership "teams" is argued to be an important key to the path of organizational reform (Chapters 2 and 4). Social network analysis of institutional change involves retracing where and how organizational leadership "teams" have taken form and gained access to organizational resources.

According to the social network model of action proposed in Chapter 4, the impact of the organizational environment on processes of institutional reform is mediated by social network recruitment and social network communication. Especially in a de-institutionalized and uncertain situation, individuals' conceptions of what would be appropriate or rational to do are not clear or complete. Instead, organizational entrepreneurs rely on interpersonal trust, asking others to suggest appropriate and rational courses of action. Furthermore, and importantly, the organizational entrepreneurs are dependent on the help and cooperation of trusted others to be able to put these ideas into practice.

The social network model of action – the logic of interpersonal trust – argues that norms and cognitions have a stronger impact when they gain entry into processes of institutional reform via ties of interpersonal trust. Social network relations channel ideas and problems into decision-making situations. In the terminology of temporal sorting or "garbage-can" models, social network ties are important parameters
steering streams of problems and solutions into processes of decision-making (Chapter 4).

To the extent that social networking is based on similarity, such as gender similarity, “unsimilar” ideas will be less likely to gain access to social network interaction (Chapter 5). In this context, feminism is analyzed as a set of norms, means and cognitions which are more likely to be carried by women than by men, and which depend on women actors for their implementation. Hence, it is surprising that the reformation of the SED into the PDS – which was male-dominated - resulted in a feminist turn and a 50 percent quota for women. Taking a close look at developments, I argue that this was a result of crucial intermediaries of trust, linking feminist women into the process of organizational entrepreneurship. In this sense, the trajectory of institutional change was not pre-destined or necessary, but contingent on social network restructuring.

The case study is presented as a narrative, where I use numerous individual examples to illustrate the two models launched in earlier chapters: the logic of interpersonal trust and the “strength of similarity”.

**Overview**

The chapter analyzes the reformation of the SED into the PDS as a process of social network entrepreneurship. Notably, social network mobilization brought very few women into the process. Still, the PDS soon installed a quota for women. The susceptibility to feminist ideas is retraced to the informal group “Modern Socialism” at the Humboldt University in Berlin, whose members came to crucially influence the party’s ideological development. The party’s quota decision is retraced to the informal recruitment – via crucial intermediaries of trust – of a group of West German leftists, who carried a feminist agenda.

The reformation of the SED into the PDS and the party’s later turn to feminism is discussed in six sections. The first section outlines the East German transition to democracy, where the SED was forced from state power. Secondly, a working committee was installed to organize an extraordinary party conference. The conference is then described in the third section.

The fourth and longest section discusses the phenomenon of social network niches under authoritarian rule, with the example of the
“Modern Socialism” group, which was linked into the SED reform process at an early stage. The fifth section makes a temporary breach in the chronology of the narrative. By 1994, an informal “team” or “inner circle” with roots in the social network recruitment to the party had emerged at the top echelons of the PDS organization.

The sixth section of this rather lengthy chapter looks at the efforts of the PDS in 1990 to expand into western Germany – the old Bundesländer. The social network recruitment of a number of West German leftists with feminist ideas – the “Hamburg circle” – is contrasted with the marginalization of organized East German feminists trying to influence the party.

With the exception of the section on the organizational “team”, the case study analyzes the early, formative phase of the PDS, from the autumn of 1989 until the 50 percent quota for women had been written into the party statute, in the summer of 1991. The chapter concludes with a short summary of the lasting impact on the party organization of early social network entrepreneurship: some legacies of “how the cards were dealt” during the formative phase of the party (Panebianco 1988).

**Background**

In the East German transition to democracy, the SED was ousted from state power. Simultaneously, within the SED, the party leadership was enthroned. When the reformation of the SED into the PDS began, with an extraordinary party conference held in December 1989, the party had already been forced out of state power (See Table 7.1).

During the autumn of 1989, various “reformers” within the SED demanded that an extraordinary party conference should be held. Since its founding in 1949, the SED had only held four party conferences (Parteikonferenzen), all “ordinary”. An “extraordinary” party conference (Sonderparteitag or Außerordentlicher Parteitag) entailed the election of a new party chairman as well as an entire new party government.

When, in mid-October 1989, SED General Secretary Erich Honecker eventually ceded power to Egon Krenz, his chosen crown prince, Krenz also at first declined to call an extraordinary party conference (Krenz 1999: 268–9). The demands for a Sonderparteitag
were voiced for example in an open letter to the SED Central Committee (ZK) on November 7 from academics at the Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaften (Bahrmann and Links 1994: 85). Tens of thousands of letters with the same demand reached the ZK from party organizations in other parts of the country (Hertle and Stephan 1997: 83; Welzel 1992: 87; Hübner 1990: 47).

On November 10, the day after the opening of the Berlin wall, the Berlin SED organization gathered 150,000 demonstrators in the Berliner Lustgarten to “show that the party is still there” (Bortfeldt 1992: 110; Spittman and Helwig 1989; Klein 1997: 214–5). At the gathering, the SED General Secretary Egon Krenz was booed when he tried to persuade his audience that an ordinary party conference would be better and faster than the demanded Sonderparteitag (Bortfeldt 1992: 110). On November 12, SED reformers demonstrated in several GDR cities to demand a “renewal of the party from below” (Spittmann and Helwig 1989). At this point, the SED General Secretary Egon Krenz saw no alternative but to consent to the Sonderparteitag, which was then scheduled for December 1989. The SED leadership had been enthroned.

Table 7.1 Chronology of events, autumn 1989
(Spittman and Helwig 1989; Maier 1991; Bahrmann and Links 1994; Arnold et al. 1995; Teresiak 1997; Zessin et al. 1998)

The Berlin wall is opened:

October 6/7/8  Gorbachev visits Berlin
October 9    70,000 demonstrate in Leipzig for democratic renewal
October 18  Honecker is replaced by Krenz as SED General Secretary
October 23  300,000 demonstrate in Leipzig against concentration of power
October 24  New SED General Secretary Krenz is appointed head of state
October 30  200,000 demonstrate in Leipzig for free elections
November 4  Artists gather 500,000 demonstrators on Alexanderplatz
November 5  The regional SED government in Leipzig elects new First Secretary
November 7  Various SED reformers demand extraordinary party conference
November 9  The Berlin wall is opened

A “non-party” government is installed:
November 12  An extraordinary party conference is scheduled for December
November 13  The Volkskammer names Modrow to form government
November 16  All regional First Secretaries of the SED have been replaced
November 27  200,000 demonstrators in Leipzig demand German unity
November 28  The West German government proposes German unity
November 28  GDR oppositionists demand an independent East Germany

The SED party government resigns:
December 1  The SED’s “leading role” abolished by the Volkskammer
December 3  The SED Zentralkomitee and Krenz’s new SED Politbüro resign
December 3  A working committee is assigned to plan extraordinary party conference
December 7  Round-table talks begin

The SED is reformed into the PDS:
December 8/9  First session of SED extraordinary party conference
December 16/17  Second session of SED-PDS extraordinary party conference
The East German Transition to Democracy

On December 1, 1989, the People’s Parliament – the Volkskammer – voted to abolish the “leading role” of the SED from the GDR constitution (See Table 7.1). On December 3, the SED party government, the Politbüro, and the Central Committee of the SED, the Zentralkomitee, both resigned from state power. This meant that up until the first democratic elections in March 1990, a “non-party” government under Hans Modrow led the country.

Who, then, was the new head of government, Hans Modrow? As the party secretary of Dresden, Modrow had made a name for himself as a reformer. By the autumn of 1989, he was a well-known person in the GDR. In West German media, he – together with the former Stasi head Markus Wolf – counted as the East German “carriers of hope”. With the ousting of Honecker, Modrow was recruited to Egon Krenz’s new SED party government, in an attempt to give it reformist legitimacy. However, Krenz’s attempts to hold the SED in power failed, and Modrow was instead installed by the Volkskammer to head the state government.

The effects of the constitutional abolishment of the “leading role” of the SED and the installment of Modrow as head of the Council of Ministers must be understood from the background of the specific construction of the communist system. The center of power in the GDR was the SED party government, the Politbüro, which reproduced itself through cooptation of new members. On paper, with the People’s Parliament (Volkskammer) and its government, the Council of Ministers (Ministerrat), the GDR had institutions seemingly similar to those of Western democracies. However, in a number of ways, the party SED controlled the Volkskammer, the Ministerrat, as well as public administration.

In the GDR, the Volkskammer and its Ministerrat were subordinate to the decisions of the SED party government, the Politbüro. The most important instrument of SED control was ostensibly personal union, where SED cadre would control top state positions (compare Wagner 1998: 94, 60). In the mid-1980s, only 39 persons occupied the 64 top political positions in the GDR (Weber 1999: 321–322). Among these 39 persons, 25 were members and candidates of the SED Politbüro (ibid.). The state bureaucracy was controlled by SED cadre, as were
all forms of administration in the GDR (Wagner 1997; Winkler 1997). The SED bureaucracy, the Parteiapparat, paralleled the state administration at all levels. Furthermore, as outlined in the previous chapter, the political parties and all other organizations of the Volkskammer were satellites of the SED.

Given this design of the GDR political system, the abolishment of the “leading role” of the SED from the GDR constitution did not put an end to the influence of SED structures on the state overnight. It did, however, cut the central SED organization off from the East German government.

The Modrow Government

The Modrow government entered into round-table talks with the citizens’ rights movement and the SED-PDS, resulting in the first democratic elections in March 1990. The Modrow government had important ties with the future PDS. In December 1989, Modrow himself was elected one of three deputy chairmen of the SED-PDS and later became “chairman of honor” (Ebrenvorsitzender) of the PDS. Hand-picked members of the new Modrow government included, for example, Christa Luft, vice-chancellor of the university of economics in Berlin. Professor Luft was later elected on the PDS ticket to the Bundestag.

In the interim government, Modrow appointed Luft minister of the economy and deputy chairman of the government:

I absolutely wanted Christa Luft as my deputy in the government, but since nothing had been prepared by the Central Committee, it was incumbent on myself to win her for the position. [–] It was a very personal conversation. [–] I was certain I had won a comrade-in-arms (Mitstreiterin), whose profile would co-determine the government and who would manage a demanding scientific task for the necessary economic reform.

(Modrow 1999: 341, my translation)

Hans Modrow’s appointment of Christa Luft seems to confirm the social network hypothesis that interpersonal trust is important in recruitments to high uncertainty positions demanding close communication and loyalty in non-routine, high discretion tasks (compare Modrow 1999: 390, 421). On the other hand, Modrow’s recruitment of professor Luft is an interesting counter-example to the tendency
for such social network recruitments to be based on gender similarity (Chapter 5).

In the development of the PDS, the tendency for social network recruitment to be based on gender similarity was generally stronger toward politically less visible and organizationally more influential positions. In the reformation of the SED into the PDS, a male-dominated party leadership “team” took form (Chapter 2; Duverger 1959/1964).

In five sections, I describe this process of organizational entrepreneurship: the installment of a working committee to plan the extraordinary party conference, the extraordinary party conference itself, some social network antecedents of the PDS’ think-tank, the emergence of informal structures within the PDS, and the western extension of the party. With the help of illustrational examples, I argue that a social network perspective is relevant to the understanding of the PDS reform and the party’s turn to feminism.

The Reformation of the SED

On December 3, 1989, the SED Politbüro and Zentralkomitee abdicated from SED leadership. On the same day, a working committee was assigned to organize an extraordinary party conference to elect a new party chairman and government. To date, research has still not revealed exactly how this working committee was formed (Neugebauer 1997: 108). It is quite possible that no one person has an overview of the disorderly process, but more can surely be learned from additional interviews with those involved. Here, I shall try to contribute to this research endeavor, concentrating on some social network roots of the later PDS development.

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4 Some sources claim that Gerd Schulz, Abteilungsleiter (head of department) of the ZK, and Wolfgang Herger, head of the ZK Nationale Verteidigungsausschuß (Committee of National Defence) and member of Krenz’ Politbüro in the autumn of 1989, should have been two of perhaps three persons calling in members to the working committee. Schulz and Herger were both originally protegees and confidants of Egon Krenz. Compare Falkner 1996: 154; Gysi and Falkner 1990: 8,72; Hübner 1990; Gerner 1994: 157; Wolf 1991/1999: 53,134–138,156; Krenz 1999: 65; Hertle and Stephan 1997: 49ff, 481.
The Installment of a Working Committee

At 8.30 a.m. on December 3, the SED Politbüro convened for what would be the last time (Hertle and Stephan 1997: 92ff). At 10.30, the Politbüro consulted the new regional First Party Secretaries. These were no longer appointed from above, but had been nominated in their respective regions during the first half of November (See Table 7.1). Discussing the appointment of a temporary committee to replace the Politbüro and plan the extraordinary party conference, it became evident that Politbüro members hoped to cling on to power by joining the committee (Hertle and Stephan 1997: 92ff). At this point, the new regional party secretaries protested and demanded that not only the entire Politbüro, but also the SED Zentralkomitee, should resign and that neither should have any influence on the constitution of the working committee (ibid.). After approximately two hours, the regional party secretaries had their way (ibid.).

The working committee came to include the 14 newly appointed regional party secretaries as well as 11 (later 12) persons, who were expected to contribute to “fundamental changes and a renewal of the party”. Exactly how these “personalities” were selected has not been documented by research (Schwertner 1996; Neugebauer 1997; Gerner 1994: 155–160; Hertle and Stephan 1997: 97). Ostensibly, the nominations were a complicated tug-of-war between the new regional party secretaries and Krenz’s Politbüro, as well as members of the Central Committee, and members of the party administration, der Parteiapparat. One of the new regional party secretaries involved has said that although he and the other regional party secretaries participated in the hasty nomination procedure, nominating for example Klaus Höpcke, Lothar Bisky and Gregor Gysi, the overall process was still unclear to him also (Interview R.C.).

