Participatory Sense-Making for Integration Practices and Policies*

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Abstract: In this presentation, I continue previous work on extracting consequences for the design of integration policies from research on participatory sense-making in cognitive science. Participatory sense-making was introduced in cognitive science in the early 21st century. The idea, roughly, is that social understanding consists in mutually inclusive social face-to-face real-time participation in pursuit of joint activities. I mean to unpack the concept of participatory sense-making to the end, specifically, of proving it relevant for integration policies and practice. I argue that modelling integration policies on participatory sense-making is instrumental to consolidate a sense of community and mutual respect for others and norms for how to live together.

1. Introduction

Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel A. Di Paolo (2007) introduced the concept ‘participatory sense-making’ in an attempt to show how real-time face-to-face social interaction is constitutive of and not only contextual or instrumental for social understanding (cf. De Jaegher et al. 2010; Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009).

The guiding idea, in a nutshell, is as follows. Social understanding (understanding others’ beliefs, emotions, intentions, and so on, and the pragmatic significance of behaviour) is an achievement within processes of social interaction pursued by two or more individuals. Interaction is social only if involved parties are autonomous—each is free to regulate its own activities—and each party regulates its activities with an aim to generate or sustain engagement with the other(s). If, in the process, someone’s autonomy is broken or significantly reduced (e.g., coercion), the interaction ceases to be social at that point. As opposed to the individual case—where one party alone is trying to make sense of some phenomenon—sense-making is participatory when two or more parties together regulate their engagement so as to together make sense of each other or some phenomenon. Participatory sense-making, then, is social interaction where each party autonomously is moved by and move each other’s sense-making activities. When this happens, it is said that the interaction process gains an autonomy of its own in the space of relational dynamics: the constant unfolding of mutually moving-and-being-moved-by the interaction process means that now the interaction process, and not only engaged parties, regulate the sense-making. This means that none of the engaged parties could reach the resulting sense-making alone and in abstraction from the social interaction. That is why it is claimed that the resultant social understanding consists in mutually participatory social real-time face-to-face social interaction.

Now, an obvious question is this: What does this have to do with values, norms and integration policies and their design? I think there are important lessons to be made here:

- for how to think about ethics and design of integration policies such that they may consolidate a sense of community and mutual respect among parties,
- for the realization among parties of a feel that values and norms are not something exogenously imposed or to one-sidedly assimilate to, but are rather something of shared labour; something mutually participated in the making of,

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for how to prevent a sense of exclusion among immigrant groups and mutual antipathies between immigrants and non-immigrants.

How to extract those lessons, and what they may be, is exactly what I will talk about for the rest of this presentation. To my knowledge, these implications have been largely neglected, apart from my own first steps in that direction (e.g., Lo Presti 2018).

But first of all, I want to say something about what this new approach to social understanding—in terms of participatory sense-making—is a reaction against; what it sets itself in contrast and opposition to. Seeing those contrasts will bring to light, in what follows, problematic implicit assumptions that feed certain predominant integration practice- and policy-types.

2. Contrasting approaches to social understanding

The new participatory approach to social understanding is contrasted to two main contenders. One is the so-called Theory of Mind theory (ToMT), and the other is simulation theory (ST).

According to ToMT (e.g., Baron Cohen 1995; Gopnik & Metzloff 1997; Gordon 2008, p. 220), understanding others is a theoretically structured individual activity. First you observe the behaviour of an other (e.g., the other is running towards the train station). Then you make an analogical inference to what you yourself might want, believe and intend if you are running towards the train station (e.g., you intend to catch a train and believe that it is departing shortly). Third, you use the output of that inference as input for understanding the other (e.g., the other believes s/he is late for a train...). On this approach, what you need to learn in order to understand others is a set of concepts, such as ‘belief,’ ‘desire’ and ‘intention,’ and inferential moves that function as rules for attributing specific beliefs, desires, and so on, which play the role of reasons for explaining and predicting their behaviour.

