The Value of Knowledge

Olsson, Erik J

Published in:
Philosophy Compass

2011

Link to publication

Citation for published version (APA):

General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal

Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.
The Value of Knowledge

Erik J. Olsson


Abstract: A problem occupying much contemporary epistemology is that of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. This paper provides an overview of this debate, starting with historical figures and early work. The contemporary debate in mainstream epistemology is then surveyed and some recent developments that deserve special attention are highlighted, including mounting doubts about the prospects for virtue epistemology to solve the value problem as well as renewed interest in classical and reliabilist-externalist responses.

1. Introduction

Everyone agrees that knowledge is a good thing to have. If you know which horse will win the race, you can bet on that horse and make a fortune; if you know all the answers to the teacher’s questions, you will pass the exam; and so on. Knowledge is clearly valuable in the sense of being conducive to successful practical action. Even philosophers, who disagree about many other things, don’t normally debate the proposition that knowledge is valuable. However, they do argue about another slightly different claim.

To set the stage, it is widely assumed that knowledge is something more than true belief.¹ Knowledge, it is believed, is true belief of a special kind. There is disagreement about what exactly distinguishes true belief that is knowledge from true belief that is not. Some people think that knowledge requires, beyond true belief, some sort of justification

---

¹ There are some notable exceptions to this rule. See, for instance, Levi The Enterprise of Knowledge; ‘Knowledge as True Belief’; Sartwell. Goldman holds that there is a weak sense of knowledge in which knowledge is just true belief but that there is also a stronger sense in which this is not so. See his Knowledge in a Social World.
or good reasons. They are often called internalists because the subject is required to be, in some sense, aware of the justification; it is something internal to the subject’s mind. Others think that knowledge requires that the true belief in question has been arrived at in a reliable way. This is the so-called reliabilist theory of knowledge, which is a kind of externalism since the knower is not required to be aware of the process leading up to her belief, or its reliability; they may very well be subject-external facts.\(^2\) Returning to the horse race, if you know which horse will win, you can place the bet and consider yourself a rich man or woman. But the same is true if you have a mere true belief about which horse will win, i.e. a belief which, although it is in fact true, falls short of being known to be true. For instance, you may lack good reasons for the belief, or you may have arrived at it in an unreliable manner. It suffices, then, to have a true belief about which horse will win to place the bet in question and collect the money. But if so, what we value is not really knowledge but only a part of it, namely true belief. But we do value knowledge; it is something distinctively valuable. Let us refer to the problem of resolving this conflict as the special value problem.

This is essentially Plato’s famous argument in the dialogue *Meno* to the effect that knowledge is no more valuable than true belief (opinion) with regard to its practical benefits. Plato took the example of going to Larissa, arguing that it wouldn’t matter whether you know where Larissa is or merely have a true belief about its location; either way you will get to Larissa. The problem, again, is that the conclusion clashes with what many philosophers think of as a fundamental epistemological intuition: that knowledge is something of special value.

To make matters even more complicated, most epistemologists, whether reliabilists or not, think that knowledge requires some additional condition, beyond justification or reliable acquisition, in order to solve the famous Gettier problem. The problem, in the simplest case, is that someone may justifiably believe something, and that something may be true, but the justification depends crucially on a false premise. In such cases, it is thought, the person lacks knowledge. Hence, we also need an anti-Gettier condition. This observation raises a further value problem: how can we account for the greater value of

---

\(^2\) Reliabilists can also formulate their view in terms of what sustains a belief, as opposed to how it originates. This complication is disregarded in the following.
having the anti-Gettier condition satisfied? In my terminology, the *general value problem* amounts to explaining the greater value of knowledge over lesser epistemic standings (true belief, justified true belief etc). When appropriate, I will let ‘the value problem’ cover both the special and the general value problem.

The purpose of this paper is partly to provide an overview of the value of knowledge debate, partly to indicate where I believe the most interesting and useful ideas are to be found. In section 2, some earlier, sometimes neglected, work is brought to the fore. Section 3 is concerned with the contemporary debate in mainstream epistemology, and section 4 discusses some recent developments that I take to represent particularly promising avenues for future inquiry.