We decided who should call whom, whom do we need now? Well, we need Klaus Höpcke and we need Markus Wolf... We simply invited the people and brought them together. (Interview R.C., my translation)

Ostensibly, the working committee should have needed both former party functionaries who were capable of controlling the party, and less compromised persons who could lend the committee democratic legitimacy. Several of the “personalities” seem to have been recruited with
the latter purpose in mind, to lend the committee reformist legitimacy. Gregor Gysi tells how his nomination was motivated with the argument that he had repeatedly criticized the party publicly, but still declared his intention to strive for a reformed party (Gysi 1995: 84). The recruited “personalities” were persons who had made a name for themselves as renewers and possessed respect in the country (Gysi and Falkner 1990: 75).

The committee convened for the first time later the very same afternoon, with less than a week to go before the first session of the extraordinary party conference. The conference was held on December 8–9, with a second sitting on December 16–17. Through the organization of the extraordinary party conference – the agenda, the proceedings, and the nominations – the special committee was in a position to crucially influence the trajectory of the SED reformation into the PDS (Gysi 1995: 91; Falkner 1996: 155–156; Brie 1996: 174–175). As an analytical key to the broader question of whether social network structures and mechanisms had any impact on the process of change, I shall focus on the question of how women representatives and feminist ideas fared in the process.

The Working Committee Members

The working committee appointed to plan the extraordinary party conference of the SED consisted of 26 members, of which only two had been members of the resigned SED Central Committee5 (Herbst 1997: 856; Gerner 1994: 156–160; Neugebauer 1997: 108). Prominently, the committee included 14 of 15 recently appointed First Secretaries of the regional SED organizations (Herbst 1997: 856, compare 860–878). The remaining 12 members were intended as “personalities who, through their critical outlook and points of view, can contribute to a fundamental change and a renewal of the party” (Schwertner 1996: 160). Of the 26 members of the working committee, four were women. The women were all appointed as “personalities”; the regional party secretaries were all men.

Did the working committee members later become PDS politicians? At the extraordinary party conference, ten of the 14 regional party

5 The two members of the SED Central Committee Gerd Schulz and Erich Postler (Gerner 1994: 156; Hertle and Stephan 1997: 97).
secretaries in the working committee went on to become members of the first SED-PDS party government. This SED-PDS party government, however, consisted of no less than 101 members. In practice, the SED-PDS was led by the ten-member party government presidium. Only one of the recently appointed party secretaries went on to the first SED-PDS presidium. In the party presidium, five of ten members were instead “personalities” who had been informally recruited to the working committee. In short, it was the “personalities” in the working committee who went on to the early PDS: not the regional party secretaries. However, two other regional party secretaries remained in leading positions in the state organizations of the PDS and later resurfaced in federal PDS politics.

And what of the women? As we shall return to below, of the four women who were all recruited as “personalities” to the working committee, none went on to any PDS mandate or party government position.

Movement or Conspiracy?

As mentioned above, during the first two weeks of November 1989, regional party secretaries of the SED were ousted and new First Secretaries appointed. Beginning in Schwerin and Leipzig, by mid-November the secretaries of all 15 regional party organizations had been ousted and replaced (Bahrmann and Links 1994: 108–9; 81ff). How did these new party secretaries manage to cooperate, demanding that the Politbüro should step down? Were their actions coordinated in any way?

Some analysts affiliated with the PDS describe the regional renewals as a “democratic-socialist movement among the party rank-and-file” (Basisbewegung) (Falkner 1996: 152) or even a “social movement” (Interview D.S.). Rather than a putsch or coup, the SED reformation into the PDS is claimed to have been a “storm” in the whole country, culminating in a rush for the SED headquarters in Berlin (Falkner 1996; Gysi and Falkner 1990).

In the context of the extraordinary party conference reforming the SED into the PDS, the only allegations of a direct conspiracy come from Ellen Brombacher, herself a member of the working committee planning the conference (Brombacher 1996, compare Brie 1996: 181–187,
Modrow 1999: 308–314). Brombacher had little influence on the reform process, but later became spokeswoman of the Berlin section of the communist platform (KPF) within the PDS. She laments Gorbachev’s “sell-out” of the Soviet allies to the West, and sees “treason” (Verrat) and the interests of German capital to have decided the course of events in 1989/1990 (Brombacher 1996). Then again, as another PDS affiliate has commented, allegations of conspiracy are a part of the GDR political tradition (Falkner 1996: 151).

I regard it as highly improbable that anyone should have been able to successfully plan or plot events in the unexpected and very rapid political reformation of the SED into the PDS. Instead, I would argue that old friendships proved important in the situation of turbulent political change. As a concept, social network mobilization is broader, more open, spontaneous, emergent and decentralized than what is popularly implied by a “conspiracy”. Compared to a social movement, on the other hand, social network mobilization relies more on interpersonal trust and is therefore considerably more exclusive. Social network mobilization aiming at organizational entrepreneurship relies on stronger ties of interpersonal trust than does mobilization in social movements (compare Sandell 1998).

Party Secretary Networks

Roland Claus, the new SED secretary in Halle, was the first regional party secretary to publicly demand the resignation of General Secretary Krenz. How did he end up in this position? Between 1983 and 1987, Claus had headed the SED youth organization FDJ, Freie Deutsche Jugend, in Halle (Herbst 1997: 868; Interview R.C.). He then moved to Berlin, as head of division (Abteilungsleiter) in the Central Council (Zentralrat) of the FDJ (Herbst et al. 1994.).

In Berlin, Claus got to know academics who were critical of the regime and was influenced by the historical information that reached him through these new friends (Interview R.C.). Through informal encounters, characterized by interpersonal trust, Claus came to change his cognitions and norms in relation to the SED-regime. Among these new acquaintances were members of the research group on “Modern Socialism” at the Humboldt University; a group whose members came to have much influence on the development of the PDS:
Yes, I was involved with those people – not institutionally, but more on a personal basis. No-one from the [FDJ] Central Council went there. It was also difficult after this banning of Sputnik\(^6\). After that I no longer believed in the continued existence of the GDR and the ability of the SED to renew itself. In Halle, I had not realized all of these things. In Berlin, I experienced a number of truths that were new to me. Concerning Katün for example. (Interview R.C., my translation)

On November 11, 1989, two days after the opening of the Berlin wall, Roland Claus was then appointed First Secretary of the regional SED organization in Halle. He was nominated by the chairman of the regional state administration to head the Halle region (Interview R.C.; compare Wagner 1998). Claus, who was only 34 years old at the time, presumes that the motive of most of those who approached him then was to give the SED a new, younger face; another label.

As regional First Secretary, together with reform-oriented academics in Berlin, affiliated with the Modern Socialism group at the Humboldt University, Claus and other regional party secretaries attempted to organize an opposition within the SED against Egon Krenz’s Politbüro (interview R.C.). During the month of November, they together cooperated with SED reformers in other regions. Specifically involved were representatives from Karl-Marx-Stadt/Chemnitz, Dresden and Leipzig, several of whom already knew each other from the SED youth organization FDJ. For example, Wolfgang Berghofer, Hans Vietze and Roland Claus knew each other from the FDJ – the latter two “quite well” (Interview R.C.). On December 3, at the Politbüro consultation of the new regional party secretaries, as a spokesman for the party secretaries, Claus demanded that the Politbüro and Zentralkomitee should step back, and that a working committee be formed to plan an extraordinary party conference; a proposal agreed upon beforehand by the regional party secretaries.

Intermediaries of Trust

Amongst the 14 regional party secretaries in the working committee, only two went on to the top echelons of the PDS: Roland Claus

\(^6\) On the SED-regime’s 1988 banning of the journal Sputnik, containing translated excerpts from Soviet journals, see Chapter 6.
himself and Heinz Vietze from Potsdam. A few years after the re-
formation of the SED into the PDS, Claus and Vietze would count
among the handful of PDS politicians most burdened by SED biogra-
phies. Their roles, I argue, were as intermediaries of trust, linking
other SED reformers with less tainted biographies into the reform
process.

For example, the new Potsdam party secretary, Hans Vietze,
recruited the academic Michael Schumann into the reform process
(Interview M.S.). In mid-November 1989, Schumann received a call
from his dean at the Potsdam-Babelsberg Akademie für Staats- und
Rechtswissenschaften, who asked him to replace him as speaker at a party
rally the following morning. The dean had been assigned by the
regional party secretariat to speak, but delegated the assignment on
to Schumann, who then spoke in front of the 15,000 assembled party
members. The new Potsdam party secretary, Hans Vietze, then
recruited Schumann to hold one of the four key speeches at the
extraordinary party conference, renouncing Stalinism. The actual
“spiritus rectus” or mind behind the key speech was – apart from Hans
Vietze and several others who collaborated drafting the speech –
Markus Wolf (Interview M.S.; Schumann 1995; Hornbogen et al.
entrepreneurial process, Schumann later became part of the informal
inner circle of the PDS party government.

How did Markus Wolf enter the process? Between 1952 and
1986, Markus Wolf was chief of the foreign division of Stasi, the
Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit. Wolf
sympathized with Gorbachev’s Perestroika, and in 1986 he voluntarily
stepped back from Stasi service to become a writer (Wolf 1991/1999).
As mentioned before, by 1989, Wolf together with Hans Modrow
were the most well known personalities amongst the country’s SED
reformers. According to Wolf’s autobiography, the two had not
met very often, but regarded themselves to be good friends (Wolf
example, they had once been to a health resort together, where Modrow
had outdone Wolf at swimming (Wolf 1991/1999: 206–207). In the
summer of 1988, Wolf was about to publish his Perestroika book
“The Troika”, where he mentioned discussions with his friend Hans
Modrow in the late 1970s. Before publishing the book, Wolf first
went to Dresden to discuss its content with Modrow and talk over the current political situation in the country (ibid.).

On December 3, 1989, Modrow, who was now head of state of the GDR, called Wolf to participate in a crisis meeting (Modrow 1999: 371). In his autobiography, Modrow writes that since the situation was uncertain, he wanted someone by his side whom he trusted and from whom he could ask advice (Modrow 1999: 371–372):

On the unclear field of security questions, I simply wanted a person around me whom I trusted. (Modrow 1999: 371, my translation)

Markus Wolf then became a member of the working committee organizing the extraordinary party conference, but did not speak at the conference, and has not remained with the PDS. With his Stasi biography, Wolf was much too incriminated to be legitimate as a politician in the democratizing GDR. This first became clear to him at the November 4 party rally on the Berlin Alexanderplatz (Compare Table 7.1). On the first page of his autobiography, Markus Wolf describes his failed speech at the November 4 rally as the “key experience” of the year 1989 (Wolf 1991/1999: 5, 190–197). At the mention of the word “communist”, he was booed at, and when he tried to defend the secret police, the Stasi, his voice was drowned in booing and whistling (ibid.).

A Charismatic Leader

The future PDS leader Gregor Gysi belonged to the more successful speakers at the November 4 rally. Gysi was and is a brilliant speaker. As an attorney, he had earlier defended numerous regime critics in the political trials of the GDR. In the autumn of 1989, he had recently accepted to represent the citizen’s rights group Neues Forum (Gysi and Falkner 1990: 10–12). At the November 4 rally, Gysi demanded that Neues Forum be permitted to organize themselves (ibid.: 73–74). On the other hand, he also asked the 500 000 demonstrators to “give Krenz a chance” (ibid.; Gysi 1995: 77–78). Still, he was not booed and jeered like Markus Wolf (Wolf 1991/1999: 191). A few weeks after the Alexanderplatz rally, at the December 2 rally in front of the building of the Central Committee, Gysi reversed his position and demanded that the Central Committee and General Secretary Egon Krenz resign (Gysi 1995: 81–82).
In summary, by the late autumn of 1989, Gysi had made a name for himself as an outspoken and eloquent but still loyal critic of the SED-regime.

On December 3, Gysi was then recruited as a “personality” to the working committee planning the extraordinary party conference. According to Gysi’s autobiography, he was in a meeting of the Berlin party organization when he was suddenly summoned to the Central Committee (Gysi 1995: 82–85; Gysi and Falkner 1990: 73). There, he was informed that the Central Committee as well as its government, the SED Politbüro, had resigned, and that a special committee was to plan a party conference. Gysi was offered a place in the working committee as chairman of a commission that was to investigate Central Committee corruption and abuse of office. According to Gysi, he was astonished by the offer (ibid.).

As soon as the working committee had constituted itself, Gysi was sent down to speak to demonstrators in front of the Central Committee building (Gysi and Falkner 1990: 76; Gysi 1995: 85). Since only days earlier, he himself had been among the protesters, the committee estimated that Gysi would have a favorable starting position (Gysi and Falkner 1990: 85). For their public legitimacy, the committee had an acute need of persons whose biographies were less tainted by the SED-regime.

Gysi was initially recruited to head an investigation on party corruption, not to head the party. It was not until two or three days before the extraordinary party conference, when first the regional party secretary of Erfurt and then the Dresden SED-reformer Wolfgang Berghofer had both declined to be nominated as party chairmen, that the working committee decided to nominate Gysi to the office (Gysi 1995: 94–95). One party secretary motivated the nomination with the arguments that Gysi had picked up a lot from the discussions of Berliner academics on democratic socialism and was capable of speaking both to the party and to the general public in a completely new manner (Interview R.C.). During the following years, Gysi was to prove indispensable for the PDS. His charisma, political talent and comparatively less tainted biography decisively altered the public image of the party.