According to ST (e.g., Gallese & Goldman 1998; Goldman 2005), social understanding is a capacity to put yourself in the other’s “mental shoes” by running a simulation. This is a direct, implicit and sub-personal process, as opposed to ToMT. Specifically, neural mirroring systems (Gallese 2005, 2007), so called “mirror neurons,” are claimed to underpin our simulation of each other’s inner lives. To keep the story as to how short, mirror neurons function by activating motoric systems when an other is observed in a specific situation—the observer experiences as if he or she is in the observed other’s situation, at least to the extent that the observer will feel a preparedness to act based on information about the other’s situation. The output of a functioning neural mirroring system’s processing of perceptual input contains information about the other as if you were the other, and this information is used to build a model that, on this approach, is a simulation of the other and to that extent constitutes social understanding.

As can be seen from these short summaries, ToMT and ST both construe encounters between parties to social understanding as quite detached. Processes of social interaction and mutual engagement between parties play, at best, a peripheral role in social understanding. Also, both are committed to methodological individualism. That is, social understanding is something that goes on inside individual minds or brains. Moreover, both implicitly adhere, to various degrees, to versions of the old philosophical view that the core conundrum of interpersonal understanding lies in the fact that individuals have access only to outward behaviour which is an opaque surface behind which lies hidden inner lives. On that metaphysical assumption, it is no surprise that also solutions to the problem of understanding others are sought within isolated individual minds (theoretical capacities or simulations, as the case might be).

The participatory approach to social understanding turns out to clearly contrast to ToMT and ST in at least the following three important respects.
First, the participatory approach conceives of social understanding not as theoretical in structure (as in ToMT) nor as spectatorial and simulationist (as in ST). The participatory approach emphasises that social understanding has its foundation in practical know-how (cf. Ryle 1949) to navigate social relational dynamics that emerge in, and only in, mutual autonomous participation in the pursuit of joint activities. Practical know-how is implicit in abilities to act appropriately in response to changing contingencies. In fact, on the participatory approach, meanings and norms are enacted and embodied in interaction; not in individuals in isolation (whatever that could possibly mean) nor in the world in abstraction from social interaction (whatever that could possibly mean). This is important. For what is to be understood—meanings and norms—is enacted in the concrete context of participation in live situations. Thus, individuals do not encounter each other in a situation of pre-determined norms and meanings—abstracting, here, from histories of social interaction with which relatively stable norms for specific situations have been established. But also in cases of relatively stable pre-existing norms, the relational dynamics of social encounters may lead parties to negotiate and modulate their engagement, enacting new norms for their here-and-now. This means that what is to be understood as well as the how of understanding it is embodied in the encounter. Were individuals unilaterally to bring prejudices about others and correctness for the encounter to bear as strict rules, the prediction is that mutuality and autonomy will collapse and the encounter end up non-social.

Second, the participatory approach, in contrast to ToMT and ST, is not methodologically individualist. It looks to interaction dynamics as autonomous in the sense that though engaged parties regulate their participation, social interactions regulate the evolution of interaction; hence also the evolution of meanings and norms. This means that explanations of why people interact as they do, or why some norms rather than others are enacted, cannot, not even ideally, be given in terms only of individual behaviours or beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on. Such explanations must incorporate the interaction dynamics as constitutive of the enactment, evolution and negotiation of meanings and norms.

Third, precisely because the participatory approach focuses on the micro-level of everyday face-to-face encounters in seeking to understand the enactment, evolution and negotiation of meanings and norms it also furnishes a novel bottom-up account of those phenomena. Thus, consider norms for, e.g., whether to greet someone with handshakes in a given social group. Sometimes it is said, e.g., “In Sweden we shake hands when we greet each other,” conveying that that is norm in our society; that it is correct and something one should do, on pains of social sanctions. Such a claim may be a fairly accurate snapshot generalization; it may say something true about what today, in most situations, for most people, is considered appropriate. But, from the point of view of the participatory approach, such a claim—of which there are many instances that are relevant for integration and social understanding—is also misleading and detrimental to social understanding. The reason why is that there are indefinitely many everyday situation in which acting in accordance with the claimed norm would be considered incorrect. For instance, should the person who was told about handshakes being the norm shake hands with staff at the supermarket when they say hello? What about the bus driver? What about cases where you greet someone from the other side of the street? Or what about saying hello to people who are remote acquaintances? If this newcomer to our society were truly to uphold the general norm to shake hands when greeting then, quite likely, he or she would end up acting in ways that many people would consider odd, at best. And the participatory approach has a straightforward answer why that is, and a solution to the problem. The answer is that what the newcomer really needs to learn is not snapshot generalized directives. To navigate his or her new social environments, the newcomer rather needs, first of all, and to avoid misunderstandings, to be invited to mutually participate in face-to-face real-time social encounters in this society. In contrast to this, ToMT would say that what the newcomer needs to do is to learn how to reason and infer “hidden inner mental states” from the observed behaviours of others. And ST would say that what the newcomer needs to do is observe others act in various situations and hopefully his or her sub-personal simulational neural system will do the rest. These latter proposals may
have some merit. But, importantly, they both conceive the newcomer as a passive receiver to be unilaterally assimilated to his or her new social environment, much like a shapeless, passive object, with no formative agency of its own, to be formed in ways fitting for a pre-existing structure of social significances, values and norms. The autonomy of the newcomer is, as it were, side-lined. He or she is allowed onto the field of everyday life first when he or she has proved knowledgeable enough about the rules of the game (rules that, on the participatory approach, are likely to be misleading).