2. Classical and early responses

Given the negative conclusion of the Larissa example, it may come as a surprise that Plato proceeds to let Socrates propose a way of solving the puzzle. Upon hearing the Larissa argument, Meno, understandably, begins to question whether knowledge and true belief differ at all. Socrates responds by drawing an amusing analogy with the statues of Daedalus:

> Socrates: If you have one of his works untethered, it is not worth much; it gives you the slip like a runaway slave. But a tethered specimen is very valuable, for they are magnificent creations. And that, I may say, has a bearing on the matter of true opinions. True opinions are a fine thing, and do all sorts of good as long as they stay in their place, but they will not stay long. They run away from a man’s mind; so they are not worth much until you tether them by working out the reason. That process, by dear Meno, is recollection, as we agreed earlier. Once they are tied down, they become knowledge, and are stable. That is why knowledge is something more valuable than right opinion. What distinguishes one from the other is the tether.  

Thus, the proposal is that knowledge is better than mere true belief because knowledge is more stable than mere true belief. A true belief that is a case of knowledge is more likely to stay put than a true belief that is not. Plausible as this may sound, Plato fails to explain,

---

3 The special and general value problems are sometimes referred to as the primary and secondary problem, e.g. in Pritchard ‘Recent Work on Epistemic Value’.

4 Quoted from Kvanvig *The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding* 13.
in terms attractive to the modern mind, why it is that a true belief that is known is more stable. As indicated in the passage just quoted, Plato tried to account for this in terms of his antiquated theory of recollection.

While Plato’s contribution to the debate has been widely acknowledged, indeed as seminal, this hardly goes for Kant’s. And yet there is a lucid discussion at the end of the Critique of Pure Reason bearing directly on the problem at hand. As a preliminary, Kant distinguishes judgments that are valid for everyone (provided only the person is ‘in possession of reason’) from those that have their ground only in the special character of the subject. The former are called ‘conviction’, the latter ‘persuasion’. Knowledge, for Kant, is essentially true belief that is based on conviction (in this special sense). Kant now proceeds to make the following interesting remark: ‘I cannot assert anything, that is, declare it to be a judgment necessarily valid for everyone, save as it gives rise to conviction’. Persuasion, by contrast, ‘has only private validity, and the holding of it to be true does not allow of being communicated’. The key idea, in modern terminology, is that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief in being communicable. If you know that p, you may assert that p, thus (in normal circumstances) making others believe that p as well. This may not be of extra value to you, the asserter, but it is likely to be of extra value to your community (again, in normal circumstances). Knowledge, then, has an added social value.

An early reliabilist account of the value of knowledge can be found in David Armstrong’s 1973 book. The context is a discussion of the proper level at which to describe the situation under which the belief in question was formed. In Armstrong’s terminology, ‘A’ denotes a subject who has attained knowledge about the temperature through consulting a thermometer, and ‘H’ a specification of the subject’s condition and the circumstances under which the belief was acquired. The issue is how specific H should be (original emphasis). According to Armstrong,

what is wanted is a thermometer which will register correctly in a variety of conditions. But in order to ensure this, the conditions in which it gives a correct reading must not be specified too closely. Indeed, the more unspecific these are, then, all other things being equal, the more useful the thermometer will be … The same sort of considerations apply in the case of non-inferential knowledge. There is a sense in which knowledge is a pragmatic concept. Why are we interested in the distinction between

Kant Critique of Pure Reason 645-652.
knowledge and mere true belief? Because the man who has mere true belief is unreliable. He was right this time, but if the same sort of situations crops up again he is likely to get it wrong … But if it is empirically impossible or even very unlikely that the same situation will crop up again, then the distinction loses almost all its point … So I think it is fair to put the following restriction on H. H must not be so specified that the situation becomes unique, or for all practical purposes unique. H must be such that the situation has some real probability or at least possibility of being repeated. And, all other things being equal, the less specific H is the greater the ‘value’ of A’s knowledge, because this increases the probability of repetition (173).

The suggestion is, in its essence, that if you have knowledge, you have mastered a reliable method which doesn’t merely give you the truth now, but which you can use repeatedly to get more true beliefs and knowledge in response to problems and questions that arise in the future.

A further interesting earlier work in this area is Kaplan’s article from 1985. Kaplan’s starting point is the claim that what makes an epistemological problem important is the extent to which solving the problem succeeds in ‘advancing or clarifying the state of the art of inquiry’ (354). Solving the Gettier problem, e.g. by requiring that knowledge must not depend on false premises, does not advance our understanding of inquiry in this sense, or so Kaplan thinks. Therefore, the anti-Gettier clause, while part of our conception of knowledge, fails to add value. Thus, a negative answer to the general value problem is implicit in Kaplan’s paper.