Still, at the time of his election as party chairman, Gysi was not yet the power-broker or wire-puller that Western media assumed him to be (Moreau 1992: 30). According to the autobiographies, Gysi was not acquainted with any of those SED-reformers who were more closely
affiliated with the SED. In their autobiographies, Gysi and Modrow claim to have met only on December 3, 1989 (Gysi 1995: 83, 91; Modrow 1999: 342, 380). Neither did Gysi know the other Dresden reformer, Wolfgang Berghofer (Interview Gregor Gysi, Hoover Archives). Likewise, Markus Wolf and Gysi claim to have met for the first time at the Alexanderplatz rally on November 4, 1989 (Wolf 1991/1999: 5, 191; Gysi 1995: 122). However, it is quite possible that this is not the whole truth. In contrast to the autobiographies one interviewee claims that “Heinz Vietze knew Gregor Gysi, Gregor Gysi knew Markus Wolf, and so on.” (Interview M.S., my translation).

Be that as it may, by November 1989, the network of new regional party secretaries and persons from the Modern Socialism group had already contacted Gysi, “actually more from the point of view that we needed a good lawyer” (Interview R.C., my translation). In the past, Gysi had acted as defense attorney of prominent SED-reformers such as Rudolf Bahro and Robert Havemann.

In the working committee preparing the extraordinary party conference, Gysi then came to know Lothar Bisky – a friendship which was to form the future PDS. Lothar Bisky had been recruited in November 1989 by Klaus Hüpcke, former vice-minister of culture, to assist Hüpcke in his new position as responsible for cultural questions in Krenz’s new Politbüro (Interview Lothar Bisky, Hoover Archives; Barth et al. 1996: 323). Bisky, who had been honorary professor at the Humboldt University in Berlin from 1979 to 1986, took over as vice-chancellor of the Potsdam-Babelsberg College of film and television in 1986, where he made a name for himself as a reformer. Bisky also spoke at the November 4 rally on Alexanderplatz, where he claims to have met Gysi for the first time (ibid.). In the working committee, Gysi and Bisky soon discovered that they “saw things in a similar way” (Interview Lothar Bisky, Hoover Archives). Once in the PDS party presidium, they worked late nights together and called each other around the clock:

We then developed a completely spontaneous relationship of cooperation with one another. A relationship of trust and the certainty that we think in the same direction. [—] He is indispensable. I place great value in that we both continue together. There are no struggles between us who should be the top dog. (Interview Lothar Bisky, Hoover Archives)
In the PDS development, the two men exercised a *de facto* double leadership. In 1993, on Gregor Gysi’s demand, Lothar Bisky replaced him as party chairman. Gysi remained head of the party group in *Bundestag* and was still incomparably the most well known PDS profile in the media. In 1997, PDS feminists proposed that the party should institute a statutory double leadership consisting of one man and one woman – a so-called *Doppelspitze*. Lothar Bisky then objected that a double leadership would presuppose that the two leaders work as well together as he and Gysi. (Observation, party conference).

**Exit Women**

As mentioned above, in the working committee there were four women members, all nominated as “personalities” but none of whom went on to the PDS party government or parliamentary mandates.

Brigitte Zimmermann was the editor of *Wochenpost*, where she, according to Markus Wolf, had “shown courage” (Wolf 1991/1999: 247). In the complicated tug-of-war for committee nominations, Zimmermann was recruited by the regional party secretary circles (Interview R.C.; Zimmermann 1999). She was the press speaker of the working committee (Hornbogen et al. 1999: 20). However, she did not go on to the top echelons of the PDS but became deputy editor of *Neues Deutschland*. A second woman in the working committee, Eva Maleck-Levy, spoke on the “women’s question” at the November 4 Alexanderplatz rally (Interview E. M.-L.). She then became one of three deputy chairpersons of the working committee, where she actively represented women’s questions. She also helped start up the women’s group LISA within the PDS, but then left the party. A third woman in the working committee, Ellen Brombacher, had a background within the Berlin party organization and the Berliner FDJ, which she had headed between 1975 and 1984. As mentioned, she later became a leading figure within the conservative Communist Platform (KPF) within the PDS. The fourth woman, Dagmar Hülseberg, was a university professor of glass and ceramics (Barth et al. 1996: 328–329). Her name does not figure in the later development of the PDS. In summary, none of the four women were drawn into the PDS leadership team.

How can we interpret the exit of the women in the working
committee? I argue that one possible interpretation, which would be congruent with the observed developments, is the strength of similarity. According to the “strength of similarity” model, presented in Chapter 5, actors prefer to cooperate and deliberate with others who are perceived to be similar. This in turn leads to further similarity – for example, in terms of political ideas – and to a social network structure based on social similarity. If pre-existing social network ties, as well as spontaneous sociability, structure cooperation in a changing organization, then this may help to explain why women exit the process. Women may be less likely to be drawn into an emerging organizational “team”, when this is male-dominated.

At that stage of the party reform process, there were few premonitions of PDS’ later turn to feminism. In the following section, we shall look at the events of the extraordinary party conference. At the conference, a new party government was elected where two out of ten in the presidium were women. The presidium included no less than six participants from the working committee process: Gregor Gysi, Lothar Bisky, Klaus Höpcke, Wolfgang Berghofer, Hans Modrow and Wolfgang Pohl. Despite the male-dominated process, the program proposed by the working committee included some references to gender equality. In the next section, an important influence on the programmatic development is then retraced to the Modern Socialism group.

The Extraordinary Party Conference

The extraordinary party conference, reforming the SED into the PDS, Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus, was held in the Dynamo Sporthalle in Berlin in two sittings, on December 8–9 and December 16–17. The approximately 2,700 conference delegates had been newly nominated by the SED district organizations, for the first time in comparatively free elections (Hertle and Stephan 1997: 89). From a look at the transcriptions of recordings made at the extraordinary party conference, the proceedings seem to have been held in an atmosphere of ongoing exchange between the podium and the delegates, with frequent interruptions, cheers and protests from the conference “floor” and quick votes on decisions of procedure (Hornbogen et al. 1999:}
37–380). Still, the decisions of the extraordinary party conference did not substantially go against the proposals made by the conference organizers.

At the first session of the extraordinary party conference, a party chairman and a party government were elected. Gregor Gysi was the sole candidate nominated for the party chairmanship. He was elected in a closed voting procedure by 2588 of 2714 delegates, i.e. 95.32 percent (Hornbogen et al. 1999: 158). In the voting procedure for the party government, delegates were asked to cross out ten names from a ballot, leaving 100 candidates to be elected. The 110 names had been nominated by the regional party organizations, as well as by the working committee planning the party conference (Interview R.C.; Hornbogen et al. 1999: 110–115). In the new party government, only four of 100 members were former members of the sed Zentralkomitee (Hertle and Stephan 1997: 98; Welzel 1992: 95).

As we remember, the party government presidium became the actual party government. Of the presidium’s ten members, six had also been members of the working committee. Likewise, speakers from the working committee dominated the conference agenda. The second session of the extraordinary party conference was opened with the historian Michael Schumann’s speech breaking with Stalinism as a system. The other key speeches at the conference were held by Hans Modrow, who argued that the party should not be dissolved, Gregor Gysi, who spoke of a “third road” of socialism, Dieter Klein from the Humboldt University Modern Socialism group, and the regime critic of the 1970s: Rudolf Bahro. At the second conference session, a new party statute was adopted and the old statute abolished.

Less than 20 Percent Women

The extraordinary party conference cannot be said to have heralded the later 50 percent representation of women in the PDS. The proposed party statute, drafted by a group appointed by the working committee, did not contain a quota (Hornbogen et al. 1999: 366). During the conference, a quota was proposed from the floor, but the proposal seems to have met with little assent (ibid.: 363–6). The provisional party statute adopted on December 17 contained only a formulation on the organization of the party as a whole: through the organization
of the activities of the party, “women should be given real possibilities of active participation” in the party (ibid.: 440, my translation).

Among the delegates at the extraordinary party conference, 19 percent were women (Hornbogen et al. 1999: 101). The new party government elected, including party chairman Gregor Gysi, consisted of 101 persons, of whom 16 were women (ibid.). In the party government presidium, which came to act as the de facto party government, two out of ten members were women (ibid). The low number of women was a consequence of the nominations, not of the voting. Among the ten candidates not elected, none were women. Announcing the results of the party government election, party chairman Gregor Gysi expressed his regret at the low numbers of women:

One has to admit that unfortunately this is already all the women there are. We have really not been successful at it, but we will have to make it better next time. I say this really critically and self-critically; but with the lack of time, unfortunately it wasn’t possible to do it in any other way. (Hornbogen et al. 1999: 161, my translation)

Was Gysi an advocate of gender equality, one might ask? A week earlier, on December 1, Gysi had given an interview to the GDR women’s journal Für Dich, where he had pronounced himself favourable concerning a proposed quota for women to political parties, state institutions and societal organizations (Bahrmann and Links 1994: 154–5; Hornbogen et al. 1999: 106). However, this does not seem to have been a very firm position. At the extraordinary party conference, prior to his election as chairman, Gysi was subject to a shorter questioning from the delegates (Hornbogen et al. 1999: 102–108). When questioned from the conference floor on his views on women’s politics (Frauenpolitik), Gysi gave the following declaration:

N.N.: Please position yourself to the women’s politics in our party. (Unrest and laughter.) I do not say this without reason. Nineteen percent [women delegates] is a strange figure for a party.7 (Hornbogen et al. 1999: 103, my translation)

7 The questioner also asked whether Gregor Gysi was still the lawyer of the regime-critic Bärbel Bohley, which Gysi found to be an ambiguous and intolerant question (Gysi 1995:102–3).
Gysi: Women’s politics. Well, we have spoken not only of equal rights, but of gender equality [–] one of the basic problems of our society, I would like to state that clearly. [—] And I would also very much like that women should take on responsibility. But please, as women. I do not want that they should enter a competition to become the better men.

(Amusement. Applause.)

And then, we can really learn something from them, that’s right. [—] It is so terribly difficult to change that all of a sudden. [—] We have to prepare ourselves for a process there, and we have to change the mentality. (Hornbogen et al. 1999:106, my translation and abbreviations)

Attempting to assess this statement at the party conference, it can perhaps be concluded that it is open-ended, and multi-faceted. A skilful speaker, in his answer to the critique of the low number of women delegates, Gysi solicits the amusement and applause of the male-dominated audience by implying that the responsibility of democratic politics would risk robbing women of their femaleness. On the other hand, Gysi leaves the point in question open. He actually claims gender equality to be a “basic problem” of GDR society. Thirdly, he reassures the conference delegates that this would be “terribly difficult to change all of a sudden”.

In summary, the statement cannot reasonably be said to forebode an impending 50 percent quota for women to party government and parliamentary mandates. However, it does leave an opening for a programmatic turn to issues of gender equality.

A Founding Consensus of Gender Equality

As described, less than 20 percent of delegates at the extraordinary party conference in December 1989 were women. The same also applies to the new party government elected at the conference. From a look at the protocols, it seems that intercessions from the conference floor on gender equality did not seem to resonate well with the delegates. Despite all of this, the speeches of the new party leader, Gregor Gysi, did advance gender equality as a norm. Indeed, according to feminist women in the PDS today, gender equality belonged to the Gründungskonsens – the party’s founding consensus – established at the December 1989 conference (Interviews).
In a programmatic speech to the extraordinary party conference formulating the proposed reform socialism, Gysi listed “the implementation of real rights for women” as a distinguishing feature of a socialist “third way”:

This third road of a socialist character that we strive for is characterized by radical democracy and rule of law, humanism, social justice, conservation of the environment, the implementation of real equal rights and equality for women. (Hornbogen et al. 1999: 53, my translation)

Where did these formulations of reform socialism originate? As we remember, the second session of the extraordinary party conference was held on 16/17 December, only two weeks after the working committee had been installed. The time pressure was enormous (Gysi 1995: 97). Three days before the first session of the conference was to begin, the committee had not yet discussed nominations and political content (Zimmermann 1999). Generally, the preparations for the party conference began in chaos, since no preparations had been made by the party organization (Wolf 1991/1999: 248).

The working committee’s group on programmatic questions included representatives from the 15 regional party organizations, who all brought their own agenda into the process (Interview Lothar Bisky, Hoover Archives). With so many members, it was not easy to reach a quick consensus. Lothar Bisky describes the meetings that he was set to mediate:

That was then very funny, because about 30 people from the regions were going on and on, shouting terribly: So this about the women’s question, it’s impossible like that. Everyone wanted to contribute with their stuff: And we must confess to Marxism-Leninism, and why are you mentioning Kautsky and Bernstein. It was a very heated discussion. And then I realized: nothing will come out of this. (Interview Lothar Bisky, Hoover Archives)

In the working committee, Dieter Klein from the Humboldt University had, together with Lothar Bisky, been responsible for programmatic statements (Gysi 1995: 93). For example, Klein wrote the introduction of Gysi’s speech at the extraordinary party conference (ibid.: 97). In turn, members of Klein’s research group on “Modern Socialism” also wrote parts of Gysi’s speech, as well as several drafts of Klein’s own
speech (Brie 1996: 147). The same persons then cooperated, drafting the February 1990 party program.

In the words of a member of the Modern Socialism group, the head-start that the group had gained through their research project was an enormous advantage for GDR conditions (Brie 1996: 147). From a social network perspective, this head-start or advantage was not only – or even primarily – a matter of the development of new political ideas. In the very rapid political developments, the ideas of how the GDR should be reformed were soon to be outdated. In addition to the specific ideas that the group carried, the social network perspective focuses on the capacity for trustful cooperation. The social network perspective emphasizes the importance of the established relations of interpersonal trust that tied the members of the informal group into the process of organizational entrepreneurship and made them capable of flexible and efficient collective action.