For the rest of this talk, I argue that the participatory approach has important implications for how to conceive of integration policies and practices, such as, to repeat how I ended the first part:

- to think about ethics and design of integration policies such that they may consolidate a sense of community and mutual respect among parties,
- for the realization among parities of a feel that values and norms are not something exogenously imposed or to one-sidedly assimilate to, but are rather something of shared labour; something mutually participated in the making of,
- to prevent a sense of exclusion among immigrant groups and mutual antipathies between immigrants and non-immigrants.

Drawing those implication into the light of critical scrutiny is what I now want to end this talk with. In doing so, I will make critical points about alternative ways to think about integration policies and practices.

### 3. Integration Policy, Participatory Sense-Making and Two Problems for Top-Down Regulation: The Generalization and Content Problems

In this part, I introduce the participatory approach as an approach to integration policies and practices. To do so, I start from my earlier work on these issues, because, to my knowledge at least, implications for integration policies and practices have not previously been traced. I will identify two problems for non-participatory, so-called “top-down” approaches. In the next section I identify three more problems. Then, finally, I will say something about how the participatory approach handles those problems.

In my book *Att Förstå Social Förståelse: En Filosofisk Undersökning av Social Förståelse och Integration* (roughly based on results in my doctoral dissertation *Norms in Social Interaction* from 2015; cf. Lo Presti 2016a/b) I propose an ethically defensible and democratic design of integration policies. In that book, I am critical of so-called top-down designs; designs that simply assume that there are general norms and values that can, not to mention should, be taught to newcomers in classroom fashion.

To illustrate how integration practices and policies may go wrong as well as how they may rather be successful, the book departs from a fairly recent real-life event: the so-called refugee crisis of 2015, and how the reception of arriving immigrants played out at Malmö central station during autumn that year. The gist of the argument I pursued was that—based on recent research in cognitive science, specifically on social cognition—a top-down policy, in order to be instrumental for social understanding, should ameliorate possibilities for face-to-face social encounters that enact and negotiate meanings and norms. That is, if long-term mutual social understanding and respect for genuinely *shared* values, meaning and norms is the goal, then real-life face-to-face social encounters between immigrant and non-immigrant groups must be facilitated. That, at least, is what the participatory approach recommends.

Suppose, instead, the chosen policy is to disseminate a so-called “code of conduct” to immigrants (a proposal that has been made in Sweden). The way I understand it, this would be done by sending out information from authorities to be taught in a classroom fashion. The idea, it would seem, is the intuitive one, that there *are* norms and values that are non-negotiable, at least in the sense that an expanded realm
of social encounters between different groups must not change them. For instance, we might cherish values such as freedom of religion and freedom of speech as ones we are not prepared—and perhaps ought not be prepared—to negotiate. Now, I think we should be prepared to agree with the intuition. That is, some norms or values might be non-negotiable (at least among us, and for an unforeseeable time). However, I also think it is a good idea to distinguish between, on the one hand, norms encoded in and enforced by law and, on the other, norms we live by within the framework of law and which are rarely or never explicitly coded (Lo Presti 2019; cf. Brinck 2015). Let me linger on this distinction a bit.