There are reasons to think, however, that Kaplan is mistaken, and that a positive solution may be extracted from his argumentation. The crucial part in the paper is where Kaplan notes that one person X may consider herself justified in her true belief, although from where another person, Y, is standing X’s justification relies crucially on a false assumption. In such a case it would still be appropriate for Y to criticize X’s argument for the claim in question. This observation seems to open up the possibility of the anti-Gettier clause adding value in the sense of contributing to the dialectic immunity of a person’s true beliefs. (There is an intriguing connection here to Kant’s claim that knowledge must be based on grounds that are valid for every reasonable person.) Be that as it may. We now proceed to the more recent discussion.

3. The contemporary debate
It is fair to say that the value of knowledge was long not considered to be a central epistemological concern until it emerged, in the late 90s, as the central problem of a new research program occupying epistemologists like Sosa, Kvanvig, Zagzebski, Axtell, Jones and Swinburne.\(^6\) Other authors followed, e.g. Greco, Riggs and Pritchard, marking what Riggs has described as a ‘value turn in epistemology’.\(^7\) Another noticeable work is Kvanvig (2003) which is a useful introductory text – with the caveat that classical and early responses to the value problem are dismissed already in the first chapter for reasons that, at least by my lights, are not always compelling.

The starting point for much deliberation in this new movement was the discovery that reliabilism seems particularly ill-equipped to deal with the special value problem. Indeed, the latter was taken to be something of a knockdown argument against reliabilism. (One rarely finds knockdown arguments against anything in philosophy, whence the excitement.) There is some irony in all this considering the fact that Armstrong, an arch reliabilist, was probably the first modern author to present a distinct and striking solution to the special value problem. Armstrong’s proposal would go largely unnoticed until just recently, a point that I will return to in the next section.

Why, then, does reliabilism seem particularly unpromising in this regard? Reliabilism, in its simplest form, states that knowledge equals reliably acquired true belief. The reasoning, also called the *swamping argument*, runs as follows: Reliable belief acquisition is something valuable because if a belief is reliably acquired it is most likely true. Thus we supposedly value reliable belief acquisition only because the fact that a belief was reliably acquired is an indication of the truth of that belief. But this means that, if a belief is already assumed true, then adding that it was reliably produced doesn’t make it more valuable. In other words, once true belief is in place, reliable acquisition fails to add value. In this sense, the value of true belief seems to ‘swamp’ the value of reliable acquisition, to use Kvanvig’s terminology. It would follow that reliabilist knowledge is

\(^6\) See, for instance, Sosa ‘Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue; Kvanvig *The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind* and ‘Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know’; Zagzebski; Axtell; Jones; Swinburne.

\(^7\) See Greco ‘Agent Reliabilism’; Riggs ‘Reliability and the Value of Knowledge’ and ‘The Value turn in Epistemology’; Pritchard ‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck’.
no more valuable than mere true belief.\textsuperscript{8} The argument is more general than it seems and carries over to internalist theories of knowledge that view justification as valuable solely because it indicates the truth of the belief in question.\textsuperscript{9}

The second characteristic feature of the new movement is that some form of virtue epistemology is by leading practitioners taken to be the most plausible answer to the value problem. What, then, is virtue epistemology? The key strategic insight is that the special value problem could be solved if it could be shown that reliable belief acquisition has some value in itself, over and above the fact that such acquisition indicates the truth of the resulting belief. This may not seem very plausible for reliable belief acquisition in general, whence the move to restrict belief acquisitions leading to knowledge to those that involve the use of intellectual virtues. For virtues seem to be just the kind of thing whose exercise could be considered valuable in itself. There are different views on what counts as an intellectual virtue, but accurate perception, reliable memory and various kinds of good reasoning are usually assumed to belong to that category.\textsuperscript{10} In the terminology of some, but by no means all, authors, exercising an intellectual virtue makes the agent worthy of credit.\textsuperscript{11} No such credit pertains to the acquisition of mere true belief. Hence, knowledge – in the virtue epistemological sense – is more valuable than mere true belief.