The “Modern Socialism” Group

A central characteristic of East German democratization was that it was unexpected and happened very fast. In the tightly controlled GDR society, there had been very little possibility to prepare for democratization. The extraordinary party conference in December 1989, where the SED was democratized and re-named “SED-PDS”, was planned within a matter of weeks. To show the renewal of the party, there was an acute need for new ideas and conceptions as well as for party functionaries. Who could supply such conceptions?

In this second section of the chapter, I explore the link between the PDS and an informal group of researchers at the Humboldt University: the “Modern Socialism” group. First, I describe the phenomenon of the Modern Socialism group, arguing that it can be seen as a social network niche in GDR society. Secondly, I describe some social network recruitments from the group to the PDS. Thirdly, I discuss the transfer of feminist ideas from the Modern Socialism group to the PDS.

The ambition is not to explain the complete development of the PDS – which of course was influenced by many more sources of ideas and persons. Neither has it been possible to map all links between the
Modern Socialism group and the PDS. Rather, I wish to illustrate the theoretical argument that informal cooperation and informal networks can be important in a democratization, especially when the process is unexpected and swift.

Social Network Niches

With its totalitarian ambitions, the SED-regime strived to prevent any spontaneous cooperation that could give rise to critical ideas (compare Arendt 1951/2000). One of the most important instruments of authoritarian rule, and a central feature of the “leading role” of the SED, was the Kaderpolitik (see for example Wagner 1997). In all segments of GDR society, SED cadre controlled activities. These SED officials were nominally elected by the party members within each respective organization or workplace, but in fact appointed from above.

In many segments of GDR society, both inside and outside the SED, people struggled to create spaces of free interaction beyond the control of the party leadership (see for example Land and Possekel 1994; Neubert 1998a; Fehr 1995). I argue that it was through informal cooperation based on interpersonal trust that small niches were created, where ideas could be exchanged and developed without being immediately subordinated to the ideological review of higher SED levels.

In the context of GDR history, social network niches have just begun to receive scholarly attention. In popular discourse, social network niches have traditionally been discussed as the ordinary GDR citizen’s retreat from politics, nursing their private interests and allotment gardens (Gaus 1983). In academic studies, social networks have recently begun to be highlighted as shelters from authoritarian control, allowing everyday life to escape the totalitarian ambitions of the regime (Lindenberger 2000).

More rarely, social network interaction has been discussed as activities that develop in an authoritarian society as efforts to compensate for the lack of civil society and a public sphere. Little research has been done on personal networks as micro-mobilization contexts in repressive regimes (Opp and Gern 1993: 662). In one such study, personal networks were found to be important contexts for mobilizing citizens to participate in the regime-critical demonstrations in Leipzig during the autumn of 1989 (Opp and Gern 1993).
Oppositional activities were based on networks of trusted friends, colleagues and neighbors. The workplace was a context of mobilization only in as far as colleagues were also friends (ibid.: 674).

The GDR universities were not typical sites of the citizens’ rights movement. Institutes of higher learning were tightly controlled by the SED-regime (Florath 1999; Hohlfeld and Mattes 1999; Eckert 1999b; Laitko 1997; Straube 1996). Especially within the social sciences, academic recruitment followed ideological criteria. Instead, the universities had traditionally been strongholds of a timid intra-party opposition. The GDR universities had hosted SED-reformers such as Robert Havemann in the 1960s and Rudolf Bahro in the 1970s.

At the institutes of higher learning, social network structures emerged as efforts to ease or escape the disciplining power of the SED (Land and Possekel 1994: 41). Within networks of trusted friends, norms and cognitions could be communicated that did not follow the party line. To a certain, limited extent, it was possible to escape party discipline by finding a protective sponsor or by assuming a function within the party (Flam 1998: 69). These solutions relied on personal relations with specific trusted others (ibid.)

The “Modern Socialism” Group as Niche

One example of a university social network niche is the room for development – Freiraum – provided during the 1980s by the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Humboldt University in Berlin. During the last years of the GDR, his department hosted a research project on Moderner Sozialismus (Land 1990). Later, the group’s ideas and the wider circle of associates involved came to influence the path of development of the PDS.

The story of the project “Modern Socialism” – or Philosophische Grundlagen einer Theorie Moderner Sozialismus – illustrates how heavily dependent such intellectual niches during authoritarian rule were on personal friendships and interpersonal trust. The project was possible only because the Dean of Social Sciences at Humboldt University held his hand over it (Brie 1996: 115). The Dean himself describes how a project like Modern Socialism was made to conform to the central planning of the SED:
As in all spheres of society, science too was planned. There were five-year plans and there were projects within these five-year plans. [-] And in this case it was a legitimation of this project to simply declare it an official plan-theme. That gave it, so to speak, a legal basis and the people could meet and consider critical questions and they were so to speak in conformity with the plan. After all, no-one knew the results. (Interview D.K., my translation)

Nominally, the party secretary of the section of philosophy headed the project Modern Socialism. He, however, tells how the Dean persuaded him to take on the SED office in order to protect the project, which in reality gravitated around three other academics (Interview D. S.).

With the reformation of the SED into the PDS, these three “core” academics of the Modern Socialism group have distanced themselves from the PDS to varying degrees. None of the three have taken on any function or mandate for the PDS. One core academic left the SED-PDS party government in early 1990 in discontent over the party leadership’s decision not to dissolve and re-constitute the party, but instead to take over the organizational resources of the old SED. Still, he has continued to cooperate with the PDS. For example, he co-authored the February 1990 party program, as well as the 1997 party program commentary, published by the PDS’ foundation for social analysis (Gesellschaftsanalyse und Politische Bildung e.V. 1997).

A second central academic of the Modern Socialism group first tried launching a new political party himself and later joined the social democrats. He has published several well-initiated analyses of the PDS and its intellectual origins (Land 1997). The only woman among the three core academics, Rosi Will, seems to have made the most complete break of the three with the PDS context. Some years after democratization, she became the first East German to be appointed judge in a state court.

As interesting as the core group itself is the wider circle of academics that the intellectual exchange involved. Some of these were from other academic institutions, such as the Potsdam-Babelsberg Akademie für Staat- und Rechtswissenschaften. One former student at the Humboldt Department of Philosophy, close friend of one of its respected core academics and later associate of the project Modern Socialism describes the cooperative character of the enterprise:
When you look at the individual papers, many persons have cooperated at some specific point. Like that, there are three pages of typewritten text on how you should build up the judicial system of the GDR. And on all kinds of areas. It was this kind of free space that in the end emerged [the Dean of Social Sciences] – he held his hand over it. That had a long history. It had continuity at least over the eighties. (Interview D.S., my translation)

At the Department of Social Sciences at the Humboldt University, this specific project had precursors, involving some of the same persons in various constellations (Interviews). During the second half of the eighties, with the increasing pressure on the GDR leadership from the new Soviet leader, Gorbachev, such niche environments gradually gained in freedom and could expand their activities (Land and Possekel 1994: 36–48). The Humboldt group discussed reforming socialism in a democratic direction, but failed to propose the crucial immediate abolishment of the “leading role” of the socialist party.

*An Intermediary of Trust*

Members of the Modern Socialism group made several attempts to offer their reform ideas to SED magnates, but were initially unsuccessful. Only via a strong tie of interpersonal trust did the group members and their ideas come to gain access to the SED reform process.

In the summer of 1989, the number of GDR refugees fleeing the country via Hungary was rapidly increasing. Some group members then spontaneously decided to try and influence developments:

Some of the persons involved in the “Socialism project” met in Micha’s apartment (I never call my brother Michael). We decided to draw up some propositions on the situation in the GDR, which we wanted to forward to the SED Central Committee. (Brie 1996: 116, my translation)

In early October 1989, the young academics then sent their unpublished writings to Markus Wolf (Wolf 1991/1999: 159). In early November, the group handed some of their writings to a Politbüro member, who offered them to the new party secretary Egon Krenz (Hertle and Stephan 1997:67; Schabowski 1990: 140; 1991: 319–320). The latter, however, did not have time to read them (ibid.). The Politbüro member then handed the documents to Hans Modrow (ibid.).
Modrow emphasizes how the reformers around the Humboldt University Dean, Dieter Klein, were no new discovery for him, but that the two men had been companions along the road since the 1950s, albeit while retaining some differences in political values (Modrow 1999: 17–18). In the early Perestroika years, around 1986–1987, when Modrow was regional party secretary in Dresden, the two then cooperated informally and secretively to try to prevent environmental risk-taking and damage in the Dresden area, where the Politbüro wanted to build a silicon plant (Modrow 1999: 169–180, Interview D.K.). In mid-November 1989, Hans Modrow became the minister of state of the interim government. In this situation, Dieter Klein made use of his social network tie to Hans Modrow – which had been strengthened by their cooperation on the Dresden environmental scandal – to offer him the reform concepts of the Modern Socialism group:

I tell this only to say that sometimes, on such occasions, I again contacted Hans Modrow. In 1989 we of course called him and said: Hans, we have concepts. What would you like to do with them? (Interview D.K., my translation)

However, within a few months, both Modrow as a politician and the ideas of the Humboldt group to reform state socialism had become obsolete, overrun by the speed of democratic development. Instead, the Humboldt Dean ended up holding the key programmatic address at the extraordinary party conference in December 1989, reforming the SED into the PDS. He was also active, for example, in writing the first party program of the PDS in February 1990, as well as the 1997 commentary to the party program (Gesellschaftsanalyse und Politische Bildung e.V. 1997). During the first years of the PDS, he held no formal position in the PDS, but in 1997, he entered the federal party government.

Social Network Recruitments

As described previously, in the democratization of the SED, the whole top level of the party was ousted, save two or three newly elected regional party chairmen. Less than four months later, in March 1990, the PDS was to face the first democratic elections to the East German
parliament, the *Volkskammer*. During these winter months, several people affiliated with the Modern Socialism group started to fill the organizational “power vacuum” in the PDS.

For example, the PDS needed an election campaign manager. Initially, Wolfgang Berghofer had recruited “all of his old FDJ-acquaintances” to run the PDS election campaign (Interview Lothar Bisky, Hoover Archives). When Berghofer quit the party, in January 1990, Lothar Bisky reorganized the election campaign management. On the recommendation of the Humboldt Dean, Lothar Bisky and Gregor Gysi decided to hand on the responsibility for running the election campaign to a member of the Modern Socialism group (ibid; Brie 1996: 161–162). Besides the election campaign management, André Brie came to organize the work with the programmatic development of the party. He soon became the leading strategist – *Vordenker* – of the PDS and emerged as one of the three or four men in the “Troika” or “Quadriga” heading the party.

Another associate of the group Modern Socialism, a children’s psychologist, tells the story of how he in turn was asked by the PDS election manager, whom he knew from the Humboldt environment, to become his assistant:

As the election campaigns began to the Volkskammer-elections [–] I saw a draft for an [election–] poster. And I simply criticized it and wrote it all down in detail for [the election manager] and told him what was wrong with the way it was. [–] Then it all went very fast, because [the election manager] had also jumped into cold water, or been thrown. And he had no idea of election campaigns or where to start with it. And then we talked about it and he said something like “well, then you should go on working with us in the election campaign”. (Interview H.P., my translation)

Planning the election campaign, the small PDS crew moved into the empty building of the ousted SED Zentralkomitee in Berlin.

Well, at that time in any case, it was all very practical and this large building was after all completely empty. And at some point in time André then said “well, you can pick yourself a room here too – pick yourself a room!” At that time all rooms were empty. I wandered through the place and into the big rooms – I had never been in there before (laughs). And I took the room with the nicest telephone (laughs). (Interview H.P., my translation)
Later, the psychologist became the personal advisor of the party leader Gregor Gysi and a few years later, the personal advisor of the second PDS chairman, Lothar Bisky.

In the words of the PDS election manager, “almost everyone” who had in one way or another cooperated on the project Modern Socialism resurfaced again in the house of the Central Committee in December 1989, administering the reform process of the SED-PDS (Brie 1996: 146). Interestingly, however, this did not include any of the women associated with the project.

**Feminist Ideas**

In my interviews, some PDS politicians claimed that feminism was part of the founding consensus – *Gründungskonsens* – of the PDS (compare Falkner 1996). In the first party program of February 1990, there were indeed some (rather timid) passages on the issue of gender equality. The February 1990 program, drafted by among others former members of the Modern Socialism group, speaks of the need for mutual respect and solidarity between the sexes, real societal gender equality, a new culture of living together and the preservation of features of the GDR, such as the constitutionally guaranteed rights of women and plentiful supply of kindergarten and day nurseries (Herbst et al. 1997: 838–844).

One ostensibly necessary, but insufficient, background factor leading up to the later quota decision was surely the intellectual heritage of the project Modern Socialism, which had included some writings on gender equality. A second factor was of course the East German women’s groups trying to influence the PDS. However, as we shall return to in the next section, the statutory quota decision, its systematic implementation and the later more Western-style feminist politics were a result of the recruitment of West German feminists to the party.