Norms explicitly encoded as rules and enforced by law can be compared to rules constitutive of games. For example, if you don’t know that you cannot legally move a tower diagonally in a game of chess then you don’t know how to play chess. If you make an illegal move you simply don’t play the game according to rules defining it. The rules are constitutive of the game being the game it is. It is not just that you are doing something inappropriate if you violate them; rather, you are not playing a legal game. Similarly, you cannot score a legal goal in soccer by throwing the ball with your hands. It simply doesn’t constitute a goal, according to the rules of the game. These are constitutive rules (cf. Searle 1969; 2015). But, and in contrast, there is an indefinite range of behaviours open to you while nevertheless remaining within the rules that constitute the framework for what counts as playing. For example, the rules of chess say nothing about loud and demonstrative yawning, or spitting in your hand, or flirting with someone in the audience (at least, I don’t know of any such rules, and if there are then you may construe your own example). Yet for all behaviours on which constitutive rules are silent, the issue may arise whether the behaviour is appropriate or not. Thus, it may be inappropriate to yawn loudly and demonstratively in a game of chess even if you’re still playing a legal game. Let us call the latter norms regulative (cf. ibid). To use a last example for purposes of illustration, consider rules for driving. There are clearly defined legally enforced rules for driving a car—such as have to do with, e.g., speed limits. These rules define, i.e., are constitutive of, what counts as legal driving. But within the framework of legally defined constitutive rules there is an indefinite range of behaviours the appropriateness of which may be an issue—such as have to do with, e.g., how loud music to play. Norms for many of these behaviours may not be—and likely are not—explicitly encoded anywhere.

Now then, to return to the issue of integration policies and practices, the point I want to emphasise is the following. However sanguine we may be about legally enforced and explicitly encoded rules—such as those that secure freedom of speech—and however important it is that newcomers to a society know about such rules, still, to believe that teaching those rules is what social integration requires is at best to mislead ourselves. The reason is that those rules only—however importantly—define fringe standards for how to judge a behaviour as legal or not. That is, they only—however importantly—tell a newcomer to society what not to do to act legally. But within the legal framework defined by those rules there remains an indefinite sea of standards of appropriateness—regulative norms—that dynamically evolve over time and vary across social settings. These norms practically cannot be taught in classroom fashion or disseminated as some kind of list as codes of conduct, for reasons already argued. The dynamics of social encounters in real-time face-to-face encounters within which alone, on the participatory approach, meaning and norms are enacted, and evolve and change, simply rule out such snapshot generalizations. Consider norms for handshakes today, in corona-times, compared to three years ago. Social and other contingencies make for changes to what we value, and how we live and act, accordingly as we consider it appropriate, in ways that are not amenable to snapshot generalizations provided by top-down generalized rules.

What I have just suggested is that there is a problem, first, with thinking of integration as the handing out of general rules; a problem that has to do with the in principle indefinite circumstances in which such rules are either silent or do not distinguish what is from what is not appropriate. Let us call this the Generalization Problem. And, secondly, I have pointed to a problem that has to do with what learning such rules does and does not teach you; they teach you what defines legal behaviour, which is
not the same as—as philosopher I would say “neither necessary nor sufficient for”—learning how to live with others according to shared norms in everyday life. Let us call this the Content Problem.

Before concluding with positive responses to the problems introduced, I want to present three further problems associated with thinking of integration practices and policies as a top-down teaching of codes of conduct. After that, I will briefly say something about how the participatory approach can handle the problems and why, on those grounds, the participatory approach should be at the table of advisors when integration policies are formulated and practically pursued.

4. The Authoritarian Fallacy, the Problem of Alienation, and the Conservativist Fallacy

In addition to the Generalization and Content problems, there are three further problems associated with the idea that integration and social understanding may be approached by way of providing top-down defined rules to be taught to newcomers to a society. The first has to do with the question who is in position to define what is norm in a society. The second has to do with the question for whom those norms are supposed to be binding. And the third concerns why or the justification of a certain set of norms and values being the correct ones. I will simply state the three problems first, and after that look at how the participatory approach helps us handle them.

To begin with, suppose we accept the idea that a society should handle integration by means of a centralized compilation of rules to be handed out and taught to newcomers to society. I call this a top-down approach.