One rather obvious problem with virtue epistemology is that it seems to give the wrong result when applied to Gettier examples, which are precisely cases in which a virtuous agent, having done everything by the book, falls short of knowing for some reason that is outside her control. Take Goldman’s fake barn case for example:\textsuperscript{12} Henry believes that there is a barn over there because he sees a barn from the front while driving through an unfamiliar countryside, unaware that people who wish to appear affluent have erected many fake barns that look just like real barns from the road. In fact, Henry is attending to the only real barn in the area. So Henry’s belief is true and it has been formed through accurate perception which, we agreed, is an intellectual virtue. It would follow from virtue epistemology that Henry possesses knowledge. And yet,

\textsuperscript{8} See Jones 426 for a clear early statement of the swamping problem, though not under that name.
\textsuperscript{9} For more on this, see Olsson ‘Reliabilism, Stability, and the Value of Knowledge’ 344.
\textsuperscript{10} Greco ‘Virtues in Epistemology’ 287.
\textsuperscript{11} See Riggs ‘Reliability and the Value of Knowledge’; Greco ‘Knowledge as Credit for True Belief’.
\textsuperscript{12} Goldman ‘Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge’.
epistemologists (almost) unanimously think that Henry doesn’t know that there is a barn over there. Why not? Well, he could just as well have formed a corresponding belief while attending to one of the fake barns, in which case that belief would have been false. That seems somehow unsatisfactory. It is tempting to draw the conclusion that virtue epistemology, too, needs an anti-Gettier clause. If so, then the problem remains to explain (a) what that condition should look like and, no less importantly, (b) why invoking it adds value.

Notwithstanding the intuitive severity of this objection, several virtue epistemologists, among them Sosa and Greco think that their view can deal with Gettier problems without the need for an additional anti-Gettier condition. Greco, for instance, makes a distinction between (a) a belief’s being true and virtuously formed, and (b) a belief’s being true because virtuously formed. The correct virtue theoretic account of knowledge should make use of the second clause, in which case it can, says Greco, respond to Gettier problems. For instance, Henry’s belief that there is a barn over there, while true and virtuously formed, is supposedly not true because virtuously formed. Here one could object that the belief is true because the proposition in question is true, and (disregarding some abnormal cases) that’s not because of any cognitive act performed by the subject. In particular, no proposition is true because of any exercise of the subject’s intellectual virtues. Hence, no belief is true because virtuously formed. Greco sometimes formulates his solution somewhat differently in terms of ability or virtue being relative to an environment. Judged from that perspective, Henry doesn’t know because he lacks a relevant perceptual ability relative to the barn façade environment. It should be noted, however, that a similar move is open to the reliabilist, who could argue just as well that reliability is relative to the environment. Indeed, Goldman’s invocation of ‘local’ reliability can be seen as an attempt in this direction. From that point of view, Henry doesn’t know because the process he uses, while reliable in a global (environment-independent) sense, fails to be so in a local (environment-dependent) sense.

---

13 See Sosa A Virtue Epistemology; Greco ‘The Value Problem’.
14 See Greco ‘The Value Problem’ 319.
15 I owe this point to an editor of this journal.
16 See Greco ‘The Value Problem’ 320 and for discussion Kvanvig ‘Responses to Critics’.
17 Goldman Epistemology and Cognition 44-51.
Another type of objection to virtue epistemology centers on the observation that it appears that one can possess knowledge without deserving any credit for acquiring the true belief in question. Jennifer Lackey takes the example of a person, Morris, arriving at the train station in Chicago wishing to obtain directions to the Sears Towers. As a matter of fact, the person Morris approaches, the first adult passer-by he sees, is knowledgeable about the area and gives him the directions he requires. In this case, we would say that Morris now knows the directions, although he did preciously little to acquire that knowledge. Rather than acknowledging Morris, we are inclined to credit the passer-by. Pritchard rightly objects to Lackey’s conclusion by pointing out that Morris (or ‘Jenny’ in Pritchard’s version of the example) still deserves some credit for the belief about the directions: to his merit, Morris, in approaching an adult rather than, say, a child did exercise some discretion in the selection of an informant. Hence, so long as virtue epistemology doesn’t require that the knower deserve a whole lot of credit, the Morris example is inconclusive.18