The Humboldt Dean of Social Sciences, who was responsible for much of the programmatic development during the first months of the PDS, asked that the impact of women activists themselves on the PDS decisions not be underestimated. However, he described how ideas of gender equality were considered in the work of the male-dominated Modern Socialism group, creating a readiness on behalf
of the former group members to let feminist ideas influence the reformation of the party:

I mean the people themselves, the women themselves, with their feminist ideas were also there during the last years of the GDR. [...] Because of the fact that they were relatively weakly represented in this conceptual work in groups, [feminist ideas] weren’t initially in the foreground – I simply have to admit that. [Still,] the ideas did play a role in the programmatic work from the beginning and on, because the ones who were in [the Modern Socialism group] so to say [found] that a new socialist movement also had to be a feminist one. Everyone in there thought that. Or almost everyone. [The future election campaign leader of the PDS], he knew that, of course. [The future co-author of the first PDS program] knew that. I knew that too. But we weren’t people who did feminist research ourselves. (Interview D.K., my translation)

So, who brought feminist ideas into the Humboldt group? During the last years of the GDR as well as during the transition to democracy, there was indeed a plethora of feminist activity without parallel in other democratizing East European countries (Ferree 1993; compare Kamenitsa 1998). However, there were also important interpersonal feminist influences on the group. These feminist women did not go on to reform the SED into the PDS.

One of the few direct personal feminist influences on the group *Moderner Sozialismus* was a woman who was associated with the group only during 1989. She provided the group with ideas of gender equality, contributing with concepts of how the GDR should be reformed (Merkel 1989a; 1989b; Land 1990). In the late autumn of 1989, Ina Merkel co-founded the independent women’s organization UFV and became its first chairperson (Hampele 1992; 1993b).

During the same winter of 1989/90, other feminist academics from other departments at the Humboldt University, from other academic institutions and newly formed organizations, were active in influencing the feminist programmatic of the PDS. However, these women did not stay on in PDS politics or have not reached prominent positions within the party.

Looking at the two most influential East German feminists within the PDS faction in the Bundestag today, they have two characteristics in common. Firstly, both women joined the UFV during democratization and were recruited to the PDS only later. Secondly, they
both had non-redundant ties to the Humboldt group before democratization, which might – hypothetically – have influenced their later recruitment to the PDS. One of the women, Christina Schenk, was a physicist. She participated in an informal inter-disciplinary research group, where she got to know the Dean of Social Sciences. He names her as a personal influence in matters of feminist ideas (Interview D.K.). The other woman, Petra Bläss, was then a doctoral candidate at Humboldt University. Her academic advisor – a woman professor of literature – was a close discussion partner of the Dean of Social Sciences (Interview P.B.). Bläss tells how she herself knew of the Modern Socialism group and had access to some of their papers (ibid.). The two feminists were later individually recruited to the PDS Bundestag group, Bläss later in 1990 after having hosted a television discussion-program and Schenk in 1994 via the Green/Bündnis ’90 coalition faction in the Bundestag (Interviews P.B. and C.S.).

The paths of recruitment of these two top feminists into the PDS stand in stark contrast to the earlier, strong tie, all-male recruitments from the Modern Socialism group. The difference between organizational assignments and parliamentary mandates is also striking. Feminists and westerners are better represented and considerably more influential within the PDS Bundestag faction, whereas former members of the Modern Socialism group, who are all male, have technical and administrative positions within the party organization.

*Heritages of the Social Network Niche*

The informal Modern Socialism group is an interesting example of a social network niche under authoritarian rule. In short, I would like to make four analytical points related to the impact of the group on the PDS reform process. Firstly, several persons affiliated with the Modern Socialism group later became influential political advisors to the PDS. I argue that social network ties were crucial to these recruitments, as well as to the examples of continued informal cooperation. Secondly, of the few women who were more closely affiliated with the group, contributing to its writings, neither one continued on to the PDS. As in the example of the working committee, this development is congruent with the “strength of similarity” model, where gender similarity is an important factor enhancing the probability of informal cooperation.
Thirdly, with democratization, many political ideas of the Modern Socialism group rapidly grew outdated or at least insufficient for the new political situation, and new political ideas had to be developed. Notably, the social network structure outlived these changes in ideas and values. Fourthly, among the discussions of the Humboldt group that spilled over into the PDS was an initial openness to feminist ideas. This is mirrored in the speeches at the extraordinary party conference in December 1989, as well as in the PDS’ first party program of February 1990.

In summary, the impact of the group on the PDS reform process can neither be fully explained by a discursive perspective, focusing on the impact of disembodied discourses, nor can the group’s impact be fully explained as meritocratic recruitment. The social network perspective highlights how social network structures and mechanisms impact on the development and change of organizational cognitions and norms. To the degree that organizational recruitments are based on social network ties, these cognitions, norms and ideas are then channeled into processes of institutional change.

In the sixth section, I shall describe a second similar example. Via intermediaries of trust, the “Hamburg Circle” brought Western feminist ideas into the PDS reform process. However, firstly, in the fifth section, I shall make a breach in the chronology of the narrative with a discussion of the legacies of early social network recruitment. Later in PDS history, an informal “team” could be distinguished in the top echelons of the PDS party organization. The group became more closely forged together as a team, for example, through their actions in protest of a tax authority decision in late 1994. The account of the all-male team is an illustration of the importance of informal structures within organizations and of the “strength of similarity” in the formation and functioning of such structures.

Informal Structures in the PDS

From a social network perspective, one important feature of organizational institutionalization is the emergence and consolidation of intra-organizational informal structures. As discussed in Chapter 2, in the course of organizational entrepreneurship, “inner circles” or
“teams” may be forged, which condition the later functioning of a political party (Duverger 1959/1964). In the case of the PDS, it is possible to distinguish one such team in the context of the federal party government, at least during the two first parliamentary terms, i.e. 1990–1998. Although the PDS federal party government and the parliamentary faction both consisted of roughly 50 percent women, in contrast to the parliamentary faction, the work of the party government was dominated by an all-male “team”. The team members were brought together as a group in the social network-led reform process of the PDS. With the 1998 elections, some of the “team” members entered the Bundestag faction.

I would argue that the existence of “teams” may be important to institutional change in a political party. The PDS “team” is not an intellectual grouping, but rather a small circle of pragmatic functionaries, on whom the more Western-oriented leader of the parliamentary faction, Gregor Gysi, as well as the leading party strategist André Brie rely. Within the PDS, such pragmatic functionaries at both the state and federal levels of the party organization are generally referred to as Macher, i.e. “men of action” or “doers” (Interviews; Land 1997: 33).

One well-initiated analyst suggests that in the complex ideological disputes within the PDS, the determining contradiction is no longer the one between reformers vs. traditional communists, but between a reformism oriented toward the West versus a neo-communist reaction (Land 1997). Generally, the Macher are ideologically undecided and understand themselves primarily as competent problem-solvers – people who “get things done” (ibid.). Still, they tend to see the PDS as the representative of former SED functionaries and of eastern Germans generally, and are prone to support the neo-communist reaction within the party (ibid.).

_Similarity-Interaction_

The “team” at the federal party government level is more readily available for analysis since it is an all-male team. To coin a medical metaphor, the women PDS politicians are the “contrast liquid” which make visible the party government inner circle or team. Notably, similarity interaction seems to have been an important mechanism in
the forging and consolidation of the informal team. Several top women politicians in the PDS claim that women tend to decline nomination to the federal party government because it is dominated by informal structures, which are all-male (Interviews C.G., P.P., Anonymous). The phenomenon of all-male “informal structures” or “men’s circles” in party decision-making and recruitment processes has been debated within PDS feminist forums (Vordenbäumen 1996; Schröter et al. 1996).

Indeed, in the PDS federal party government, male members have tended to stay on longer than have women members. In accordance with the statutory quota, of the 18 members elected to the 1997–1999 party government, half were women. Of the nine women, five were new to the party government, three were in party government since 1995 and only one woman – Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann – had been in party government as early as 1991. In contrast, five of the nine men had become party government members in 1991 or earlier. The four other men included the former Dean of Social Sciences from the Modern Socialism group, a western leftist recruited with the “Hamburg circle”, and the new party treasurer. Through the years, only men had held the functions of party chairman, treasurer and federal party manager. The function of deputy chair had been held only by women.

Some women in the PDS top echelons suggest that this development is a consequence of the “team” in the federal party government (Interviews C.G., P.P., Anonymous). One feminist ironically terms this small inner circle or team the “hunger-strike plenary”. The social network ties uniting the group were further strengthened by their common hunger-strike in protest of a 1994 tax claim on the party (ibid.; Bisky 1995). In itself, this event also appears to be an example of informal, team deliberation and cooperation according to the logic of interpersonal trust.

The hunger-strike was politically important, since it received a substantial amount of media coverage – considered unusual and very valuable by the party (c.f. Die Zeit 1994a; Die Zeit 1994b; The European 1994; compare Statistische Auswertung des Presseausschnittsdienstes PDS 1995–1997; Kopecký 1995; von Beyme 1996; Perkins 1996). The hunger strike staged the PDS as the victim of a “threatening annihilation of a democratic party” (Bisky 1995: 9). Contemporary political commentaries suggested that the tax conflict would have been possible
to resolve in court, and that the PDS may have wished for and provoked the tax trouble in order to unify the party by reinforcing its image as a victim of German unification (Die Zeit 1994b).

Within the PDS, several non-team top politicians were skeptical as to the drastic choice of symbolic action taken – the hunger strike. The chair of the Berlin party organization, Petra Pau, was called on to assist in the first part of the action, but then backed out and instead organized the accompanying party rallies (Interview P.P.). She describes the hunger strike as an important event in the institutional development of the PDS:

I have asked myself many times if the hunger strike was an appropriate thing to do. Does not this form of confrontation lose its value through such an action? On the other hand, for many people inside and outside of the PDS, this was a signal to make up one’s mind about how to deal with the PDS. (Interview P.P., my translation)

The story of the hunger strike team well illustrates both the significance of social network structures and mechanisms to the maintenance and reinterpretation of the institutional logic of appropriateness, and the importance of the social or similarity-interaction aspect of social network cooperation.

### The Hunger-Strike Team

In November 1994, the Berlin tax authorities surprised the SED-successor with a demand for 67 million D-mark in arrears for the first six months of 1990 – assets which the PDS claimed they no longer possessed, since the wealth of the SED had been taken over by the special federal authority Treuhand (Bisky 1995; Zessin et al. 1998: 207–215). This led several PDS politicians and functionaries to go on hunger-strike in protest. The Hunger-strike team included seven persons: the chairman, the treasurer and two ordinary members of the federal party government, the party’s press secretary, the party manager of the Brandenburg parliamentary faction, Heinz Vietze, and the leader of the federal Bundestag faction, Gregor Gysi. When the news of the tax authorities’ claim reached them, the party chairman Lothar Bisky and five other future hunger-strikers were having an informal meeting to discuss party matters:
On November 29, Gregor Gysi, André Brie, Michael Schumann, Heinz Vietze, Dietmar Bartsch and I met in the “Hotel Spree” to discuss some questions of content, which had cropped up as the 4th party conference was approaching. We never got to the point.

Dietmar Bartsch informed us: The existence of the PDS was now in danger, its solvency was challenged. By means of judicial ruling and a tax assessment, it was from now on possible to confiscate the PDS’ election campaign refund as well as everything that the PDS owned. We discussed for a long time, over several hours, how to get out of this situation. (Bisky 1995: 11, my translation)

In protest at the decision of the Berlin tax authorities, the group took an instant decision to go on hunger-strike, starting the following day. Within another day, five well-known PDS women politicians in Bernau and Dresden had joined the hunger-strike (Zessin et al. 1998: 208–209). In Potsdam 16 party members hunger-striked (ibid.). One member of the Berlin “hunger-strike team” claims that almost everyone in the PDS would have been prepared to participate, if asked. How then was it decided who should participate in the central hunger-strike in Berlin?

It was the circle that happened to be meeting in this hotel by the Spree on this evening. We couldn’t say: now we will call together the party government and have a vote on who should participate. You see, when you hunger-strike in cramped spaces, sitting around together day and night, the chemistry must be right. So it’s better that you have a team of men friends than when you put everything together democratically and then the women have to take part in it and you have to have a folding screen. The whole thing becomes an infinite fuss and we didn’t want that. (Interview M.S., my translation)

Towards three o’clock on November 30, the hunger-strike team “squat” the Berlin Treuhand building and the building of the independent commission for the assets of GDR organizations (Zessin et al. 1998: 207). The hunger-strike seems to have been quite an adventure. By nine o’clock the same evening, the PDS hunger-strikers are thrown out by the police. They then move on to the PDS offices in the Berlin city parliament. On the next day, 20 000 PDS sympathizers demonstrate in Berlin (The European Dec. 9–15, 1994). Gregor Gysi and Lothar Bisky make a video recording of themselves to be shown to the demonstrators (Zessin et al. 1998: 207). Late at night, the police
again evacuates the hunger-strikers. The director of the theater \textit{Völksbühne} in eastern Berlin then offers them to continue their hunger-strike there. Interactions seem to have been informal:

We hadn’t eaten anything, but instead had a schnapps, and then we reached an agreement with Frank Castorf, at three in the morning or so, and moved into the \textit{Völksbühne}. (Interview M.S., my translation)

Eventually, on December 7, the Berlin administrative court decides that the taxes will be taken from the SED assets administered by the \textit{Treuhand} and that the PDS will receive its promised state refund for election campaign costs (Zessin et al. 1998: 212). The hunger-strike is then called off.