A first obvious question and problem to be faced by a top-down approach is: Well, who precisely is in position to make such a compilation? I mean, who, in any society, can claim to know about or be an epistemic authority on society-wide norms and values? (We can weaken the requirement from “society-wide” to “accepted by a sufficient number of the population.”) The problem is that different groups in society live by different norms for their everyday being together while still being part of a common larger, legally (constitutionally) defined society. For instance, in my family we cherish certain political values, norms for how to greet each other, ideas about how best to preserve the environment (and beliefs about why that is important). Those values, norms and ideas may differ quite radically from those of people living next door or with whom we grew up in the same legally defined society, but converge much with those of people living far away and who grew up in a differently legally defined society. Indeed, even within a small family or group of friends, certain norms and values may differ more, in certain respects and at certain times, than with “outsiders.” Thus, the problem is who is the authority to find, interpret and compile norms and values in a society? It would seem that, because of the diversity and dynamics of norms in society, such authority cannot coherently be localised. I call the reasoning leading to this problem the Authoritarian Fallacy.

A second problem to face for a top-down approach for handing out and teaching norms and values to newcomers to a society is that it risks alienating newcomers from norms and values rather than facilitate integration. The reason is that newcomers would not be participants to the realization of norms and values for how to live. Norms and values will be exogenously imposed, not something newcomers through invitation and mutual participation in their new society are parties to; the norms and values do not result from shared labour. Thus, the risk is an experience of alienation as opposed to one of community and mutual respect: “those are not my norms!” and justifiably so, if you have not been invited to participate in their making. (Indeed, this is a two-way problem. For the strategy also risks alienating non-newcomers from newcomers, since the former, no more than the latter, participate in the joint enactment of norms and values for how to live together. Moreover, this can also be a problem in the dimension of citizen-authority interaction, if citizens are not invited to participate in the enactment of norms and values for how to live in their society.) I call this the Problem of Alienation.
The third problem I identify for a top-down approach to integration is a version of what in philosophy goes by the name “the naturalistic fallacy.” The naturalistic fallacy is the fallacy of inferring how something ought to be from premises that only state how something is. From a list of matter-of-factual premises, you must, at some point, introduce an evaluative premise, in order to infer an evaluative conclusion. A very unsophisticated example of the fallacy is to infer that someone should be considered to be of less worth because of the colour of his or her skin. Now, the third problem is what I call the Conservativist Fallacy. This is the fallacy of inferring from what has been considered to be appropriate or correct that it will or even should remain so. Thus, suppose we could indeed compile a list of values and norms that the major part of a population considers appropriate or correct. The fallacy is then to infer from that list that those values and norms will or should remain appropriate or correct through time, based on their now being so considered or having been so for some or for quite a long time (compare: slavery, human rights, gender roles). The problem in the context of integration practises and policies in particular is that norms and values in society change through time, and can do so quite quickly in any subgroup in society. For instance, I lived away from Sweden for five years. On my return, norms for how to hang out with friends (what days of the week, where, and so on) had changed. And during the year I have now lived here, many norms for everyday encounters have changed rather dramatically. Were I to resist the changes by reference to what used to be correct or appropriate, I would commit the conservativist fallacy. Scaling up from the level of individuals and small groups, there is a risk that top-down approaches to integration policies and practices will teach norms and values that no longer agree with norms and values as they have evolved in society, and in different parts of society (how often will such a list of norms and values be updated and, again, by whom for who?).

Now, I have only mentioned these problems for a top-down approach to norms and values and how integration is to be achieved. There are of course much detail and responses to these problems that I don’t have time to go into. Instead, I will close by considering how the participatory sense-making approach can respond to the problems.

5. Responses from the Participatory Sense-Making Approach to Integration Policies and Practices

We have five problems for the top-down approach. How does the participatory sense-making approach to integration policies and practices fare in face of these problems?

The first, Generalization Problem, was associated with the idea that integration can be handled by teaching general rules as “codes of conduct.” The problem was that general rules allow for in principle indefinite circumstances in which they do not apply or are silent on what is appropriate (think, for comparison, of all behaviours that are proper or improper in a game of chess while playing a legal game). On the participatory approach, norms and values are precisely not generalizations and ought not be taught in a top-down fashion. The reason is that the participatory approach takes the dynamics of social encounters between autonomous participants to be where norms and values for social interaction are enacted. Thus, the primary source of know-how to live together with others is mutual participation in the concrete context of shared activities. Generalized rules and directives may indeed aggravate such learning because of the indefinite range of behaviours and exceptions in everyday life on which those rules and directives give the wrong verdict or no verdict at all.