A lot of ingenuity has gone into this debate, and many of the fine distinctions invoked and elaborate variations proposed have not been covered in this short survey of current mainstream thinking. Yet, it is becoming gradually clear, I believe, that invoking virtue epistemology in order to account for the extra value of knowledge is not as straightforward as some practitioners initially believed. Since there seems to be no obvious alternative theory, some authors, e.g. Kvanvig and Pritchard, have concluded that knowledge does not have extra value after all. Such doubts are more common regarding the general value problem than regarding the special value problem. Thus Kvanvig believes that the special value problem can be satisfactorily solved, e.g., by invoking virtue epistemology, but that knowledge is simply not distinctively valuable in the more general sense. Fortunately, there is, in his view, another intellectual good, namely understanding, which is distinctively valuable, suggesting that epistemologists should focus more of their efforts on understanding and less on knowledge.19

4. Some recent developments

18 See Lackey; Pritchard ‘The Value of Knowledge’.
19 See Kvanvig The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding and ‘The Value of Understanding’. See Haddock, Millar and Pritchard for a recent exchange between Kvanvig and his critics.
Well-known advocates of some form of reliabilism include not only David Armstrong but also Fred Dretske and Alvin Goldman, i.e. some of the most influential and respectable figures in modern philosophy.\textsuperscript{20} Moreover, the fact that it has been intensely debated since the 1970s testifies to its central position in analytic epistemology. Although virtue epistemology, too, has its share of distinguished advocates, most notably Ernest Sosa, it is fair to say that it does not have the same standing in modern epistemological thought. The question therefore naturally arises whether reliabilism could somehow be ‘saved’. Perhaps the resources available for reliabilism to cope with the value problem have been underestimated.

The natural point of departure for those who find this project attractive is Armstrong’s old proposal according to which reliabilist knowledge comes with the benefit of repetition. If you have reliabilist knowledge, you have by definition employed a reliable method. If the method is not narrowly specified, it may be used more than once, thus producing more true beliefs on future occasions. This outcome is less likely to materialize if the method was unreliable, for then it is less likely that future beliefs will be true. It seems therefore that reliabilism, contrary to common belief, has no problem whatsoever with the value issue, and that the celebrated swamping problem was a mere illusion.

Still it must be remembered that Armstrong stated his proposal in very concise terms, leaving some obvious objections unanswered. For example, no added value in this sense arises if the problem was a ‘one shot’ problem, or if the method at some point ceases to be reliable. At the very least, the conditions under which Armstrong’s proposal works need to be made explicit. Many of these remaining concerns are addressed in Goldman and Olsson ‘Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge’. In their view, knowledge has a surplus value in the following sense:

\textsuperscript{20} See e.g. Dretske; Goldman ‘Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge’ and \textit{Epistemology and Cognition}. F. P. Ramsey, a further prominent figure, seems to have been the first to articulate a reliabilist theory of knowledge. See Olsson ‘F. P. Ramsey on Knowledge and Fallibilism’ for a discussion of Ramsey’s contribution.
The probability that S will have more true beliefs in the future (of similar type) is higher conditional on S’s knowing (in the reliabilist sense) that p than conditional on S’s merely believing truly that p.

They now submit that what makes (CP) true in our world is the fact that a number of empirical regularities hold:

Non-uniqueness: once you encounter a problem of a certain type, you are likely to face other problems of the same type in the future
Cross-temporal access: a method that was used once is often available when similar problems arise in the future
Learning: a method that was unproblematically employed once will tend to be employed again on similar problems in the future
Generality: a method that is (un)reliable in one situation is likely to be (un)reliable in other similar situations in the future

Under these conditions a reliable method will be used repeatedly so as to produce more true beliefs. Goldman and Olsson call this solution to the special value (swamping) problem the conditional probability solution. In another paper, Olsson extends the conditional probability solution to an argument for a modern version of Plato’s thesis that knowledge is more stable than mere true belief.

The conditional probability solution was developed by Olsson, whereas Goldman put forward another, independent, approach in the same paper. The solution Goldman offered has two elements: type-instrumentalism and value autonomization. The swamping

---

21 The kind of added value that pertains to reliabilist knowledge is “indicator value”, i.e. the value something has in virtue of indicating something good. Cf. Zimmermann (2002). For criticisms of the conditional probability solution, see Werning; Kvanvig ‘The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist’; Jäger. The theory is defended in Olsson ‘Knowledge, Truth, and Bullshit’, ‘In Defense of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Swamping Problem’ and forthcoming; and in Olsson and Jönsson.

22 A central issue is the question of whether the value problem involves relationships that are universal and necessary. Is knowledge sometimes and some places better? Always and everywhere? Of Necessity? These issues are crucial to the conditional probability solution, and to other similar proposals. See Goldman and Olsson, especially 30-31; Kvanvig ‘The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist’; Olsson ‘Reply to Kvanvig on the Swamping Problem’.