\textbf{Strengthening Ties}

Although some team members perhaps knew each other before the democratization of the GDR, the men had been brought together as a group only in the PDS (Interviews P.P., C.G., Anonymous). At least one of the seven persons, the treasurer Dietmar Bartsch, joined the PDS party government only in 1991. With the hunger strike, the team seems to have strengthened its interpersonal ties and hence reinforced its capacity for informal cooperation. Party chair Lothar Bisky comments:

Of course I also ask myself the question, what it would have been like with another composition of the group. That is difficult to foresee. I think, that the composition still played an important part, because the mutual acceptance was there. We knew each other a little bit from work, and now we got to know each other more thoroughly, and this is maybe something that can absolutely play a role also in the future. (Bisky 1995: 58, my translation)

In retrospect, has it then indeed proven important to have this common experience? Another member of the hunger-strike team seems to confirm that it has:

We felt at ease. It was… in this circle, we could trash out a lot of things without time-limits. For people who often have no time, this is something pleasant. (Interview M.S., my translation)
One woman PDS politician emphasizes how some of the team members already had a common base in the Brandenburg party organization. Chairman Bisky relies on his “Brandenburger team” Heinz Vietze and Michael Schumann (Interview P.P.). To her, the formation of the informal men’s team at the federal level of the party organization is a result of general social mechanisms:

Though I think it does not only have to do with the hunger strike – that is surely one reason, that they grew more confident there – but really it also has something to do with mechanisms that develop in an organization: self-esteem – and in this case actually men’s circles – how difficult it is to break those things up. (Interview P.P., my translation)

A PDS functionary, originally recruited with the “Hamburg circle”, member of the 1993–1995 federal party government, and responsible for the party’s 1998 western election campaign, has a similar interpretation of the informal team. She comments that the team’s reluctance to include others in informal deliberation and cooperation becomes especially visible in its exclusion of women. She also emphasizes the party’s authoritarian past as an explanation of the closed character of the inner circle:

This group has been forged within the PDS. It has of course left its mark on the group that they have gone through the first difficult years together. All the problems with the party finances and the Stasi problems – there has been one crises after the other, one existential crisis after the next one. This has of course welded the circle tightly together. And that’s why there are of course men’s groups. It is psychologically difficult to break such things up or renew them, to let new people in. (Interview C.G., my translation)

The problem is that that they show so little readiness to include other people, and it is exactly because of that, that it becomes so clear that the crucial people are men. I think that with the exception of Christa Luft, they don’t trust any woman. (Interview C.G., my translation)

In summary, informal structures seem to have emerged during the formation of the party PDS, which influenced the party’s later political development. The social network perspective highlights how informal structures rely on social bases of cooperation. As the “strength of similarity” model outlines, similarity – such as gender similarity – increases the probability of interpersonal deliberation and cooperation,
which in turn may enhance similarity in cognitions and norms, and strengthen the ties of interpersonal trust which make efficient cooperation possible. The example of the hunger strike team demonstrates how informal structures of interpersonal trust may be an important aspect of organizational power-struggles (compare Panebianco 1988).

In the next section, we return to the chronological account of the SED reformation into the PDS. In the extension of the party organization to western Germany, the PDS moved into an unmapped organizational field and had to rely on non-redundant or “weak” ties of interpersonal trust.

**Table 7.2 Chronology of events, 1990**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 4</td>
<td>the new SED-PDS presidium renames party PDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 24/25</td>
<td>the first party conference of the PDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 18</td>
<td>PDS gets 16.4 percent of votes in Volkskammer election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1</td>
<td>Monetary union with West Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 3</td>
<td>German reunification</td>
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**Support for PDS weakens**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 14</td>
<td>PDS gets 11.6 percent of votes in eastern Länder elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2</td>
<td>PDS gets 2.4 percent of votes in federal elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11.1 percent in the new, eastern Bundesländer)</td>
</tr>
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**Reaching West**

With the unification of the two Germanys in 1990, the PDS had to extend their organization to the Western Bundesländer (See Table 2). Because of ideological differences and because of the limited possibilities to control an existing organization, the PDS did not want to cooperate with the West German communist party DKP (compare Bortfeldt 1992: 216–230; Moreau 1992: 182–224). Still, since the East Germans in the PDS lacked Western experience, it was necessary for them to rely on Westerners in building up a new party
organization in the West. The PDS needed not only Western candidates to place on electoral lists, but above all, they needed Western know-how and guidance in the new political landscape; advisors to council them on the democratic rules of the game; and modern leftist ideas with which to create a political profile suitable for democratic elections.

The PDS knew that they would initially be very dependent on their chosen Western partners to help them interpret the Western political scene, and choose and implement a strategy for expanding westwards. With the first federal democratic elections coming up in September 1990, the PDS was under considerable time pressure. How did the party recruit Westerners?

The run among various Western leftist groups and initiatives to become the partners of the PDS gave rise to a fair amount of turmoil (Bortfeldt 1992: 216–230; Moreau 1992: 182–224). I argue that the victors emerging from this competition were elected not only on ideological grounds, nor primarily because they were well-known leftists who would gain many west German votes, but on the basis of interpersonal trust. Once recruited, these individuals were in a position to promote their own political agenda within the PDS, including the demand for a 50 percent quota for women (compare Moreau 1992: 205–206).

The Logic of Interpersonal Trust

Formulating the same argument in theoretical terms, I would argue that the Western extension of the PDS can be better described within the framework of a social network model of action, than within models of appropriate or consequential action (Chapter 4). According to the proposed model of social network action, organizational action builds on a logic of interpersonal trust and is based on the questions: “Whom do I trust?” “What do they say?” and “Can we cooperate on that?”. In their expansion to the West German political arena, the PDS recruited candidates and advisors through pre-existing ties of interpersonal trust. These persons were then in a position to influence PDS policy.

As discussed in earlier chapters, the model of consequential – or rational-purposive – action expects organizational action to be based on the questions: “What are my alternatives?” “What are my values?”
and “What are the consequences of my alternatives for my values?”. Assuming that the primary “value” of the PDS was to maximize the party’s votes, which political alternatives would appeal to voters? Especially in the West German political arena, the PDS’ leadership had very little knowledge of the potential electoral consequences of various political alternatives. Instead, I argue, they relied on trusted Westerners for advice and cooperation.

Neither would a logic of appropriateness suffice to describe the trajectory of the PDS’ Western expansion. According to the normative new institutionalist logic of appropriateness, organizational action is based on the questions: “What kind of situation is this?” “Who am I?” and “How appropriate are different actions for me in this situation?” (March and Olsen 1989). In the development of the PDS, Western feminists succeeded in influencing PDS policy precisely by arguing that feminist reform was “appropriate” for a modern leftist party.

The “Hamburg Circle”

As it turns out, the lion’s share of the West Germans today in the top echelons of the PDS entered the organization in one unrepeated social network recruitment in 1990. A leading reformer of the West German Communist Party, who strategically stepped out of the DKP in January 1990, mediated this recruitment. The DKP reformer brought with him a number of less well-known West German leftists. Most of these other Westerners came from a number of various other leftist groups less ideologically tainted than the Moscow-oriented DKP. Some were politicians and activists working as far removed from the DKP as the Greens. Others were part of small leftist organizations such as the Kommunistischer Bund. Several persons who entered the PDS via their social network connections with the DKP-reformer were younger women who had never been DKP members.

Although these people were not all from Hamburg, I choose to call them the “Hamburg circle”. The “Hamburg circle” was not a group in any formal sense, but an informal circle, drawn together for the occasion by the DKP reformer and his wife. The informal circle drawn together by the DKP reformer should not be confused with other Hamburg leftists who have later tried to gain access to the PDS (von Ditfurth 1998: 259–267).
The informal circle around the DKP-reformer managed to respond very swiftly to the changes in East Germany. Did they know each other before? The DKP-reformer himself answers:

Yes, we all knew each other. As it happens, it all began in my apartment in Hamburg [laughs]. We all knew each other – I mean the political scene is not so enormous that these 50,000 leftists…. So, it was speakers of various leftist groups. We all knew each other personally and we knew roughly what to think of each other. (Interview W.G., my translation)

The DKP-reformer describes his own role in the recruitment as someone the new PDS leadership could trust. He was familiar with the SED and with the East:

I think that I with my person built something like a bridge for trust. I knew the old SED very well. They knew me very well. I had earlier openly fought for a change in the DKP. That was a bridge of confidence that was necessary. [...] That was one of the reasons I did it. I thought it was necessary to have a person who got accepted in the East and could make himself understood in the West. (Interview W.G., my translation)

This “bridge of confidence” between the DKP-reformer and the PDS leadership went in particular over his personal friendship with the SED-reformer Hans Modrow, now the honorary chairman of the PDS. The two men had been able to meet during the ’80s when the cities of Hamburg and Dresden, where Modrow was party secretary, initiated a twin-town exchange. Modrow in turn had the confidence of the new generation of PDS leadership, who, compared to Modrow, were biographically and ideologically an additional step further distanced from the old SED.

The DKP reformer tells:

Yes, Modrow. I knew Hans Modrow. Of the present PDS leadership most were unknown to me. They were swept to the top by the events of 1989. I knew Hans Modrow. Modrow and I were brought together in the eighties in the twinning of Hamburg and Dresden. [...] Gysi and those folks I didn’t know yet at that time. (Interview W.G., my translation)

The DKP-reformer organized a series of discussions in the old Bundesländer, where the PDS leadership could meet Western leftists, including non-DKP activists (Interview J.B.). One of the younger women today in the PDS describes the meetings:
Wolfgang [the DKP reformer] was together with his wife Christiane, the one who very strongly organized it. Since I for example, or people from my organization, had no relation whatsoever to the East and had always rejected the GDR. (Interview C.G., my translation)

In summary, the recruitment of the Hamburg group can be described with a metaphor of a chain being formed into a circle, or with connecting the far ends of a network, where the DKP-reformer was a crucial linking pin. Through Hans Modrow’s trustful tie with the DKP-reformer, the new SED-PDS leadership was brought together with the West German women leftists, who carried a feminist agenda.

*The Heritage of Early Networking*

Heading into the third legislative period after the 1990 democratization, it is possible to observe the long-run fall-out of this network-led recruitment. Westerners recruited with the Hamburg group have had a higher propensity than other Westerners to stay in the PDS and they have reached higher positions (compare for example von Ditfurth 1998). About half of the Western Bundestag delegates in the first two legislative periods; almost all of the Western representatives in the party executive during the party’s first six formative years; the top Western person in the crew planning both the 1994 and the 1998 election campaigns; as well as the party’s press spokesman in Bonn, were all part of the same Hamburg circle.

During the first years of the PDS, these Westerners made important imprints on the party’s program. Although they were politically active not primarily as feminists, the Western women recruited via the DKP-reformer all carried a feminist agenda. Especially during the first formative years of the PDS, they were very active in making the PDS adopt Western feminist positions into the party program and a 50 percent quota for women in the party statute. The PDS’ feminist program today has striking similarities to the positions of the German Greens, although the PDS positions tend to be slightly more radical (Gerner 1994: 240–241; Betz and Welsh 1995).
Eastern Feminists Marginalized

Persons affiliated with the Modern Socialism group and the “Hamburg circle” gained access to the PDS reform process via social network ties and have tended to stay on in the top echelons of party power. In contrast to this, I shall briefly describe two women’s initiatives which did not gain ground within the PDS. The independent women’s association UFV lacked institutional resources and was soon marginalized in the political process. The women’s group LISA has not gained the leverage on party decision-making that they aimed for.

Firstly, as mentioned, a member affiliated with the Modern Socialism group chose to launch a feminist initiative instead of cooperating further with the rest of the group (Merkel 1989a; 1990). On December 3, the Independent Women’s Organization (Unabhängiger Frauen Verband) was formed. Ina Merkel, who had been working and writing together with the Modern Socialism group during 1989, organized the first UFV convention, drafted its program and became its spokeswoman (compare Hampele 1992; 1993b; Unabhängiger Frauenverband der DDR 1990). The UFV participated in the Round Table talks for democracy and had a minister in the Modrow government, but like other social movements, it was marginalized with the advent of parliamentary democracy (see Chapter 6). The UFV gained 2 percent of the East German vote in the first democratic elections in March 1990.

Secondly, overlapping with the UFV, a women’s initiative formed within the SED. The group LISA was drawn together by, among others, Ewa Maleck-Lewy, who was deputy chair of the working committee planning the SED extraordinary conference (Interview E.M-L.). LISA activity had already started up during the autumn of 1989, and the group was formally constituted in late spring 1990. At the extraordinary party conference in December 1989, the group presented a special program on women’s questions (Interview Anonymous). LISA tried to influence the PDS party leadership to support a quota for women, but did not succeed in making the party formally adopt a quota. Open distrust marked the relationship of LISA with the party leadership (See LISA 1990). On the initiative of the PDS chairman, one LISA member was elected deputy chair of the party (Interview). However, in this position, she experienced that she did not have access to informal decision-making and communication, learning of important
party decisions at press conferences (ibid.). Another LISA member, who was also elected deputy party chair, later became the personal assistant of Gregor Gysi in Bundestag, but is no longer active in LISA.

During the first years of the PDS, many East German women, several of them LISA feminists, left their positions in the party government or left the party altogether (Schröter et al. 1996). One LISA member explains the exit of the Berliner feminist academics with problems of interpersonal cooperation:

Many [of the Berlin feminists] then left the PDS, out of disappointment or out of the most different reasons. At that time, it also played an important role who personally got along well with whom. The personal relationships there, i.e. with André Brie and Gregor Gysi: whoever couldn’t work with them also withdrew. (Interview Anonymous, my translation)

The same LISA feminist comments that with time, the personal relationship to the federal party leadership has grown less important. Instead, the individual party career increasingly depends on who has made a name for themselves in state politics, in the regional Länder parliaments.

### Western Feminists Recruited

The PDS’ quota decision was not taken until the Western feminists of the “Hamburg circle”, through bridges of interpersonal trust, had reached access to the top echelons of party decision-making. The women from the “Hamburg circle” succeeded in persuading the party leadership that quotation would be a wise decision. These Western feminists came to have considerable influence over PDS politics. In the second PDS Bundestag faction of 1994–1998, three of four Western women were originally from the “Hamburg circle”.