The second problem was the Content Problem. It is associated with what you do and do not learn from being told general rules. The problem here was that while such rules may, indeed, correctly teach you what defines legal behaviour, what is legal and not accounts only for a small part of contingencies you need to learn how to navigate in society; contingencies that, moreover, remain on the fringes of inclusion in society— inclusion in the weak sense of not acting illegally. On the participatory approach,
learning what is legal is indeed important. But to learn what is legal is not to learn norms and values for everyday social encounters in different situations, such as, e.g., standing distance in conversation, how to greet others, body language, and so on. To learn the latter requires participation (and to be invited as an autonomous participant in) the pursuit of everyday joint activities; which means being allowed to move and be moved by the dynamics of social encounters.

The third problem was the Authoritarian Fallacy; to think that there is some central authority in society that is in position to say what is and is not dominant norms and values while, instead, an inestimable number of norms and values may differ radically within any society. The problem then is who, if anyone, is in position to say what norms and values are dominant and, consequently, how to determine what norms and values newcomers to a society should be taught. Since the participatory approach says that the primary source of social understanding and norms and values is face-to-face real-time social interaction, it recommends decentralized integration policies and practices. Apart from knowledge about laws and the institutional organization of society, it is a mistake, and can even be misleading, to centrally compile a code of conduct for newcomers to be taught in abstraction form participation with others in everyday life. Thus, this approach does not assume that there are any generalized norms to be compiled to begin with; hence not a problem about who is to compile them.

The fourth problem was the Problem of Alienation: the problem that if you are told how to live, what norms and values to act in accordance with, in a top-down fashion, then there is a risk that rather than feeling included in society you experience alienation from its norms and values. The reason is that you have not been allowed the opportunity to autonomously and on equal grounds participate in enacting the norms and values you are supposed to live by. In a sense, you become a mere vessel to be filled with pre-determined ways of life to assimilate to. Now, the participatory approach deals with this by emphasizing that social understanding and enactment of norms and values is fundamentally participatory and mutual. That is, genuine social understanding and integration is to be achieved through participation between autonomous individuals. If that is allowed, a sense of community and mutual respect for norms and values thereby enacted is at least promoted. Top-down strategies, in contrast, risks being unilateral and assimilationist, treating newcomers as passive, non-participatory and non-autonomous.

The fifth and last problem was the Conservativist Fallacy; to infer from what norms and values are or have been accepted that they will or should remain in force. Specifically, this overlooks the fact that norms and values do, sometimes on short time-scales, change or dissolve, and do so in different parts of society at different times. So, unless we are prepared (per impossible) to constantly survey and reformulate what norms and values newcomers are supposed to be taught, the top-down approach risks remaining procrustean and monolithic; insensitive to change and progress, impenetrable and rigid. On the participatory approach, norms and values for everyday living together are rather fluid and dynamically negotiable on micro- and macro-timescales and cross-contextually within any given society. It allows, indeed promotes, individual freedom for bottom-up (we could say “grass root”) participatory enactment of norms and values. Since this approach does not recommend top-down regulation (apart from rules defined by law) it mitigates the risks of conservativist and authoritarianist fallacies in integration policy and practice. The participatory approach rather favours individual and group freedom for how to live together, with responsibility to mutually respect each other’s autonomy.

In summary, recent refocusing of research in cognitive science on social understanding, away from the individual mind and from static conceptions of norms and meaning and towards a participatory and dynamical approach, throws much needed light on what we need to do (and not to do) in order to make integration policies and practices ethically respectful and resilient. By their being resilient, I mean that they fortify a sense of community and mutual respect for norms and values, and prevent alienation. With respect to ethics, the participatory approach tells us that individuals ought to be free to on equal grounds participate in the enactment of norms, meanings and values to guide their everyday being together. This is an old idea: subjects are genuinely bound only by, i.e., responsible to, norms they autonomously
authoritatively acknowledge as binding (here, one thinks of Rousseau and Kant). But because the participatory approach emphasises exactly mutual participation, it also says that no one individual has the power individually to make him or herself bound or not bound by some norm simply by using his or her authority to take him or herself to be so. We are bound only by what we do. That is, it takes the autonomous activities of others, to complement those of any one, to decide what norms anyone actually is bound by (here, one thinks of Hegel’s social reaction to and complementation of Rousseau’s and Kant’s liberal ideas).

References