23 Olsson ‘Reliabilism, Stability, and the Value of Knowledge’.
argument presupposes, in Goldman’s view, a token-instrumentalist account of surplus value, meaning that whatever value is contained in a token (i.e. concrete) reliable process derives wholly from the singular causal fact relating the token process to its token belief output. Goldman believes that there is also a second way in which value instrumentalism may proceed, namely via type-instrumentalism. The main idea is that a token process inherits value from its associated token type. This value goes beyond the value that the token process has in virtue of the fact that it produced a true belief on the particular occasion in question. The thought behind value autonomization is, roughly, that a type of process that regularly produces something valuable, such as true belief, may eventually be considered valuable in itself, which would explain why we consider reliabilist knowledge more valuable than mere true belief.24

The Platonic view that a true belief that qualifies as knowledge is more stable than a true belief that fails in this regard is defended by Timothy Williamson in his influential book *Knowledge and Its Limits*. However, Williamson rejects the reliabilist analysis of knowledge; indeed he repudiates any attempt to define knowledge in terms of something else. Knowledge, in his view, should be taken as a primitive concept in epistemological theorizing. Williamson’s theory about stability has been criticized by Kvanvig.25 Another objection has been leveled recently by Sherrilyn Roush, who maintains that what gives knowledge a surplus value is not stability but that ‘it makes the bearer more likely to maintain an appropriate belief state – possibly non-belief – through time and changing circumstances’ (‘The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Survival’ 255). Roush’s paper provides a game-theoretical justification for the surplus survival value resulting from satisfying externalist conditions characteristic of truth-tracking accounts of knowledge.26 Probabilistically rendered, these conditions state that the probability that the subject believes that p given that p is true should be high, as should the probability that the subject does not believe that p given that p is false. The result is that the tracking conditions strictly dominate (will always beat for survival) any other possible conditions for knowledge that go beyond true belief. Drawing on evolutionary considerations,

24 For criticism, see Pillar; Werning; Kvanvig ‘The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist’. For a recent defense, see Goldman ‘Replies to Discussants’.
25 Kvanvig *The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding* ch. 1.
26 Nozick; Roush *Tracking Truth*. 
Markus Werning too tries to explain the surplus value of externalist (reliabilist) knowledge in terms of survival value. By contrast, the main idea behind Klemens Kappel’s expressivist account is that ‘saying that a belief is known rather than merely believed with some justification is to insist that further inquiry is pointless and that the possibility that p is false should be discounted in practical deliberation’ (189). This is a good thing because it relieves the inquirer of the cost of further inquiry. Kappel takes his proposal to be largely compatible with reliabilism.27

Given the recent revival of Plato’s ideas, one may wonder whatever happened to Kant’s social approach. Kant, we recall, claimed that knowledge is communicable via testimony in ways that ignorance (non-knowledge) is not. If you know, you have the license to make an assertion, thus transmitting your true belief to others to the benefit of society at large. The knowledge account of assertion has been defended by, among others, Williamson and DeRose.28 The work of Welbourne as well as that of Kusch should be consulted in connection with the social value of knowledge.29 Obligatory reading also includes Craig’s innovative essay Knowledge and the State of Nature.

5. Conclusion

The problem of accounting for the distinctive value of knowledge is a hotly debated one in current epistemology. It was long thought that reliabilism is obviously impotent in this regard, and that some form of virtue epistemology could do better. This seems now increasingly disputable. Instead, there is renewed interest in reliabilism and other externalist theories and the extent to which they can deal satisfactorily with the matter given the resources they have at their disposal. Classical and early responses have been invoked in this connection, including responses focusing on stability and repeatability. Many questions are still open, like the problem of how, if possible, to account for the

27 Werning; Kappel.
28 Williamson; DeRose.
29 Welbourne The Community of Knowledge and Knowledge; Kusch. The latter contains many interesting ideas as well as references to relevant work outside philosophy.
added value of anti-Gettier clauses in the context of reliabilism. Also, a detailed and systematic account of the social value of knowledge remains to be fully articulated.  

References


30 I would like to thank an editor of this journal and two referees for their many valuable suggestions.


Lackey, J. ‘Why We Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know.’ *Synthese* 157 (2007): 345-361.