To the October 1990 Bundestag elections, West Germans were nominated on a specially designed West-East ticket; the Linke Liste/PDS. A member of the LISA program commission criticizes the informal procedure:

The manner in which the Linke Liste/PDS has come about must be described as deeply undemocratic. At the congress in Köln, while the “foot-soldiers” from East and West were intensively discussing political
content, a narrow circle of persons behind closed doors discussed the evidently more important things. Comrades of the Central Coordinating Council of “Lisa” remained locked out from these talks. Marlies Deneke (“by the way” deputy party chair) and Christel Wietusch (“by the way” member of the party government, and present in Köln) were only afterwards taken into the advisory board of the Linke Liste – and evidently because in connection with West German leftists, the quota is suddenly indispensable and formally interpreted. (Herbst 1990: 3–4, my translation)

The Appropriateness of the Quota

Despite the fact that eastern feminists within the PDS had been discussing a quota ever since the autumn of 1989, the PDS leadership at first resisted this idea. An eastern Lisa member and deputy party chair tells how the Western feminists argued for the quota:

We were told that “If the party doesn’t [adopt a quota], then it isn’t feminist. And if it isn’t feminist, it won’t be accepted in the West as a new left party.” And we all thought “Oh goodness!”. We were not stupid, but we didn’t know a thing about that. We clung on to new things at once and hoped to get somewhere. (Interview Anonymous, my translation)

Another Lisa member explains how the early PDS was in search of a new political profile:

We didn’t have an identity, not a real one. We began to collect everything that seemed leftist, that seemed modern, as on a vendor’s tray [–]. The modern women’s movement demanded a quota, we sought a new identity and adopted ideas from the women’s movement and the quota was top priority. (Interview B.B., my translation)

In response to this search for appropriate action, the women from the “Hamburg circle” succeeded in persuading the PDS leadership that the party would make a better impression on the Western political arena if it adopted Western feminist positions and a quota. The DKP reformer describes how the party leader Gregor Gysi was persuaded to support the quota:

[The quota] was something modern. Gysi is an attorney. Whether it’s a client or a party – Gregor Gysi has always understood himself as the attorney of this party. (Interview W.G., my translation)
Party Formation versus Institutionalization

In the genesis, or formative phase of a political party, leaders generally have a broader freedom of movement (Panebianco 1988: 20). Additionally, in a situation of acute social stress – such as the democratization of the GDR – party leaders tend to acquire “situational charisma” (Panebianco 1988: 52). In the case of the PDS, the party leadership and the charismatic party leader Gysi enjoyed an unchallenged authority within the party during its first years (Interview C.G.). During the formative phase, the federal party leadership had a stronger hold on the state party organizations.

For example, both in 1990 and 1994 federal elections, the party election manager in Berlin cleared the top nominations of each state party organization to the federal elections (Interview election manager A.B.). This meant that the central party leadership could secure the implementation of the quota. Only in the nominations to the 1998 elections did the Länder organizations grow more independent in their decisions concerning nominations (Interviews A.B. and C.S.).

With the growing institutionalization of the party, the central party leadership has less freedom of movement (Panebianco 1988: 20; Dietzel et al. 1997). Initially, the 50 percent quota for women had been run down as “Western feminism” (Interview D.E.). However, by 1998, the Länder party organizations had been subject to the quota for almost eight years, and the majority of PDS factions in state parliaments were headed by women. At the state level, several women, some of whom have a background within the SED youth organization FDJ, have acquired a regional basis of power within the party. In the year 2000, the PDS elected one of these women – Gabi Zimmer – as party chair after Lothar Bisky.

In summary, the early decisions of the powerful party leadership during the formative phase of the PDS seem to have been crucial to the high proportion of women in the top echelons of the PDS today. In other words, the “crucial political choices made by its founding fathers” have left “an indelible mark” on the party (Panebianco 1988: xiii). One woman from the “Hamburg circle”, comments:

Feminism has developed better within the PDS because there were certain groups in the leadership who – in my opinion – have made the right decisions, but of course in a somewhat avant-garde manner. I think that
many people have gone along with feminism because of that. This is of course not a democratic process. (Interview C.G., my translation)

Interestingly, the original promise of the PDS turn to feminism – that the party would reach acceptance in the West as a modern new left party – cannot be said to have been fulfilled. Feminist members of parliament complain that Western women’s organizations still refuse official cooperation with the post-communist party (Interview P.B.). In the Western Bundesländer, only 19 percent of party members are women (Schenk 1996: 42; Interview Western election manager C.G.). As mentioned, the PDS has the support of little more than one percent of the voters in the old Bundesländer.

Conclusions

The reformation of the SED into the PDS can be analyzed as a process of social network entrepreneurship, guided by the logic of interpersonal trust (Chapter 4). Examples of pre-existing social network ties that proved relevant for the course of institutional reform include friendships formed in the SED youth organization FDJ; ties of interpersonal trust among the members and affiliates of the project “Modern Socialism”; and the familiarity and social network ties among some West German leftists who then assembled for the occasion in the “Hamburg circle”.

These networks were coupled together with the help of crucial intermediaries of trust, such as, amongst others, the well-known SED-reformer Hans Modrow. The role of Modrow and other intermediaries of trust were not, however, necessarily that of an architect. The reform process, I claim, cannot reasonably have been possible to plan to any greater extent. Neither was it a social movement, open to any inclined participant. Instead, the process was based on a combination of pre-existing ties of interpersonal trust as well as on the emergent formation of new social network ties, facilitated by intermediaries of trust.

The social basis of social network interaction was illustrated by several examples of the “strength of similarity” (Chapter 5). Interestingly, throughout the social network-led SED-PDS reform process, women tended not to be drawn into informal deliberations and coop-
eration. Still, the PDS came to adopt a statutory 50 percent quota for women.

I suggest how the feminist turn of the PDS can be modeled as a “garbage-can” decision (Chapter 4). Despite the tendency to similarity-interaction, via intermediaries of trust, “different” persons and ideas were channeled into the reform process as non-redundant resources. The Western leftists were recruited to contribute with much-needed know-how on Western politics, and then influenced the party with feminist ideas. Hence, the problem of SED reform was surprisingly coupled with the solution of Western feminism.

The pressures from the new democratic organizational environment forced the SED to reform, but did not determine the particular path of how the SED heritage was changed, adapted or reinterpreted. The reform process relied on pre-existing social network ties, as well as on social network restructuring, which was enabled by intermediaries of trust but conditioned by the “strength of similarity”. The important role of social network structures and mechanisms shows the inefficient and contingent character of institutional change.
CHAPTER 8

Conclusions

Action, as distinguished from fabrication, is never possible in isolation; to be isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to act. Action and speech need the surrounding presence of others no less than fabrication needs the surrounding presence of nature for its material, and of a world in which to place the finished product. Fabrication is surrounded by and in constant contact with the world: action and speech are surrounded by and in constant contact with the web of the acts and words of other men.

Hannah Arendt (1958) *The Human Condition*, p. 188.

In this book, I have argued and illustrated how social networks and social rationales of networking matter to the organization of politics. According to the proposed model of social network agency, when institutional frameworks are weakened, individual actors turn to those persons they know and trust, deliberate matters with them, and join in collective action. While the institutional environment – economic, social and political forces – may pressure an organization to change, it is a limited number of specific individuals who together interpret these demands and through their agency determine how institutions change. In other words, while the de-institutionalization of an institutionalized organization is likely to require a major shift in the environment, agency is necessary for change to occur (Sztompka 1993: 191–201).

In this study, the agency necessary for institutional change has been located to social network cooperation, made possible by interpersonal trust and capable of reflection, purpose, promotion and innovation.

In relation to political science new institutionalism, the social network perspective offers an answer to how institutional scripts or
logics of appropriateness are produced, maintained and changed (Tolbert and Zucker 1996: 180). In relation to new economic institutionalism (NEI), the social network perspective offers an answer to how rationality and institutional adaptation to the environment are bounded (ibid.: 186–187, footnote 10). In contrast to any pending “balkanization” of the field of organization studies, the proposed model of social network agency should be compatible with both cultural and calculus ontologies (compare March 1996; Dowding 1994). To both lines of new institutionalist theory, the social network approach suggests a third level of analysis, in-between the individual actor and the institutional structure. Crucially, the proposed social network model of action is characterized by an inter-subjective dimension: interpersonal deliberation and cooperation based on interpersonal trust.

Overview

In this last, concluding chapter, I shall firstly discuss the implications of the proposed framework of analysis on research. Based on the proposed social network models, I generate some suggestions for research questions. This is mainly a restatement of points made in earlier chapters.

In the second section of this rather short chapter, I then turn to the relationship between the social network perspective and normative political theory. I argue that the communicative power that may spring from trustful interpersonal cooperation should make social network perspectives relevant to discussions of deliberative democracy, as well as of the relationship between democracy and trust. This venture into less well-known waters should be seen as an exploration. I do not pretend to draw any definite map of the relationship between the social network approach and normative democratic theory.

Methodological Implications

How then can institutional change be studied from a social network perspective? Does it not all boil down to narrative? Indeed, a distinctive methodological implication of the proposed approach is to ask questions that are often associated with narrative rather than
generalization, namely questions of “who”: Who knew whom? Who recruited, conferred with, and cooperated with whom? Where did they meet? Which norms and cognitions, problems, solutions and paradigms did they carry into the process? Where are they in the organization today?

When posed from the social network perspective outlined in this study, however, these questions are based on well-defined theoretical assumptions and hypotheses. The assumed importance of particular patterns of communication and cooperation among specific individuals demand that studies be qualitative and detailed. Based on the assumption that social network ties matter, the social network approach offers an explanation as to why institutional change takes one path or trajectory rather than another.

Retracing institutional history with the help of the tool-kit of the social network approach contrasts with efforts to retrace institutional change through changes in ideas, policies and discourses, or changes in routines or in the formal institutional structure. A basic assumption of the approach is that ideas, utilities, tastes, values, goals, interpretations of the environment as well as organizational decisions are likely to be conditioned by social network processes of deliberation, cooperation and mobilization of resources (Chapter 4). As a structure, ties of interpersonal trust are assumed be the most relevant ecological context of action, potentially outliving both formal rules and policy fads (compare March 1996). Rather than the standard operation procedures or other institutionalized features of organization, the “genes” of institutional evolution are assumed to be the social networks which initiate and support them.

When is the approach relevant? As discussed in earlier chapters, social network structures and mechanisms should be most influential in a de-institutionalized situation and in formative phases of organizational development. Although social network recruitment is common in many contexts (Granovetter 1974/1995; Burt 1998), ostensibly, when recruitment processes are less formalized – such as in a process of organizational entrepreneurship – social network-led recruitment should be even more likely (Burt 2000). Secondly, although social network processes may also be important where formalized processes of decision-making exist, deliberation with trusted others should be most indispensable when formal frameworks are lacking, when there
is time-pressure and in the face of organizational uncertainty. Generally, information acquired from trusted others is perceived to be of a higher quality than other information. Likewise, where institutionalized forms of cooperation are lacking, ties of interpersonal trust are likely to coordinate actions.

I have argued that the current restructuring of politics and economics due to new information technologies, globalization and administrative decentralization may be giving rise to more fluid forms of organization as well as to inter-organizational coordination in the form of emergent networks (Chapters 1 and 3). In these respects, contemporary politics may be tending towards a state of permanent de-institutionalization, which, I argue, may hypothetically give social network structures and mechanisms increased importance.

Which research questions does the proposed framework generate? Below, I briefly suggest three broad fields of research where the approach should be relevant. I try to motivate how the social network perspective may be relevant to studies of public administration and “governance”, to organizational studies, and to political leadership and change in post-communist as well as information age polities.

**Retracing Governance**

Firstly, the social network approach directs our attention to the origins of social network ties, to the re-structuring of social networks through intermediaries of trust, and to the access of social networks to institutional resources. While general theories fail to specify the mechanisms through which institutional change occurs and cannot predict its pattern, the social network approach expects institutional change to take an unpredictable and contingent path, resting both on tighter circles of social network cooperation and on the mobilization of non-redundant resources through non-redundant or “weak” social network ties.

For example, studying the effects of deregulation and reorganization of local public administration, in addition to the mapping of shifting forms of formal organization, we may choose to retrace social network cooperation. How have new organizations been created? How have patterns of inter-organizational cooperation evolved? With the trend in local administration to decentralization, semi-autonomous public
enterprises and more involvement of voluntary organizations, links to actors outside of the town hall become increasingly important (Bogason 1998). Theoretically, this organizational fragmentation may leave more room for social network initiatives and cooperation.

Another example of a context where the social network approach may be put to the test is the growing literature on EU governance. As Risse-Kappen notes, a necessary condition for the ongoing integration process is communicative action (Risse-Kappen 1996; Risse 1999, 2000). From a social network perspective, we may ask to what extent this communicative action relies on the logic of interpersonal trust, i.e. deliberation, persuasion and cooperation among specific individuals who are trusted.

According to the new governance agenda, the EU is evolving into a “system of multi-level, non-hierarchical, deliberative and apolitical governance, via a complex web of public/private networks and quasi-autonomous executive agencies” (Hix 1998: 54). EU policy-making is an emergent process among multiple actors with changing preferences, involving informal contacts and “constant deliberation and cooperation”, leading to complex and uncertain outcomes (ibid.: 39–40, 48). In this context, from a social network perspective, we may ask to what extent possibilities of cooperation and collective action depend on established ties of interpersonal trust. In comparison with traditional rational as well as non-rational institutionalist approaches, the social network approach introduces an additional level of analysis, namely that of the social network (compare Aspinwall and Schneider 2000: 26).

**Similarity and Flexibility**

As emphasized, the social network approach highlights the interdependence of instrumental and social rationales of networking. The “strength of similarity” model suggests that individuals tend to forge social network ties not only on the basis of structural opportunity and resource-dependence, but also on the basis of perceived as well as aspired social similarity (Chapter 5). Rather than being a realistic model, in its extrapolated form, the “strength of similarity” is an abstract ideal-type that can be put to interpretative use. If the tendency to similarity-interaction were unambiguous, and if it would not be counter-acted by formal organizational structure, resource-interdependence, and
sources of socialization and information other than the logic of interpersonal trust, then norms and cognitions would converge in local groups and diverge between groups (compare Axelrod 1997).

Which research questions does the “strength of similarity” model pose? For example, inside an organization where co-workers are allowed to organize their projects freely, the “strength of similarity” may help to explain local convergence and global polarization in the emergent informal structure. In contemporary more fluid and informal forms of organization, the “strength of similarity” may help to explain the limits to efficiency inherent in the logic of interpersonal trust. Although interpersonal trust may enable actors to cooperate efficiently, the “strength of similarity” may potentially limit variance, leading to inflexibility and dysfunctionalism.

From Leaders to Teams

Thirdly, applying a social network approach to organizations, we may gain a different perspective on political leadership. According to political party theory, new organizations are likely to be dominated by a charismatic party leader (Panebianco 1988). In the context of the new democracies of East and Central Europe, this has directed attention to “individual preferences, styles of behavior, personal history and the particular sequence of events” (Lewis 1994: 397). “Subjectivity”, it is argued, “may be just as important as the grand questions of political, economic and social change” (ibid.).

The social network approach offers a possibility to theorize on the role of political leaders and the structural sources of their subjectivity. In classic accounts, “The History of the World...was the Biography of Great Men” (Thomas Carlyle, quoted in Sztompka 1993: 263). According to the counter-argument, neither heroic determinism nor social determinism decides history (Sztompka 1993: 259–273). To become a prophet, there must be a heroic moment and there must be believers (ibid.: 267–268). Selective social mechanisms elevate some individuals to the status of “heroes” or leaders (ibid.). In this vein, we may choose to study charismatic leadership as a component of social network entrepreneurship, conditioned by the “team” behind the leader.

For example, regarding a new political leader in a de-institutionalized political system, such as, say, president Vladimir Putin of the Russian
Federation, we may want to know more about his subjective views on the one hand, and on the other about which social and political forces in society that have made his advent possible. Apart from this, however, we might ask if smaller circles of interpersonal trust may have paved the way for this new leader. This, I argue, might perhaps tell us more about the streams of problems and solutions, norms, cognitions and world-views that enter into the policy-making process of the new leadership.

In Chapter 2, I argued that the current trend toward professional-electoral political parties is strongest in the new post-communist polities, but that it also affects the inner dynamics of traditional, institutionalized political parties in Western democracies (Padgett 1996; Mair 1997; Kopecký 1995; von Beyme 1996; Perkins 1996). In the information society, political initiative may be shifting into the hands of smaller numbers of politicians and functionaries at the central level of party organizations, who organize election campaigns and decide the party's media image. A not-too-bold conjecture would be that this may also make Western party organizations more amenable to social network analysis.

In concert with political new institutionalism, the social network approach assumes history to be “inefficient” (March and Olsen 1989, 1995: 39–43, 1998). Competitive selection of institutions, as well as institutional processes of adaptation, are weak and inefficient. Institutional history is not fully determined by environmental constraints (ibid.). Here, the social network approach emphasizes that historical change should be studied as a distinctly human product (Sztompka 1993: 191–201). Centrally, it is argued that human agency is likely to be conditioned by social network interactions, based on the logic of interpersonal trust.

The Politics of Social Networks

In this book, I have had an interpretative ambition to try to further our understanding of how social networks matter to politics. However, on the basis of the contrived framework of analysis, it should also be possible to adopt a more critical perspective, discussing issues of power and democracy.
In their volume on *Democratic Governance*, March and Olsen criticize the democratic pessimism and lack of confidence in modernity and enlightenment that characterizes many accounts of today’s democracies (1995: 1–6). They see this pessimism to derive in part from contemporary thinking about institutions in terms of exchange metaphors, assuming both citizens and governors to be but self-interested individualists (ibid.; compare Mansbridge 1990a). In response, they launch an – admittedly romantic – vision of governance that is “honorable, just, and effective”, and which relies on the integrative rather than the aggregative capacity of institutions (March and Olsen 1995: 6).

The argument launched in this book – that social networks matter to the organization of politics – can be read as an empirical critique, clarifying some real-life complications in fulfilling democratic ideals. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the findings of social network studies should be relevant as empirical premises for the ongoing lively debates of, for example, deliberative democracy, democracy and difference, as well as discussions of trust and democracy. In these last few pages, I shall pick up some threads from these debates and try to tie them to the proposed social network approach, firstly discussing the deliberative component of social network agency, and then the issue of trust raised by the logic of interpersonal trust.

Firstly, I discuss Hannah Arendt’s normative concept of communicative power, which has some affinities with, but is far from equitable with the proposed model of social network agency. According to the proposed model – the logic of interpersonal trust (Chapter 4) – actors turn to other individuals whom they trust, deliberate with them, pool resources and cooperate. In contrast to the concept of communicative action, the logic of interpersonal trust does not preclude, for example, strategic action (compare Carleheden 1996: 37–73). In real life, communicative power and other forms and exercises of power, such as what Arendt terms “violence”, often appear together (Arendt 1969: 69). Furthermore, in contrast to the deliberative democratic ideal, social network deliberations are not open and inclusive, but delimited by structures of interpersonal trust.

In the last section, a parallel argument is made regarding the relationship between democracy and trust. In contrast to current discussions of democracy and trust, I claim that it should be of interest to study structures of interpersonal trust among specific individuals,
which have actually had a direct and observable impact on political organization. Ostensibly, more empirical inquiry would reveal the complex and multifaceted normative democratic aspects of how, in social network agency, communicative power may be intertwined with other forms of power.

Communicative Power vs. Deliberative Democracy

The social network perspective highlights a source or aspect of power that is often overlooked in contemporary political science, namely communicative power. According to Hannah Arendt, power is not just the ability to act, but the ability to deliberate, agree and cooperate: “Power springs up whenever people get together and act in concert” (Arendt 1969: 68; Benhabib 1992). The concept of communicative power contrasts with notions of power as violence or force, found for example in the writings of C. Wright Mills, Max Weber and Marx (Arendt 1969: 59–60; Habermas 1977: 75–76). While “violence” is the capacity to “assert my own will against the resistance” of others (Weber quoted in Arendt 1969: 60), communicative power lies in voluntary agreement. Hence, according to Arendt, power can never be the property of an individual, but is the property of a group and exists only as long as the group keeps together (1969: 64).

Jürgen Habermas’ well-known ideal of deliberative democracy seeks to institutionalize the generation of communicative power by combining republican visions of democracy, such as Hannah Arendt’s, with a liberal constitutional framework (Habermas 1992, 1996a, 1996b: 277–292; Carlehedén 1996: 91–135). Informal and spontaneous processes of opinion-forming in civil society and the public sphere should be drawn into parliamentary fora, laying the ground for legitimate legislative decisions (Habermas 1992: 373–374). In the deliberative democratic model, competitive democracy supplies a formal procedure for the deliberative processes where communicative power is created (Habermas 1992: 429–432).

Deliberative politics gain their legitimacy from the quality of public debate, which should in turn rely on opinions formed in multiple informal contexts in a de-centered society (Habermas 1992: 362, 373, note 26; Fraser 1992). Democratic institutions should be an arena
where the initiatives, perceptions and identifications emanating from the associations of civil society can be integrated by means of reasoned, open and inclusive deliberation regarding the common good (Habermas 1996b: 288–292). In line with enlightenment ideals, deliberations in parliament and in the public sphere achieve something other than a simple aggregation of interests. Deliberations should be “without subject”, relying on “upgraded inter-subjectivity”, where the better argument should prevail (ibid., my translation).

The Deliberative Ideal vs. Social Identity

In Habermas’ development on Arendt’s work, the salience of relationships with specific other individuals seems to have been lost on the way. While, according to the critique, Habermas’ individuals seem to participate in the public sphere as speakers and readers, in contrast, in Arendt’s work, the individual construction of subjectivity is located within a “web of human relationships” (Landes 1995: 99–101; Arendt 1958: 183–184). To Arendt, the political realm arises out of acting together, “sharing words and deeds”, which in turn produces relationships that bind people together (Arendt 1958: 198).

The feminist critique has used Arendt’s work to highlight several points where empirical reality is likely to fall short of the ideal of deliberative democracy and/or where the ideal may be insufficient for making injustices visible (Benhabib 1996; Young 1996; Fraser 1992). Centrally, the deliberative democratic model does not take the salience of processes of social identity into account. Public spheres are not only arenas of rational deliberation, but of the formation and enactment of social identities (ibid.). Furthermore, deliberation may require some degree of initial understanding or trust (Warren 1999a: 14–16), which may in turn be based on social identity. These claims lead to questions on the one hand of the relative power and institutional resources of competing and co-existing communities (Fraser 1992: 120), and on the other of access to and membership of powerful informal value-defining, meaning-generating communities (Frazer and Lacey 142–149).

The idea that our democratic agency is limited and enabled by the “web of human relationships” should direct our attention toward how this structure is formed and sustained. According to the “strength of similarity” argument made in Chapter 5, the structuration of social
networks is contingent on structural opportunity as well as perceived and aspired social similarity, such as, for example, gender identity. Confronted with the deliberative ideal of democracy, the findings of social network studies may form the basis of a normative critique of actual democratic processes.

Real Social Networks

The social network perspective highlights how interpersonal ties to specific, trusted others matter to politics. Deliberations and consensus-making are facilitated by structures of interpersonal trust, enabling efficient and powerful agency. In recent years, trust has received renewed interest from sociologists and economists as a “soft” factor of social coordination. Concurrently, among political theorists, the relationship of democracy and trust is moving into the center of debate (Warren (ed.) 1999; Seubert 2000; Putnam 2000). Most well-known is perhaps the contribution of Robert Putnam on the topic. Below, I shall briefly list three points of contention regarding his approach and relate these discussions to the type of social network approach outlined in the present study.

In Robert Putnam’s influential account, social capital – i.e. interpersonal trust and norms of reciprocity – is a normative concept, closely related to “civic virtue”, and the “conceptual cousin” of “community” (Putnam 2000: 19, 21). Although Putnam does acknowledge that social capital may have a “dark side”, this is taken to be the exception rather than the rule. Statistically, he emphasizes, membership in civil associations is correlated with a greater tolerance of racial integration, civil liberties and gender equality (ibid.: 350–363). According to Putnam, social capital is what makes democracy work (Putnam 1993; 1995; 2000). In the eyes of Putnam’s critics, he has a romanticized view of community and overlooks how social networks may block innovation, reinforce traditionalism and localism and be resistant to change (Levi 1996).

In contrast, in most discussions of social networks within organizational studies, the social network metaphor is empirical rather than normative. Likewise, the model of social network agency proposed in this book – the logic of interpersonal trust – is intended as an empirical generalization. We cannot a priori assume all aspects of social networks
to be virtuous. Real social networks may be potentially conducive to democracy, but may also delimit democracy. The complexity of the relationship between social network agency and democratic norms may be just what should make social networks an important topic for further study.

Interpersonal Trust and Democracy

Secondly, there is the question of which social networks are relevant for study. According to Putnam, face-to-face interpersonal relations amongst members of voluntary associations such as soccer clubs, bowling leagues, choral groups and bird-watching societies is linked to high quality government performance (1993; 1995; 2000). However, the exact linking mechanisms between civic engagement and government performance are a cause of analytical concern (Levi 1996; Cohen 1999). In this context, I would agree with Levi that it should be worthwhile to take a closer look at the origin, maintenance and effects of social capital. This should perhaps be done, I argue, by starting at the other end, retracing the origins of social network ties that have actually had a concrete impact on the organization of political institutions. Notably, Putnam’s approach also excludes from analysis social networks that have origins outside of formally constituted voluntary associations (Cohen 1999: 226). Still, such networks may be empirically important.

Putnam’s choice of object of study rests on the assumption that soccer clubs and bowling leagues promote not only interpersonal but generalized trust, which in turn makes democracy work. However, both parts of this argument can of course be discussed. Does interpersonal trust always translate into generalized trust? According to one line of critique, communities may be the basis of particularized rather than generalized trust, i.e. trust based on race, ethnicity, lifestyle or religion (Warren 1999a: 8–12; 1999b; 1999c: 356–357).

More relevant for our present concerns is the second part of the argument: does generalized trust really make democracy work? Several authors criticize Putnam from a perspective closer to the deliberative democratic ideal, emphasizing the importance of a liberal democratic framework. Inverting causality, Cohen argues that it is legal and political institutions which make a vivacious flora of voluntary associations possible (Warren 1999a: 12–14; Cohen 1999). In a modern social
structure, it is not primarily interpersonal encounters in bowling leagues that promote society-wide general trust, but legal norms of procedural fairness, impartiality and justice (Cohen 1999: 222). This point is congruent with the claim that former communist societies are now plagued by “endemic distrust” at all levels of society (Sztompka 1998).

This book, however, has bypassed these discussions in favor of a quite different take on how trust may relate to political organization. The social network perspective emphasizes that generalized trust or distrust must be analytically separated not only from “particularized” trust, but from interpersonal trust. I argue that relations of interpersonal trust amongst specific individuals are empirically relevant to political institutions.

The concept of social networks does not hold the same normative connotations that the concept of civil society does. The social network is simply a social structure with certain qualities: it is emergent rather than planned; social rather than strictly instrumental; trust-carrying rather than oppressive or built on threat; and consists of spontaneous cooperation rather than formal organization. If generalized trust helps democracy to work, it is interpersonal trust that makes institutions change.
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